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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the development of the Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) thinking on Islamic 
law and international human rights and argues that the MB has exacerbated, rather than 
solved, tensions between the two in Egypt. The organisation and its scholars have drawn on 
hard-line juristic opinions and reinvented certain concepts from Islamic traditions in ways 
that limit the scope of various human rights and to advocate for Islamic alternatives to 
international human rights. The MB’s practices in opposition and in power, have been 
consistent with its literature. As an opposition party, it embraced human rights language in its 
struggle against an authoritarian regime, but advocated for broad restrictions on certain rights. 
Yet, its recent and short-lived experience in power provides evidence for its inclination to 
reinforce restrictions on religious freedom, freedom of expression and association, and the 
rights of religious minorities, and to reverse previous reforms related to women’s rights. I 
conclude that the peaceful management of political and religious diversity in society cannot 
be realised under the MB’s model of a shari‘a state. This thesis advocates for the drastic 
reformation of traditional Islamic law and state impartiality towards religion, as an alternative 
to the development of a shari‘a state or exclusionary secularism. This transformation is, 
however, contingent upon significant long-term political and socio-cultural change, and it is 
clear that successfully expanding human rights protection in Egypt requires not the exclusion 
of Islamists, but their transformation. Islamists still have a large constituency and they are not 
the only actors who are ambivalent about human rights. Meanwhile, Islamic law also appears 
to continue to influence Egypt’s law. I explore the prospects for certain constitutional and 
institutional measures to facilitate an evolutionary interpretation of Islamic law, provide a 
baseline of human rights and gradually integrate international human rights into Egyptian law.      
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Note on the Transliteration 
 
I have standardised the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJME) transliteration system, 
with few diacritical marks. Words that are anglicised, such as shari‘a, Qur’an, jihad and ijtihad are not 
italicised. All other Arabic anglicised words are italicised. I have used the English spellings of words 
that are most commonly used in the English-speaking world for the names of Egyptian and Arab 
politicians and public figures, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood’s General Guides and leaders.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1. Defining the Research Problem 
This thesis examines the way in which the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood (hereinafter 
MB) has developed on the relationship between Islamic law and human rights in Egypt. The 
Arab world1 has witnessed profound political transformation over the last five years. Since 
December 2010, massive popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt led to the ousting of two 
Arab authoritarian rulers and set in motion tumultuous political transitions elsewhere in the 
region, the outcomes of which remain uncertain.2 The common feature in all countries in the 
Arab world since the outset of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ is the unprecedented political 
influence of Islamists (Sadiki 2011; Tibi 2013b). Although political Islam did not lead the 
popular protests in Tunisia and Egypt, Islamists were ostensibly the first to benefit from 
them, by drawing on their organisational superiority and the weakness and division of liberal 
factions (Tibi 2013b; Mikail 2012; Bradly 2012).  
 
The MB enjoyed unprecedented political freedom in post-Mubarak Egypt and up to the 
removal of President Mohammed Morsi on 3 July 2013, and it was able to establish its 
political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (hereinafter, FJP) (Trager 2011:114-126). The 
MB became the leading political bloc in the 2012 Parliament, with one of its leaders elected 
as the President of Egypt on 18 June 2012. It also led the 2012 Constitution-making process. 
However, its experience in power was short-lived: President Morsi was deposed by the 
military on 3 July 2013, and the Islamist-backed Constitution was suspended following 
massive popular protests across Egypt against Morsi and the MB (Brown 2013). 3    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In this thesis, the Arab world refers to the 22 member states of the League of Arab States.     
2 For a critical evaluation of the Arab Spring, see Sadiki (2014), Brownlee et al (2015) and Achcar (2013).   
3 See Statement by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Commander-in-Chief of Egyptian Armed Forces and Minister of Defence 
and Military Production, Official Gazette no.26bis of 3 July 2013. 
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The rise of Islamist movements in many Muslim states4 has long triggered serious concerns 
among academics and human rights practitioners regarding their commitment to international 
human rights (Benard 2003; Scientific Council for Government Policy 2006; Emerson et al. 
2009).5 Islamism, or political Islam,6 as articulated by prominent Islamist ideologues, is 
centred on two key assumptions. The first assumption is that Islam mandates Muslims to 
establish the Islamic state, in which Islamic law regulates all aspects of the state and society. 
The second assumption is that determination of the normative content of shari‘a is only 
acceptable if it complies with the methods developed by the mainstream traditional Muslim 
jurists.7  
 
The assertion of these two assumptions as the authentic expression of Islam is, however, 
contested by other Muslim scholars (Tibi 2013a; An-Na‘im 1990; 2008). The institutional 
and social settings in which shari‘a developed and was applied during pre-modern Muslim 
governance are paradigmatically different from the modern nation state, and therefore the 
idea of incorporating shari‘a into it (Hallaq 2013). This has prompted many scholars to 
maintain that Islamism is a modern construction that cannot be seen as an extension of the 
tradition (Tibi 2012; Iqtidar 2011:39-40). An-Na‘im (2008:8) has held that ‘the notion of an 
Islamic state is in fact a postcolonial innovation based on a European model of the state’. In 
this thesis I use the term Islamic law to mean legal rules that are extracted from the Qur’an 
and Sunna, Islamic sources. The substance of these rules varies among Muslim jurists and 
scholars according to their different epistemological and methodological approaches to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In this thesis, Muslim states refer to states where the majority of populations are Muslims, members of the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC), or states that recognise Islam as their official religion or consider Islamic law an official source 
of domestic legislation in their constitutions.     
5 See the Journal of Democracy (2008:5-8).  
6 Islamism and political Islam are used interchangeably in this thesis.  
7 For a general discussion of the nature of Islamism and its distinctive features, see Tibi (2012).   
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Islamic sources. The diversity of opinions on what constitutes Islamic law opens the 
relationship between Islam and human rights to significant contestation and evolution. 
 
Some scholars express pessimistic attitudes towards Islamist movements’ responses to human 
rights and liberal democracy (Huntington 1996: 192-198; Tibi 2008; Haqqani 2013). This 
pessimism has been influenced by previous experiences of governance in the name of Islam 
in particular Muslim states such as Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, and Afghanistan under the Taliban, 
which have created strong concerns over the respect of Islamist movements for international 
human rights norms (Mayer 2012:36-46; Marshall 2005; Haqqani 2005). The commitment of 
Islamist parties to human rights law has also been a matter of enquiry by the European Court 
of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR). In a famous case involving the Turkish Welfare Party 
in 2003, the Court upheld Turkey’s decision to dissolve the party due to its adoption of a 
platform through which it sought to implement Islamic law. The court opined that the party’s 
religious programme conflicted with the protection of basic rights and liberties in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR).8  
  
Nevertheless, given the popularity of Islamist parties in many Muslim states, other scholars 
and human rights advocates argue for the integration of ‘moderate’9 and peaceful Islamists 
into political processes as a tool of de-radicalisation and moderation (El-Ghobashy 2005, 
Kausch 2009; Hamid 2011; 2014; Roth 2012:4).10  In this context, Baker (2003:1-14) 
suggested using the expression ‘Islam without fear’ to refer to the emergence of a ‘moderate’ 
trend among Egyptian Islamists. The term ‘post-Islamism’ has meanwhile been coined by 
political scientists (Bayat 2013) to explain the transformation of some Islamist parties, such 
as the Justice and Development Party in Turkey (AKP), into ‘a conservative democratic party 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, 13 February 2003. The Court, however, ignored other possible liberal 
interpretations of Islam and shari‘a, see a commentary on this case by Abou Ramadan (2007).     
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[that] defends change, reform and transformation in favour of democracy, human rights and 
rule of law’ (Sambur 2009:117).11 
 
Since the 1980s, political repression and restricted political space in Egypt has created a 
common agenda of political activism for various political actors and human rights defenders 
in Egypt, including the MB (Shehata 2010). During the decade before the 2011 uprisings the 
MB embraced human rights language in its political discourse and, by harnessing other 
political forces, pressured Egyptian authorities to respect the right to free assembly, 
association and expression, to judicial independence and to a fair trial (Brown and Hamzawy 
2010). After the MB won 88 seats in the 2005 Parliament, the Deputy General Guide, Khairat 
al-Shater (2005), wrote in The Guardian newspaper that the MB’s main objective was to 
‘trigger a renaissance in Egypt, rooted in the religious values upon which Egyptian culture 
and society is built’. He added that ‘the success of the MB should not frighten anybody: [the 
MB] respects the rights of all religious and political groups’.  
 
It was not clear at the time whether the MB’s shift towards human rights language was a 
question of political convenience, or reflected a genuine intellectual change in the 
organisation. However there was no consensus between the MB and other human rights 
activists on the content of certain rights and the acceptance of international human rights 
treaties as a term of reference. Ideological disparities between the MB and other political 
forces, as well as the restricted political space during Mubarak’s governance, had not allowed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The term ‘moderate Islamists’ has been largely used in the literature to refer to Islamists who condemn violence and 
peacefully participate with other political parties in the constitutional and political institutions. However, I subscribe to other 
views (Tibi 2012:9-10) that find that what constitutes ‘moderate’ is ambiguous and misleading. Tibi (2012:10) suggests 
‘institutional Islamists’ as a more neutral concept than moderate Islamists.       
10Kenneth Roth (2012:4), the executive director of HRW stated that ‘Islamic movements are hardly monolithic or 
implacably opposed to rights. Yet rather than engage with them to demand respect for rights, Western governments have 
often treated them as untouchable’. 
11 See also Kuru (2013). However, other scholars argue that the AKP still embraces an Islamist agenda and engages in what 
they call ‘creeping Islamisation’ (Tibi 2012:98-102; Baran 2010).   
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such a consensus to emerge (Shehata 2010; Hicks 2002). Among other areas, this thesis will 
explore whether the political climate after Mubarak has provided an opportunity for this 
consensus to develop, or rather deepened divisions between Islamist and non-Islamist forces.   
My interest in this research is founded on my direct engagement with the debate on Islamism, 
Islamic law and human rights in Egypt and other Muslim states as a human rights practitioner 
since 2003. The intersections between the MB and international human rights, along with 
increasing scholarship on the transformation of Islamist movements across the Muslim world, 
has motivated me to explore to what extent the MB has the potential to gradually legitimise 
international human rights in Islamic terms. While the experience of the MB in power after 
Mubarak was too short to comprehensively judge the party’s actual record in human rights, it 
does enable us to compare the MB’s literature and experience in opposition with its positions 
in power. 
 
A great deal of research has been conducted on the MB, much of it dealing with the political 
history of the organisation, its institutional development and its ideology (Mitchell 1993; Lia 
2006; Zollner 2007; al-Awadi 2004; Pargeter 2010; Ruben 2010). Scholars have examined 
the cooperation between the MB and human rights non-governmental organisations, the 
MB’s approach to constitutionalism, and its position on the rights of religious minorities, on 
political pluralism, and gender equality (Hicks 2002; MacQueen 2008; Rutherford 2006; 
Dalacoura 2007; Slit 2010; Scott 2010; Tadros 2012a). However, this thesis is the first legal 
research to investigate the development of the MB’s thinking on the relationship between 
Islamic law and International Human Rights Law (hereinafter IHRL) over the last three 
decades. 
 
Religious actors and their involvement in the struggle over the meaning of human rights has 
increasingly become a subject of academic inquiry (Cismas 2014; Hopgood 2013; Chase 
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2015). The aim of this thesis is to put the debate between Islamic law and human rights in 
context through a systematic assessment of the thought and practice of a major Islamist 
movement. As proposed by Preis (1996:286-315), there is a need to study human rights as 
cultural practice within certain political and social contexts in order to understand the 
dynamics of the evolution of human rights discourses in different societies. The future of 
Islamic discourses is contingent on the political and social dynamics in Muslim states. As 
stated by An-Na‘im (2004:9) ‘the relationship [between Islam and human rights] is open to 
engagement and transformation precisely because it is contingent on an interactive web of 
internal and external factors and forces’.  
 
This research focuses on the MB as one such force to be influencing the debate on Islamic 
law, in Egypt and the whole Muslim world. The thesis is structured to answer the following 
questions: how has Islamic law influenced the MB’s conception of human rights? What have 
its reactions been to the development of IHRL? To what extent has there been change or 
continuity in the thought and practice of the MB towards human rights issues? In which areas 
has the MB expanded or restricted its understanding of human rights? Is there consistency 
between the MB’s practices and the positions taken by its ideologues and scholars?  And 
finally, how have the MB’s thought and practice influenced the evolution of the debate on 
human rights in Egypt?  
 
Although Islamists share common goals, one cannot generalise about their detailed attitudes 
to different human rights issues, or the extent of their respect for these rights.  Islamists’ 
different responses to human rights in post-uprising Egypt and Tunisia since 2011 are 
illustrative in this regard (El Fegiery 2012). The major argument of this thesis is that the MB 
has exacerbated rather than solved tensions between Islamic law and international human 
rights. The organisation and its scholars have drawn on hard-line juristic opinions and 
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reinvented certain concepts from Islamic traditions to limit the scope of freedom of 
association, freedom of expression, religious freedom, rights of religious minorities and 
women’s rights, and to advocate for Islamic alternatives to international human rights. The 
MB’s positions on human rights, while in opposition and in power have been consistent with 
its intellectual literature. In opposition, it embraced human rights language in its struggle 
against an authoritarian regime but advocated for broad restrictions on certain rights. The 
MB’s short-lived experience in power provides evidence for its inclination to reinforce 
restrictions on the freedom of religion, expression and association, and the rights of religious 
minorities, while reversing previous reforms related to women’s rights.  
 
Since the literature and discourses of the MB were developed in different historical phases, in 
the following section I present a brief introduction to the main historical developments of the 
organisation since its establishment. The third section examines the research methods and 
sources, and in the last section I explain the structure of this thesis.  
          
2. The Muslim Brotherhood: A Historical Background 
Founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), the MB in Egypt represents the oldest and 
largest organisational manifestation of Islamism in the Muslim world, from which other 
groups emerged in many Muslim states (Lapidus 2002:522; Ruben 2010:1). The call for the 
enforcement of Islamic law is a central characteristic of its political and legal identity 
(Mitchell 1993 245-250; Pargeter 2013:17), however it is the MB’s stance on the use of 
violence to achieve its goals, that is a particularly contentious issue. During the 1940s the 
group was involved in violent actions through a secret apparatus (al-Majid 2010:21-29). MB 
leaders argue that this apparatus was established by al-Banna to engage in the struggle 
against colonialism. They admit that the secret apparatus assassinated some civilian figures. 
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However, they assert that al-Banna and the leadership of the organisation were not directly 
involved in these killings, invoking certain statements made by al-Banna that condemned the 
killings and the perpetrators (al-Shamakh 2011a; al-Banna 2006:757-785). Other observers 
however, argue that the use of violence was justified and supported by al-Banna himself (‘Ali 
2007:82-90). The increasing political power of the MB and its involvement in violence led to 
its dissolution by a military order on 8 December 1948,12 and to the assassination of al-Banna 
on 13 February 1949 (Mitchell 1993:58-79; Pargeter 2010:29-30).13 Once the state of 
emergency had ended, the Court of Administrative Justice held on 17 September 1951 that 
the dissolution of the MB by a military order was void.14     
 
On 23 July 1952, the Free Officers’ Movement came to power after a military coup. This was 
well received by many Egyptians, who considered it to be a relief from the political and 
social crises prevailing in Egypt under the monarchy. The MB was a political ally of the Free 
Officers’ Movement before 1952 and backed its political move. However, political tensions 
quickly erupted between the MB and the new leader of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and 
reached a peak in 1954 when Nasser was subjected to an assassination attempt, allegedly 
planned and implemented by MB members. Consequently, the Leading Council of the 
Revolution ordered the dissolution of the MB and a considerable number of its leaders and 
members were sentenced to death or life imprisonment in military trials (al-Majid 2010:29-
37; Pargeter 2010:33-34).  
 
Between 1957 and 1964, the MB ideologue Sayid Qutb (1906-1965) shifted the MB to a 
more radical direction via his book Milestones (1990), in which he asserted that all societies, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Egypt was under martial laws since 31 May 1948. See Military Order No.63/1948 Concerning the Dissolution of the MB, 
8 December 1948. 
13 Some members of what was called at the time the Political Police were convicted for the killing of al-Banna after the 1952 
Military coup but ‘higher responsibility has never been proved’ (Reid 1982:636).    
14 Court of Administrative Justice, Case No.190/3, 17 September 1951.  
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including Muslim societies who do not submit to the sovereignty of God in all spheres of life, 
are in a state of ignorance (jahiliyya).15 Qutb (1990:43-57) asserted that pious Muslims 
should revolt against this jahiliyya to establish the Islamic state and then initiate a holy war 
globally to ‘liberate’ all other peoples. These ideas contributed to the emergence of violent 
Islamist movements (Shepard 2003: 521-522; Calvert 2010). In response to this wave of 
radicalisation, the former General Guide of the MB, Hassan al-Hudaiby (1977b), wrote a 
book titled Preachers not Judges to distance the MB from the hardline thought developed by 
Qutb and his followers (Zollner 2007). However, the book did not explicitly state that it was 
refuting the ideas of Qutb. It defended the application of Islamic law in the Muslim state as a 
fundamental component of Islam and did not abandon the possibility of declaring Muslims to 
be apostates and sentencing them to death, but rather subjected this to certain conditions. The 
MB has not yet directly denounced Qutb’s ideas (‘Ali 2012). Instead, they have repeatedly 
stated that the words used by Qutb were mistakenly interpreted by his readers, and argue that 
Qutb used the term jahiliyya as a metaphor to reject un-Islamic laws and morals that have 
become common in Muslim societies (Al-Bahnasawi 1985; 2000).16  
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the MB was able to reconstitute itself in Egyptian politics. 
Former president Anwar al-Sadat tolerated the activities of Islamists in an attempt to 
counterbalance his leftist and Nasserist critics, and so the MB leaders were released from 
prison and resumed their political, social, and cultural activities in Egypt (Kepel 1993:139-
141; Shehata 2010:53). During the 1970s, the group was allowed to republish its magazine 
al-Da‘wa, which was vocal about the Islamisation of Egypt’s constitution and laws (Kepel 
2005:127; Mustafa 1996:206). The MB was not the only Islamist player in Egypt at that time. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The term jahiliyya is mentioned in the Qur’an (3:154; 5:50; 33:33; 48:26) to describe the state of affairs in the Arab 
Peninsula before Islam. 
16 See an interview with the General Guide of the MB Mohammad Badie (2010).  
  
 26 
Other Islamist trends emerged. Ultra-conservative Salafism17expanded in Egypt, and both 
Islamist trends influenced each other (Abdel Latif 2012; Tammam 2010b; Brown 2011:5). 
Despite its subjection to strict legal restrictions and harassment by security forces, the MB 
had established itself as a major political actor in Egypt and enlarged its popular constituency 
under former President Mubarak. Members of the group controlled the boards of major 
professional syndicates and university students unions during the 1980s and 1990s (Shehata 
2010:53-54).  
 
The Egyptian electoral system in this period did not allow non-partisan or independent 
candidates to run for elections, and the MB was not legally recognised as a political party. In 
1984 the MB allied with the liberal al-Wafd Party and won eight seats in Parliament (Shehata 
2010:85). In 1987 it established the Islamic Alliance with the Socialist Labour Party and the 
Liberal Party, and won 38 seats (Shehata 2010:87). The Islamist agenda of the MB (1987) 
was strongly manifested in the electoral platform and activities of the Islamic Alliance. 
Taking a position that was common among various opposition parties, the MB boycotted the 
1990 elections to protest the heavy interference of the Ministry of Interior in the electoral 
process. In 1995 one candidate of the group won in the elections, but the 1990s saw a harsh 
security campaign by the regime against the MB, to contain its increasing political influence 
(Stilt 2010:78).  
 
In 2000 the group became politically active again after the Supreme Constitutional Court 
(hereinafter the SCC) decided that elections must be judicially supervised. The MB won 
seventeen seats in the elections of 2000 and 88 seats in 2005 and became the largest 
opposition block in the Parliament (Stilt 2010: 78-79). Yet between 2006 and 2010, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17This term is usually used to refer to Islamists who have been influenced by the Wahabism that was developed in Saudi 
Arabia. The principal characteristic of those Salafists is their emphasis on the strict and literal interpretation of the Qur’an 
and Sunna (Denoeux 2011:59-60).            
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government adopted a set of repressive measures against both secular and Islamist opposition 
parties. On one occasion in 2007, in response, a group of students affiliated to the MB 
organised a show that resembled a para-military parade – causing the MB to apologise, and to 
claim that this action was undertaken without consulting the organisation. Yet this had 
triggered intense public debate, and questions about the continued existence of a so-called 
secret apparatus among the MB, and soon after, a group of MB leaders (including the Deputy 
General Guide) were arrested and referred to military trial on charges of terrorism and money 
laundering (al-Majid 2010:144-154).  
 
In 2007, a package of constitutional amendments banned the establishment of religious 
political parties, which also curtailed the judicial supervision of elections (Bernard-Maugiron 
2008). To show its commitment to peaceful political participation, the MB declared its 
intention to establish a political party and suggested a draft platform for public debate (Stilt 
2010:76), yet it and other political parties failed to gain seats in the first electoral phase of 
parliamentary elections in 2010. Reported irregularities during this phase led the opposition 
to boycott the run-off elections (CNN 2010). However, massive popular protests swept Egypt 
from 25 January 2011, leading to the resignation of Mubarak on 11 February 2011. After this, 
the MB established its political party (Trager 2011:114-126), and obtained a legal status as an 
association in March 2013.18 In the parliamentary elections of November 2011-January 2012, 
the FJP won 47% of the seats in the People’s Assembly, the lower chamber of Parliament and 
the Salafist al-Nour Party won 24% of the seats and became the second largest political group 
in Parliament (BBC 2012b).   
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs, Decision No.644/2013, 19 March 2013, al-Waqa’i‘ al-Masriyya no.129 of 5 
June 2013, pp.5-6. After the removal of President Morsi, Cairo Court for Urgent Matters banned the MB and all of its 
affiliated organisations on 23 September.   
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3. Methods and Sources 
The analysis in the following chapters examines the thought and practice of the MB in 
comparative consideration to IHRL and traditional and modern approaches to Islamic law. I 
apply a legal qualitative analysis of various primary and secondary sources that relate to the 
legal thought and practice of the MB, between 1984 and 3 July 2013 (the final day of MB 
rule). Considerable attention is given to the political context in which the MB has developed 
its doctrines and practices. The selected research period provides rich sources on the 
interaction between the MB and the Egyptian legal system. It also allows the study to track 
the change and continuity of the group’s thought and practice on human rights issues in 
different political contexts.  
 
The study proposes a set of categories of sources for analysis. The MB has not developed 
comprehensive written positions in respect to all the topics of this research, yet the practices 
of the MB as a political entity, and of MB leaders in political and legal institutions, help to 
answer the questions identified in this study. For instance, parliamentary deliberations inform 
the researcher about the group’s approach to some human rights issues, as discussed during 
the research period, and MB leaders have commented on diverse legal and political issues 
through a range of media. Official positions of the MB can be derived firstly from the official 
documents and pamphlets that it has issued, and secondly, from the positions taken to human 
rights issues by its representatives, as revealed in official parliamentary records. Thirdly, I 
analyse the writings and documents published by the MB’s General Guides, the highest 
authority in the MB, and its official mouthpiece. 19  This analysis also covers the 
organisational leading bodies which involve members of the Guidance Bureau and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The names of the General Guides: Hassan al-Banna (1928-1948); Hasan al-Hudaiby (1949-1973); Umar al-
Tilmisani(1973-1986); Mohamed Hamid Abou El Nasr (1986-1993); Mustafa Mashhur (1993-2002); Ma'mun al-Hudaiby 
(2002-2004); Muhammad Mahdi 'Akef (2004-2010); Mohamed Badie ( 2010 until present time).   
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Executive Office of the FJP. This includes the leaders of the Department of Da‘wa, who 
conduct research on Islamic law and develop legal opinions, which are published online.20        
 
The school of thought of the MB is very broad and has been shaped by jurists and 
intellectuals from Egypt and other Muslim states. Scholars or jurists who are members of the 
group and shape its day-to-day public discourse are covered within the leading bodies of the 
organisation. Historically, Hassan al-Banna has been the principal ideologue of the group, 
and leaders of the MB intensively cite his articles and messages. However, many Egyptian 
scholars influenced by Hassan al-Banna have emerged from the school of thought of the MB. 
The work of Islamist scholars from Lebanon and Jordan also contributed to the development 
of the group, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s when the Egyptian government 
severely repressed their leading members (al-Anani 2007:136-137). Given the practical 
difficulties of covering non-Egyptian scholars in this study or even all Egyptian scholars in 
this category, I focus on those whose writings have been produced and distributed over the 
last three decades by the MB. This group includes: ‘Ali Jirisha (d.2011) and Tawfiq al-Shawi 
(d.2009), two jurists with close ties with the organisation, who are among its intellectual and 
legal figures; Salim al-Bahnasawi (d.2006), a prominent jurist who wrote intensively on the 
rights of women in Islam; and Mohammad al-Ghazzali (d.1996) and Yusuf al-Qaradawi,21 
both former MB leaders who represent a major intellectual trend in Egypt’s Islamist 
movement.    
 
Significant challenges were experienced during the collection of primary and secondary 
sources in Egypt in 2013. This was due to political and violent clashes, which intensified 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The Department of Da‘wa has been headed respectively by Abd al-Satar Fathalla , Abdallah al-Khatib, Hassan Gudah- 
Abd al-Mun‘im Ti‘ylab, Khayrî Rakwah,  Abd al-Rahman al-Barr, and Abd al-Khaliq al-Sharif. Al-Khatib and then al-Barr 
are two prominent jurists and members in the Guidance Bureau of the MB during the research period.   
21 I give special attention in this thesis to the work of al-Qaradawi given his spiritual and ideological guidance for the global 
movement of the MB, see Soage (2010) and Tammam (2009).   
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after the removal of Morsi on 3 July 2013, including the detention and killing of thousands of 
MB members, and their declaration as a terrorist group in December 2013 (HRW 2014; BBC 
2013). In this climate, it was no longer possible for me to directly communicate with the MB 
or any of its affiliate institutions.   
 
4. Structure of Thesis  
This thesis is composed of nine chapters. After this introductory chapter, chapter two 
examines the main conceptual issues and theoretical trends in the debate on Islamism, Islamic 
law and IHRL. The following chapters examine the evolution of the MB’s thought on human 
rights universality, international human rights treaties, political pluralism, freedom of 
association, expression and religion, and the rights of religious minorities and women. 
Chapter three critically engages with the doctrine of the supremacy of shari‘a – as the 
central doctrine to have informed the MB’s political activism since its establishment in 1928 
– and argues that it presents substantive and procedural challenges for the development of 
human rights in Egypt. The chapter examines the MB’s philosophy on human rights in Islam, 
and concludes that Islamic law determines which international human rights are accepted by 
the MB. Chapter two also analyses the 2012 Constitution-making process and argues that the 
MB, post Mubarak, was strongly driven by the will to entrench its political powers in the 
emerging political regime, rather than to work with other political forces to consolidate the 
transition to democracy and human rights.               
    
Chapter four discusses the MB’s stances on political pluralism and dissent. The relationship 
between freedom of association and religion is problematic in Egypt. A general ban on 
religious parties was applied for decades, in order to exclude Islamists from political 
participation, but this was motivated by politics and was not an outcome of societal 
  
 31 
consensus. Policies of exclusion also shaped the MB’s philosophy on political pluralism, 
which advanced certain Islamic arguments to exclude secularists, and any form of opposition 
that could threaten the rule of shari‘a. Chapter five discusses the relationship between 
religion and freedom of opinion and expression in the thought and practice of the MB by 
focusing on three issues: academic freedom, artistic creativity and blasphemy. It analyses the 
MB’s literature and practice, and argues that massive restrictions on expression in the name 
of religion were introduced by the MB to serve religious conformism in society and guard its 
religious dogma.    
 
Chapter six examines the position of the MB towards the rights of religious minorities, with 
focus on the rights of Christian and Baha’i minorities. It begins with the meaning of 
citizenship under the rule of shari‘a, and how this significantly differs from a human rights-
based concept of citizenship. The chapter then explores the reactions of the MB to thorny 
issues in the status of religious minorities in Egypt, including: non-Muslim legal autonomy, 
the building of places of worship, the right to hold public office, inter-faith marriage and the 
status of unrecognised religious minorities. This chapter shows that the MB’s contribution to 
the debate on the rights of religious minorities has furthered the discrimination rooted in 
Egyptian law, and legitimated it in Islamic terms.  
 
Chapter seven addresses freedom of religion, including apostasy or conversion from Islam 
and proselytising, noting that, while the MB has become less assertive on the imposing of the 
death penalty for apostasy, it has hesitated to establish that religious freedom involves the 
right of Muslims to convert from Islam. It argues that the MB’s activities have sustained 
restrictions on religious freedom in Egypt and blocked development in this area.                         
Chapter eight discusses issues related to family law, including equality in marriage and 
divorce, and polygyny. It also discusses the issue of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and 
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child marriage. Its main conclusion is that the MB rejects gender equality as articulated in 
international human rights treaties, and advances the concept of complementary roles 
between men and women. This understanding has then influenced the discriminatory 
positions of the MB towards marriage, divorce and certain aspects of the political rights of 
women, and has prompted the group in opposition and in power to resist certain partial 
reforms achieved in Egypt in this area since the 1980s.   
 
In Chapter nine, I conclude that the peaceful management of political and religious diversity 
in society cannot be realised under the MB’s model of a shari‘a state. The primary argument 
of this thesis is that traditional Islamic law must be drastically reformed, and the state must be 
impartial towards religion, as an alternative to the shari‘a state22 or exclusionary secularism. 
This transformation is, however, contingent upon long-term political and socio-cultural 
change. Successfully expanding human rights protections in Egypt requires not the exclusion 
of Islamists, but their transformation. Islamists still have a large constituency and they are not 
the only actors who are ambivalent about human rights. Meanwhile, Islamic law also appears 
to continue to influence Egypt’s law. In the concluding chapter, I explore the prospects for 
certain constitutional and institutional measures to facilitate an evolutionary interpretation of 
Islamic law, provide a baseline of human rights and gradually integrate international human 
rights into Egyptian law.       
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The Shari‘a State is a title of a recent book published by Bassam Tibi (2013) where he critically engages with the overall 
objective of Islamists to establish states governed by Islamic law.   
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Chapter Two: Islamic Law and Human Rights: 
Conceptual and Theoretical Issues 
 
1. The Nature and Evolution of Islamic Law 
In this section, I examine the historical evolution of Islamic law, and explore how the debates 
on Islamic legal theories matter to the application of international human rights in the Muslim 
world. I also analyse the place of Islamic law in Egypt’s legal system and explore the debate 
on religion-state relationships. 
 
1.1 The Divine and Human Aspects of Islamic Law 
Opinions and practices in the name of Islamic law have been remarkably diverse (Afshari 
1994:271). The sources of Islam, the Qur’an and Sunna23 do not stipulate systematic rulings 
that can be applied by Muslims. Thus, the role of human agency in the interpretation of these 
sources is inevitable (An-Na‘im 2008:11). This has led to the plurality of legal opinions 
among jurists, which has manifested itself throughout Islamic history (Masud 2009:71). The 
articulation of Islamic law as a legal system involving rulings, methods and principles did not 
systematically begin until the second century of Islam. This does not mean that Muslims did 
not previously apply law derived from Islamic sources, but there was no systematic and 
coherent legal system by which to do so (Hallaq 1997: 16-17; An-Na‘im 1990:16-17). 
Zubaida (2003:4) explains that the development of Islamic law was not the task of rulers but 
‘pious private individuals who sought to live by the rules of God and avoid the sin and 
corruption of rulers and their courts’ gradually systematised Islamic law. The plurality of 
Islamic legal thought was manifested in the establishment of different schools of law in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Sunna or Tradition is ‘the exemplary biography of the Prophet. The hadiths are the literary expressions and context- 
specific accounts of the Sunna’ (Hallaq 2009a:177).  
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early years of the Muslim community, ‘but most of them disappeared and others merged by 
the beginning of the third century of Islam’ (Baderin 2003:37). Four principal schools of law 
in sunni jurisprudence have survived in the Muslim world: The Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘i and 
Hanbali schools (Hallaq 2009:31). 
  
The definition of shari‘a and fiqh is a contentious and important issue. The ways by which 
these terms are defined influence Muslims' responses to human rights in Islam, as well as 
their positions on independent juridical reasoning (ijtihad). In this thesis, I generally 
distinguish between two key approaches: the traditional and the transformative approaches. 
shari‘a rulings, by the traditional approach, are derived in accordance with sources, methods 
and principles developed by classical Muslim jurists in what is known as the science of 
jurisprudence. These sources hierarchically include the Qur’an and Sunna, and the methods 
include consensus (ijma‘) and analogy (qiyas). Then, other principles involve juristic 
preferences (istihsan), interest (istislah) or (maslaha), and presumption of continuity 
(istishab). Pre-modern Muslim jurists utilised these principles differently in legal reasoning. 
For instance, while the doctrine of maslaha was a supplementary principle to the method of 
analogy, some jurists used it as a source of law in its own right (Opwis 2007:80; Masud 
1995:252-255). 
 
The science of jurisprudence developed rules by which jurists can approach the Qur’an and 
Sunna. Among these is the distinction between those shari‘a rulings derived from clear and 
authentic texts, and other rulings derived from ambiguous and non-authentic texts. While the 
former rulings are considered fundamental for the whole construction of shari‘a and must not 
be subject to change, the latter can be a subject of independent juristic reasoning (al-
Qaradawi (2011:20-21). However, human reflection is not totally absent in the interpretation 
of clear and authentic texts For instance, if usury (riba) is prohibited in the Qur’an, the 
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enforcement of this rule in reality requires human reflection to define usury and determine 
the exact conditions of its application. The criminal penalties (hudud) are also stipulated in 
the Qur’an in clear texts, but jurists have disagreed on the conditions of the application of 
these penalties and the law of evidence (An-Na‘im 2008:35-36).  
 
Many Muslim jurists use certain methods or principles of Islamic law – such as the doctrine 
of maslaha, the objectives of shari‘a, or selection (takhayyur) between different 
jurisprudential opinions – to solve possible tension between Islamic law and international 
human rights (Baderin 2003). In Egypt, Rashid Rida (1865-1935) was the pioneer of what is 
called ‘the utilitarian Islamic legal theory’, which has a far-reaching effect on Muslim states 
and scholars (Hallaq 1997:218-219). In his work, al-Qaradawi (2011:20-21) followed this 
approach as well (Graf 2009). He argues that many of the techniques developed in the 
science of jurisprudence have gained the consensus of jurists for centuries and cannot be 
reformulated. However, he suggests that Muslim jurists can choose the suitable legal 
opinions from the work of Muslim jurists without being restricted by a specific school of law. 
Al-Qaradawi adds that Muslims can utilise the theory of the objectives of shari‘a to develop 
new rulings.  
 
These methods allowed al-Qaradawi to uphold some opinions congruent with human rights, 
such as his arguments for the prohibition of FGM, or for setting a minimum age for marriage 
(see chapter eight). In its recent documents, the MB (2007) and FJP (2011a) explained their 
position on Islamic legal theories along these lines, and as explored in the following chapters, 
this helped them to develop more progressive views on human rights. On the other side, the 
SCC) was keen to harmonise Islamic law and human rights in Egypt, and did so by drawing 
on the theory of the objectives of shari‘a (Lombardi and Brown 2006). Yet even though the 
use of these methods can expand human rights under Islamic law, I assert that some 
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differences in the scope and application of human rights in international law and Islamic law 
will continue,24 unless the science of classical Islamic jurisprudence is revisited.  
 
This takes us to the transformative approach, which distinguishes between the divine and 
human aspects of religious traditions and argues for a contextualist reading of the Qur’an and 
sunna (Saeed 2014; An- Na'im 1990; Mir-Hossein 2009:26; al-‘Ashmawi 1996:57-59; Abu 
Zayd: 2006). Thus, Mir-Hosseini (2009:25) defines shari‘a as ‘the totality of God’s will as 
revealed to the Prophet Muhammad’, and dissociates it from fiqh, which literally refers to 
Muslim jurists’ understanding of Islamic sacred sources. The Egyptian jurist Mohammed 
Said al-‘Ashmawi (1996:57) argued that shari‘a in the Qur‘an means the pathway (al-
minhaj), and that the term was given a strict legal meaning in Islamic legal thought. He 
maintained that religion is the totality of principles that were revealed to the Prophet, while  
religious thought is the understanding and application of these principles in different 
historical contexts (al-‘Ashmawi 1996).  
 
Other scholars brought new ideas about the nature of the revelation, and argued for the 
historicity of the Qur’an. For example, the Pakistani scholar Fazlur Rahman (1980) and 
Iranian scholar Abdolkarim Soroush (2009; 2000) argued that the revelation was internal, in 
the mind and heart of the Prophet, who transmitted it in his language, reflecting his life 
experience and knowledge. This perspective opens new horizons for an epistemological shift 
in the Muslim world, from scriptural based-knowledge to rationalism. To conclude, some 
scholars argue that it is already possible to establish rulings that are friendly to international 
human rights from within traditional Islamic law, while others argue that the transformation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 This is the conclusion of Baderin (2003: 219) who extensively depended on takhayyur and maslaha to address areas of 
tensions between Islamic law and international human rights.    
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of traditional methods of Islamic law is first necessary in order to legitimise international 
human rights in the Muslim world.      
 
1.2   Islam and Egypt’s Law 
Islamic law has been subject to immense structural developments in the Muslim world during 
the modern era. Hallaq (2004:22-25) shows how the interaction of the Muslim world with 
modern political, economic, military and intellectual developments in the West, and Western 
domination over the Muslim world since the 19th century, led to the demise of shari‘a as a 
source of a coherent legal system in most Muslim states. New secular education gradually 
marginalised traditional religious legal education, and the graduates of these modern schools 
were recruited as judges and lawyers in the newly established judicial systems. As noted by 
Hallaq (2004:42-44) Islamic law did not have the chance to develop on its own terms to 
accommodate the challenge of modernity. Moreover, the emergence of authoritarian political 
regimes in the Muslim world, and their absolute control over Muslim jurists in the post-
colonial era has hindered the development of new Islamic legal theories. Some of these 
regimes instrumentalised Islamic law to increase their grip on power (Hallaq 2004:42-44).   
 
Egypt witnessed a rigorous programme of modernisation in the 19th century. Modernist legal 
schools emerged in the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, 
which aimed to merge Western legal systems and Islamic legal traditions, and legitimise state 
laws in different areas of life. For this purpose, modernists developed new methods and 
techniques for ijtihad without discarding the principles or hermeneutics of the traditional 
science of jurisprudence. As concluded by Schacht (1982:100), ‘modernist criticism is in the 
first place directed against Islamic law in its traditional form, not indeed against the concept 
of a religious law’. Egypt adopted codified laws in the areas of civil, commercial, criminal, 
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and procedural law that were based on European models. New national courts were 
established to implement these laws. However, traditional Shari‘a Courts continued to apply 
un-codified Islamic law to family issues until they were abolished in 1955. The family law 
was first partially codified in 1920 based on the Hanafi school of law (Berger and Sonneveld 
2010:54-58). Modern legislators codified certain shari‘a rulings from different schools of law 
to meet new political, economic and social challenges. This method was used in family and 
civil laws, and it contributed to the promulgation of testamentary inheritance law in 1946 and 
enabled the government later to reform substantial parts of personal status law (Anderson 
1976:48-51; Welchman 2004:3).  
 
The Egyptian Civil Code of 1949 merged European civil laws and Islamic jurisprudence. 
Article 1 of the code provides that: ‘In the absence of any applicable legislation, the judge 
shall decide according to the custom and failing the custom, according to the principles of 
Islamic Law’.25 The drafter of this law, the Egyptian jurist al-Sanhuri, considered the 
application of shari‘a in Egypt and the Muslim world to be a sign of cultural and 
civilizational independence. He developed a comparative method to enable Muslims to apply 
Islamic law in modern legislation. He basically proposed that Muslims subject the work of 
the different schools of jurisprudence to rigorous comparative analysis to identify the 
universal rulings and principles of Islamic law that must be respected by Muslims in all times 
(Lombardi and Brown 2006: 413; Hill 1987). However, Hallaq (2004:24) has observed that 
the result of this process is that legal rules have been ‘uprooted from their indigenous 
context’. To conclude, these methods have not led to a genuine and coherent methodological 
reform of traditional Islamic legal theories. One can also argue that the methodological 
limitations of the modernist movement, as well as the codification of certain rulings of 
Islamic law, unwittingly legitimised the cause of Islamists and their call for the Islamic state.        	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Article 1 of Law No. 131/1948 promulgating the civil code, Official Gazette no. 108 of 29 July 1948.   
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1.3 Shari‘a and the Constitution 
The reference to shari‘a in the constitutions of Muslim states has been a contested issue in the 
contemporary Muslim world. The idea that the modern nation state should be bound by the 
rulings of Islamic law goes back to the traditional doctrine of siyasa shar‘iyya (Lombardi 
2006:49). This doctrine has been expounded in the writings of Muslims scholars since the 
11th century and it ‘justified the idea that a ruler, within bounds set by the jurists, could enact 
and enforce statutory rules and to order judges to apply these rules instead of rulings of fiqh’ 
(Lombardi 2006:53). In modern Islamic history, this doctrine was reinvigorated to 
accommodate the administrative and legal expansion of the state. Modern Islamic legal 
theories suggested methodologies that allow Muslim modern states to promulgate laws that 
serve the public interest of Muslims and at the same time maintain the universal rulings of 
Islamic fiqh (Lombardi 2006:54).  
 
Baderin (2010: 135-136) argues that the reference to Islamic law in the constitutions of 
Muslim states is a double-edged sword. He shows that the interpretation of a constitutional 
provision on Islamic law is contingent on the institutional and political settings in different 
states. In the experiences of some Muslim states, the constitutional clause of Islamic law has 
been supportive of human rights and good governance (Lombardi and Brown 2006; 
Lombardi 2010). Yet, on the contrary, An-Na‘im (2008:1-3) challenges the model of the 
Islamic state ‘as a post-colonial discourse that relies on European notions of the state and 
positive law’. According to An-Na‘im, in the paradigm of the modern nation state, state law 
cannot be labelled as Islamic even if it pretends to be so, and this law reflects only the 
understanding of shari‘a by ruling elites. According to him, the enforcement of Islamic law 
by the machinery of the state goes against the nature of the whole body of shari‘a as moral 
and ethical norms that are followed voluntarily by individuals based on their free conviction 
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and understanding. An-Na‘im (2008:267) adds that ‘the Qur’an addresses Muslims as 
individuals and community, without even mentioning the idea of a state, let alone prescribing 
a particular form for it’  
 
As an alternative to the Islamic state, An-Na‘im (2008:52-54) maintains that the secular state 
as a neutral body is more consistent with Islamic history. He explains that the Prophet 
enjoyed the religious and moral authority to adjudicate on religious and political matters, but 
that after the death of the Prophet, Muslim rulers struggled in different ways to settle the 
permanent disputes between religious and political authority, as ‘none of those rulers have 
been accepted by all Muslims as capable of holding the supreme position of the prophet, who 
defined Islam and determined how it could be implemented’ (An-Na‘im 2008:53). However, 
under a secular state, according to An-Na‘im (2008:7), Muslims can still propose public 
policies based on their understanding of Islam, but they should deliver their proposed policies 
to other citizens through civil and not religious reasoning that can be accepted and 
comprehended by all people regardless of their religious convictions.    
 
It will be established by this research that the secular state proposed by An-Na‘im proposes a 
pragmatic solution for regulating the relationship between state and religion in the Muslim 
world and ensuring that human rights are protected, and are not contingent on changing 
interpretation of Islamic sources. Islamist parties can also survive a secular state by focussing 
on the Islamic ethics and values instead of being overwhelmed by the Islamic state and the 
application of shari‘a. If the option of the secular state is not possible due to an agreement 
among different social and political forces that a provision on Islam and Islamic law should 
be included in the constitution, the constitution can contain powerful safeguards for the 
protection of human rights, citizenship and the rights of religious minorities. Otherwise, 
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human rights can become threatened when the interpretation of this provision is left to day-
to-day politics.  
 
The constitutional experience in Egypt is instructive in this regard. Lombardi (2006:49) 
submits that ‘the decision to constitutionalise Islamic law in late twentieth-century Egypt 
represents a commitment to the idea that state law must be a modern analogue of siyasa 
shar‘iyya’. Egyptian Constitutions, since 1923, have referred to Islam as the official religion 
in Egypt.26 The principles of Islamic shari‘a were adopted for the first time as a source of 
legislation in the 1971 Constitution. 27  In the constitutional amendments of 1980, the 
reference to Islamic law was consolidated by stipulating in Article 2 that ‘the principles of 
Islamic shari‘a are the main source of legislation’.28 This advanced status of Islamic law 
came as a reaction to the rise of Islamic political opposition in Egypt, and the emergence of 
Islamisation projects in other Muslim states in the 1970s (Zubaida 2003: 155). Since the 
1970s, the MB advocated for Islam to become the main source of political, social and 
economic guidance for the Egyptian state, and that an explicit reference to shari‘a in the 
Egyptian constitution is beyond question. The introduction of Article 2, however, did not 
substantially change the Egyptian legal system, which has maintained its secular features. As 
noted by Berger and Sonneveld (2010:84), ‘a form of compromise has been found between 
shari‘a and Western law’. Political authority, as well as the constitutional judiciary, has kept 
the incorporation of Islamic law into the Egyptian legal system to a minimum (Berger and 
Sonneveld 2010: 82-84). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Article 149 of Royal Decree No.42/1923 Establishing Constitutional Regime Egypt, Al-Waqa’i‘ al-Masriyah no. 42 of 20 
April 1923. 
27 Article 2 of the Constitution of Egypt, Official Gazette no.36 of 12 September 1971, pp. 1-16.  
28 Amendments to the Constitution of Egypt, Official Gazette no.26 of 27 June 1980, pp. 4-9.  
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There were some official and non-official initiatives in Egypt to codify shari‘a in the 1970s 
and 1980s. In 1978, the Egyptian parliament formed a committee to codify Islamic law in 
different legal fields. In 1982, the committee produced new drafts of civil law, penal law, 
commercial law, maritime commercial law, law on evidence and procedures of litigation 
(People’s Assembly 1983: 129). The committee said that it relied on the Qur’an, Sunna, the 
consensus of Muslim jurists, and the opinions of jurists without being restricted by a certain 
school of law. It also utilised the principle of interest (maslaha) to codify new provisions in 
conformity with the universal rulings and principles of shari‘a (People’s Assembly 1983: 
115). The MB was supportive of these drafts during the 1980s. These efforts failed, as the 
government at the time was not encouraged to officially adopt these initiatives (Skovgaard-
Petersen 1997: 208-213).   
 
The SCC was very cautious about developing an authoritative interpretation of Article 2.  It 
took several years until judges reached a theory that they believed would ensure the stability 
of the existing political and legal order, while satisfying the Islamic religious establishment, 
and Islamist opposition (Lombardi 2006:174). The SCC developed a flexible theory of 
Islamic law that provided the legislator with a wide margin of discretion. It held that 
legislation would be declared unconstitutional if it was inconsistent with rulings based on 
unambiguous verses of the Qur’an or hadiths (rulings established by the consensus of Muslim 
jurists), and the objectives of shari‘a. To maintain the political and legal order, the Court 
affirmed that the SCC’s jurisdiction would be applied only to laws promulgated after the 
enforcement of the constitutional amendment of Article 2 (Lombardi 2006:199-200). For 
example, the case law of the SCC shows that the Court has not taken a hard-line position with 
regards to the rights of women, and it has been consistently progressive in the interpretation 
of Islamic sources (Lombardi and Brown 2006: 379-435). The SCC has backed personal 
status law reforms initiated by the government over the past three decades, and it has 
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arguably found a middle ground between the liberal agenda of women’s rights movement and 
the hardline agenda of Islamists. According to Abu-Odeh (2004:1193-1145), it has opted to 
improve the status of women in the family without challenging the hierarchal relations 
between husbands and wives.   
 
Lower court judges have given diverse reactions to the SCC’s theory.  Although some judges 
have incorporated the SCC’s approach to shari‘a in their judicial practice, Lombardi and 
Berger have explained that others remained in favour of the conservative approach, 
particularly on cases related to freedom of religion, heresy and blasphemy (Lombardi 
2006:263; Berger 2003). Moreover, Lombardi argues that the theory of the SCC will be 
subject to the normative and values-bias of judges. Therefore, the progressive interpretation 
of Islamic law will not always be guaranteed if conservative judges take leading positions in 
the judiciary and the SCC (Lombardi 1998: 122). I explain in chapter three that the MB in 
2012 took some steps to reconstitute the SCC and curtail its roles.  
 
Despite efforts made by the Egyptian government and the constitutional justices to minimise 
and contain the conservative understanding of shari‘a, the scope of some international human 
rights has been restricted in Egypt based on references to Islam as the official religion, and 
shari‘a as the main source of legislation in the Constitution. Most reservations made by Egypt 
to key international human rights treaties are justified by respect for shari‘a (see section 2.2 
below). The case law of Egyptian courts on apostasy, the right to freedom of expression and 
the rights of unrecognised religious minorities show that judges consider Islam to be a 
constitutive element of the public order, by which they have accordingly restricted the scope 
of certain human rights (Berger 2002; 2003).        
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After Mubarak, the debate on the application of Islamic law was renewed. Islamic codes 
drafted by Parliament in 1982 were used as a reference by Islamists who advocated for the 
codification of shari‘a (Ghanim 2012: 41-49; al-Bishri 2012: 40). The main political forces in 
Egypt agreed that Islam, as the official religion, and shari‘a, as the main source of legislation 
would be included in the post-Mubarak constitution. A well-known Egyptian political analyst 
has asserted that liberal and secular forces conceded on this issue, retreating from their 
previous positions on either the abolition or amendment of Article 2 (Said 2012). However, I 
show in the following chapters that the practical implications of shari‘a on the state’s 
commitment to international human rights has been a matter of political controversy among 
political actors and human rights advocates.     
 
Egypt’s official Islamic religious institution, al-Azhar, took part in this debate. Traditionally, 
Egyptian rulers have been eager to subordinate al-Azhar to their political power in order to 
control the Islamic discourse in Egypt, and the MB and Islamist movements in general have 
always been critical of this control (Zubaida 2003: 163-165). The state’s alignment with al-
Azhar was politically necessary to counter Islamists but it has also set limits to the reform 
processes since the support of al-Azhar for certain human rights were not guaranteed 
(Barraclough 1998; Moustafa 2000) (se chapters five, six, seven and eight).    
 
It has been apparent since 2011 that al-Azhar wanted to restore its role in Egyptian religious 
and political life after being subjected to political control since the 1960s, and its public 
activities over this period seem also to be driven by the increasing influence of Islamist 
parties in the debate on Islamic law in Egypt (Brown 2012). The current Grand Sheikh of al-
Azhar, Ahmed al-Tayyib, sponsored a series of dialogues with the various political forces in 
Egypt, and proposed a set of guiding principles for constitutional and legal reform via two 
documents (Al-Azhar 2011; 2012). In these documents, Al-Azhar affirmed that the new 
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constitution should refer to the general principles of Islamic law as the main sources of law in 
Egypt. The documents highlighted the centrality of human rights and democracy in the new 
political regime of Egypt, but did not define the limits by which Islamic law can restrict 
human rights.  
 
2. Human Rights and Religion  
In this section, I explore the evolution of international human rights in Egypt’s changing 
international political landscape. I highlight the global appeal of human rights as well as its 
limitations. I then address philosophical and legal issues in the debate on human rights 
universality and the challenge of cultural relativism.     
 
2.1 The Evolution of Human Rights 
The establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 was the cornerstone of the 
development of IHRL. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter UDHR),29 
adopted on 10 December 1948, was the first comprehensive international human rights 
document, and was followed decades later by tens of international treaties that create an 
international community, and make the rights of all human beings a matter of international 
law (Szabo 1982:21-23; Bentekas and Oette 2013). It has been widely maintained that the 
most direct historical precedents of IHRL are the paradigm of rights manifested in the 
philosophical writings and the bills of rights in England, America and France during the 
‘Enlightenment’ era of the 17th and 18th centuries (Cranston 1973:1; Morsink 2009; Grayling 
2007). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted on 10 December 1948) GA res. 2171 (III), UN Doc. A/810 at 71 
(UDHR). 
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However, on one hand, scholars (Baxi 2003:92-93) have argued that the model of 
international human rights represents an epistemological break with the Enlightenment 
traditions of the rights of man, in which ‘the notion of being human was all along constructed 
on Eurocentric or racist lines’. On the other hand, Moyn (2010) argues that the emergence of 
the language of IHRL is a recent phenomenon, and affirms that ‘human rights were 
peripheral to both wartime rhetoric and post-war’ (Moyn 2010:7). He shows, through a 
historical analysis of the development of the international human rights movement that the 
explosion of human rights at a global level started only in the middle of the 1970s and before 
that the idea of rights continued to be ‘part of the authority of the state, not invoked to 
transcend it’. According to Moyn (2010: 8) the emergence of IHRL since the middle of the 
1970s was catalysed by the beginning of the collapse of other political utopias propagated by 
the Soviet Union and its allies, as well as the legitimacy crisis of the new post-colonial nation 
states. At the same time, Europe attempted to search for an identity different from the 
dictionary of the cold war, and the US declared officially its adoption of liberal and moralised 
foreign policy as a reaction to the moral disaster that hit American politics after the war in 
Vietnam. Moyn (2010:8) explains that ‘an internationalism revolving around individual rights 
surged, and it did so because it was defined as a pure alternative in an age of ideological 
betrayal and political collapse.’  
 
Forsythe (2000:21) argues that the recent development of international relations ‘caused 
some to see a radical reformulation of state sovereignty’. Human rights abuses committed in 
one state can easily become a common concern of the international community. The 
constituency of the culture of human rights has enlarged remarkably across the globe. This 
reality prompted a human rights theorist to argue that human rights are neither universal nor 
relativist but have been proved to be strongly appealing (Goodhart 2008). Research shows 
that international human rights norms and regimes have influenced domestic practices in 
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different states (Riss and Ropp 1998:275). The campaigns and activities of international, 
cross-regional and domestic human rights non-governmental organisations have brought 
about substantive changes in human rights landscapes domestically and globally (Forsythe 
2000:17-20; Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
 
However, this global momentum of human rights seems to be at crisis today (Hopgood 
2013). Human rights norms are ‘under attack as never before by conservative nationalist and 
religious forces’ (Hopgood 2013:3). ‘The distribution of power globally towards a more 
multipolar world’ empowered many states from different continents to reject human rights 
(Hopgood 2013:3). This is evidenced by intense ongoing disputes between states over the 
interpretation of human rights in the UN. Cross-regional coalitions between Islamic and 
Christian religious actors are working in collaboration with other global powers like Russia 
and China to reinforce conservative interpretations of some rights and block the development 
of others (Hopgood 2013:158-160; Chase 2015).  
 
On the other hand, the intensive use of the language of human rights in international relations 
by Western powers has been also a source of politicisation, inconsistency, and double 
standards (Mutua 1996:648-650). While some Western states criticise human rights 
violations in other countries, they turn a deaf ear to international human rights on many 
occasions in order to maximise their own political, economic and security interests. In the 
aftermath of 9/11, the United States and other Western states have repeatedly infringed on the 
human rights of people at home and abroad, and side-lined public international law in the 
name of security and counter-terrorism. People in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and other 
Muslim states have been victims of these policies. Mayer warns that these developments 
‘could energize Islamist hostility to human rights, confirming suspicions that human rights 
are part of a nefarious Western plot’ (Mayer 2007: 27). As noted by An-Na‘im (1996:240-
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241), the cultural resistance to international human rights has been usually driven by 
sentiments against Western policies. This confrontational climate between Western and non-
Western societies encourages governments and political forces in the latter to demoralise the 
domestic protagonists of international human rights and portray them as part of the Western 
political project (Mayer 2007: 25-26). 
 
Judging the performance of Islamists by international human rights standards does not mean 
that they are perfect and free of limitations. The assumption upheld both by the proponents of 
universal human rights and the relativists that IHRL is a coherent and linear discourse has 
been increasingly questioned (Bhuta 2012; Emon, Ellis and Glahn 2012; Baderin 2003:24; 
Glendon 1999:8-12). States, international and regional human rights organs and NGOs 
disagree on the scope of many rights, in Western and non-Western countries. As noted by 
Bhuta (2012:126): ‘The catalogue of rights found today in [international treaties] represent a 
word-smithed bricolage of rights claims derived from heterogeneous traditions and specific 
political projects’. Rosenblum (2002:306) shows that the texts of international human rights 
can also become a source of tension among conflicting discourses, such as the possible 
tension between individual and group rights. IHRL is, in other words, unfinished business 
(Glendon 1999). ‘Unlike most other legal disciplines, human rights has no ultimate arbiter’ 
(Rosenblum 2002:315). The door is open for states and non-state actors to challenge the 
scope of rights and present different interpretation of rights. The expansion or restriction of 
the scope of rights and the settlement of conflict of rights is an open battle in international 
and regional human rights mechanisms and among domestic actors in different states (Chase 
2015). 
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2.2 Interpretation of International Treaties 
The application of IHRL is not absolute. It can be subject to certain restrictions by states, and 
also interpretations. In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter 
ICCPR),30 for example, there are certain rights that are absolute and non-derogable in all 
circumstances,31 but states can restrict other rights during states of emergency on the 
condition that these restrictions are necessary and proportionate, to contain the eminent 
threat.32 Many other rights such as rights to freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, 
freedom to manifest religion and belief, and freedom of association can be subject only to 
such limitations ‘as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, 
health, or morals, the fundamental rights and freedoms [or] . . . reputation of others’.33 
Moreover, Article 20 of the ICCPR stipulates certain further restrictions on freedom of 
expression, such as propaganda for war, or advocacy of forms of hatred that constitute 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.34 States, and international and regional 
human rights organs follow different approaches in explaining the application of these 
limitations in some human rights issues, like freedom of expression (Langer 2014; 
Temperman 2012), human rights implications of legal pluralism (Quane 2013) and state-
religion relations (Temperman 2010).         
 
The main international human rights treaties that will be cited in this thesis are the ICCPR, 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(hereinafter CEDAW)35, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter CRC)36. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966 and entered into force 23 March 1976) 
999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR).  
31 Article 4(2) of the ICCPR. See UNCHR ‘Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.29’ (2001) U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11.  
32 Article 4(1) of the ICCPR.  
33 Articles 18(3),19 (3),21,22(2) of the ICCPR  
34 Article (20) of the ICCPR.  
35 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted on 18 December 1979 and 
entered into force on 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW).  
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Egypt has ratified the three treaties,37 but it explicitly referred to the rulings of shari‘a as a 
reason for its reservations to Articles 2 and 16 of the CEDAW.38 Both Articles are concerned 
with states’ obligation to ensure gender equality in domestic legislation. Egypt also made a 
general declaration upon signing the ICCPR that it will comply with the provisions of the 
Covenant ‘to the extent that they do not conflict with shari‘a’.39  
 
In international law, states have the ultimate authority on whether to accede to international 
human rights treaties, and can also make reservations to particular articles of any treaty. 
However, ‘international human rights obligations rest primarily on the existence of 
customary international law’ (Donoho 1990:376). In order to challenge the applicability of 
certain norms of customary international law, a state should prove that it has been a persistent 
objector ‘from the norm’s inception and during its evolution’ (Donoho 1990:376). Many of 
these customary norms are now peremptory norms of international law, which nullify any 
legal practices that violate these norms (Brownlie 2008:562-564). Moreover, in public 
international law, states’ power to make reservations to treaties is not absolute. Article 19(3) 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates that if a treaty does not include 
specific regulations on reservations, no state can make a reservation that is ‘incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the treaty’.40 The Human Rights Committee (HRC) takes a 
strict approach to the issue of reservations to human rights treaties, asserting that states 
cannot make reservations to provisions of the ICCPR that are considered customary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted on 20 November 1989 and entered into force on 2 September 1990) 1577 
UNTS 3 (CRC).  
37Egypt signed the ICCPR on 04/08/1967 and ratified it on 14/01/1982, see Presidential Decree No.536/1981 Concerning the 
Ratification of the ICCPR, Official Gazette no.51 of 17 December 1981. Egypt signed the CEDAW on 30/07/1980 and 
ratified it on 18/09/1981, see  Egypt signed the CRC on 05/02/1990 and ratified it on 06/07/1990, see Presidential Decree 
No.260/1990 Concerning the Ratification of the CRC, Official Gazette no.7 of 14 February 1991.      
38  ibid., 
39  ibid.,  
40 Article 19 (3) of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted on 23 May 1969 and entered into force 27 January 
1980) 1155 UNTS 331.  
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international law or peremptory norms of international law.41 It has also expressed its 
concerns over general reservations made by states to avoid obligations under the ICCPR that 
conflict with domestic law,42 and was critical of the general reservation made by Egypt to the 
ICCPR on the basis of Islamic shari‘a.43Also, the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination has considered Egypt’s reservations to Article 2 and 16 of CEDAW (which 
urges states to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women in all areas including 
marriage) to be ‘incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention’.44    
 
But although states’ ability to accept or reject human rights norms may have become limited, 
they continue to broadly and controversially interpret the application of these norms at the 
domestic level. Scholars have defended this range of interpretations. Donoho (1990:386) 
points out that the application of many human rights norms by states might vary in light of 
the domestic institutional, social and cultural traditions, although he also maintains that a 
detailed definition of international rights is needed to avoid conflicting interpretations that 
can go against the essence of human rights norms. Jones (1994: 214-215) asserts that ‘if a 
diversity of practice is simply a response to differences of circumstance, it need not embody 
any fundamental difference of value’.      
 
In the absence of a world court of human rights, the UN treaty bodies and independent 
experts have been guiding the interpretation process of the international human rights treaties. 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has examined numerous human rights cases 
involving issues such as the right of self-determination, states’ reservations to human rights 
treaties, and human rights in occupied territories. Its case law has played a crucial role in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41UNCHR ‘Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24’ (1994) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para 8-12   
42 ibid.,para.12.  
43 UNCHR ‘Comment on Egypt’s Third and Fourth Periodic Report on the Implementation of the ICCPR’ (2002), para.5.  
44 UNCHR ‘Comment on Egypt Combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic Report on the Implementation of the CEDAW’ 
(2010), para.14. See also ‘Comment on Third and Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports’ (2001), para.327.    
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disclosing the existence of rules of customary international law (Higgins 2007: 745-746). 
Regional human rights systems have also developed remarkable jurisprudence on human 
rights (Bonello 2005:117; Roht-Arriaza 2006).   
 
2.3 Universality and Cultural Relativism 
The accelerating development of positive IHRL has not quietened the hot debate on the 
interrelation of moral philosophy, culture, religion and human rights. The idea of universality 
has been constantly challenged by the claim of cultural relativism. Cultural and religious 
arguments have been invoked repeatedly by many states, including Muslim states, to reject 
the applicability of some human rights norms, as apparent during the drafting of the UDHR, 
the ICCPR, the CEDAW and the CRC (Abiad 2008). Some philosophers and social scientists 
have also flatly challenged the idea of international human rights, using arguments related to 
cultural relativity. McIntyre criticises the assumption that all societies have valid 
transcendental moral values stating that: ‘outside a particular community an individual would 
have no reason to be moral, since he would not have access to the goods which justify 
morality’ (McIntyre 1984 cited in Nino 1991:88). Renteln (1990) has proposed a cross-
cultural approach to human rights, in which human rights universals can be empirically 
identified in different societies. However this has not satisfied proponents of the universal 
doctrine of human rights. Jones, for example, contends that human rights is a moral doctrine 
and not just a scientific exploration of shared values in different cultures (Jones 1994:217). 
 
Traditionally, the theory of cultural relativism has provided various repressive political 
regimes with an ostensibly rational justification for the commission of serious human rights 
violations (Donnelly 2003:100). In the meantime, the pessimistic analysis of Huntington 
(1996:207-245) of the fault lines of conflicts among cultures and civilizations has 
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underestimated the diverse and even conflicting traditions inside each culture. One can find 
now supporters for IHRL in regions where the cultural relativist argument has been 
continuously made (Mayer 2012). While harmonisation between IHRL and Islamic law is 
still problematic in many Muslim states, there are increasing practices among these states, 
scholars and even Islamists that aim to blend Islam and human rights (Baderin 2007; 
Dalacoura 2007; Mayer 2008).  
 
Dozens of human rights NGOs have been established in Egypt over the past three decades, 
and an increasing number of advocates emphasise the universality of human rights, with the 
UDHR and other international human rights treaties as their frame of reference (Qa‘ud 1997; 
Hassan 1998; Crystal 1994). According to a leading Egyptian human rights defender, these 
NGOs have become vocal domestically and globally, even in relation to sensitive issues in 
the Muslim world such as the right to religious freedom, the rights of religious minorities, 
and gender equality (Hassan 2009: 27; CIHRS 2004: 2). In spite of their uncertain results so 
far, the uprisings that hit the Arab world in 2011, in particular, have shown the popular thrust 
for democracy and human rights values (Dunne and Radwan 2013). As noted by Hassan 
(2011), these developments challenge the assumptions that the human rights framework has 
no social base in the Arab world, and that conservative Islamist forces are the sole political 
alternative in the region. Although Islamists have consolidated their political influence as a 
result of the political transitions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the political and intellectual 
diversity of these societies are obvious.   
 
 
Other scholars have attempted to establish a sound justification for the idea of universal 
human rights. There were some attempts during the drafting process of UDHR to explicitly 
refer to God or nature as a source of human rights values, but due to different views among 
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delegates, the final document avoids explicit reference to any metaphysical justification of 
rights (Morsink 1999: 285-286). There are also those who rigorously appeal to 
comprehensive moral philosophical doctrines to establish that a universal morality exists, and 
Morsink defends this moral foundation as a necessary guarantee of the universal validity of 
human rights (Morsink 2009:1-15). Gewirth (1982; cited in Freeman 2004:392) argues that 
the existence of universal human rights cannot simply be justified as a legal enterprise 
because human rights will exist even without this law, through the power of moral argument.   
 
Some foundational arguments apply Kantian moral constructivism to establish that the 
universal conception of human rights is the outcome of reasonable reflection by rational 
human agency.  An-Na‘im (1990:162) refers to the moral maxim that ‘one should treat other 
people as he or she wishes to be treated by them’. This ‘golden rule’ of reciprocity is an old 
moral principle embraced in many cultures all over the world. An-Na‘im (1990:163) argues 
that if any person put himself or herself in the same position as another, this person should 
wish to provide others the same rights that he/she demands for himself/herself. An-Na‘im 
(1990:163-164) is nevertheless aware of the difficulty of applying this principle to cultural or 
religious traditions that uphold discriminatory practices, and argues that this challenge needs 
to be addressed from within each tradition through the reformulation and re-interpretation of 
the sources of these traditions. In the tradition of moral arguments, Gewirth (1982, cited in 
Morsink 2009:116-117) maintains that a rational human being will recognise his/her right to 
freedom and well-being as generic rights necessary to his/her human condition, and to all 
other human beings.  
 
Other theorists argue that moral intuitionism is the most plausible justification for universal 
human rights. Morsink argues that ‘the doctrine of inherent human rights’ has been the salient 
justification of human rights documents and treaties since the UDHR. According to Morsink 
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(2009:5), this doctrine involves two theses that are deducible from the text of the UDHR. The 
first thesis is ‘the metaphysics of inherence’ whereby ‘we have our human rights by virtue of 
our humanity alone and not by any executive, legislative, or judicial procedures or decisions’. 
The second thesis is that human beings can become aware of these rights when they are 
subject to grave injustice and violations, as found in the UDHR in the term, ‘obeying the 
conscience of humanity’. Morsink (2009: 8-9) named this awareness ‘a moral epistemology 
of rights’, in which certain ‘moral birth rights’ are realised by the human family after hard 
lessons were drawn from the human suffering generated by certain historical incidents such 
as the Holocaust and the second world war. Morsink (2009:119-120) argues that the golden 
rule of reciprocity cannot alone justify universal human rights, since a person ‘must have a 
healthy conscience and good moral intuition to be able to use it properly’. The doctrine of 
inherent human rights is the basis of this moral intuition.   
 
Sachedina (2009:10) defends the position of Morsink, observing that ‘while the search for 
universality through secularization of human rights norms paved the way for pluralistic 
sources of morality, it led to their inevitable relativity’. However, while this doctrine is 
largely articulated in the West, this does not mean that it does not exist in other cultures. 
Sachedina (2009:26-27) attempts to articulate an Islamic version of the doctrine, engaging in 
a dialogue with the theological traditions of Muslims and the ethical foundations of the 
Qur’an to explore whether the concepts of inherent human dignity and inalienable rights are 
rooted in Islam. He concludes that these concepts can be justified in Islam through ‘the 
doctrine of the innate nature (fitra) of humanity bestowed by God through His act of creation’ 
(Sachedina 2009:30).   
 
Other scholars have been critical of concepts relating to universal metaphysical and 
transcendental moral foundations, and instead find human rights to be contingent upon 
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history, social reality and politics. Ignatieff (2001:53) argues that the belief in a metaphysical 
foundation of human rights can turn it into ‘a species of idolatry’. Ignatieff (2001:55) instead 
presents a justification of universal human rights by which humans have realised across 
history, and particularly within the context of World War II, that their lives and dignity were 
subject to grave risk without international norms and mechanisms to provide protection for 
individuals. According to Ignatieff (2001:56) it is not the function of human rights to 
determine a universal meaning of a good life but, based on the historical experience of 
societies, a consensus is possible among diverse cultural and civilizational traditions on what 
is wrong. This utilises a minimalist or thin universalism that, he asserts, should not 
undermine cultural or religious traditions.  
 
Due to religious, cultural and ideological diversity among peoples and individuals, the 
ontological doctrine of inherent human rights might not be persuasive for  members of 
different comprehensive doctrines. Instead, human rights can be justified as the most 
plausible formula of co-existence among multiple religious, and cultural communities in a 
well-ordered society regulated by the values of human rights. In this regards, the work of the 
American Philosopher John Rawls on the conception of freedom and justice in liberal 
democratic societies can synthesise between the foundational and non-foundational theories 
of human rights. Drawing on Rawls’ (2005) methods and concepts in his seminal book 
Political Liberalism, human rights can be seen as a conception of political justice in well-
ordered societies, developed through overlapping consensus among different comprehensive 
doctrines. According to Rawls, a political conception of justice is a freestanding conception. 
Some individuals can justify it through comprehensive doctrines such as moral intuitionism, 
Kantian moral constructivism, or utilitarianism. However, it only becomes acceptable in 
domestic or global level through reasonable overlapping consensus on the principles needed 
to maintain well-ordered societies (Rawls 2005; 1993).  
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Donnelly (2007:292-293; 2003:85) doubts that a moral foundation to human rights can be 
shared by all cultures and religions in the world. He is instead in favour of a functional 
universalism whereby the idea of human rights represents the best remedy to the threats and 
challenges posed by the political, social and economic transformation that has taken place in 
the modern nation state. Human rights in such states protect individuals from increasing 
threats from the state apparatus and capital market. This functional analysis makes human 
rights relevant to all states that have gone through similar modern structural transformation. 
Inspired by the philosophy of Rawls, Donnelly (2007: 289-291) adds that international 
human rights is one product of an overlapping consensus between different moral, religious 
and ideological comprehensive doctrines, used to reach a political conception of justice that 
can be accepted by opposing comprehensive doctrines. The consensus is partial, since it aims 
only to reach an agreement on certain regulations for the human community, although 
through multiple moral foundations and grounds. In this framework, the issue of cultural 
relativism need not to be approached as a conflict between an arrogant universal human 
rights morality and other relativist moralities. Jones (1994:219) points out that ‘the world is 
in much larger measures one characterized by rival universalisms’. The universal morality of 
human rights is rather introduced as a tool by which to settle potential conflict between rival 
universalisms.     
 
The major challenge is that some rights might be rejected on cultural grounds by some 
societies during the process of overlapping consensus. This results in a gap between what 
already exists in international human rights documents and what can be accepted by the 
different cultural or religious doctrines. Donnelly (2007:290) argues that history demonstrates 
that adaptation and transformation can occur gradually in every kind of culture, resulting in 
the acceptance of international human rights. He highlights that this has been the case in 
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Western societies. He states that ‘no culture or comprehensive doctrine is by nature, or in any 
given or fixed way, either compatible or incompatible with human rights’ (Donnelly 
2007:291). Preis (1996) has refuted assumptions that culture is static, essentialist and 
homogenous, and has argued that the study of culture and human rights should consider the 
complexities and the evolving nature of cultural interactions in different context. In the words 
of Merry (2005:9): ‘Culture is hybrid and porous and … the pervasive struggle over cultural 
values within local communities are competitions over power’. Mayer (1994) has argued that 
the conflict between Islam and human rights is not a conflict between Western and Islamic 
civilizations but between different forces within the same civilizational construct.  
 
Scholars have paid considerable attention to the importance of, and the best method by which 
to legitimise international human rights in different cultural and religious traditions. 
Orentlicher (2001:155) argues that ‘universal acceptance of the human rights idea depends 
upon its legitimacy within diverse religious traditions and not just alongside them’. An-Na‘im 
(1999a:319-323) argues that human rights should be legitimised in different cultural and 
religious traditions through domestic and cross-cultural dialogue. In the same direction, 
Merry (2005:1) explains that: ‘in order for human rights ideas to be effective . . . they need to 
be translated into local terms and situated within local contexts of power and meaning. They 
need in other words to be remade in the vernacular’. I point in the following section to 
various strategies developed by Muslim scholars and human rights defenders to legitimate 
human rights in their societies.        
 
Another relevant issue in this debate is to what extent IHRL can tolerate the violation of its 
norms in the name of culture or religion? Baderin (2003:28-29) proposed the concept of 
‘inclusive universalism’ to realise human rights in non-Western societies through ‘a multi-
cultural or cross cultural approach to the interpretation and application of human rights 
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principles’. He argues that there is no global homogeneous legal understanding of the 
substance of human rights, neither between western and non-western states nor within 
western states (Baderin 2003:28). This leads him to the conclusion that international human 
rights schemes should consider the contextual cultural values of non-Western societies such 
as Muslim societies, but he also invites Muslim communities to demonstrate an evolutionary 
interpretation of their legal traditions (Baderin 2003:6). Baderin (2003:235) argues that the 
doctrine of margin of appreciation, which has been recognised by the ECtHR, can provide the 
international human rights system with ‘the flexibility needed to avoid confrontation between 
Islamic law and IHRL’ The scholar acknowledges that there are tensions that might not be 
solved by applying his methodology, however, Baderin (2003:234) considers that these 
tensions are not substantial. In a similar appreciation for the possible multiple interpretations 
of certain human rights, Donnelly proposes the concept of relative universality as an 
appropriate way to mediate the tensions that arise from the multiple interpretations given to 
international human rights norms. Donnelly states that societies should be given certain 
flexibility to deviate from international human rights norms when ‘a particular conception or 
implementation is, for cultural or historical reasons, deeply imbedded within or of unusually 
great significance to some significant group in society’ (Donnelly 2007:231).  
 
Other scholars, however, have been suspicious of the idea of relative universality or weak 
relativism. Orentlicher (2001:143-144) wonders by which criteria some cultural practices will 
therefore be tolerated, and other practices not. She submits that engaging with the 
foundational sources of domestic cultures to legitimatise human rights will effectively 
promote and defend the moral validity of universal human rights to all human beings 
(Orentlicher 2001:154-156). Mayer (2005:302-306) believes that the method developed by 
Baderin provides Muslim states with an excuse to escape their international human rights 
obligations on the ground of cultural and religious values. Moreover, Shah (2008:471) refers 
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to the possible dangers of applying the margin of appreciation in international human rights 
system, as suggested by Baderin. He argues that states will apply it to misuse their 
discretionary powers and unjustifiably limit human rights. This concern has been expressed 
by Baderin himself (2003:231-232) when he explains the reluctance of the UN’s Human 
Rights Committee to adopt this doctrine. Meanwhile, according to Shah ‘the statutory laws of 
many Muslim states do not prevent polygyny, which can be condoned under the doctrine of 
marginal appreciation, making it difficult to achieve gender equality’ (Shah 2008:472).  
 
According to Brems (2004:14), margin of appreciation doctrine is applied by the ECtHR in 
cases for which there is no agreement among states on the means for protecting or restricting 
a right. In this situation, it asserts that states are best suited to decide as long as this principle 
is not used arbitrarily to justify violations. Sweeney (2005:474) asserts that ‘The doctrine has 
been presented as a valuable tool for recognising and accommodating limited local variations 
within a nevertheless universal model of human rights’. I submit that while different cultural 
and religious traditions should be invited to contribute to IHRL within the dialogue among 
civilisations and inclusive universalism, international human rights bodies should not tolerate 
practices which fall short of its well-established interpretations of international human rights 
treaties, such those to protect and promote gender equality, freedom of religion, equality 
between Muslims and non-Muslims, and the prohibition of torture and cruel punishment.  
 
It is argued by Brems (2004:13-14), that the international human rights system should be 
flexible enough to accommodate the cultural and socio-economic conditions that might 
obstruct the application of IHRL in some societies. As proposed by Brems, the principle of 
progressive realisation of human rights, which is recognised in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), can be extended to other human rights, 
whereby states can delay their compliance with certain human rights due to contextual 
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cultural or political factors. Brems (2004:14) explains that in order to invoke this principle, 
states should clearly demonstrate their commitment to comply with these rights and adopt 
practical steps to doing so. Certain core rights and some aspects of human rights cannot be 
violated in the name of the principle of progressive realisation of human rights.  
 
To conclude, the view of what is and is not a violation of international human rights norms, 
in many situations, is deeply intertwined in complicated networks of social, economic, 
political and cultural power, and cannot be treated only by technical and abstract legal norms. 
While the principle of progressive application of human rights is not a judicial doctrine, such 
as the doctrine of margin of appreciation, it can guide the human rights treaty bodies to 
consider contextual factors in societies without sacrificing the essence of some fundamental 
human rights norms. The use of this principle might be necessary in some Muslim societies 
where, even if some states have the political will to enforce certain rights, they still need to 
lay the groundwork domestically, and engage in dialogue with certain cultural, religious and 
social groups. These states need to be politically and technically supported by human rights 
treaty bodies.  
 
3. Islam and Human Rights: Theoretical Perspectives 
A mounting body of research argues compellingly that Muslims’ responses to international 
human rights are not monolithic, and that harmonisation between Islamic law and IHRL is 
possible (Akbarzadeh and MacQueen 2008: 1-11; Bielefeldt 1995; Abou Ramadan 2007; 
Abiad 2008). In this context, harmonisation means the intellectual and legal efforts that aim 
to solve the areas of tension between Islamic law and IHRL through various techniques and 
methods. Baderin (2007) argues that this harmonistic perspective can become a catalyst for 
the respect of human rights in the Muslim world. Narrowing the gap between Islamic law and 
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international human rights can occur from within methods and principles developed by the 
principal schools of jurisprudence. Baderin (2003:39) argues that the method of selection 
(takhayyur) and the principle of public interest (maslaha) are viable tools by which to choose 
relevant opinions from one of the principal schools of Islamic law.  
 
Applying this hypothesis in a comparative study between international human rights norms 
and Islamic law, Baderin concludes that many of the areas of tension between Islamic law 
and international human rights can be solved. For instance, Baderin found evidence to 
support freedom of religion, including the rights of Muslims to convert to another religion 
without being threatened with death. He reviewed opinions that improve the status of women 
in family and public life within the traditional model of complementarity of roles between 
men and women. He also argues that many modern Muslim jurists have developed opinions 
supportive of citizenship and equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. Morocco followed 
this strategy and was able to significantly improve the protection of women’s rights in its new 
Family Code, adopted in 2004 (Mir-Hosseini 2007). Egypt also adopted some reforms for its 
personal status law over the past 30 years based on Islamic law, and the SCC confirmed their 
compatibility with the constitutional provision on Islam (chapter eight).           
      
Nevertheless, I distinguish between the critical engagement with Islamic legal traditions for 
the purpose of coherent Islamic law reform, and the pragmatic engagement with traditional 
Islamic law in an eclectic way to facilitate the implementation of some human rights without 
challenging underlying assumptions of IHRL and undermining other human rights. For 
example, neither the doctrines of maslaha nor the method of takhayyur allow Muslims to 
consistently review certain rulings originating from clear and definite texts in areas such as 
polygyny, the discrimination against women in the family, the marriage between Muslim 
women and non-Muslim men, and the civil consequences of apostasy (An-Na‘im 1990:51). 
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As noted by An-Na‘im (1990:46): ‘The temporary and insufficient relief that is introduced 
through these devices is subject to loss when there is a forceful reassertion of shari‘a’ (An-
Na‘im 1990:46).  
 
Other theorists have argued for new approaches to Islamic law. For example, al-‘Ashmawi 
(1996:58-60) argued that the traditional conception of the Qur’an as an eternal text, which 
was common in the classical periods of Islamic thought, had led jurists to deal with it as a 
closed system, transcending the human and social milieu. Al-Ashmawi underlined the 
connection between shari‘a and the socio-political conditions of pre-Islamic society. He 
affirmed that the interpretation of shari‘a should be contingent upon changing human and 
social conditions (Shepard 1996). Other Egyptian Muslim scholars such as Jamal al-Banna 
(2011), Faraj Foda (2005), and Hussein Ahmed Amin (1992) applied a contextual 
interpretation of Islamic sources. However, the socio-political conditions in Egypt have not 
allowed this liberal trend to flourish, and indeed those liberal scholars were subjected to harsh 
persecution and intimidation, which culminated in the assassination of Foda by violent 
Islamists in 1992 (Zubaida 2003:176-180).   
 
Islamic feminism is another harmonistic perspective in the debate on Islamic law and 
international human rights, which aims to establish, through interpretative methods of Islamic 
sources, that Islam is committed to gender equality. Mayer notes that ‘Islamic feminism 
enables Muslim women to remain within the ambit of Islamic principles while demanding 
equality in rights’ (Mayer 2008:17). The significant feature of Islamic feminism is that 
Muslim women themselves have become vocal in the realm of Islamic law, since for 
centuries, men have dominated the construction of this law (Hassan 2005:46). Islamic 
feminists are critical of the patriarchal characteristic of classical and medieval Islamic fiqh, 
which according to them is a result of specific social context and is inconsistent with the 
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egalitarian moral foundation of the Qur’an (Ali 1997; 2000). Hassan (2005:60) points out that 
‘the Islamic tradition [like other religious traditions] developed in a patriarchal culture, one 
that was male-centred and male-controlled’. In her analysis of Islamic fiqh and gender 
equality, Mir-Hosseini concludes that ‘while shari‘a ideals call for freedom, justice and 
equality, their realisation was impeded in the formative years of Islamic law by Muslim 
social norms and structures’ (Mir-Hosseini 2009:43).  
 
Islamic feminists have proposed a contextual interpretation of Qur’anic texts. According to 
Wadud (2009: 95-107), the interpreter of the Qur’an should approach certain verses within 
their social contexts and in light of the overall principles and values of the Qur’an. Reading 
Islamic sources according to this methodology affirms the moral commitment of Islam to 
gender equality. Moreover, Wadud (2009: 107-109) argues that the patriarchal subordination 
of women to men is not consistent with the doctrine of the oneness of God (Tawhid), which is 
the core principle in Islamic belief whereby all people are subordinated only to God, and any 
other horizontal relationships between individuals should be based on the principle of 
reciprocity (mu‘awada). Islamic feminism has been recently transformed from theory to 
action through the establishment of regional and global networks of human rights activists 
who believe in the approach. A prominent example is Musawah, a global movement for 
equality and justice in the Muslim family that combines human rights defenders and scholars 
from different Muslim states. The Musawah Framework for Action (2009:12) underlines that 
the values of justice and equality constitute the core universal values of the Qur’an. Musawah 
(2009:15-17) asserts that the adherence to justice and equality between men and women in 
Muslim family laws is possible through a new interpretation of Islamic sources that is 
consistent with the Qur’anic universal values of justice and equality.  
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Despite the contribution of Islamic feminists to the construction of new, progressive ways of 
reading Islamic sources, recent literature highlights their methodological limitations (Moosa 
2011; Ali 2006; Abu Zayd 2009; Hidayatullah 2014). Rhouni (2010:251) maintains that 
‘Islamic feminist theory based on the postulate of the normativity of gender equality in the 
Qur’an has reached a theoretical dead end’. In her book Sexual Ethics and Islam, Kecia Ali 
(2006:128) argues that the hierarchy of men over women is limited not only to family-related 
issues, but is found in other verses that aim to support men’s sexuality in the Qur’an (2:222-
223). In these verses ‘women are spoken about and men are spoken to in a way that presumes 
male control’. The same point is addressed by Wadud (2006:261) in her second book Inside 
the Feminist Jihad. Wadud (2006:189) cites certain verses in the Qur’an (4:3; 2:223; 52:20; 
55:72; 56:22) which are ‘directed toward men and men’s sexual desires, while women and 
women’s sexuality remains passive’.   
 
In the same line, Hidayatullah (2014:135) concludes that: ‘The historical contextualization 
method helps explain the patriarchal language and framing of certain statements, but it does 
not change that the Qur’an is not only describing but also prescribing behaviour based on a 
presumption of male control’. I believe that this critique is relevant not only to Islamic 
feminists, but to the intellectual trend of Islamic reformation in general. I see it as an alert 
that the interpretation of the Qur’an may not be enough for a meaningful reformation project, 
without questioning many of the common assumptions about the nature of the Qur’an and the 
revelation.  
 
The Egyptian reformer Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (2004) was aware of the limitations of the 
interpretative approaches of the Qur’an and developed an innovative theory on the nature of 
the Qur’an that can solve many of the incoherencies and contradictions seen in interpretative 
methods. Abu Zayd aimed to free the Qur’an from being ‘at the mercy of the ideology of its 
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interpreter; for a communist, the Qur’an would reveal communism, for a fundamentalist the 
Qur’an would be a highly fundamentalist text and for a feminist it would be a feminist text’ 
(2009:98). Abu Zayd (2013:154) was concerned with questioning the common assumptions 
regarding  Qur’anic phenomena, arguing that ‘to reconnect the worlds of the Qur’an, we need 
to approach the Qur’an differently’. He concluded that the Qur’an should be viewed as 
independent discourses rather than a text, explaining: ‘The concept of ‘text’, with its 
underlying assumption of authorship, is the cause of this paradoxical entrapment between 
historicity and divinity, or between the chronological order and the mushaf order [of the 
Verses]’ (Abu Zayd 2013:155). 45  
 
According to Abu Zayd: ‘It is not enough to invoke modern hermeneutics to justify the 
historicity and hence the relativity of every mode of understanding, while in the meantime 
claiming that our modern interpretation is more appropriate and more valid’. Rhouni 
(2010:257) joins Abu Zayd in search of ‘a coherent and confident contextual approach’ and 
to overcome ‘the crisis of interpretation and counter-interpretation’ of the scripture. She 
argues that ‘by revisiting the concept of the Word of God’ or revelation, scholars can 
consider [the Qur’an androcentric discourse] as historical and contextual rather than eternal 
and divine’ (Rhouni 2010:252). The idea of the historicity of the Qur’an is theorised by the 
Iranian scholar Abdolkarim Soroush (2000) who maintains that ‘revelation is a phenomenon 
that adapts itself to the environment and takes on the colour of the environment in every 
way’.  
 
These critical approaches can help to transform the system of knowledge among Muslims 
from scripture-based to reason-based knowledge. I see this route as necessary in coming to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45According to Abu Zayd (2013:154) the different discourses of the Qur’an were collected, arranged and written down in the 
mushaf after the passage of the Prophet. The chronological revelation of the verses is not the same arrangement in the 
mushaf. ‘The mushaf gave the Qur’an the form of a book, which in its turn redefined the Qur’an as a text.    
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terms with Islamism and what has been called by Tibi (1988) as the ‘crisis of modern Islam’ 
– and in avoiding inadequate interpretative methods that unwittingly legitimise the goal of 
Islamists to present the Qur’an as a comprehensive text with valid answers for all aspects of 
life. I argue in the following chapters that interpretations and counter-interpretations of the 
Qur’an and Sunna have trapped Muslim human rights defenders in an open-ended religious 
argument, and blocked other ways of thinking. Finally, the debate on Islamic law and 
international human rights has been mostly concerned with the substance of Islamic law, 
without addressing other human rights limitations which are inherent in ‘the very system of 
those forms of political organisation that are premised on state enforcement of religious law’ 
(Temperman 2010:189). I submit that the challenge in the thought of the MB and other 
Islamists in general is not just related to the expansion or restriction of the substance of rights 
provided under the model of the Islamic state, but the idea of Islamic law as the state law 
itself obstructs the development of human rights-based citizenship.  .          
 
 
4. Conclusions  
This chapter has addressed the main conceptual and theoretical issues that arise in debates on 
Islamism, Islamic law and international human rights, and has examined the influence of 
Islam and Islamic law in Egypt’s constitutional and legal system. One of the key purposes of 
human rights, as underlined in this chapter, is the management of diversity, and the peaceful 
coexistence of individuals with different religious, sexual, ethnic, linguistic, social and 
political backgrounds in societies. Despite the progress achieved so far in determining its 
scope, the disputes over the meaning of international human rights is a salient and ongoing 
feature of the international human rights system, involving states, non-states actors and 
international and regional human rights organs.  
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In this chapter, I have examined different theoretical perspectives that address possible 
tensions between Islamic law and international human rights. It is clear that while Islamists 
can develop their positions on many human rights from within traditional Islamic law, this 
approach has limitations. Namely, it fails to address possible tensions that can arise between 
human rights and clear texts in the Qur’an and Sunna. This approach also takes for granted 
the idea of applying Islamic law as the state law, without questioning the compatibility of the 
latter with the nature and history of Islamic law, or addressing the potential implications for 
human rights and citizenship in the modern nation state. Other Muslim scholars have 
questioned the principles and methods developed by traditional jurists and argued for 
epistemological and methodological shifts in the interpretation of Islamic sources.  
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Chapter Three: Human Rights under the Rule of Shari‘a 
 
This chapter examines the foundations of the MB’s legal thought. The first section discusses 
the MB’s approach to Islamic law and its enforcement in Egypt. The second section 
addresses the foundation of human rights in the thought of the group and its position on 
IHRL. The third section focuses on the debate over the constitution-making process in the 
post-Mubarak era, and the role of the MB in it.     
 
1. The State-Religion Relationship   
1.1 The Supremacy of Shari‘a 
The central idea of the MB’s thought is that Islam is a comprehensive system covering all 
aspects of life (al-Banna 2006:275. This comprehensive view of Islam has dominated the 
ideology of the MB until now and justifies the call for the establishment of the Islamic state 
and the application of shari‘a as state law (Amin 2005:44-59). According to al-Qaradawi 
(2001:7), Islam should guide and regulate all spheres of Islamic society: its morals, policies, 
constitution, laws, economy, and arts. He adds that this Islamic society should replace current 
societies in the Muslim world that comprise different forms of Islam and jahiliyya (al-
Qaradawi 2001:7). According to the prominent Islamist ideologue Fathi Yakan (2004:97), 
‘the task of the Islamist movements is to restore the Islamic society which derives its laws 
from the Qura’n and Sunna’. The Former General Guide of the MB, Hassan Al-Hudaiby 
(1952), explained the MB’s slogan, ‘the Qur’an is our Constitution’, stating that the group 
believes that the guidance of the Qur’an covers the constitutional, legal, and political realm, 
and it also provides Muslims with a comprehensive approach by which to purify and reform 
morals, and prevent crimes. In the literature of the MB, this comprehensive approach is a 
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fundamental feature of the cultural and political independence of Muslim societies (al-Banna 
2006:151; al-Qaradawi 1974; al-Shawi 1987; Ghanim 2012).  
 
 
For the MB, the application of shari‘a is a religious obligation for Muslims, and evidence 
from the Qur’an is invoked to support this belief. Amongst these verses are those revealed in 
Surat al-Ma’ida which say that ‘those who do not judge according to what God has revealed 
are rejecting God’s teachings (Qur’an 5:44) . . . are doing grave wrong . . .  (Qur’an 5:45) . . . 
are lawbreakers (Qur’an 5:47)’.46 Other verses are also cited to support this proposition 
(Qur’an 4:60-65; 24:47-51; 33:36). Al-Qaradawi (2005c:101-112) argues that these verses 
establish that the submission of Muslims to the orders of God and the Prophet is part of the 
Islamic creed. According to al-Qaradawi (2005c:107) deviation from shari‘a is a grave sin 
and a Muslim can be declared an apostate if he/she intentionally denies the application of 
shari‘a.  
 
According to (Jirishah 1986a; al-Shawi 1987), the supremacy of shari‘a is the source of 
legitimacy of the Islamic state. Accordingly, no provisions in the constitution or legislation 
can override shari‘a. The ijtihad of Muslims is derived only from the Qur’an and Sunna but it 
does not override them (Jirisha 1986a: 224-225). Al-Shawi (1987) argues that the doctrine of 
consultation (shura) is the Islamic model of democracy whereby popular sovereignty is 
restricted by the doctrine of the supremacy of shari‘a. In this model the people are the source 
of political power but sovereignty lies in the divine law. The Former Guide of the MB 
Mustafa Mashhur (1987:10) explained that the application of shari‘a as a principle cannot be 
put to the approval of people or their representatives in the parliament because Muslims are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46The Arabic word used for judge in these Verses is yahkum. Those who do not judge (yahkum) by the revelation of God are 
kafirun, al-zalimun, and al-munafiqun.  
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obliged to apply shari‘a. He added that the function of the parliament is only to discuss and 
suggest suitable procedures and mechanisms for the application of shari‘a.          
 
It was only in the 1971 Constitution that the principles of Islamic shari‘a became a main 
source of legislation in Egypt. Article 149 of the Constitution of 1923 referred to ‘Islam as 
the official religion of the state’.47 For the MB, Article 149 meant that all legislation should 
be consistent with shari‘a (al-Banna 2006:360).48 In 1952, the MB proposed a model of an 
Islamic constitution.49 Article 1 said that ‘Egypt is an Islamic state of a parliamentary 
system’. It continues to assert that all laws should be consistent with the rulings and teachings 
of Islam (Articles 10, 44, 45, 48, 63 and 102), and the constitutional clauses on the 
supremacy of Islam are not amendable (Article 101). During the 1970s, the MB advocated 
for the modification of Article 2 of the Constitution, so that Islamic law would become the 
main source of legislation, rather than one of various sources. It also pressured the 
government, along with other Islamists, to codify Islamic laws in the different fields of law 
(al-Qaradawi 1974:83; Jirisha 1976:4; ‘Ashmawi 1976:39-41;). In doing so, the MB official 
magazine called on Egyptian judges to judge directly according to Article 2 without waiting 
for legislation, and to refrain from applying laws that are inconsistent with Islamic law 
(Tammam 1981:24-26). Some judges sympathised with this call and in some cases examined 
in lower courts, they used Article 2 to justify their direct application of Islamic 
law.50However, higher courts overruled these judgments (Ghurab 1986- ‘Ashmawi 1981:12-
13).      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Article 149 of Royal Decree No.42/1923 Establishing Constitutional Regime in Egypt.   
48 Al-Banna (1938) sent a memorandum to the Minister of Justice urging the government to repeal all laws that were 
inconsistent with shari‘a..    
49 The MB adopted this draft constitution on 26/9/1952, see al-Bahnasawi (2006: 134) and al-Da‘wa (1978:18-19).         
50 For instance, in criminal cases, judges in some lower courts bypassed Egypt’s Penal Code and referred to Islamic (hudud) 
and Islamic criminal procedures in their judgments. Other judges invalidated the payment of interest, arguing that it is a form 
of usury (riba) that is prohibited under Article 2 of the 1971 Constitution. Other judges applied Egypt’s laws but in their 
judgments, they urged the government to comply with Islamic law. For samples of these cases, see Ghurab (1986).      
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In the 1980s, the application of shari‘a had been a central issue in the political platforms of 
the MB (1987). In the Reform Initiative of 2004, the MB (2004:322) asserted that its 
objective is ‘comprehensive reform through constitutional and legal channels to apply the 
shari‘a of God as a way to reform the state and religion’. It also stated that the application of 
shari‘a requires the formation of pious Muslim citizens and families then the Islamic 
government. The MB’s documents do not give detailed information about the interpretive 
methods used by the group to define the content of Islamic law. Since its establishment, the 
MB has not aligned itself with any particular school of law, involving members whose 
juristic backgrounds are diverse. However, the MB reiterates that Muslims who engage in 
ijtihad should be trained in the methods of Islamic jurisprudence (Amin 2005:297). In The 
Message of Teachings, al-Banna (2006:275) explained that ‘the Qur'an and Sunna are the 
reference points for every Muslim to acquaint himself with the rules of Islam’. In his 
emphasis on the flexibly of Islamic law, al-Banna (2006:275) said: 
 
 
The opinion of an Imam or his deputy is acceptable in matters which are of 
proven benefit to the public, provided that his opinion does not conflict 
with any established principle of Islam. It may change in light of 
circumstances, customs and habits. 
 
In the Draft Party Programme of 2007, the MB (2007) stated for the first time that it accepted 
the interpretation of Article 2 introduced by the SCC, considering it a centrist Islamic vision. 
The FJP (2011a:3) asserted that the general objectives of shari‘a determine the public policy 
of the party, pointing out that the eternal and unchangeable part of shari‘a is the fixed rulings 
of shari‘a governed by certain texts in their meaning and authenticity. Other rulings are 
derived through ijtihad according to changing time and place and the achievement of justice 
and interest. Nevertheless, I prove in the following chapters that the MB has not translated its 
talk about the flexibility of Islamic law into moderate positions on certain human rights. 
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Furthermore, the MB used the 2012 Constitution to curtail the SCC’s approach to Islamic law 
(see further below Section 3). 
 
1.2 Civil State with Islamic Background 
In the post-Mubarak era, the MB has repeatedly stated that it aims to establish a civil state 
with an Islamic background. The group coined this term as a response to critics who argue 
that the MB attempts to establish a ‘theocratic’ or ‘religious’ state. Most Egyptian liberals 
and leftists use the term civil state (dawla madaniyya) to avoid the popular criticism of the 
term secular state that has been always been portrayed by Islamists as anti-religion or atheist 
(Tadros 2012a:50). Those liberals have a different conception of the civil state than Islamists, 
but for many Egyptian liberals reference to the civil state does not necessarily mean the total 
exclusion of Islamic law as part of state law.      
 
‘Issam al-‘Iriyan (2011: 27-28) argues in a document published in 2011 by the MB that the 
Islamic state is presented as neither a theocracy nor a secular state. It is a state where the 
majority of its population are Muslims and its legislation is derived from shari‘a, with the 
general function of fulfilling the interests of its people in this life and the hereafter. 
According to the document, the source of powers in the Islamic state is the people, while 
state institutions protect the teachings of Islam (al-‘Iriyan 2011:30-31). In this state there is 
no clergy that monopolises religious knowledge or speaks on behalf of God because Muslim 
jurists are experts in their field and any Muslim can be trained to become a jurist (al-‘Iriyan 
2011:15-16). Al-‘Iriyan (2011b:22-24) argues that the Islamic state is a constitutional and 
contractarian state, and that the presidency is a contract between the president and the 
representatives of the nation. The scholar maintains that in modern democratic constitutional 
states the elected parliaments are the representative of the nation. The regulations of this state 
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and its institutions, as well as the rights and liberties of its citizens are stipulated in a 
constitution, and according to al-‘Iriyan (2011:44-45) this constitution is based on the 
principles of shari‘a. State institutions govern in accordance with God’s revelation. 
Consultation (shura) is performed by an elected parliament whose outcomes are obligatory 
for the executive.  
 
It should be noted that historically there was no agreement within the MB on the obligatory 
nature of shura. Al-Banna maintained that shura is only instructive for the ruler. Other 
scholars of the MB such as al-Qaradawi, al-Ghazali, and al-Shawi argue that the imam should 
comply with the decisions of the representatives of the nation (Tadros 2012a:61-62). In 1994, 
a document published by the MB (1994) on the doctrine of shura in Islam asserted that this 
doctrine is practiced in modern democratic states through elected parliaments, whose 
decisions are obligatory for the executive. However, in Islamic states the parliament 
legislates in accordance with Islamic law.  
 
Al-‘Iriyan has pointed out that the SCC oversees the compatibility of these laws with the 
principles of shari‘a. Nevertheless, in the literature of the MB there is a tendency to ensure 
that Muslim scholars who are trained in Islamic law participate in the law-making process. 
Al-Banna (2006:667) advocated the reform of the electoral law at this time to make sure that 
certain categories of qualified people, including Muslim jurists, are represented in the 
parliament. Al-Shawi (1987) proposed an elected council of jurists should take part in the 
legislative process. In its Draft Party Programme of 2007, the MB proposed the establishment 
of a council of jurists to assist parliament in making laws that are consistent with shari‘a. The 
document did not set out the exact powers of the council, whether its decisions would be 
obligatory, or the mechanisms of choosing its members (the MB 2007). This proposal has 
been subject to harsh critique by commentators and political forces who opposed the idea of 
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giving legal powers or any kind of advantages to a religious council (Brown and Hamzawy 
2010:19-20). In 2011, the FJP (2012:28) emphasised that the SCC is the competent organ to 
review the constitutionality of laws. However, the 2012 Constitution obliged the Parliament 
to consult a religious body on the content of shari‘a (see further below Section 3).         
 
On the other hand, Egyptian liberals do not share the meaning of the application of shari‘a 
upheld by the MB. Some of them have advocated for a significant departure from traditional 
Islamic law; in their proposed civil state, shari‘a could still represent a source of reference for 
society, but in its ethical meaning and not as specific rulings (al-‘Ashmawi 1996:182-193; 
Foda 1993). However, in the public debate over the new constitution of Egypt in the post-
Mubarak era, most liberal forces did not call for the abolition of the reference to Islamic law 
in the constitution (Said 2012).51 Rather, human rights defenders and some liberal political 
activists proposed basic provisions by which to protect citizenship and human rights (CIHRS 
et al 2011), while other liberals have attempted to soften the constitutional and legal impact 
of a constitutional provision on Islamic law though a general reference to religious values as 
a source of legislation among other sources.52    
 
This does not mean, however, that there have been no voices in Egypt calling for a secular 
state. Writing in the 1980s, Faraj Foda (2005:7-26) argued that to portray the secular state as 
anti-religion is to be ignorant of its meaning; in the secular state, authorities perform their 
functions in accordance with a constitution that ensures equality between all citizens, and 
guarantees religious freedom without restrictions. He asserts that legislation is made on the 
basis of public and private interest; that the system of governance is civil with its legitimacy 
gained from the constitution and the law, and that it should be committed to international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 For instance, Article 2 of the 1971 Constitution was copied in a draft constitution prepared by al-Wafd Party (2012).  
52See the draft constitution proposed by the leftist al-Tagammu‘ Party (‘Alam 2012).    
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human rights. Other Egyptian writers have pointed out that the term civil state is confusing 
and implies multiple conflicting definitions. Anwar Mughith (2011) suggests that liberals 
should not be reluctant to use the term secular state, instead, because he does not consider the 
secular state to be hostile to religion, but one that shows neutrality before all religions. 
According to Mughith, the cornerstone of such a state is comprised of the principles of 
equality and human rights, which should be stipulated in the constitution; he adds that in the 
secular state, lawmaking is based on rational deliberation among citizens and does not take 
the label of a certain religion.53  
 
A substantial amount of scholarship provides an evidential basis for the critique of the MB’s 
views on the place of Islam and Islamic law in its envisaged Islamic state. A lot of scholars 
have established certain arguments based on the historical reality of Islamic law in order to 
challenge the authenticity of the Islamic state model (An-Na‘im 2008; Hallaq 2012; Tibi 
2012; Iqtidar 2011). Historically, Islamic law was developed and applied at large by jurists 
and judges, and not by the ruler (Layish 2004). With the expansion of the Islamic empire and 
administration, there was a double administration of the legal affairs of the Muslim 
community, whereby the substance of shari‘a became under the jurisdiction of Muslim jurists 
and judges, and the ruler dominated the secular sphere of politics (siyasa) (Schacht 1982:54; 
Tibi 2012:160). Hallaq (2009:74) states that in ‘the functioning of pre-modern siyasa, the 
political regimes were subordinated to independent shari‘a, whereas in modernity the state 
has come to sit on top of a largely dismantled shari‘a’. Under the modern trend of shari‘a-
based order propagated by Islamists, shari‘a has become the supreme law in the constitution, 
and certain laws are codified and labeled Islamic and applied by the coercive powers of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 A group of Egyptian academics and political activists under the leadership of Murad Wihba (2006), professor of 
philosophy, held a conference in Cairo in 2006 to defend the separation between state and religion in Egypt and explicitly 
called for the removal of Islamic law from the Constitution. Wihba (2012) continued his advocacy for the secular state after 
Mubarak.  
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state. As noted by Tibi (2012: 160), this is ‘an invention made by Islamism of a non-existent 
Islamic tradition of law’.                      
        
Al-‘Ashmawi (1996:35-38) explained that the word shari‘a is mentioned just once in the 
Quran (45:18), and it meant at the time of revelation ‘the way or path of God or Islam’, not 
specific legal rulings that should be applied by Muslims at all times. The term was given a 
legal meaning by Muslim jurists in later stages of history. In the words of Tibi (2011:159) ‘all 
other uses of the term are post-Qur’anic constructions’. In his explanation of the three verses 
in Sura al-ma’ida that label those who do not judge by the revelation of God as unbelievers, 
sinful or lawbreakers, al-‘Ashmawi (1987:41-42;1996:46:47) argued that these verses were 
revealed in specific historical circumstances when the Prophet was arbitrating between Jews 
in a specific case.54 The word al-hukm in the Qur’an (4:58) means judge, arbitrating among 
disputants (the Qur’an 39:3) or wisdom (the Qur’an 12:22; 26:21; 45:16; 6:89). In these 
verses the word hukm does not mean the political authority. Al-‘Ashmawi (1987:38-39) 
addressed other verses in the Qur’an (4:65; 4:105) cited by Islamists to establish that 
Muslims should judge by the revelation of God, and concluded that these verses were 
directed only to the Prophet, who communicated directly with God through the revelation. 
Al-‘Ashmawi (1996:68) maintained that the interpretation of the Qur’an should start from the 
causes of revelation (asbab al-nuzul) and not the occasions of revelation (munasabat al-
nuzul). He argues that the former approach interprets the texts against the context of 
revelation, but the latter leads to the erroneous generalisation of certain rulings that were 
revealed in specific circumstances.   
  
The introduction of Islamic law as the state law as understood by the MB, is likely to limit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54In the interpretation of these verses, al-‘Ashmawi has cited famous classical books of the Qur’an exegesis for al-Tabari, al-
Suyuti, al-Baydawi, al-Wahidi, al-Nasfi and al-Zamakhsari (al-‘Shmawi 1987:42).  
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the scope of constitutional rights. There are also other concerns inherent ‘in the very system 
of those forms of political organisation that are premised on state enforcement of religious 
laws’ (Temperman 2010:189-190). Before discussing these concerns, it is important to note 
Bielefeldt’s distinction (2013:55) between ‘political secularism’ and ‘doctrinal secularism’. 
The former ‘operate[s] in the service of a non-discriminatory implementation of freedom of 
religion or belief for every one’, but the secular world view in the latter ‘claims an 
ideological priority over freedom of religion or belief’. In addition, the practical meaning of 
state neutrality towards religious communities is also of course contentious (Boothby 1998). 
An obvious example is found in the case-law of the ECtHR, where the Court held that 
prohibiting schoolteachers from wearing the headscarf is an acceptable limitation under the 
ECHR in order to maintain the neutrality of education and protect children’s religious 
freedom.55 In another case the Court found that the crucifix on the wall of a school classroom 
in Italy is a passive symbol with no influence on religious beliefs of students nor the 
neutrality of the educational process.56   
 
Nevertheless, in this section I discuss a model of strong identification between state and 
religion in which the state is clearly biased in its legislation and policies on specific religious 
belief, and monopolises the right to interpret its content. I submit that this brings far-reaching 
consequences on religious minorities and non-religious people. It is argued that the law-
making process under a constitutional provision that makes any religion the main source of 
legislation lacks ‘transparency, legal certainty and checks and balances’ (Temperman 
2010:196). It will be always up to the parliament and judiciary to introduce certain 
interpretations of shari‘a. Each parliamentarian majority will claim its correct understanding 
of shari‘a, and consequently, the law-making process is not an outcome of inclusive and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See Dahlab v. Switherland, ECtHR, 15 January 2011. See also Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, ECtHR, 29 June 2004    
56 See Latusi and Others v. Italy, ECtHR, 18 March 2011.   
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reasonable deliberation between parliamentarians.  
 
Moreover, the powers of the elected parliament to make laws in accordance with shari‘a is 
monitored by other supreme organs, whether a constitutional court or a council of jurists, and 
those who dominate these supreme organs are thus able to define what constitutes religion, 
and impose their religious views on all citizens. This preferential treatment of a certain 
religion in the constitutional and legal process undermines state neutrality towards the 
religious beliefs of the people, and alienates those who believe in other religions, since they 
will be required to follow the religious rationale of the dominant religion in the law making 
process. The Islamic model of citizenship proposed by the MB requires all citizens to admit 
the moral superiority of Islamic law and values as a precondition for being a citizen in the 
state, which is not impartial. Citizens must debate laws and policies within the limitations of 
the dominant religious worldview. It is difficult to call this an equal citizenship between 
Muslim and non-Muslims.  
 
On the interpretive methods of Islamic law, the MB portrays the traditional science of 
jurisprudence as the only legitimate way to derive law from Islamic sources. This traditional 
construction reflects religious thought of Muslims in specific time and space and according to 
other Muslim scholars (An-Na‘im 1990; 2008; Al-‘Ashmawi 1996), it is not an eternal and 
uncontested tenet of Islam. The MB asserts that in the Islamic state no one monopolises the 
interpretation of shari‘a, and that ijtihad is open for all Muslims. However, in reality a certain 
understanding of Islam is institutionalised and protected by the state as the authentic reading 
of the tradition. Thus, any religious thought that diverts from the mainstream version of 
Islamic law can be considered heresy. This conclusion is supported by evidence in chapters 
three and four of this thesis which show that the MB has systematically discredited the 
religious piety of other Muslims for their different religious views.  
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Even though secular political parties can be established in the Islamic state, the recognition of 
shari‘a as the supreme law of the state would jeopardise political pluralism and the right of 
individuals to participate in the conduct of public affairs. Contesting political parties would 
have limited political choices, and would have to justify their policies and proposed laws in 
Islamic and not secular terms. As stated by Temperman (2010:309) ‘concrete legislative 
decisions will not be made because they are supported by the majority of the people, but 
because they are the only decisions permitted’. If non-Islamist forces replace Islamist 
majority in parliament, the outcomes of legislative processes are still limited by the dominant 
Islamic law unless the whole constitution is modified. An-Na‘im (2008:85) has clarified in 
this regard that ‘civic reason and reasoning processes are required for the adoption of public 
policy and legislation in a democratic state because they are publicly contestable by all 
citizens’.   
 
Individuals in all societies adhere to different moral and religious doctrines and world views. 
This plurality needs to be justly and peacefully reconciled without coercing individuals to 
concede to a specific moral or religious worldview. This was the concern of the liberal 
philosopher John Rawls (2005) in his theory of political liberalism. This theory does not 
require citizens to abandon their moral convictions to participate in the political sphere but to 
accept minimum rules of equal citizenship that are necessary for a well-ordered society in 
which citizens settle their fundamental differences in accordance with an idea of public 
reason. According to this concept ‘the political value of a public life [is] conducted on terms 
that all reasonable citizens can accept as fair’ (Rawls 2005:98). As an alternative to the 
Islamic state, An-Na‘im (2008) has proposed the secular state, in which laws reflect the 
contribution of all citizens regardless of their religious affiliation. According to An-Na‘im, 
the process of open and inclusive deliberation of laws and policies known as ‘public reason’ 
or ‘civil reason’ is the essence of equal citizenship. This understanding of citizenship is 
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necessary, according to An-Na‘im (2008:34), to manage religious diversity in modern 
territorial states. Muslims’ right to citizenship is dependent on their recognition of non-
Muslim equal right to citizenship. Muslims themselves will be able to freely live their own 
understanding of Islam much better than in an Islamic state where a specific understanding of 
Islam is enforced by state authorities (An-Na’im 2008:1-2).  
  
Temperman (2010:151) explains that many human rights scholars have held that the 
‘establishment of religion is not per se in conflict with human rights law’. But this view has 
been challenged by another argument to the effect that ‘the rights of people adhering to non-
dominant and non-traditional religions, and the rights of non-believers, may in fact be ipso 
facto threatened by the existence and preservation of an official religion’ (Temperman 
2010:160)57. Under Article 18 of the ICCPR ‘a person may not be ‘subject to coercion which 
would impair one’s right to freely choose a religion or belief’. The UN Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt (2013:52) has held that:  
 
In order to operate as the guarantor of freedom of religion or belief for 
everyone in a fair and non-discriminatory manner, the state should not 
identify itself with one particular religion or belief and, in this sense, should 
remain neutral.   
 
UN treaty bodies have repeatedly noted ‘the difficulty of reconciling the very existence of an 
established religion with the state’s human rights obligations’ (Tempera 2010:150-151). As 
argued by Durham (1996:16) and Temperman (2010:160-196), equality and non-
discrimination is not reconcilable with the strong model of identification between state and 
religion. The superiority of religious law in the state is an example of this model. Those who 
argue that the establishment of religion is not per se incompatible with human rights draw on 
General Comment No.22 of the Human Rights Committee. In this opinion, the HRC has held 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 See De Long (2000), Durham (1996), Brugger (2007) and Shelton and Kiss (1996).   
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that ‘states where a religion is recognised as a state religion or that it is established as official 
or traditional or that its followers comprise the majority of the population’ should respect the 
substance of the ICCPR.58 However, the reference in this sentence is made to weak forms of 
identification between state and religion, and not to making the law of a specific religion the 
supreme source of legislation.  
 
2. Reactions to International Human Rights 
In this section, I address the foundation of human rights as proposed in the literature of the 
MB, and explore the extent to which this theoretical foundation is reconcilable with IHRL. I 
then assess the interplay between the concepts of rights and religious duties and obligations 
in the philosophy of human rights proposed by the MB. I also discuss the MB’s stances on 
international human rights treaties and their application in Egypt.            
 
2.1 The Historical Roots of Human Rights in Islam 
One often finds in the literature of the MB an assertion that the origins of human rights date 
back to Islam, and that the protection of human rights in Islam is more advanced than in any 
other culture and religion in the world. According to the basic documents on human rights 
published by the group: ‘Islam is the only ideological and political system that has honoured 
man and humanity to the utmost degree’ (MB 1995; al-Hudaiby 1999:33). Tawfik Al-Wa’i 
(2001:39) states that ‘Islam was the first to stipulate human rights when the world was living 
in a state of darkness and slavery’. Al-Ghazzali (2005b:6) stated that ‘human rights principles 
which were previously exported by early Muslims to other peoples are being exported today 
to us by the West as a distinctive human achievement’. He added that the discovery of these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 HRC GC 22. para.9.  
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principles was something new for the West but not for Muslims. Mahmoud Ghuzlan 
(2011:98) writes that Islam guaranteed individual liberties fourteen centuries before they 
became recently known.59 This trend is also found in the early writings of the MB on 
constitutional rights in Islam, where writers have also attempted to show that Islam 
established individual rights and liberties many centuries before Western positive 
constitutions and laws (‘Auda 1960:24-47).  
 
This defensive tone is shared by many other Islamic human rights schemes. As noted by 
Mayer (2012:59) the authors of these schemes have asserted that ‘human rights originated in 
Islam, asserting falsely that the Western and international principles from which they are 
heavily borrowing are the derivative ones’. 60 In most cases, the sources under assessment in 
this section presents new interpretations of Islamic sources after their authors have been 
influenced by the content of the international human rights framework. For instance, in his 
comparative study on human rights in Islam and the UDHR, al-Ghazzali cited verses from the 
Qur‘an and Sunna and referred to certain historical precedents to prove that certain rights 
were recognised in Islam. He did not however explain that his interpretation of the tradition 
in many cases is new and that pre-modern Muslim jurists did not interpret Islamic sources in 
the same way. Mayer has addressed this point in her critical analysis of the work of the 
Islamist ideologue, al-Mawdudi, and concludes that: 
 
 
There is an utter failure to deal with the historical reality that, although 
research in the Islamic sources may uncover ideas that have foreshadowed 
human rights principles, Islamic statements of human rights principles did 
not appear until after IHRL was produced (Mayer 2012:59).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The same assertion made by al-Bahnasawi (2003:110), al-Qaradawi (1998: 178) and Jirisha (1986b: 25-26).  
60 In her book, Mayer (2012) analyses Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, Universal Islamic Declaration of Human 
Rights, the writings of the Pakistani Islamist al-Mawdudi and Iranian scholar Tabandeh.  
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This critical assessment of the methodological flaws in the position of the MB on Islam and 
human rights does not suggest that Islamic traditions are irrelevant to international human 
rights. Human values can be found in the different cultures of the world. As argued by 
Donnelly (1982), pre-modern cultures had multiple means by which to express appreciation 
of human dignity, social justice, and solidarity. However, it was in the West in the 18th 
century when, for the first time, the idea of rights as individual entitlements against society 
and state was theorised and formalised in the constitutional and legal system of modern 
nation states. Donnelly (2009) argues that this idea was new and radical for Western and non-
Western societies. International human rights treaties in the 20th century represented another 
new wave of thinking about human rights, by which all human beings are endowed with 
inherent human rights by the virtue of their humanity. 
 
Baderin (2001:85) holds that Muslim jurists knew a system of legal rights under Islamic fiqh, 
arguing that ‘rights are . . . interwoven with duties under Islamic law. The two are seldom 
treated in isolation of each other’. A right enjoyed by certain individuals requires the 
fulfilment of duties by others. However, Abou El Fadl (2009:153) states that: ‘Muslim jurists 
did not imagine a set of unwavering and generalised rights that are to be held by each 
individual at all times. Rather, they thought of individual rights as arising from a legal cause 
brought about by the suffering of a legal wrong’.    
 
Historical traditions of Muslims introduce valuable sources and precedents for Muslims 
today that can certainly help develop an Islamic approach to human rights, but the defensive 
strategy applied by the MB and its scholars is not helpful in the harmonisation of Islamic 
law with international human rights. This strategy fails to address the conceptual differences 
between modern human rights and the historical legal traditions of Muslims. This difference 
is not unique to the traditions of Muslims; international human rights challenge inherited 
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traditions in Western and non-Western societies alike (Donnelly 2009). A historical analysis 
of human rights in Islam should examine the tradition in its own terms and institutions. It 
appears that this defensive strategy has been motivated by a desire to defend Islam and 
shari‘a against accusations of backwardness and inferiority, but for Islamist movements, the 
defensive strategy also legitimates their political struggle to establish the Islamic state and 
the application of shari‘a. 
    
2.2 Human Rights: Its Sources and Limitations 
The MB holds that respect for human rights in Islam is a religious duty and obligation, and 
that the major sources of rights are the Qur‘an and Sunna. The Former General Guide of the 
group Ma’mn al-Hudaiby (1997) wrote that: 
 
 
From the beginning, Islam has protected the blood, privacy, property and 
honour of all individuals and considered any violation of these sanctities a 
forbidden act or sin. It has also made their protection a religious duty and 
an Islamic act of devotion, even if non-Muslims do not oblige themselves 
with such standards.   
 
Similarly, Ali Jirisha (1986b) stated that human rights in Islam are sanctities (hurumat), 
proposing the expression ‘the sanctities of human beings’ rather than human rights, to show 
the extraordinary status of human rights in Islam.61 Al-Qaradawi (2007c:190) argues that the 
philosophy of human rights in Islam is founded on the extraordinary value of human beings 
and human dignity in the Qur‘an and Sunna. According to him, when Muslims fulfil their 
duties, they consequently enhance human rights because each right has a correspondent duty 
in Islam, and emphasises that duties and obligations in Islam take priority over the language 
of rights as human beings are accountable (mukalaf) to God (Al-Qaradawi 2007c:194-195). 
Al-Qaradawi (2007c:47-48) adds that the substance of human rights in Islam can evolve 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61See also ‘Umara (1985).   
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through ijtihad, by which Muslims can accommodate new developments in the field of 
human rights provided that they are consistent with the texts of the Qur‘an and Sunna.       
 
The argument that human rights in Islam reach the status of religious duties, obligations or 
sanctities stimulates believers to be committed to these rights in order to fulfill their 
obligations to God. However, problems arise when certain aspects of shari‘a are inconsistent 
with international human rights. The practice of ijtihad, as proposed by al-Qaradawi, is 
limited by the texts of Islamic sources, and has not enabled him to solve substantive tensions 
between Islamic law and certain international human rights as such equality between men and 
women, and Muslims and non-Muslims. Moreover, the emphasis on shari‘a as the main 
source of rights and duties blurs the boundaries between the voluntary religious duties of 
individual Muslims and the law enforced by the state. A state might believe that certain rules 
are necessary to maintain religious duties, yet these rules prevent the enjoyment of 
international human rights. For instance, Jirisha (1986b: 63-66) suggested that in Islam, the 
state should protect, amongst other sanctities, the sanctity of women. For Jirisha, this 
protection in reality means restricting the rights and liberties of women in the public and 
private spheres.      
 
Moreover, the foundation of rights as religious obligations defined by shari‘a obstructs the 
possibility of developing an Islamic rational foundation of rights that appeal universally. It is 
understood from Article 1 of the UDHR that each individual in the universe can recognise 
his/her human rights by appealing to human reason and conscience.62 This does not exclude 
the role of religion as a basis of human rights but, as argued by An-Na‘im (1990), Islamic 
sources are open to renewal and reinterpretation by Muslims. The position of the MB, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Article 1 of the UDHR.  
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however, resembles many other Islamists who ‘uphold the primacy of revelation over reason’ 
(Mayer 2012:48). In the words of Tibi (1994:297) this is the major source of the conflict that 
lies between ‘a man (reason) - centered and a cosmological theocentric view of the world’.  
 
In the thought of the MB, the cultural interaction between Muslims and international human 
rights norms is determined in accordance with the idea that Islamic morality is superior to all 
other cultures. Consequently, in the literature of the MB, shari‘a qualifies the acceptance of 
international human rights norms. The call for values that are inconsistent with shari‘a is seen 
by Jirisha (1986b:74) as an attack on Islam. Al-Wa‘i (2001:41) states that ‘the Muslim 
society is not free to deviate from the principles of Islam . . . Muslims cannot accept apostasy 
or the freedom to disseminate immorality (al-fawahish)’. The intrusion of religious morality 
into the sphere of state law is problematic. Muslims are free to identify certain conduct as 
sinful but according to IHRL, certain conduct may not be prohibited and criminalised under 
domestic law. Al-Qaradwai (2007:200), affirms that international human rights documents 
can be accepted generally but the application of these instruments should consider the 
cultural particularities in each society. For instance, he expresses his opposition to many 
articles in the CEDAW as being incompatible with Islamic law. He explains his position by 
saying that ‘the Muslim nation would not abandon the rulings of its shari`a to comply with 
the UN’s rules’.   
 
MB theorists address the issue of constitutional rights and human rights in Islamic terms and 
within the boundaries of Islamic law. In the early period of its history, the group did not 
oppose the concepts of modern constitutionalism, such as limiting the powers of the ruler, 
representative democracy and the rights and liberties of citizens. Early MB ideologues 
asserted that these concepts are not alien to Islamic traditions (‘Auda 1960:10-28; 1977b:105-
123). Nevertheless, ‘Auda (1960:28-29) understood these rights as to be within certain 
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Islamic restrictions. For example, he advocated the privileged position of men over women as 
a justifiable exception to the principle of equality.    
 
Human rights have been present in the political platforms of the MB since 1987. The 
electoral platform of the MB (1987) in 1987 stated that ‘human rights should form a basis for 
constitutional, legal, and political reform’. The Draft Programme of 2007 (MB 2007) asserted 
that: ‘Freedom, justice, and equality are gifts from God to human beings. They are inherent 
rights in all citizens regardless of belief, sex, and colour’. The FJP (2011a:3-4) points to 
certain universal values such as freedom, justice, rule of law, constitutionalism and 
democracy. According to the party, these values are products of the universal human 
heritage. The substance of human rights are however limited in these platforms by ambiguous 
reference to Islamic law and morality. The FJP (2011a:39) reiterates that IHRL provides for 
safeguards for the protection of human rights on a domestic level, but it clearly affirms the 
superiority of shari‘a over international treaties.   
 
Thus, many rights proposed and advocated by the MB intersect with international human 
rights norms. However, its literature is clear in stating that some international rights are not 
relevant to Muslim states and Islamic legal traditions; and while the differences between 
Islam and human rights are addressed, the group and its scholars have not invested 
intellectual efforts to overcome these differences. On the contrary, the political platforms of 
the MB and the FJP point out that Muslims take only from international human rights that 
which is consistent with their religious traditions; the MP literature does not however engage 
with the fact that this tradition is, however, understood by Muslims in different ways.   
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3. Shari‘a and Human Rights in the 2012 Constitution   
In this section, I address the MB’s approach to the constitution-making process in the post-
Mubarak era. The literature increasingly considers the constitution-making process to be a 
means to conflict resolution in divided societies (Hart 2002; Haysom 2005; Horowitz 2008; 
Hatchard et al. 2004:28-42).63 According to this view, durable constitutions are devised 
through inclusive, representative and transparent processes in which different political elites 
are ready to compromise and reach consensus. Landau (2013:926) maintains that ‘in many 
situations, the central challenge of the design of constitutional politics may be in finding 
ways to control uses of power, and in particular, in ensuring that powerful individuals and 
groups are not able to use the constitution-making process to impose unilateral projects’. This 
section shows that the constitution-making process in post-Mubarak Egypt intensified 
polarisation and the lack of trust between Islamists and non-Islamist forces, and was a factor 
behind increasing unrest, set against President Morsi and Islamists. In this process, all 
attempts to integrate efficient safeguards for human rights, citizenship, and the neutrality of 
the state towards religions in the new constitution failed. Political and civil forces as well as 
religious minorities that actively took part in the 2011 uprising were marginalised. The MB 
also used different legal and coercive measures to shield the constitution-making process 
from judicial oversight. The substance of the new constitution strongly reflected the 
ideological and political vision of the MB and its allies, who firmly resisted any attempts to 
negotiate the future of shari‘a in Egypt and refused to refer to international human rights 
treaties in the new constitution.  
 
Former president Mubarak transferred his power to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces 
(hereinafter the SCAF),64 which led Egypt’s transition from 11 February 2011 until August 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The Secretary General of the UN (2009) highlighted these principles.   
64 See Constitutional Declaration of Egypt, Official Gazette no.6bis of 13 February 2011, pp.3-4.     
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2012, when President Morsi gained full presidential powers, and settled his struggle with the 
SCAF.65 In the early months of the transition there was harmony between the SCAF and the 
MB. They agreed on a transitional plan whereby the SCAF suspended the 1971 
Constitution66 and formed a committee to prepare constitutional amendments; it was headed 
by a prominent Islamist jurist, Tariq al-Bishri, and included another leading member of the 
MB, Sobhi Salih. Liberal and leftist forces complained at the unrepresentative nature of the 
committee and its bias to Islamists (Moustafa 2012:3; Stilt 2011:7). This committee proposed 
that a new elected parliament would be entrusted with selecting members of the Constituent 
Assembly. The constitutional amendments also allowed for a competitive presidential 
election. This proposal engendered deep divisions between Islamists and liberals. Drawing on 
their organisational capacity, the MB and its Islamist allies were confident that they would 
gain the largest number of seats in Parliament and then lead the constitution-making process. 
Liberals opposed this plan, arguing that a consensual constitution must be devised before the 
parliamentary elections. They were concerned at the prospect of leaving the constitution-
making for a parliamentary majority that would be keen to defend its political interests, at the 
expense of an inclusive and participatory constitution (Stilt 2011:7-8).  
 
The proposed constitutional amendments were put to public referendum on 19 March 2011, 
and Islamists mobilised their constituencies to support these amendments. The supporters of 
the amendments argued that this was the best way to ensure stability and to retain 
constitutional institutions without delay. Islamists also argued that writing a new constitution 
before parliamentary elections might put the constitutional provisions of Islamic law at risk 
(Moustafa 2012:4). The constitutional amendments were approved in the public referendum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 President Morsi adopted a new constitutional declaration on 12 August 2012 where he took over presidential powers from 
the SCAF, see Constitutional Declaration, Official Gazette no.32 bis of 12 August 2012, p.3.  
66 Article 1 of Constitutional Declaration of Egypt, 13 February 2011.  
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and a new interim Constitutional Declaration was adopted by the SCAF on 30 March 2011.67 
Although the public referendum was about a package of constitutional amendments to the 
1971 Constitution, the SCAF incorporated the amendments into a new Constitutional 
Declaration that copied many articles from the suspended constitution. The Declaration gave 
the SCAF executive and legislative powers until the parliamentary and presidential elections 
were held, on 28 November 2011. The MB and the Salafist al-Nour Party led this parliament. 
The parliament convened from 23 January 2012 until 14 June 2012 when the SCC struck 
down the electoral law and dissolved the lower chamber, the People’s Assembly (see further 
below).  
 
To reduce the domination of Islamists over writing the new constitution, liberals advocated 
the development of a set of supra-constitutional principles on human rights, citizenship, and 
democratic governance to which the Constituent Assembly should be committed.68 The first 
document was proposed by the liberal opposition figure Muhammad al-Baradei on 26 June 
2011 and was sponsored by secular political groups such as the Egyptian Social Democratic 
Party. Some key Egyptian human rights organisations contributed to the development of the 
document as well. The document referred to the principles of shari‘a as the main source of 
legislation, however Article 10 of the document says that ‘nothing in the document can be 
interpreted in a way that gives the state, any groups, or individuals a right to threaten or 
violate the rights and liberties included in the document’. Moreover, article 11 provided that 
‘the rights included in the document are non-amendable, and non-derogable and that the 
violation of any of the document’s rights is a crime against the constitution’.69     
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Constitutional Declaration of Egypt, Official Gazette no.12 of 30 March 2011. 
68 One can mention the experience of South Africa where drafting the constitution was abided by a set of constitutional 
principles adopted by the Multi-Party Negoting Forum (MPNF) (Hatchard et al. 2004:37-38).   
69 See the text of the document in Ta‘lab (2011).   
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A coalition of 27 human rights NGOs proposed a draft bill of rights to be considered by the 
drafters of the new constitution. The manifestation of international human rights in this 
document was very clear. The coalition explicitly stated that its proposed bill of rights set 
‘guarantees for the protection of a secular state, as inspired by the values of the January 25 
Revolution’. In explaining its framework of reference, the document states that: 
 
 
All rights and guarantees found in international human rights conventions 
and international law must be incorporated as the base line for the new 
constitution and these sources of law should be the prime reference used to 
elaborate these rights in the constitution and in legislation (CIHRS et al 
2011). 
 
Instead of calling for the abolition of the constitutional clause on ‘the principles of shari‘a as 
the main source of legislation’, the document suggested that the new constitution should refer 
to multiple sources of legislation in Egypt to reflect the diversity in society, and to provide 
Egyptian citizens with different choices based on their beliefs. The document proposed the 
establishment of an independent constitutional council to be entrusted with the protection of 
the fundamental provisions from possible infringement by the parliamentary majority 
(CIHRS et al 2011).  
 
The FJP (2011c) rejected these principles, insisting that the elected parliament and the 
Constituent Assembly are the highest organs by which to define the content of the 
constitution. The FJP (2011c) also opposed this reference to international human rights, 
arguing that these treaties often ‘reflect Western conceptions of human rights’. Finally, the 
Party refused to identify the certain criteria by which the constituent assembly should be 
formed. According to the FJP, the elected parliament is the competent institution to set these 
criteria and choose the members of the assembly. After rejecting the previous two proposed 
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documents, the MB referred to another document produced in July 2011 by the Egyptian 
Democratic Alliance, a coalition that included 28 political parties aligned with the MB.  
 
Many articles of the document are similar to the content of the political platform of the FJP. 
The first principle recognised ‘Islam as the official religion of the state and that the principles 
of shari‘a are the main source of legislation’, and the document also reiterated that ‘religious 
values and moral principles are fundamental in the formation of human beings’. It stated that 
‘the nation should maintain its foundations (thawabit), its identity, and spiritual values which 
are established by monotheistic religions’. The document spoke about ‘the protection of 
public morals and religious values in the society’ and that ‘the respect of human rights is 
guaranteed in accordance with international treaties provided that they are not in conflict with 
Islamic shari‘a (al-Wafd Party 2011).  
 
The idea of having a set of constitutional principles was fully defeated in November 2011 
after the transitional government and the SCAF presented draft constitutional principles that 
‘sought to entrench the power of the military in domestic governance’ (Moustafa 2012:4). 
The document was initially suggested by the former Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Selmi, and 
its declared purpose was to address the fears of liberals and religious minorities by making 
sure that certain principles would guide the constituent assembly while they wrote the 
constitution, particularly the principles of human rights, citizenship, and democratic 
governance. However, the document proposed that the military budget should not be under 
civilian oversight for the purpose of national security and suggested that ‘the SCAF becomes 
exclusively competent to approve all bills relating to the armed forces before they come into 
effect’. Another controversial proposal was to entrust the army with defending constitutional 
legitimacy (Moustafa 2012: 4-5). Al-Selmi’s document triggered profound political outrage 
among many political forces including the MB. Although al-Selmi amended some of the 
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controversial provisions, the whole document was withdrawn under public pressure and the 
debate on the constitutional principles ended.   
 
Having the majority in Parliament, Islamists dominated the first Constituent Assembly 
selected by Parliament on 23 March 2012 (Ottaway and Brown 2012). However, the harmony 
between the SCAF and the MB did not last long. The vague language of certain articles in the 
Constitutional Declaration paved the way for judicial challenges to the parliament and the 
Constituent Assembly. On 10 April, the Court of Administrative Justice dissolved the first 
Constituent Assembly formed by Parliament on the grounds that Parliament’s members 
should not have been elected as members in the Constituent Assembly.70 On 14 June 2012, 
SCC struck down the electoral law under which the first post-Mubarak parliamentary election 
was held. The SCC held that the law discriminated between independent and partisan 
candidates by allowing the latter to run for elections as either part of party lists or individual 
candidates while the former could only run as individual candidates. The Court argued that 
the law violated the principle of equal opportunities among candidates, a well-established 
doctrine previously applied by the Court in 1986 and 1990.71 Many commentators at the time 
of drafting the electoral law had warned that the constitutionality of the law would be 
questionable, but the MB did not listen to the advice (Sha‘ban 2012). The SCAF was the only 
entity that had the power to amend the Constitutional Declaration to shield the law from the 
oversight of the SCC. It appears as though the SCAF wanted also to keep this constitutional 
ambiguity in order to be able to disrupt the political process if it went against its interests.  
 
The dissolution of Parliament allowed the SCAF to entrench its powers through an addendum 
to the Constitutional Declaration, released unilaterally by the SCAF on 18 June. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Court of Administrative Justice, Case no. 26657/66, 10 April 2012.  
71 Supreme Constitutional Court, Case no.20/34, 14 June 2012. On the jurisprudence of the Court on similar cases, see Case 
no.131/6, 16 May 1987 and Case no.37/9, 19 May 1990. See also Gabr (2000).    
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addendum gave the SCAF legislative powers until a new parliament was elected. It also 
allowed the SCAF to appoint a new constituent assembly if the Assembly formed by 
Parliament before its dissolution encountered an obstacle that would prevent it from 
completing its work. The Declaration included an ambiguous article that gave the SCAF and 
other organs the power to refer any draft constitution to the SCC ‘if they found that the new 
constitution contains one or more articles which conflict with the revolution’s goals and its 
main principles or which conflict with any principles agreed upon in all of Egypt’s former 
constitutions’. Moreover, the military set itself above all other civilian bodies. The 
Declaration stated that ‘the incumbent SCAF members are responsible for deciding on all 
issues related to the armed forces’. Article 54 of the Constitutional Declaration stated that ‘a 
council entitled the National Defence Council will be headed by the president and tasked 
with evaluating affairs concerned with means of security and its safety’.72 The structure of the 
Council was left to the law. On 19 June, the SCAF adopted a decree forming the Council that 
was overwhelmingly controlled by military leaders.73 
 
In his first two months in office, President Morsi backed by the MB underwent a power 
struggle with the military leaders. In a step seen as a challenge to the SCC, Morsi reconvened 
the previously dissolved lower chamber of the parliament by a presidential decree released on 
8 July 2012.74 The SCC considered this decision void and without any legal effect (al-Wafd 
Newspaper 2012b). However, the People’s Assembly met and decided to refer the ruling of 
the SCC to the Court of Cassation which, according to the MB was competent to decide on 
the legality of the status of members of Parliament. Morsi and the MB argued that they 
respected the ruling of the SCC and agreed that the Court had the power to decide on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 See Addendum to the Constitutional Declaration official Gazette no.24bis of 17 June 2012. 
73 See Supreme Council of Armed Forces Decree No.348/2012 Concerning the Membership of the National Defense 
Council, Official Gazette no.24 bis of 14 June 2012, pp. 5-6.    
74 See Presidential Decree No.11/2012, Official Gazette no.27bis of 8 July 2012.  
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immediate dissolution of the parliament, but that the timing of the implementation of the 
ruling was subject to the discretion of the executive (al-‘Iriyan 2012). The Court of Cassation 
decided that it was not competent to examine the case (al-Sharq al-Awsat 2012) and in 
another case, the Supreme Administrative Court also confirmed the judgment of the SCC.75  
 
President Morsi did not reconvene Parliament. Nevertheless, he was eventually able to 
endorse his powers as a president and settle his power struggle with the SCAF. Then, in a 
sudden and unexpected response to SCAF’s increasing grasp on power, on 12 August, 
President Morsi removed the top military leaders Field Marshal Tantawi, Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defence alongside his Chief of Staff Lieutenant, 
General Sami Anan, as well as other senior military leaders. He also declared the addendum 
of the SCAF’s Constitutional Declaration as null and void and replaced it with new 
amendments by virtue of which the SCAF’s legislative and constitutional powers were 
transferred to the president. The article that gave the power to the SCAF and other entities to 
refer the draft constitution to the SCC was deleted. The president also retained his powers 
over the military.76  
 
Before its dissolution by the SCC, the Islamist-led parliament had established the second 
Constituent Assembly that was also dominated by Islamists. Many liberal forces refused to 
join the second assembly (Ottaway 2012). President Morsi failed to deliver on his electoral 
promises to political forces that upon his elections, he would reconstitute the Constituent 
Assembly to reflect the diversity in Egyptian society (Hassan 2012). Moreover, on 22 
November 2012, President Morsi issued a Constitutional Declaration granting him immunity 
from any judicial oversight until a new constitution was enacted (Article 2). He unilaterally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 See Supreme Administrative Court, Case no 17355/66, 22 September 2011.  
76 See Constitutional Declaration, Official Gazette no.32 bis of 12 August 2012, p.3.  
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appointed a new General Prosecutor (Article 3), in violation of the Constitutional Declaration 
of 30 March 2011 and the Law of the Judicial Authority.77 This Declaration was used as a 
preventive measure from the President to obstruct the SCC and the State Council from 
examining cases related to the constitutionality of laws regulating the Constituent Assembly 
and the upper house of Parliament.78      
 
Liberal and leftist parties as well as human rights NGOs strongly opposed this step and 
escalated their street protests, demanding the immediate abolition of this declaration and the 
reconstitution of the Constituent Assembly. A wide number of judges across Egypt 
announced a strike, calling on the president to cancel the Declaration and annul the 
appointment of the new General Prosecutor (Daily News Egypt 2012). On 30 November 
2012, the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights, Navi Pillay (2012) expressed her deep 
concerns about the provisions of the Constitutional Declaration, considering it a grave 
encroachment on the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, access to justice and the 
right to effective remedy. She also expressed her dismay at the composition of the 
Constituent Assembly, affirming that ‘any proper constitution making process must include 
adequate representation of the full political spectrum, men and women, minorities, and civil 
society’. When the SCC refused to submit to the President, and announced that it would fulfil 
its oversight role, Islamists besieged the headquarters of the SCC and prevented its judges 
from getting into the Court in an attempt to postpone potential judgments on the 
constitutionality of the upper house of Parliament and the law regulating the Constitutional 
Assembly (Ahram on Line 2012a).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77Article 47 of Constitutional Declaration of 30 March 2011 says that ‘judges are independent and cannot be dismissed’; 
Article 67 of Law No.46/1972 says that ‘judges and members of the General Prosecution are not subject to dismissal’.   
78 Article 5 said:‘No judicial body can dissolve the Shura Council [upper house of parliament] or the Constituent Assembly’, 
see Constitutional Declaration of 21 November 2012, Official Gazette no.46bis of 21 November 2012, pp.2-3.  
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Under pressure, President Morsi released another Constitutional Declaration on 8 December 
2012, cancelling the Constitutional Declaration of 21 November 2012. But in order to 
validate the appointment of the new General Prosecutor, the new declaration stipulated that 
the legal effects of the November declaration continue to be enacted, and that the judiciary 
could not review constitutional declarations.79 Morsi’s constitutional declarations, as well as 
the siege of the SCC, allowed the MB and its allies to hastily pass the new constitution before 
any possible challenge from the judiciary. The Draft Constitution was put to a public 
referendum on 15 December 2012 and it was officially adopted on 24 December 2012.80 
There was not enough time for the SCC to decide on the constitutionality of the law 
regulating the Constituent Assembly before the referendum. Moreover, the new constitution 
entrusted the upper house of Parliament, dominated by Islamists, with legislative tasks until a 
new parliamentary election was held in 2013.81       
 
Literature on the SCC argues that this Court cannot be simply labelled as a model of a 
corrupted or politically manipulated Court just because it was established by an authoritarian 
regime (Moustafa 2007; Lombardi 2009). There is sufficient evidence from the SCC’s case 
law to argue that this Court was active in limiting the executive power and was supportive of 
human rights and political participation, despite political and legal constraints on the 
judiciary under Mubarak (Boyle and Sherif 1996; Moustafa 2007; Lombardi 2009).82 The 
SCC’s precedents were appreciated by human rights defenders and members of the political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Articles 1 and 4 of Constitutional Declaration, 8 December 2012, Official Gazette no.49bis of 8 December 2012, p.2.     
80 For an official result of the referendum see al-Waqa’i` al-Masriyyah no.394bis of 27 December 2012. 63.8% of voters 
said yes in the referendum and 36.3% said no. The turnout was 32.9%. These figures indicate that the constitution was 
approved by a small segment of the Egyptian society.   
81Article 230 of Constitution of Egypt, 25 December 2012, Official Gazette no.51 bis of 25 December 2012.   
82In one of its landmark judgements, the SCC in 2000 upheld full judicial oversight over general elections in Egypt (Case 
No.11/13, 8 July 2000). This judgment partially improved the integrity of elections in 2000 and 2005 and allowed the MB to 
gain seats in the Parliament. In a reaction to this judgement, some measures were taken by Mubarak since 2007 to 
circumvent the involvement of judges in elections (CIHRS 2013). Some of the SCC’s judgements were supportive of civil 
rights (Case No.3/19, 2 January 1993) and freedom of expression (Cases No.25/16, 3 July 1995, 37/11, 6 February 1993 and 
153/21, 3 June 2000).      
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opposition, including the MB (Lombardi 2009:328; CIHRS 2013a). However, in a different 
political context after Mubarak, the MB clearly felt that the judiciary and particularly the 
SCC threatened its attempts to tighten its grip on power, and seized the opportunity of 
drafting the 2012 Constitution to begin its reformulation of SCC membership and roles.  
 
To demonstrate this further, I begin with the appointment of its members. The 1971 
Constitution did not stipulate a specific mechanism for the appointment of its judges or their 
number. From its establishment and up to 2011, the President of Egypt influenced the 
appointment process. Article 5 of the provisional articles of Law 48/1979 concerning the 
establishment of the SCC provided the President with the absolute power to appoint the first 
chief justice of the Court. Under the same Article, the President had the power to appoint its 
first members, but after consulting the Supreme Council of Judicial Bodies.83 Article 5 of the 
Law maintained the President’s power to appoint the Court’s chief justices. It however 
involved the Court in the selection process of its members by stating that ‘the President 
appoints members of the Court after consulting with the Supreme Council of the Judicial 
Bodies from among two candidates, one is chosen by the general assembly of the Court and 
the other by the chief justice’.84 The SCC became a ‘self-perpetuating body’ (Haimerl 
2014:15) in June 2011 when the SCAF amended the SCC law, providing the SCC’s general 
assembly with the power to approve the appointment of the chief justice from among the 
Court´s three most senior members, and the appointment of the Court’s members.85  
 
One can agree that the appointment mechanism for SCC members and the chief justice 
needed to be revisited in the post-Mubarak era to address a legacy of executive interference 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Article 5 of Law No.48 /1979 on the Establishment of the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), Official Gazette No.36 of 
6 September 1979, p.530.  
84 Article 5 of Law No.48/1979, p.531.  
85 Law No.48/1979 Amended by Decree No.48/2011, Official Gazettes nos.36 of 6 September 1979 and 24bis of 19 June 
2011.  
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in its internal structure. Providing the SCC’s general assembly with the full power to choose 
its members and its chief justice was also a matter of concern since it isolates the Court from 
the society and risks turning it into a guardian of narrow political or economic interests. This 
goal however was not achieved by the 2012 Constitution which simply endorsed the 
executive’s powers over the Court by stating in Article 176 that: ‘Appointments take place by 
a decree from the President of the Republic’. Moreover, Article 233 reduced the number of 
judges in the Court from 17 to 11, and accordingly, six of the SCC’s most recently appointed 
members were removed from the bench. 86   
   
The Constitution of 1971 (with its 1980 amendment) left the explanation of the principles of 
Islamic shari‘a open to the SCC. Article 219 of the 2012 Constitution altered this situation by 
giving a specific explanation of Islamic shari‘a.87 This explanation was intended  to be 
binding for all judicial and political bodies in Egypt. The explanatory article is very vague 
and broad. It presents the sources, methods and principles of Sunni jurisprudence, paving the 
way for all kinds of Sunni juristic choices that range from hardline to moderate opinions. 
Article 219 ‘tie[d] the Egypt constitution to traditional Islamic jurisprudence’ (Lombardi and 
Brown 2012).  This explanation is different from the modernist approach taken by the SCC in 
the 1990s when it upheld that the legislator should not override fixed rulings of shari‘a 
derived from authentic and clear texts in the Qur’an and Sunna, and then emphasised ijtihad 
in all other cases to accommodate the changing public interest. The SCC drew on this 
reasoning in several cases to harmonise between Islamic law and constitutional rights88 
(Lombardi 2006; Lombardi and Brown 2006; Lombardi 2009:230-237). Moreover, in some 
of its judgements, the Court ‘adhered to the notion that internationally recognised principles 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Articles 176 and 233 of Constitution of Egypt, 25 December 2012.  
87 Article 219 of the 2012 Constitution says ‘the principles of Islamic shari‘a include its general evidences (adilla kulliya), 
rules of jurisprudence (qawa’id usuliyya) and juristic principles (qawa’id fiqhiyya) and the sources considered by the Sunni 
schools of law’.       
88 Most of these cases are related to women’s rights under Islamic law. I discuss some of them in chapter eight of this thesis. 
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of human rights must be accorded due respect and, together with the written provisions in the 
Constitution, constitute the basis for judicial protection of human rights in Egypt’ (Sherif 
1997:45:46).89 To reduce Islamists’ pressure on the state to Islamise Egypt’s legislation, the 
SCC developed in 1985 what is known as ‘the doctrine of the non-retroactivity of Article 2’ 
under which the Court declared inadmissible all ‘cases involve[ed] laws that had been 
enacted prior to the amendment of Article 2 in 1980’ (Lombardi 2006:167).  
 
Moreover, Article 4 of the Constitution established a consultative role for religious scholars 
in the law-making process by stating that: ‘Al-Azhar Association of Senior Scholars was to 
be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law’.90 Giving a legislative role for the 
Association of Senior Scholars at Al-Azhar was another attempt to challenge the SCC’s 
interpretation of Islamic law. The FJP was silent on the idea of giving authority to Muslim 
scholars for its interpretation, but the idea was mentioned in the draft political platform of the 
MB in 2007. Many scholars of the MB have also upheld this proposal since Hassan al-Banna. 
Moreover, the deputy leader of the MB, Khairat al-Shater, who had been the original 
presidential candidate91 of the MB, had promised in his electoral campaign that he would 
form a committee of Muslim jurists to assist him in applying Islamic law (Dabash 2012). The 
inclusion of Article 4 in the constitution has been also seen as a concession made by the MB 
to satisfy its Salafist allies (Trager 2012). Article 4 provoked outrage from a wide range of 
liberals and human rights activists. In a public statement, 23 Egyptian human rights NGOs 
declared this to be a blatant move towards theocracy, where unaccountable religious scholars 
intervene in the work of the elected bodies (CIHRS et al 2012). Even though the opinions of 
the Association of Senior Scholars were not mandatory, the constitution provided religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 See Supreme Constitutional Court, Case No.22/8, 4 January 1992. 
90 Article 4 of the 2012 Constitution.  
91 The MB chose first al-Shater to be its formal candidate but the Electoral Commission disqualified his candidacy for his 
previous criminal conviction (BBC 2012c).      
  
 102 
scholars with a powerful moral and religious authority over elected parliamentarians, and 
their opinions would be hardly ignored.   
 
Moreover, the constitution contained other limitations on constitutional rights. Article 81  
provided for a general limitation on the exercise of constitutional rights by stating that: 
‘Rights and freedoms shall be practiced in a manner not conflicting with the principles 
pertaining to state and society of the Constitution’. These principles include Islamic Shari‘a 
(Article 2) and other constitutional provisions pertaining to ‘the preservation of the genuine 
character of the Egyptian family’ (Article 10), ‘ethics, public morality and public order’ 
(Article11), the cultural and civilisational foundations of society (Article 12) and national 
unity (Article 5) determined the scope of constitutional rights.92 These limitations were very 
broad and could be easily abused by lawmakers. Given the strict position taken by the MB 
during the constitution-making process towards international human rights treaties, it was 
obvious that these limitations would restrict certain constitutional rights. I discuss in the 
following chapters restrictions found in other constitutional provisions on gender equality, 
religious freedom, freedom of expression and rights of religious minorities.   
 
4.  Conclusions   
This chapter has examined the ideological underpinnings of the MB and FJP. It has focused 
on two main issues: the application of shari‘a as state law and the foundations and substance 
of human rights. For the MB, Islam is not just a religion but is also a tool for political 
mobilisation and governance. The intellectual underpinnings of the group comprise old 
aspects of Islamic traditions and new aspects of modernity. The MB portrays traditional 
interpretive methods of Islamic law as the only legitimate way to derive law from Islamic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Articles 2,10,11,12 and 5 of the 2012 Constitution. 
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sources, but its conception of Islamic law as state law is a modern project shaped by a 
reinvention of tradition. For the MB, not all international human rights norms can be applied 
to a Muslim society like Egypt; it argues that the implementation of shari‘a as the state law is 
a religious obligation and a sign of the cultural and civilisational independence of Muslim 
societies. Accordingly, it considers the divine legislator to be the source of rights. The Qur’an 
and Sunna, and the methods and principles of ijtihad as developed by Muslim jurists set the 
limits and scope of these rights. Human rights cannot be known only through human reason, 
and shari‘a defines rights. This theoretical foundation of rights has led the group to embrace 
ambivalent positions on certain rights and to refuse other rights in IHRL. As illustrated in the 
literature of the MB and its scholars under assessment, the Islamic state protects Islamic law 
and morality in all state and societal activities. Consequently, the limits of public order and 
public morals are set by shari‘a and ‘Islamic morality’. However, state interference in certain 
areas of public and private life to comply with the state religion goes beyond the limits 
acceptable in IHRL.93              
 
The MB in the post-Mubarak era has been strongly driven to entrench its political powers in 
the emerging political regime rather than working with other political forces to consolidate 
the transition to democracy and human rights. The domination of Islamists over the 
constitution-making process increased the mistrust between the MB and its Islamist allies on 
the one hand and secular political forces on the other hand. The reference to Islamic law in 
the new constitution of Egypt has been a non-negotiable issue for the MB and other Islamists. 
For the MB, human rights should be defined by the tenets of Islamic law. By addressing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93On the limitations on human rights, see the HRC GC No. 22. The Committee says ‘The fact that a religion is recognised as 
a state religion or that it is established as official or traditional or that its followers comprise the majority of the population, 
shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the Covenant’ (para 9). The Committee also 
states that ‘the concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, limitations 
on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving 
exclusively from a single tradition’ (para8). See also the HRC GC No.34.   
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specific themes of human rights in the following chapters I will shed the light on the 
particular areas of tension between IHRL and Islamic law as articulated by the MB. 
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Chapter Four: Political Pluralism and Dissent 
  
Freedom of association, expression and assembly and the right to participate in public affairs 
constitute key legal safeguards of political pluralism in IHRL.94 This chapter addresses 
political pluralism and the treatment of dissent in the Islamic state as articulated by the MB. I 
begin with the relationship between religion and the establishment of political parties under 
Egypt’s law. Then, I examine the articulation of political pluralism in the intellectual sources 
of the MB and address the extent of tolerance with non-Islamist, secularist opposition and 
human rights defenders in the political discourse of the MB.   
 
1. The Establishment of Religious Political Parties 
Under certain limitations provided in Articles 22 (2) (freedom of association) and 19 (3) 
(freedom of expression) of the ICCPR, states are permitted to restrict the establishment of 
certain political associations whose programmes and objectives threaten human rights 
protected under the ICCPR. Article 5 says that rights included in the ICCPR may not be 
interpreted as implying for any state, group or person the right to engage in any activity or 
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognised [in the 
covenant]. For example, the Human Rights Committee found in 1981 that the reorganisation 
of the dissolved fascist party in Italy was not protected under Articles 19, 22 or 25 (political 
participation) of the ICCPR.95 Moreover, Article 20 of the ICCPR obliges states to prohibit 
by law ‘any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence’. The application of these limitations should be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 See HRC GC No.25.   
95 M.A. v. Italy, 198, para.13.2.  
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prescribed by law, necessary and proportional. The ECtHR followed a similar reasoning in 
2002: 
 
A political party may campaign for a change in the law or the legal and 
constitutional structures of the state on two conditions: firstly the means used 
to that end must in every respect be legal and democratic, and secondly, the 
change proposed must itself be compatible with fundamental democratic 
principles. It necessarily follows that a political party whose leaders incite to 
violence and the flouting of the rights and freedoms recognised in a democracy 
cannot claim to the convention’s protections against penalties imposed on these 
grounds.96  
  
Applying this test, the Court found in 2003 that the dissolution of the Islamist Welfare Party 
in Turkey was justified under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) because of 
its plans to introduce Islamic law in Turkey. The Court stated that Islamic law is:  
 
 
Incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy, as set forth in the 
Convention noting particularly its criminal law and criminal procedures, its 
rules on the legal status of women and the way it intervenes in all spheres of 
public and private life in accordance with religious precepts.97 
  
For decades, Egyptian authorities curtailed the establishment of Islamist political parties, 
using the restrictive Political Parties Law No.40/1977, which established a Committee of 
Political Parties that was charged with providing licences for new parties. The president and 
the ruling party controlled the membership of this Committee.98 This Law was used by the 
Mubarak regime to control the establishment of new parties (HRW 2007) and no Islamist 
parties were registered under this Law. This is despite the fact that since the beginning of the 
multi-party system in Egypt, all political parties have been required under the 1971 
Constitution to respect the constitutional provision on Islamic law. Article 5 provided that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96Yazar and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, 9 April 2002, Para. 49.  
97Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, para. 123. 
98 According to Article 8 of Law No.40/1977 before the amendments of 2005, the Committee of Political Parties was 
composed of the minister of justice, the minister of interior, the minister of state for parliamentary affairs, the head of the 
upper house of Parliament and three former judges. All of these were appointed by the president except the head of the upper 
house of Parliament. Law No.177/2005 increased the members of the Committee from 7 to 9 members but still all members 
were being appointed by the president except the head of the upper house of Parliament. See Law No.177/2005 Amending 
Law No.40/1977, Official Gazette no.27bis of 7 July 2005, p.3.      
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‘the political system in Egypt is a multi-party system within the fundamental principles of the 
Egyptian society’. 99  All political parties accordingly should respect Article 2 of the 
constitution, which recognises the principles of Islamic Shari‘a as the main source of 
legislation. The Political Parties Law No.40/1977 stipulated that the platforms of political 
parties should be consistent with the principles of Islamic Shari‘a.100 This condition was 
replaced in 2005 by a general provision, saying that ‘platforms, activities and methods of all 
political parties should not be inconsistent with the Constitution’.101  
 
To increase restrictions on the establishment of Islamist parties, Article 4 of the Law of 
Political Parties was amended in 2005 to prohibit the establishment of political parties 
founded on ‘religious basis or on the manipulation of religious feelings’. Furthermore, a new 
constitutional provision was adopted in 2007, stating that ‘no political activity shall be 
exercised or political parties established on a religious referential authority, on a religious 
basis or on discrimination on grounds of gender or origin’.102 This move primarily targeted 
Islamists, the major political rival of Mubarak at that time and cannot be seen as an attempt to 
separate between state and religion in Egypt, since Article 2 of the Constitution was left 
without amendment (Bernard-Maugiron 2008:412). During the debates on the amendments, 
some political forces and intellectuals petitioned the government to insert certain 
amendments to Article 2 in order that it not to be used to curtail fundamental human rights 
and equality before the law.103    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99Article 5 of the 1971 Constitution, Amendments to the Constitution of Egypt, Official Gazette no.26 of 27 June 1980, pp. 
4-9.  
100 Law of Political Parties No.40/1977, Official Gazette no.27 of 7 July 1977.  
101 Law No.177/2005 Amending Law No.40/1977, p.3.      
102 Article 5, Amendments to the Constitution of Egypt, Official Gazette no.13 of 31 March 2007, p. 3.   
103 On 5 March 2007, a petition signed by 165 well-known politicians, intellectuals and human rights defenders submitted to 
President Mubarak, calling for the amendment of Article 2 to ensure respect for international human rights and the neutrality 
of the state towards all religious beliefs in the society (CIHRS 2007b:279-288).   
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The MB refused the constitutional provision on religious parties, arguing that the amendment 
contradicted Article 2,  under which political parties can adopt Islamic platforms and promote 
the implementation of shari‘a (al-‘Iriyan 2007). According to a prominent Egyptian judge, 
Islamists parties gain their legitimacy from this article. 104  Under the ICCPR, the advocacy 
for the application of Islamic law may be considered a permissible ground by which to 
restrict the freedom of association of the MB. But since Egypt’s Constitution already 
endorses Islamic law as the main source of legislation, and some forms of discrimination 
against citizens are already in place under the law, lawmakers chose an absolute ban on 
religious parties, which allowed the state to outlaw the MB without substantively discussing 
its programme. However, this absolute ban appears not to be acceptable under the ICCPR 
(Temperman 321-322).105 The same position was taken by the ECtHR, which stated that ‘a 
political party animated by the moral values imposed by a religion cannot be regarded as 
intrinsically inimical to the fundamental principles of democracy’.106 A prominent human 
rights NGO in Egypt followed the same reasoning, stating that political parties can refer to 
religious principles in their platforms provided they do not call for discrimination between 
citizens, incite to violence, or undermine democratic society (CIHRS 2007a:310).      
 
The legal regulations on political parties were softened in 2011 and Islamists were able to 
gain legal standing. In March 2011, the SCAF amended the Political Parties Law by Decree 
No.12/2011107 under which ‘political parties are established by presenting a notification 
signed by 5000 founding members in at least 10 Egyptian governorates. The minimum 
number of signatures in each governorate is 300’.108 Notifications are submitted to a judicial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104See the legal opinion of judge Tareq al-Bishri published in 1991 when he was a vice president of the State Council and 
president of its committee of legal experts (in Huwidi 2005:12-16).   
105 See UNCHR ‘Comment on Algeria’ (1998) U.N Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.95, para. 17.    
106Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Para.100.  
107 Decree No. 12/2011 Amending Law No. 40/1977, Official Gazette no. 12bis of 28 March 2011. 
108 Article 7 of Law No. 40/1977 Amended by Decree 12/2011, Official Gazette no.12bis of 28 March 2011.   
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committee. Political parties are legally recognised after the passage of 30 days from the 
submission of their notifications to the Committee. If the Committee opposes the 
establishment of a particular political party, it submits its decision to the Supreme 
Administrative Court, which either supports or rejects the decision within 8 days. The same 
Court is the only competent organ to validate the dissolution of political parties.109   
 
The Constitutional Declaration of 30 March 2011 also reduced previous legal restrictions on 
the establishment of religious parties. Article 4 of the Declaration stated that ‘it is not 
permitted to directly engage in political activity or form political parties on the basis of 
religion, race or origin’ but it omitted the prohibition of political parties based on religious 
background. 110 The restriction in this Article is applied to parties whose membership is 
limited only to members of a certain religious community. This was the explanation 
presented by the judiciary in October 2011 in the Party of Development and Construction 
case. This case began when the Committee of Political Parties rejected the establishment of 
this Islamist Party on the grounds that its programme is based on religion, because it 
explicitly calls for the application of Islamic criminal law. The Supreme Administrative 
Court overruled this decision, arguing that Article 2 of the constitution allows political parties 
to call for the application of Islamic law. It further held that among the founders of the party 
were both Muslims and non-Muslims so according to the Court, the Party did not 
discriminate on the basis of religion.111           
 
Thus, the relation between religion and freedom of association in Egypt is problematic. The 
state under Mubarak imposed a general ban on Islamist parties that is far-reaching and not 
justified under IHRL. This exclusionary approach was a practical legal option by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Article 8 of Law No.40/1977 Amended by Decree 12/2011, Official Gazette no.12bis of 28 March 2011, p.3.   
110 Article 4 of Constitutional Declaration of Egypt, 30 March 2011.  
111 See Supreme Administrative Court, Case No.44793/57, 11 October 2011.  
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government to exclude the MB and Islamist parties from the political process rather than 
address the implications of religious law for human rights and citizenship in Egypt. The 
general ban on the establishment of religious parties was removed in the post-Mubarak era, 
and Islamist parties were allowed to gain legal standing. In the following section, I explain 
the MB’s philosophy on freedom of association which serves its Islamic state’s project by 
excluding secularists and dissidents.    
 
2.  Political Pluralism and the Rule of Shari‘a  
Classical jurists discussed certain restraints on speeches and actions to maintain the integrity 
and unity of their communities as well as their beliefs. Among these restraints were the 
prohibition of seditious (fitna) speeches or actions that could lead to the spread of doubt or 
corruption of morals, apostasy, heresy and blasphemy. The exact meaning of these offences 
was vaguely defined and was repeatedly employed throughout the history by Muslim rulers 
to repress dissent for political or sectarian purposes (Kamali 1997:190-212). These concepts 
shape MB theories on the treatment of dissent and political pluralism, freedom of expression 
and freedom of religion in the Islamic state. 
 
The view of the founders of the MB was that the establishment of political parties is not 
compatible with Islam. Al-Banna (2006:341-345; 368-370) opposed political pluralism and 
called for the replacement of the multi-party system that was operating in Egypt under the 
Constitution of 1923, with a one-party system. Politically, he believed that excessive disputes 
and fragmentation among Egyptian political parties overshadowed the struggle against 
colonialism. He argued that the society needs unity and a strong leadership to build its own 
renaissance. From a religious point of view, al-Banna (2006:244) argued that ‘Islam is the 
religion of unity in all things’. He referred to certain verses in the Qur’an (3:103; 8:46) which 
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command Muslims to be united and avoid divisiveness. Al-Banna (2006:245) distinguished 
between partisanship and freedom of expression in Islam. The former is shaped by 
fragmentation, causing the whole community to lose its direction. On the contrary, Islam 
according to al-Banna allows people to seek truth and wisdom by the examination of 
different views, in order to reach consensus or majority but within the general unity of the 
community. Although the MB has gradually bypassed this view on multi-party systems since 
the 1980s, the fear of divisiveness and fragmentation among Muslims still influences its 
theories on political pluralism.   
 
Over the last three decades, a group of scholars affiliated with the MB developed a new legal 
reasoning supportive of the right to establish political parties in the Islamic state (al-Qaradawi 
2005c; al-Shawi 1992; al-Sawi 1992, al-Ghazzali 2005b, al-Wa‘i 2001, Qimihah 1998; ‘Auda 
2005). Their views, however, contained some loopholes that set the stage for arbitrary 
restrictions on political dissent. I start first by presenting their supportive arguments of 
political pluralism in Islamic law. Then, I show the incompatibility between their conception 
of political pluralism and IHRL.  
 
According to Al-Sawi (1992) and al-Qaradawi (2005c), the ruling on political pluralism in 
Islamic law is a question pertaining to siyasa shar‘iyya, decided after weighing its potential 
benefits and harms for Muslim society. They have argued that the benefits of freedom of 
association in modern Muslim states are much greater than its potential harms, provided that 
this pluralism is governed by certain regulations. They have viewed political pluralism as an 
effective way to fulfill the duty of ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’, a duty that is 
repeatedly mentioned in the Qur’an and Sunna. In traditional Islamic law, this duty is called 
the function of hisba, under which Muslims observe the respect of Islamic ethos in the 
Muslim community (Kamali 1997:28-33). According to the scholars of the MB (al-Sawi 
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1992: al-Qaradawi 2005c; al-Shawi 1992), political parties and NGOs act as a means of hisba 
in modern states. They have argued that the practice of consultation (shura) in Muslim states 
can be enhanced under a multi-party system, whereby different groups of citizens work 
together to realise legitimate objectives such as proposing policies and observing the 
performance of state authorities.  
 
Moreover, the principle of pluralism, according to al-Qaradawi (2005c: 148-154), is a 
fundamental feature of Islamic jurisprudence. He has argued that the pluralism of opinions 
among schools of law in Islamic jurisprudence resembles the multi-party system in modern 
states. Political parties, according to this view, embrace their own understanding of Islamic 
shari‘a and peacefully compete with each other in regular elections to gain power and 
implement their visions. The alternative path to political pluralism is despotic rule which, 
according to al-Qaradawi, brought destructive consequences in Muslim societies for 
centuries.    
 
Despite these views, I argue that the conception of political pluralism in the thought of the 
MB is not compatible with IHRL. The group’s stance on political pluralism starts from a very 
specific ideological view of the state and society. According to this view, the state is 
entrusted with keeping the unity of Muslims in a political order regulated by the divine law. 
Political diversity in society is allowed as long as shari‘a is the supreme authority in the state. 
In the Islamic state, according to Al-Qaradawi (2005c:147-148), political parties should 
recognise that Islam is not just a creed or faith, but shari‘a. Political parties can practice their 
own ijtihad on different issues but within the accepted rules of ijtihad. No party is allowed to 
insult Islam or to denigrate its teachings and symbols. Those parties that call for atheism, 
obscenity, or non-religiosity should not be established in Muslim societies.  
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The latter seminal view was expressed by al-Shawi (1992:346-349) who maintained that 
political parties and all other kind of associations such as NGOs, professional syndicates or 
trade unions in the Islamic state are governed by ‘the supremacy of Islamic shari‘a’. He even 
proposed ‘the establishment of a charter that includes those Islamic principles and texts of the 
Qur’an and Sunna that no individual or groups in the Islamic state can violate in any case’. 
The charter should also contain the rights and freedoms that all citizens and groups enjoy. In 
1994, the MB (1994:302-314) explicitly held that political pluralism in Muslim society is 
acceptable as long as Islamic law is the supreme constitution of the state. The judiciary, 
according to the MB, is responsible for taking suitable measures against those who might 
deviate from the fundamental principles of  society, as agreed by Muslim jurists; it added that 
political parties should not engage in ‘disputes that could lead to societal weakness and 
failure’. The document is silent on the criteria by which one can decide that a particular 
political association weakens society.   
 
By way of comparison, Tunisian Islamist Rashid al-Ghannushi (2012:93) has held that 
secular or atheist political parties are allowed to exist and engage in politics in Muslim states. 
He has argued that throughout history, different Islamic sects and non-Muslims, including 
pagans and Magus, lived in the Muslim community. He also argued that in a Muslim society, 
most Muslims certainly opt for the Islamic choice, and that secular parties would not be able 
to exclude Islam through democratic means. Al-Sawi (1992:101) has rejected this view, 
arguing that while it is true that early Muslims hosted diverse Islamic sects as well as non-
Muslims, this does not allow secular, atheist or infidel political trends to exploit political 
pluralism to lead the Muslim nation, freely propagate their views and apply their 
programmes. He has also added that in Islamic history, non-Muslims submitted to the 
sovereignty of Islam and the political leadership of Muslims.   
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In IHRL, political pluralism can indeed be subject to certain limitations in order to ensure 
peaceful and democratic political competition and fundamental human rights but not to 
generally protect the dominance of a particular ideology or religious doctrine. Commenting 
on Iran, the Human Rights Committee in 1993 rejected restrictions on freedom of association, 
assembly and expression designed to protect particular religious doctrines.112    
 
In addition to the condition that all political parties concede to the rule of Islamic law, a lot of 
sources of the MB reiterate that political pluralism in Islam is accepted as long as it does not 
divide the Muslim community and lead to factionalism. According to these sources, the 
Western multi-party system exacerbates conflict and opportunistic partisan competition 
among political factions (al-Shawi 1994:107; al-Sawi 1992:117; al-Shater 2011; ‘Auda 
2005:70). According to al-Sawi (1992), extreme partisanship is not accepted in Islam because 
it leads to divisiveness denounced by God and the Prophet. Al-Sawi has added that party 
discipline is employed by political leaders to oblige members of political parties to blindly 
follow their partisan positions. This extreme partisanship, according to al-Sawi, should not be 
tolerated in Muslim society. Al-Qaradawi (2001:153-154) explains that the existence of 
political opposition in the Islamic state can reflect diversity of views, but should not lead to 
flagrantly contrasting positions. Al-Ghazzali stated that ‘[political parties] are unlawful if 
they aim at dividing the umma and sowing the seeds of disunity among Muslims’ (Kamali 
1997:79).  
 
Moreover, the system of consultation (shura) in Islam entails certain regulations for political 
opposition according to some prominent MB scholars. For example, Abdullah al-Khatib 
(1999:33) and Khaled ‘Auda (2005:77) explained that under shura citizens can freely 
deliberate public policies, but once a decision is taken by the ruler and the representatives of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 UNCHR ‘Concluding Observations on Islamic Republic of Iran’ (1993), para.15.  
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the people, all citizens must comply with these decisions; it is not acceptable to insult or 
denigrate these decisions as this could create a state of chaos and nihilism in the community. 
Moreover, al-Khatib (1999:33) stated that commitment to the outcomes of Shura is a practice 
of obedience to God and the Prophet. The same meaning was previously expressed by ‘Abd 
al-Qadir ‘Auda (1960:50-51) who considered that Western democracy passes through crises 
and instability because the minority always questions and challenges laws and decisions 
already promulgated by the majority in order to isolate and dismiss the ruling power. In one 
of his weekly messages, the General Guide Badie (2012b) embraced this meaning of Shura.    
 
Prompted by the fear of fragmentation, Khaled ‘Auda (2005:74) has clearly argued that Islam 
does not accept interest groups that advocate only the interests of their members and pressure 
the ruler to adopt these narrow interests. According to him, this constitutes a violation of the 
principle of equality because powerful interest groups would be able to influence decision-
making at the expense of other disadvantaged groups. The general portrayal of interest 
groups as selfish institutions confirms that some Islamists are not comfortable with the 
individualistic aspects of human rights and freedom of expression. They are basically keen to 
see all societal actors work in harmony for the ideal and messianic goals of the Islamic state. 
‘Abd al-Rahman al-Barr (2011) wrote after the 2011 Revolution that ‘Islam prohibits the 
establishment of political parties which tear and divide the nation and turn the community 
into conflicting parties’.  According to al-Barr, ‘this is an abhorred partisanship that is 
extremely biased to one view even if it goes against the truth’. Al-Barr has maintained that a 
political party that aims at fighting Islamic shari‘a and Islam and becomes aligned with 
enemies of the religion and the nation is the ‘Party of the Devil’ (hizb al-shaytan).  Evidence 
from the Qur’an (3:100; 105; 103; 8:46; 49:10) and Sunna are cited by theorists and 
ideologues of the MB to establish that Muslims are under religious obligation to maintain 
their unity and to refrain from any activity that could split this unity (Jirisha 1986b:62-63).   
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The top leadership of the MB underlined the value of unity in Islam when the group was 
under harsh critique from political opponents after the 2011 Revolution. In one of his weekly 
messages, the General Guide, Mohammad Badie (2012a), stated that ‘the Devil tries hard to 
divide the nation into warring parties which always dispute each other’s ideas and exchange 
accusations against each other’. He added that ‘the media triggers enmities, hunts mistakes, 
accuses honest people, and causes temptation’. Then he urged Egyptians to obey the elected 
President Morsi and not to be manipulated by narrow partisan interests. In another statement, 
Badie accused private media outlets of acting like ‘the pharaoh’s magicians who gathered to 
bewitch people and turn them away from truth’. This was a reference to the Qur’anic verse 
(7:124-125) about the magicians who attempted to challenge the miracles of Prophet Musa. 
Badie also described the media as ‘the devil whispering in the ears’ (Abdel-Baky 2012).  
 
These statements coincided with a series of lawsuits filed by the government and Islamist 
lawyers against journalists on charges of insulting the president and other leaders in the MB. 
Under Egyptian law, journalists can be brought before the criminal courts on a range of 
charges that restrict the right to freedom of expression (ANHRI 2012). President Morsi and 
the MB utilised this restrictive legal framework to intimidate journalists who were critical of 
the president and his political group. According to ANHRI (2013), 24 complaints were 
presented to the General Prosecutor by the president and his allies against 23 journalists on 
charges of insulting the president from June 2012 to January 2013. Other human rights 
groups (AFTE 2012: EOHR 2013; CPJ 2012) documented increasing censorship on 
journalists and columnists working in state-owned media.       
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3. Sowing the Seeds of Hate and Violence   
The MB has followed a political discourse that questioned the religious piety of liberals, 
leftists and secularists and attacked their loyalty to Islam. It portrayed Egyptian reformers as 
heretics, such as Mohammad Sa‘id al-‘Ashmawi (Abu-Isma‘il 1979:60-61; al- Mat‘ani 
1979:37-39) and Faraj Fuda (Khalid 1988:4-6; 1987:12; 1990:12-13). It does not treat the 
ideas of secular and liberal Muslims as legitimate alternative understandings of Islamic 
sources and history, but rather as a deviation from Islam itself. Political and intellectual 
pluralism cannot flourish in this intimidating environment.   
 
This trend has been found in the intellectual literature of the MB since its inception. In 1938, 
Al-Banna (2006:258) stated in The Message of al-Manhaj that political parties in Egypt apply 
non-Islamic ideas in their public policies and they should be dissolved. In The Message of 
Teachings, al-Banna (2006:288) called on his followers to ‘completely boycott non-Islamic 
courts and judicial systems [and] also to dissociate [themselves] from organisations, 
newspapers, committees, schools, and institutions which oppose the Islamic idea’. ‘Auda 
(1977:58) maintained that those rulers who apply laws other than those revealed by God are 
infidels (kuffar) if they deny these laws in favour of other human laws, and they are 
considered sinful (fasiqun) if they ignore the divine law but do not deny it.113 He affirmed 
that ‘the replacement of Islamic law by other positive laws is a deviation from Islam and a 
displacement of Islam from the heart of believers’ (‘Auda 1977:141).      
 
Sayed Qutb (1973:93), whose books are still taught in the MB and cited by its top leaders, 
considered that Muslim societies that are not regulated according to Islamic law ‘share the 
same characteristic with polytheistic, Christian and Jewish societies, the characteristic of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113  Classical jurists differentiated between ‘the greater kufr’ and ‘the lesser kufr’. The former is ‘the unequivocal 
renunciation of the faith’ and the latter was ‘used metaphorically in order to accentuate the gravity of conduct which actually 
amounts to transgression (fisq)’ (Kamali 1997:219).  
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jahiliyya’. In his famous book Preachers not Judges, the former General Guide Hassan al-
Hudaiby explained that the term jahiliyya refers to the state of affairs in societies that deviate 
from the rules of Islam. These societies are considered sinful and disobedient to God but they 
are not necessarily infidels (kuffar).  
 
Al-Hudaiby firmly stated that a Muslim should not be identified as infidel unless certain strict 
conditions are met. However, the use of the term jahiliiyya in general gives a religious 
legitimacy for the discrediting of Muslims who do not share Islamists’ view on Islamic law as 
a legal basis for Muslim states. Moreover, according to al-Hudaiby (1977:108), amongst the 
conditions by which a Muslim can be considered an infidel, is that he/she clearly denies 
shari‘a or the sovereignty of God. According to this view, many Muslim reformers or 
secularists can be easily classified as heretics. Al-Bahnasawi (2005:149-150) and Yakan 
(2004: 98) used the term jahiliyya to describe non-Islamist ideologies that favour laws 
developed by human beings and dismiss the divine law. Al-Qaradawi (2006a:75) has stated 
that ‘secularism is hostile to Islam and its comprehensive regulations of all aspects of life’. 
He added that ‘secularism is a call for the sovereignty of ignorance (jahiliyya) where people 
rule by their own law and not by the revelation of God’. He has also written that ‘a secularist 
ruler who considers Islamic law inconsistent with progress and civilisation is like the Satan 
who refused to prostrate to God’ (al-Qaradawi 2006b: 326). The former General Guide of the 
MB, Mustafa Mashhur (1981:9) wrote that the MB rejects worldly political parties whose 
ideologies are set by human beings because Islam provides Muslims with a comprehensive 
system revealed from God.   
  
Amid acute political polarisation between Islamists and liberals in 2011, numerous writers 
affiliated with the MB followed this inflammatory tradition and repeatedly published articles 
on the official website of the MB that accused secular political currents of corrupting Islam. 
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Abd al-Qadir Ahmed Abd al-Qadir (2011) wrote that liberals and secularists aim to contain 
the revival of Islam in Egypt and corrupt the religious awakening of Egyptians in the post-
revolution era. According to him, the problem of liberals lies in their imported ideas and their 
state of ignorance (jahiliyya). Using the vocabularies of Qutb, he has accused secularism and 
Western democracy of being a form of ‘paganism’ and ‘disbelief’.     
 
Abd al-Rahman al-Barr (2012c) stated that supporters of the Islamic solution would prevail 
despite ‘an atmosphere full of enemies and conspiracy against Muslims and Islam and its 
values from ignorant Muslims, hypocrites or the enemies of religion who aim to undermine 
the Islamic revival in the Muslim nation’. Nabih Abd Al-Mun‘im (2013) wondered how 
liberals can claim to respect Islam and the Qur’an and at the same time refuse to rule 
according to shari‘a and become hostile to Islamists who seek the rule of God. Helmy al-
Qa‘ud (2012; 2013c) condemned liberal media and politicians as enemies of Islam and 
Muslims, and argued that the rise of Islamists in Egyptian politics after the revolution had 
pushed the liberals to launch a public campaign against Islam and Islamists. On 6 February 
2013, the Secretary General of the MB, Mahmoud Hussein, described media outlets as 
‘swindlers’ for ‘promoting lies and rumours in favour of the alliance of evil and disbelief 
with the objective of suppressing the Islamic project’ ( 2013). 
 
In a recent report, the UN Special Rapporteur on religious freedom, Heiner Bielefeldt, warns 
that policies of religious exclusion are aggravating factors in violence in the name of religion. 
According to his report, this exclusion is manifested when ‘[the legitimacy of a state is] based 
on [its] role as guardian of certain religious truth claims [and] those people who do not 
adhere to the protected religion or those who follow interpretations deemed deviant [are] 
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publicly attacked as infidels, apostates or heretics’.114 In the socio-political and cultural 
context of Egypt and many other Muslim states this discourse has serious consequences for 
liberal and secularist Muslims. It is aimed at isolating and stigmatising the political rivals of 
the MB and Islamists in general, and it paves the way for political violence. Although this 
discourse has been followed to describe non-Islamist ideologies and political doctrines like 
liberalism, socialism and secularism, it goes beyond political critique and implies religious 
accusations of the followers of these ideas, in spite of their declared affiliation to Islam. It 
could also bring legal consequences under Islamic law. Many Muslims believe that apostates 
and heretics deserve death. Militant Islamists killed the Egyptian intellectual and politician 
Faraj Foda in 1992 as a punishment for his call for a separation between state and religion 
and his critique of the application of Islamic law (Arzt 1996:397). The murder of Foda is well 
remembered in Egypt today (Maqlad 2012). As noted by Tibi (2009:182) ‘Muslims who 
engaged in secular thinking were warned that they would face the accusation of heresy and 
share the fate of Faraj Foda if they failed to comply’. 
  
  
Under the rule of the MB, this climate of religious mobilisation and polarisation led to certain 
acts of violence against non-Islamists and religious minorities. For example, on 5 December 
2012, members of the MB violently dispersed a peaceful sit-in organised by liberal and leftist 
forces to protest Islamists’ domination over the constitution-making process. According to 
credible reports, Islamists were chanting religious slogans against secularism while they were 
attacking the protesters (CIHRS 2012b:10-11; HRW 2012b).115 In his report, Bielefeldt also 
warns that sectarian violence can occur when ‘minorities are demonized as allegedly posing a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 UNCHR ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt’ (2014),p.32.    
115According to numerous video clips of the clashes posted on YouTube and cited by CIHRS, MB members were chanting 
‘the people demand the enforcement of shari‘a’, ‘Behold oh God, the people are applying the law of God’ and calling non-
Islamist protesters unbelievers (kuffar).  
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dangerous threat to the long-term survival of the nation, or they are accused of being 
involved in clandestine conspiracies’. Several examples in Egypt support this conclusion. In 
chapter six, I argue that violence against members of Shi‘a communities in Egypt was 
motivated by religious hate speech and exacerbated under the rule of Morsi. In the following 
section, I show how Christians were major victims of the religious polarisation under Morsi.  
The relationship between Morsi and the leadership of the Coptic Orthodox Church had 
deteriorated by the end of 2012. The Church publicly expressed its fears about the future of 
Christians under the rule of Morsi. When leaders of Christians opposed the referendum on the 
2011 Constitutional Declaration and joined liberals in their campaigning against the 
declaration, the MB and its Islamists allies accused Christians of aiming to undermine the 
Islamic identity of the state. The same approach was followed during the 2012 constitution-
making process when the representatives of Christian churches in Egypt opposed the 
constitution and withdrew from the Constituent Assembly. When massive demonstrations 
erupted in November 2012 in protest at the Constitutional Declaration decreed by Morsi on 
22 November to grant himself immunity from judicial oversight, top leaders of the MB stated 
publicly that ‘the majority of protesters in front of the presidential palace were Christians’ 
(al-Biltaji 2012; al-Shatter 2012a).  
 
On many other occasions under Morsi, Christians were accused of conspiring with the 
remnants of the Mubarak regime to undermine the rule of President Morsi. In one of his last 
speeches before his removal by the military on 3 July, Morsi (2013) blamed the Coptic 
Orthodox Church for its attitudes towards him and his government. As explained by Tadros 
(2013c), ‘the MB used the Copts as a scapegoat for its failure to build legitimacy within the 
wider polity’. In parallel to this incriminating policy, sectarian violence increased and 
Christian churches and properties were repeatedly subjected to attacks in 2013. Incitement 
against Christians reached a peak in June 2013 when the popular opposition to Morsi and the 
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MB dramatically increased and the military intervened to remove Morsi from power. In the 
sit-ins organised by the MB and its Islamist allies from June to August 2013 – to counter 
other massive protests led by liberal and leftist opposition and to protest the removal of Morsi 
– Christians came under fierce verbal attack by leaders and allies of the MB (al-Majid 2013). 
Ishaq Ibrahim of the EIPR stated that ‘the MB members were spreading rumours since then 
saying it is a Coptic conspiracy to exclude them from power’ (Daragahi 2013).  
 
Based on field research across Egypt, Ibrahim (2013) documented numerous incidents where 
the MB’s leaders and members incited against Christians from 2011 to 2013, portraying them 
as an existential threat to the rule of Islam. This conclusion has been also confirmed by a 
report by HRW (2013c). From June to August 2013, dozens of churches were burnt and 
damaged across Egypt. These examples show the consequences of a political discourse that 
created a rift along religious lines between Islamists, other Muslims and non-Muslims. 
Islamists as represented by the MB consider themselves to be the representatives of the 
authentic faith of Islam, and any opposition is considered an attack against the true Islam. It 
is hard for political pluralism to survive in this climate.     
 
4. Freedom of Association and Human Rights NGOs 
This section examines the MB’s engagement with the question of freedom of association for 
human rights defenders. Human rights NGOs in Egypt have often been subjected to intense 
legal and political pressure from the government and security apparatus. Since the beginning 
of the human rights movement in Egypt in the 1980s, Egyptian authorities used association 
laws to curtail the ability of human rights defenders to associate, receive domestic and 
foreign funding and work freely inside and outside Egypt. Despite its tentative openness 
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under Mubarak towards the work of human rights defenders, once in power the MB chose to 
reinforce existing restrictions.  
 
Over the past three decades, particular concerns stimulated the MB and the human rights 
movement in Egypt to cooperate with each other. They both struggled to open up the political 
space and to end restrictions imposed on political activists and civil society; they spoke up 
against the continuing application of the state of emergency under Mubarak, the trial of 
civilians before exceptional courts, and the wide use of administrative detention. At the same 
time, human rights defenders were vocal about human rights abuses committed against 
members of the MB (Hassan 2008b). The defenders, however, remained cautious about the 
MB’s commitment to international human rights. For many human rights defenders, the MB 
was a beneficiary of their services and activism but it was not a trusted partner in the struggle 
for human rights (Hassan 1997). Some leading MB members were amongst the founders of 
the Egyptian Human Rights Organisation (EOHR), one of the oldest human rights groups in 
Egypt. Hassan (1998:68-90) stated that in 1986 when those members nominated themselves 
to be elected to the board of the organisation, their secular fellows mobilised their supporters 
in the general assembly to keep them away from leading positions. According to Hassan 
(1998:70), ‘there were doubts among the members of the organisation that the MB aimed to 
dominate the organisation and to direct its resources to serve its political agenda’. This 
behaviour was strongly rejected by secular members of the organisation who were aware of 
the intellectual gap between the project of EOHR and the Islamist agenda of the MB. 
Discussing the MB’s 2007 draft party platform, Hassan (2008a) elaborated the position of 
Egyptian human rights defenders on the MB’s conception of human rights. He stated that the 
platform generally asserted the commitment of the group to international human rights, but 
‘when translated into reality, the Platform, no matter how elusive its language is, is far from 
being consistent with human rights principles’.        
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Nevertheless, human rights NGOs were keen to involve leaders of the MB in public dialogue 
about international human rights and the position of political Islam. This allowed human 
rights actors to raise their concerns about MB’s attitudes towards human rights, and 
represented an opportunity for leaders of the MB to assess their views (Dif Allah: 2003; Dif 
Allah 2006; Hassan 2008b). This kind of dialogue did not eliminate suspicion between the 
two parties. However, the emergence of human rights language in official MB documents 
since the 1990s cannot be separated from the wider context of the development of human 
rights activism in Egypt.      
 
Islamists were also open to the idea of establishing human rights NGOs. However, they 
developed their own Islamic human rights standards, and on many occasions their human 
rights activism went against that of other secular human rights defenders. For example, it is 
one of the objectives of International Islamic Committee for Women and Child (IICWC), 
since its establishment in 1994, to counter women’s rights and feminist movements in Egypt 
and the Muslim world by advocating an Islamist form of women’s activism (Helmi 2004). 
The proactive engagement of Egyptian women’s rights groups in the International 
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), Cairo 1994 and the Fourth World 
Conference on Women, Beijing 1995 prompted the MB and its female section to develop a 
discourse on women’s rights in Islam as an alternative to international human rights treaties. 
In 2004, the MB established Sawasya Centre for Human Rights and Combating 
Discrimination. The Centre recognises the legitimacy of international human rights treaties, 
provided that they are not inconsistent with Islamic law.116 A major task of the organisation 
has been to monitor abuses committed against members of the MB and to provide legal aid to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 See the Statute of the organisation in the official web site. Available at: 
 http://www.sawasya.net/news_Details.aspx?Kind=8&News_ID=2  
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them, while also to manifest the MBs conception of human rights in Islam and give attention 
to global issues that concern Muslims such as Islamophobia, discrimination against Muslims 
in Western states, and the protection of Islam from defamation.117   
 
Since the military coup of 1952, restrictive association laws undermined the independence 
and freedom of NGOs.118 While, over the last two decades, the existence of a human rights 
movement in Egypt has become a social and political reality that governments could not 
dismiss, members of human rights NGOs were occasionally subjected to trials on charges of 
receiving foreign funding or working without legal registration. Many Egyptian human rights 
organisations were originally established either as not-for-profit companies in accordance 
with the civil law, or as law firms (HRW 2005; Forum of Independent Human Rights NGOs 
2009:31-41). The government however sought to bring all NGOs under the jurisdiction of the 
Law of Associations No. 84/2002.119  This Law has been regularly the subject of domestic 
and international criticism because of its serious infringement on the right to freedom of 
association (HRW 2005). Under this law, in order for NGOs to operate, they should be 
registered by the Ministry of Social Solidarity. Founders of NGOs should submit apply their 
files to authorities. NGOs are considered registered if founders do not receive objections 
from the authorities within 60 days. If they are rejected, they can challenge this decision 
before the administrative justice. NGOs cannot operate legally without being registered. 
International NGOs need to obtain approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to open 
branches in Egypt (Article 1). Law 84 provides executive authorities with wide discretionary 
powers under Article 11 to reject the establishment of NGOs for ‘the protection public order 
and morals’, or if NGOs aim to ‘conduct activities carried out by political parties or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 See statements published by the origination on the following link: http://www.sawasya.net/all_news.aspx?Kind=11  
118 See Laws of Associations Nos.32/1964, 154/1999,84/2002  
119 Article 4 of Law 84/2002 requires all NGOs established under other laws to register under Law 84/2002 or they are 
considered disbanded. This provision has threatened human rights groups established under other laws. See Law of 
Associations No.84/2002, Official Gazette no.22bis of 5 June 2002.  
  
 126 
professional associations’ without defining these activities. NGOs are also required to get 
permission from the Ministry of Social Solidarity for foreign and domestic fund raising 
activities (Article 17).120        
 
When Parliament discussed Law 84 in 2002, opposition political parties in general had 
reservations, but adopted different views. There was no consensus among political groups on 
the right of NGOs to receive foreign funding or on the level of autonomy that could or should 
be given to them in their management and operations. The leftist al-Tajammu‘ Party was 
vocal in the defence of the independence of NGOs; other parties such as al-Wafd, Nasserist 
and the MB were suspicious of foreign funding, but expressed reservations on the restrictions 
on the establishment of NGOs and the heavy governmental interference in their internal 
affairs. In Parliament, most members of the MB rejected the law and a few of them abstained 
from voting.121  
 
Nevertheless, the fact that the MB opposed the Law of Associations in 2002 did not mean 
that the group's view on the law converged with the demands of Egyptian human rights 
NGOs. The group attempted to soften the restrictions on NGOs, such as on their 
establishment and internal operations, but it did not advocate for the liberty of NGOs to 
receive external funding and to be fully protected against governmental interference.122 This 
reservation to foreign funding became apparent after the MB reached power. In their electoral 
platforms, the MB (2005; 2010) and the FJP (2011) pledged to amend the Association Law to 
regulate the establishment of NGOs through a simple process of notification to the 
authorities, rather than a system based on licensing, and to ensure that NGOs are independent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 For a detailed analysis of this Law, see EMHRN (2007:28-34).  
121 Official Records of the People’s Assembly, Report no.90 of 3 June 2002, pp. 80-89.  
122 ibid., pp.80-89.  
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from the state. However, it said that foreign funding should be subject to certain restrictions 
to prevent foreign penetration of the state and society.  
 
Egypt’s human rights NGOs began receiving grants from Western donors to maintain and 
expand their activities and reporting about human rights abuses in Egypt since 1992 (Hicks 
2006:78). In a low-income country like Egypt, it has not been easy for local rights groups to 
collect internal donations. Moreover, the business sector has been also reluctant to support 
human rights NGOs, fearing that this could jeopardise its relations with authorities. 
Nevertheless, Egypt’s human rights defenders’ shift towards foreign funding has been the 
subject of intense debate within the human rights movement and civil society at large on the 
associated merits and dangers (Megally 2006:111). The acceptance of foreign funding 
‘changed the nature of the Egyptian human rights movement’ (Hicks 2006:78). The 
availability of funding encouraged human rights defenders who were working together in one 
organisation to establish their new professionalised organisations without ‘efforts to create a 
base of local support through developing membership core; instead they relied almost 
completely on foreign funding’ (Hicks 2006:78).  
 
Moreover, some early founders and sympathisers with the movement took a strict position 
against foreign funding and became vociferous critics of human rights NGOs (Hicks 
2006:78). On the words of Megally (2006:111) ‘by accepting foreign funding groups 
provided further ammunition to those who sought to attach them, to question their integrity 
and loyalty, or to raise suspicions about who really controlled their agendas’. However, Pratt 
(2006:114) concluded that ‘the foreign funding debate does not reflect an objective reality 
about NGOs and foreign funding. It is not based on rigorous, empirical observation of the 
impact of foreign funding on NGO operations. Rather, it represents a dominant way of 
thinking about or interpreting Egypt’s relations with the West’. A common argument used in 
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this debate is that the West threatens Egypt’s ‘national interests’ or ‘identity’ through human 
rights NGOs.  
 
However, those who engage in this debate disregard the heterogeneity in Western societies 
and Egyptian society and put both ‘as two diametrically opposed and essentially different 
entities’ (Pratt 2006:126). What is relevant in this debate here is that successive governments 
in Egypt have long used this argument to stigmatise and marginalise human rights defenders 
as well as cover up its authoritarian policies. This binary has been also relevant for Islamists, 
many of whom believe that the international connection of human rights defenders is 
detrimental to the indigenous Islamic values (Hicks 2002). The massive campaign against 
human rights defenders after Mubarak is an example of how the foreign funding debate is 
instrumentalised by different actors for different political ends.   
 
In 2011, the SCAF led a smear campaign against human rights NGOs, accusing them of 
receiving illegal foreign funding to destabilise national security (HRW 2011). As part of this 
campaign, the Ministry of Justice established a Commission of Enquiry to probe into foreign 
funding granted to NGOs. This step appeared to be aimed at intimidating human rights NGOs 
that had been outspoken about human rights abuses that were allegedly committed by the 
SCAF during the transitional period. Moreover, the SCAF accused foreign powers of 
conspiring against the country through the funding of domestic actors to engage in protest 
and violence (Morsy 2012). However, the SCAF and the General Prosecutor presented no 
evidence to support these accusations. In its report, the Commission of Enquiry listed the 
names of 36 local human rights NGOs and three INGOs and accused them of receiving 
illegal foreign funding and operating without permission. It recommended the dissolution of 
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these organisations, and the prosecution of their leaders and members.123 The campaign 
reached a peak on 29 December when the police, supported by the army, raided the 
headquarters of six international and Egyptian human rights and democracy NGOs, 
interrogating the members of these organisations and seizing their files and computers 
(Morsy 2012). 124  Sixteen Egyptians and twenty-seven foreign activists working for 
international NGOs were subsequently tried on charges of operating without registration and 
receiving foreign funding without permission (HRW 2012a).  
 
The MB and FJP’s suspicion of Western foreign funding for human rights defenders was 
apparent in the 2011 crisis. For example, in a public statement, the MB (2011) supported the 
investigation into the foreign funding of civil society, and criticised US funding provided 
under the banner of democracy promotion. It accused this funding of corrupting politics in 
Egypt and buying loyalties to the US, and described it as sinful money (mal haram). In 
another public statement, the FJP (2012) denounced the brutal treatment of NGOs by the 
security apparatus and affirmed its unlimited support for freedom of association and the role 
of civil society in the promotion of democracy and human rights. However, it warned against 
foreign funding and urged the state to take strict actions against human rights organisations 
that received foreign funding. Another leader of the FJP stated that foreign funding was 
usually directed by the US to support secularists to undermine the Islamic project in Egypt 
(Tawfiq 2011). The Secretary General of the FJP at that time, Saad al-Katatny, urged the 
government to adopt a law banning foreign funding and stressed that the priorities of human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 See Ministry of Justice, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Foreign Funding for NGOs in Egypt, 14 September 
2011.   
124The raid targeted the following international NGOs: Freedom House, National Democratic Institute, International 
Republican Institute the Arab Center for Independence of Justice. It also targeted the following local groups: Arab Centre for 
Independence of justice and Legal Professions (ACIJP) the Budgetary and Human Rights Observatory, Future Centre for 
Judicial Studies.  
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rights NGOs should stem from the domestic agenda and should be funded only by Egyptians 
(Ikhwan Online 2011). 
 
In March 2012, the SCAF reportedly made substantive efforts to lift the travel ban imposed 
on the US and other foreign activists who had been charged. The panel of judges examining 
the case withdrew after reportedly being subject to pressure to lift the travel ban on US 
nationals (Egypt Independent 2012b). The trial continued, but only Egyptian activists were 
present in the sessions; their foreign colleagues were being tried in abstentia (al-Masri al-
Yawm 2012b). This alleged interference with the judiciary sparked anger from different 
political groups, which called for an impartial investigation into the incident. They 
condemned the fact that the SCAF and the General Prosecutor had led a harsh campaign 
against civil society and foreign funding, while taking a very lenient position toward accused 
foreign citizens and letting them leave the country (Al-Arabiya News. 2012).   
 
In Parliament, members of the MB and other political currents complained that the US and 
international NGOs had violated the national sovereignty of Egypt. They complained about 
the alleged pressure on judges to free accused US citizens.125 In his opening speech, Saad al-
Katatni, the speaker of Parliament, who became later the president of the FJP, condemned the 
US’s warning of cutting its annual aid to Egypt in order to pressure the Egyptian government 
to release the accused persons. He pointed out that the US applies double standards in its 
foreign policies through its silence on the abuses committed by Israel against Palestinians. He 
affirmed that the Egyptian government should be held accountable because it left these 
foreign NGOs to work in Egypt without permission, and to use foreign funding to harm 
national security.126 A few liberal and leftist members expressed their doubts over the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Official Records of the People’s Assembly, Report no.31 of 8 May 2012, pp. 20-21.  
126 ibid. 
  
 131 
governmental accusations, pointing out that these NGOs had been working in Egypt for years 
and that the government had even allowed some of them to monitor the first parliamentary 
election after the revolution.127         
 
In June 2013, the Cairo Criminal Court sentenced five Egyptian personnel of the international 
organisations to two years in prison, and eleven others to one-year suspended sentences. 27 
foreigners were tried in absentia and sentenced to five years in prison. Local and international 
human rights groups urged President Morsi to pardon the convicted human rights defenders 
(HRW 2013b; CIHRS et al 2013a);128 the Legal Advisor of the FJP supported the verdict,  
accusing the convicted NGOs of ‘conspiring against Egypt’s national security’, in the media 
(al-Alam 2013).  
 
Article 22 of the ICCPR on the right to freedom of association does not explicitly refer to the 
right of NGOs to receive domestic and foreign funding. However, UN human rights treaty- 
bodies and independent experts have largely acknowledged the right of NGOs to mobile 
domestic and foreign funding to implement human rights activities, and consider it to be an 
integral and vital aspect of the right to freedom of association.129 Article 13 of the UN 
Declaration on Human Rights Defenders provides that ‘everyone has the right, individually 
and in association with others, to solicit, receive and utilize resources for the express purpose 
of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms through peaceful 
means’.130 The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders stated in 2011 that: 
‘When individuals are free to exercise their right to associate, but are denied the resources to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 ibid., p.20.  
128 Article 149 of the 2012 Constitution said that: ‘The President of the Republic may issue a pardon or mitigate a sentence’. 
129 See UNCHR ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association 
Maina Kiai’ (2012), paras. 67-72 and UNCHR ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human 
Rights Defenders, Hina Jilani’ (2004), paras: 75-78.. See also the decision of UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in 
Aleksandr Bialatski v. Belarus, 23 November 2012. 
130  Article 3 of Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society 
to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1999.  
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carry out activities and operate an organization, the right to freedom of association becomes 
void.’131 The HRC expressed its concerns in 2002 at ‘the restrictions placed by Egyptian 
legislation and practice on the foundation of non-governmental organisations and the 
activities of such organisations such as efforts to secure foreign funding, which require prior 
approval from the authorities on pain of criminal penalties’.132 
 
The fact that Egyptian NGOs receive foreign funding is clearly not the issue here, since a lot 
of funding has been received by NGOs in coordination with national authorities within 
bilateral international cooperation agreements between Egypt and foreign governments. 
However, the Egyptian authorities have been concerned that a substantial proportion of 
funding has been channelled directly to NGOs without its prior approval, to be used in human 
rights and pro-democracy activities (Elagati 2013). Concerns related to the transparency of 
NGOs and national security are legitimate objectives to be realised in a national Law of 
Associations. However, the regulation of domestic and foreign funding in Egypt lacks 
transparency since it provides the executive and security agencies with unchecked powers to 
approve or reject applications for foreign and domestic funding, and has been used to 
selectively restrict funding to some NGOs, with political motives (HRW 2005; EMHRN 
2007:32).  
 
This trend continued under the MB whose subsequent draft laws of associations, tabled from 
February to May 2013, indicated that President Morsi and his government opted to keep 
human rights NGOs under state control (CIHRS et al 2013b; CIHRS et al 2013c; EMHRN 
2013). In the following section, I examine a final draft law proposed by Morsi in May 2013 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 UNCHR ‘commentary on the Declaration was provided in the report of the Secretary-General to the Commission on 
Human Rights’ (2000), p.95.  
132 UNCHR ‘Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations, Egypt’ (2002), para.21. 
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in relation to the right to freedom of association. The overall defects of this draft are that 
NGOs would need to apply for prior approval to exist, receive funds and operate domestically 
and internationally. At the same time, the draft law provided the executive with wide 
discretion to object to plans, activities and decisions made by NGOs, whose resources could 
be exhausted in litigation to challenge potential arbitrary decisions by the executive. 
Moreover, the draft law removed all other legal structures available to human rights 
defenders by obliging all NGOs operating in Egypt as law firms or non-for-profit companies 
to be registered under its provisions. This would allow the state to oversee their activities and 
funding.  
 
Article 1 of the Draft Law obliged all NGOs to apply for legal personality without leaving an 
option for the practice of the right to freedom of association without registration.133 Given 
that Egypt’s penal law also penalises ‘membership in unregistered organisations’,134 NGOs 
are required to obtain legal personality to begin their activities. They should engage in a 
registration process managed by the executive (the Ministry) rather than an independent 
organ. Applicant NGOs are considered to be registered 30 days after the submission of their 
application to the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (Article 7). The Ministry can 
object to the establishment and file a lawsuit before the administrative justice, should there be 
grounds to reject their application.135 The list of illegitimate activities of NGOs was clearly 
defined in Article 10, which prohibited the establishment of military units or organisations or 
NGOs whose members aim to make profit.136 However, Article1(1) contained an ambiguous 
limitation that could be used to reject or intervene in the work of human rights groups by 
saying that the work of NGOs should be in line with the Constitution. Additionally, Article 2 
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136 Art 10, ibid.,p.5.  
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said that: ‘All NGOs should comply with the provisions of the Constitution in their statutes, 
activities and funding’.137 These provisions could target human rights NGOs that cover 
human rights issues that might not be considered compatible with certain provisions in the 
2012 Constitution   
 
The draft law said that a Coordinating Committee would be established to approve NGOs’ 
funding applications from foreign sources (Article 13)138, provide licences for international 
NGOs (Article 54)139 and permit NGOs to conduct activities in cooperation with foreign 
NGOs (Article 12)140 or join international networks or organisations (Article 21).141 The 
independence of the Coordinating Committee was questionable since it was required that five 
of its nine members should represent the executive (Article 53).142 Article 18 provided the 
executive with absolute discretion to object to internal decisions taken by NGOs and Article 
14 obliged NGOs to obtain permission from the executive to hold domestic fund raising 
events.143    
 
Thus, the MB was not interested in supporting an independent and free human rights 
movement in Egypt after Mubarak, and its Islamist model was vehemently opposed by 
human rights defenders. Key human rights NGOs in Egypt were critical of the MB’s human 
rights record in power, particularly the constitution-making process, its demonstrated lack of 
respect for the judiciary, and its intolerance of political dissent (CIHRS et al 2012). The 
international agenda for the protection of human rights defenders was a particular source of 
concern for the MB, while the perceptions of both groups strongly diverged on issues like 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Art 1 and 2, ibid.,p3.  
138 Art 13, ibid.,p.6. 
139 Art 54, ibid.,p.11. 
140 Art 12,ibid.,p.6. 
141 Art21, ibid.,p.7. 
142 Art53, ibid.,p.11.  
143 Art 14 and 18, ibid., pp.6-7. 
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religious freedom, rights of religious minorities, freedom of expression and women’s rights. 
The MB’s efforts to bridge the gap with human rights defenders on these issues was very 
limited. This stands in stark contrast to, for example, the model in Tunisia, where political 
leaders of the Islamist movement, al-Nahda, engaged in extensive dialogue with secular 
Tunisian political forces and human rights defenders and reached agreement on many 
sensitive human rights (Hajji 2007) and transitional issues, including a very progressive Law 
of Associations, following the rule of President Ben Ali in 2011 (El Fegiery 2012).144  
           
5. Conclusion  
This chapter shows that political pluralism is irreconcilable with the ideological 
underpinnings of the MB, in holding that all political parties and associations should abide by 
the supreme reference of Islamic law. The unity of the Muslim community is underlined as a 
central value in Islam that should not be jeopardised by political pluralism and partisanship. 
The attainment of this ideal according to the group is what distinguishes pluralism in Islam 
from Western societies. However, this vague and broad qualification 
leads to unjustifiable restrictions on pluralism and freedom of association and 
expression. Moreover, the thought of the MB has established a fault line between its 
conception of the shari‘a state, and other non-Islamist ideologies. This conviction continues 
to influence the group's attitudes towards liberals, leftists and secularists who are often 
portrayed as deviant from Islam.  
  
  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 See Tunisian Law of Associations No.88/2011, Official Gazette no.74 of 30 September 2011, pp.1996-2000.  
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Chapter Five: Religion and Freedom of Expression 
 
 
This chapter explores the relationship between Islamic law and freedom of expression in the 
thought and practice of the MB. I first address the concept of freedom of expression in the 
writings of MB scholars and its official political platforms. Then I analyse the place of 
freedom of expression in the political activism of the group, in opposition and in power, with 
focus on issues of heresy, blasphemy and obscenity. These issues are hotly debated in the 
relationship between Islamic law, and freedom of expression and artistic creativity.  
 
1. Religion and Freedom of expression  
The language of international human rights treaties does not provide straightforward criteria 
for determining the limitations of a complex norm like freedom of expression. The 
interpretation of human rights norms by international and regional human rights organs can 
provide some guidance but in some situations, these organs take different positions. For 
example, in its interpretation of the ICCPR, the HRC tends to expand the scope of freedom of 
expression and accept limitations only in exceptional circumstances.145 By contrast, the 
ECtHR has provided national authorities with wide discretion to determine the limits of 
freedom of expression. For example, ECtHR has held that the historical revision of the 
Holocaust amounts to incitement to hatred and discrimination against Jews.146 The HRC on 
the other hand has held that ‘the [ICCPR] does not permit general prohibition of expression 
of an erroneous opinion or an incorrect interpretation of past events’.147 Accordingly, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 See HRC, GC No. 34 
146 See Garaudy v. France, ECtHR, 24 June 2003 and Hans-Jurgen Witzsch v. Germany, ECtHR,13 December 2005.  
147 See also HRC GC No.34, para.49.  
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circumstances of each case should be carefully considered to decide if certain expressions can 
be restricted under the permissible limitations of Articles 19 (3) or 20.148  
 
A key issue in this chapter is to what extent IHRL allows states to restrict certain expressions 
deemed offensive to religious beliefs or shocking for certain religious communities. I begin 
with relevant articles in the ICCPR. In 2011, the HRC has held in its General Comment no.34 
that the right to freedom of expression in Article 19 (2) of the ICCPR includes the expression 
of ‘deeply offensive views’,149 adding that ‘prohibitions of displays of lack of respect for a 
religion or other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are incompatible with the 
Covenant’.150 ‘Criticism of religious leaders or commentary on religious doctrine and tenets 
of faith’ are also protected.151 According to the Committee, prohibition can, however, be 
accepted under Article 20 (2) of the ICCPR, which obliges states to prohibit by law ‘any 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence’. The Committee stresses that any restrictions on freedom of expression 
under Article 20 (2) should be necessary, proportional and prescribed by law.152 Article 19 
(3) says that freedom of expression may be subject to certain restrictions: ‘For respect of the 
rights or reputations of others’; for the protection of national security or of public order, or of 
public health or morals’. These limitations are applied within strict conditions and it is not 
their purpose to protect religious doctrines from criticism or defamation (Temperman 
2012:526-527; Langer 2014:109).        
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 See Faurisson v. France, 16/12/1996. The HRC concluded that the restriction of freedom of expression in this case is 
consistent with Article 19(3). It explained that the statements of Faurisson ’read in their full context . . . strengthen anti-
semitic feelings; the restriction served the respect of the Jewish community to live free from fear of an atmosphere of anti-
semitism’ ( para.9.6).   
149 HRC, GC 34, para.11.   
150 ibid.,para.48. In its comments on states’ reports, the HRC was critical of blasphemy laws. See UNCHR ‘Comments on 
Ireland’ (1993), para.15.  
151 HRC, GC 34,para.48.  
152ibid., Para.22.  
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Moreover, it has been argued that freedom of religion does not encompass the right to respect 
for one’s religious feeling.153 The protection of religious freedom under Article 18 of the 
ICCPR is concerned with the protection of followers of religions to freely manifest their 
religious beliefs, not the protection of religious tenets. As noted by UN experts: ‘Defamation 
of religions may offend people and hurt their religious feelings but it does not necessarily or 
at least directly result in a violation of their rights, including their right to freedom of 
religion’.154 However, under Articles 18, 19(3) and Article 20(2) certain expressions may 
seriously impair the practice of religious freedom and could be subject to restrictions (Langer 
2014:123). It is also argued that understanding a right to freedom of religion or belief as a 
right to respect for one’s religion also jeopardises the right to freedom of religion or belief 
itself (Temperman 2012:543-544). Under Article 18 of the ICCPR, the manifestation of 
beliefs covers non-atheistic or atheistic beliefs. Atheists express their beliefs when they make 
offending commentaries on religions, their rituals and symbols. Dictated by their religious 
doctrines, some religious people also express offending views on atheists or the doctrines of 
the followers of other religions.     
 
The ECtHR has taken a different approach by holding that states are not in violation of 
Article 10 of the ECHR when they restrict offensive attacks on religions.155 In its case law, 
the Court has granted states a wide margin of appreciation to ensure the ‘respect for other 
people’s religions’ 156 or ‘the right of others to respect for their freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion’ 157  in response to ‘improper attacks on objects of religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 See UNCHR ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief and the Special Rapporteur on 
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance’ 2006,paras. 31-39.   
154 ibid., para.37.  
155 See Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, ECtHR, 20 September 1994 and Nigel Wingrove v. UK, ECtHR, 25 November 
1996. 
156 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, para50 
157 I.A v. Turkey, ECtHR, 13 September 2005, paras.24-28. 
  
 139 
veneration’ 158 when required by domestic circumstances. For this purpose, the Court 
established a distinction between provocative opinions that can be tolerated, and abusive 
attacks on one's religion that can be restricted.159 Meanwhile, the Court held that religious 
people ‘cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism. They must tolerate and 
accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of 
doctrines hostile to their faith’.160   
  
Although this distinction made by the ECtHR leaves wide space for critical engagement with 
religions,161 it favours in practice dominant religious doctrines and curtails the ability of 
critics or atheists to challenge them. It is also difficult to clearly define what can be 
considered ‘abusive attacks’. These concerns were upheld in 2005 by the dissenting opinion 
of three judges in the case of I.A v. Turkey, stating that: ‘The time has perhaps come to 
‘revisit’ this case-law, which in our view seems to place too much emphasis on conformism 
or uniformity of thought and to reflect an overcautious and timid conception of freedom of 
the press’.162 European states’ resistance of continuous efforts made by Muslim states in the 
UN to develop an international legally binding framework against defamation of religion 
reveals a growing consensus among European states that the legal prohibition of blasphemy 
or ‘defamation of religions’ is not compatible with freedom of expression (Leo et al 
2011:773-774; Langer 2013:273-280; Temperman 2012). The treatment of this issue is 
different in the Islamic context discussed in this chapter. When it comes to the protection of 
dominant religious doctrines, freedom of expression becomes irrelevant to the MB, whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, para50.  
159 I.A v. Turkey, paras.24-28. 
160 ibid, para.47.  
161 See Aydin Tatlav v. Turkey, ECtHR, 2 May 2006. In this case, the Court found that Article 10 of the ECHR was 
breached by Turkey when a Turkish writer was punished for his criticism of Islam. The Court held that his views could 
shock Muslims but they contain no abusive attack on sacred symbols.    
162 See Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Costa, Cabral Barreto and Jungwiert, in I.A v. Turkey, p.9. 
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this expression can be considered proper or offensive. With a few exceptions, Egypt’s 
judiciary upholds a similar view.    
 
2. The Literature of the Muslim Brotherhood  
This section discusses the scope of freedom of expression in the model of the Islamic state 
proposed by MB scholars. The functions of this state and its relationship with its subjects 
inevitably give rise to certain tensions with international human rights. As I discuss in this 
chapter, this state invasively intervenes in the ways of life and behaviours chosen by its 
citizens. The substance of freedom of expression is seriously limited, since ideas and artistic 
expression have to comply with certain Islamic moral codes dictated by those people who 
control the state.   
 
According to Muslim jurists, the doctrine of hisba in Islamic law is founded on the Qur’anic 
principle of commanding good and forbidding evil (3:114). This principle entitles citizens to 
take public actions to promote good and forbid evil. Muslim jurists have suggested different 
conditions for the practice of hisba by individuals. For instance, al-Qaradawi (1997:121-125) 
has argued that there should be a consensus among jurists and clear evidence that certain acts 
are evil. He has also added that forbidding evil by force is the responsibility of the ruler. At 
certain phases of the history of Muslims, a public position called al-muhtasib was established 
to monitor the markets and respect for public morals. In the modern nation state, many 
Muslim jurists and Islamists consider that the function of hisba should be fulfilled either by 
giving powers to the police to monitor respect for Islamic teachings and morality or by 
allowing citizens to take direct legal action if they observe violations of certain Islamic 
values (Kamali 1997:28-33; Balz 1997:137-138). As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
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doctrine of hisba has been also used by the MB over the last three decades to permit a certain 
degree of political pluralism and freedom of expression in Islamic law.               
 
Writing for his Islamist audience since the 1970s, al-Qaradawi (2005b:41) has repeated this 
meaning by stating that ‘Islamic society is based on Islamic beliefs and shari‘a. It is guided 
by Islam in its education, culture and media’. This conception of the Islamic state has 
continued to inform the MB’s political activism. In opposition, it pressured the state to 
narrow the scope of freedom of expression in the name of religion and morality, and in 
power, President Morsi, backed by the group, took certain constitutional, legal and 
administrative steps to gradually impose an Islamist version of freedom of expression.   
  
The traditional Islamic law of apostasy, heresy and blasphemy influences the thinking of the 
MB’s scholars about what is permitted and what is not in the Islamic state.163 But the 
definition of what constitutes heretical or blasphemous materials has been a source of tension 
between the MB and many other liberal Muslims. ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Auda (1977:286) 
maintained that ‘anything written or said in the Islamic state should be constrained by the 
texts and spirit of Islamic shari‘a’. Salim al-Bahnasawi (2003:84) pointed out that freedom of 
expression in Islamic law should not tolerate any challenge to fundamental Islamic beliefs or 
according to al-Ghazzali (2003:206) ‘undermine Islam as a creed and shari‘a’. Moreover, 
certain views can lead their authors, according to al-Qaradawi (2005:60), to the status of 
apostasy if these views deny what is necessarily known of religion, ridicule Islamic beliefs 
and shari‘a or insult God, his Messengers and the holy books. In traditional treatises of 
Islamic law, heresy refers to ‘a person whose teaching becomes a danger to the state’ (Saeed 
and Saeed 2004:39). Many Muslim jurists have maintained that certain acts constitute 
apostasy, but the list of these acts have not been clearly defined (Johansen 2003:692). The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Saeed and Saeed (2004) and Kamali (1997) provide a detailed discussion of these concepts in traditional Islamic law.   
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denial of a legal ruling/opinion subject to consensus can become evidence for apostasy 
according to many Muslim jurists (Hallaq 2009:319). Answering a question on the Islamic 
fundamentals that cannot be touched by the exercise of freedom of expression, al-Qaradawi 
(2006c) said in his widely watched TV show: 
 
 
Islamic fundamentals are proven by clear and authentic texts from the 
Qur’an and Sunna and unanimously agreed by Muslims across generations 
such as the belief in God, his books, the Prophet, messengers, the last day 
and the Islamic rituals, clear Islamic prohibitions and clear rulings of 
shari‘a in the areas of marriage, divorce, inheritance, buying and 
selling…etc.     
 
Although al-Qaradawi (2005b:52; 2007b:196) held that there is no consensus among Muslim 
scholars on the death penalty for apostates, he calls for punishing those apostates who ‘spread 
temptation in Muslim society’ by propagating apostasy by written or verbal words. This type 
of apostasy according to him (2005b:52-53; 2006d:62-63) is a ‘hard apostasy’ (ridda 
mughalaza), an act that amounts to ‘fighting God and the Prophet’. However, this type of 
apostasy is by definition in conflict with freedom of expression and religious freedom. It is 
not confined to the act of treason or armed rebellion against the state but represses what can 
be declared by the state to be dangerous ideas or thoughts. As an example, al-Qaradawi 
(2005b:52) has held that the British novelist of Indian origin Salman Rushdie committed hard 
apostasy in his 1988 novel The Satanic Verses.164  
 
Viewing freedom of expression through the lenses of apostasy, blasphemy and heresy is 
problematic under international human rights norms, because under these concepts, certain 
theological and religious issues move beyond political or academic discussion. Muslim 
reformers, atheists and members of unrecognised religious minorities become vulnerable to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164The Satanic Verses treats the story of Islam and the Prophet Muhammad in a satirical way. The novel stirred massive 
outrage among Muslims and it was banned in many Muslim states. On 14 February 1989, the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran 
declared Rushdie an apostate and incited Muslims to kill him (Slaughter 1993).          
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persecution. As stated by An-Na‘im (2008:121-122) ‘the risks of manipulation and abuse [of 
concepts like apostasy, heresy and blasphemy] tend to diminish the possibilities for legitimate 
theological and jurisprudential reflection and development within any Islamic society’. In the 
next section, we see that such accusations have obstructed the work of many Egyptian writers 
and artists.    
 
Although MB ideologues and scholars have found that artistic activities are permitted under 
Islamic law, these activities, according to them, are restrained by certain moral and religious 
limitations. They hold that artistic activities in the Islamic state should be clean of obscenity 
or moral corruption. Al-Banna encouraged the practice of artistic activities such as acting, but 
within certain Islamic limitations. He established a theatrical team to disseminate Islamic 
teachings and values through plays (Tammam 2004). Al-Khatib (1993:34) stated that ‘arts 
and literature can influence people like a type of alcohol or drugs, inciting them for sin and 
corruption, but arts can also become a source of purity and high values’. The MB sources 
refuse to treat arts as an end in itself, rather artistic creativity should be restrained by moral 
and religious values (al-Qaradawi 1994:300-307; al-Ghazzali 2005b:194). Al-Khatib 
(1993:61-62) argued that the Qur’an (24:19) warns those people who spread sin and 
obscenity among believers. Al-Ghazzali (2003:204) maintained that freedom of expression 
should not create a ‘moral chaos’ in Muslim society; for instance, he refused to consider the 
work of the classical Arab poet Abu Nuwas (747-815), who was known for his erotic poems, 
a legitimate practice of freedom of expression.   
 
Al-Qaradawi (1994:300; 306-307; 2004) pointed out that ‘Islam permits singing and acting 
provided that they are not obscene or harmful to Islamic morals’. Al-Ghazzali (2011:72-99) 
argued that music and singing are not prohibited in the Qur’an and that the hadiths used by 
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those scholars who outlaw music and singing are weak solitary hadiths165 whose narrators are 
not reliable. Citing the views of the Andalusian jurist Ibn Hazm (994-1064) and the Shafi‘i 
jurist Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali (1058-1111), he argued that the content of these hadiths 
contradict other forms of sufficient historical evidence which indicate that singing is not 
absolutely prohibited, He concluded that the permissibility of songs depends on the meaning 
of their words and the performance of singers; the prohibited songs are the ones that seduce 
people to follow their ‘sinful desires’ (al-Ghazzali 2011:85).        
 
Al-Qaradawi (2010a) and al-Ghazzali (1999:164-165) held that women are allowed to sing, 
as long as their performance is in line with Islamic morals and does not trigger sexual desire. 
However, this opinion contrasts with a fatwa published by al-Khatib (1977) in al-Da‘wa 
magazine where he disallowed women from singing on the basis that most Muslim jurists 
agreed that ‘the voice of women is a source of attraction and temptation’ and that it could 
lead to harmful consequences for Islamic morals. This opinion, however, deviates from the 
positions taken by al-Banna who, according to Tammam (2004) did not oppose the 
involvement of women in the arts, and even invited renowned Egyptian actresses to take part 
in some plays sponsored by the MB. Explaining the reason behind al-Khatib’s conservative 
view, Tammam (2004) argued that in the 1970s, some MB scholars were influenced by 
hardline opinions of the Saudi Wahhabis. But it does not seem that al-Khatib’s view on the 
voice of women dominates the MB today, as there are female TV presenters who have 
regularly appeared in the MB’s media, such as Misr25 TV. It is also noted that the view of al-
Qaradawi on singing is the one published on Manarat Web, the official website of the MB’s 
Department of Da‘wa (al-Qaradawi 2013). But when the MB allows women to take part in 
artistic activities, it follows certain regulations. ‘Abd Al-Khaliq al-Sharif (2013), the head of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165A solitary hadith is a report transmitted by a number of narrators does not reach that of a continuously recurrent hadith. 
Muslim jurists classified the hadiths according to the reliability of the narrators into authentic, good, weak and fabricated 
(Kamali 2006).      
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the educational section at the MB and the editor of Manarat Web, has stated that women 
should not be allowed to sing in the presence of men. The Muslim Sisters, the female section 
of the MB, have formed teams of female singers who perform what they consider ‘an Islamic 
musical performance’; they do not perform in front of men (Si‘dawi2012).  
 
Paintings, sculptures and photographs are also subject to certain restrictions, although MB 
scholars tend to be somewhat more accepting of the latter. Photographs are permissible 
unless their subject matter is incompatible with Islamic morals, but painting and sculpture are 
prohibited if they portray living beings. Making dolls or figures made of chocolate or sugar 
however, is permissible (al-Khatib 1981; al-Qaradawi 1994:119-120; al-Ghazzali 2011:98). 
Most MB scholars agree that the visual depiction of the Prophet and messengers of God is 
not allowed in Islamic law. According to al-Qaradawi (2007d), ‘there is a consensus among 
the Sunni scholars that picturing the Prophet and messengers is not permitted. This is to 
protect the ideal picture the believers have in their imagination’. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Barr, a 
leading scholar at the MB’s Guidance Bureau has maintained that the visual depiction of the 
Rightly Guided Caliphs is also prohibited (al-‘Ajuz 2012). However, al-Qaradawi has 
recently held that Islam permits the depiction of the Rightly Guided Caliphs ‘Umar and Abu 
Bakr in a TV series as long as playing these personalities is conducted in a respectful and 
objective manner. Other Muslim jurists including top leaders of the MB have not supported 
this view (al-Hay 2010; On Islam 2012).  
          
The limitations proposed by the MB on freedom of expression and freedom of artistic 
activities are not just religious injunctions to be observed by Muslims in their private lives, 
but should inform the daily policies of the Islamic state. This vision of freedom of expression 
has been manifested in the platforms of the MB since 1987. In the electoral platforms of the 
MB, the state is responsible for monitoring ‘the Islamic values and morals’ and confronting 
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‘the waves of Westernisation and cultural invasion’ (MB 1987; FJP 2011:140). This task 
provides a justification for state censorship of media and culture when it believes that the 
Islamic nature of the state is threatened. The 2012 Constitution reflected the view that Islam 
and its values and culture constitute the identity of the state and society.  
 
3. The Muslim Brotherhood in Opposition   
3.1 Pressuring the State to Restrict Freedom of Expression 
In opposition, the MB was active in generating intense political and social pressure on state 
authorities and the political society at large, to censor intellectual and artistic work deemed 
offensive to Islam and public morals. After its re-establishment in the Egyptian political 
scene during the 1970s, the group used its monthly magazine al-Da‘wa as a platform to 
attack what it considered to be deviations from Islamic and moral values in the media, 
cultural and artistic sectors. After 1984, the MB utilised its representation in the parliament to 
mobilise public opinion against certain types of expression. During the 1984 Parliament, MB 
parliamentarians posed several questions to the Minister of Information, complaining that the 
content of Egypt’s media did not comply with Islamic morals. It recommended that the 
government form a committee of Muslim scholars to oversee broadcast materials (‘Awad and 
Tawfiq 1995:198-217; al-Tawil 1992:236-234). This agenda was consolidated in the 1987 
Parliament after the establishment of the Islamic Alliance between the MB and the Labour 
Party. For instance, in 1988 and 1989, members of the Alliance posed a series of 
parliamentarian questions and an interpellation to the Minister of Culture, protesting his 
approval for showing certain films at the International Cairo Cinema Festival of 1987 and 
1988 which, according to them, were in violation of public morals and Islamic values (al-
Tawil 1992:267-277). The group explained in Parliament that ‘Islam does not oppose arts 
which do not violate the rulings or principles of Islamic shari‘a’ (quoted in al-Tawil 
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1992:267). Other questions were also directed to the Minister of Information about the 
content of the broadcasting media (‘Awad and Tawfiq 1995:374-406; al-Tawil 1992:243-
251). The group repeatedly declared that its campaign to reform the media and culture was 
necessary to lay the ground for the application of Islamic law (al-Tawil 1992:237).                
 
The same position on freedom of expression continued in the 2000 and 2005 Parliaments. 
The parliamentarian block of the MB targeted the work of some Arab and Egyptian novelists. 
I treat many of these cases in the following section. In April 2004, four members of the MB. 
Including Morsi, who was the speaker of the MB’s parliamentarian block at that time, 
protested about the organisation of the ‘Miss Egypt’ beauty contest, arguing that ‘it violates 
Egypt’s constitution, and the fundamentals and sanctities of the nation’ (al-Markaz al-Dawli 
li al-I‘lam 2005). Opponents to such contests have been vocal in Western societies since the 
1960s, many arguing that they objectify women (Sanghani 2014). But we should keep in 
mind that the MB’s stance on this issue is motivated by its emphasis on female modesty and 
women’s segregation from men (chapter eight). Leading members of the MB also urged the 
government to ban certain types of dancing that for them were not acceptable in a Muslim 
society. In a famous TV debate broadcasted in 2005, Mohammad Morsi (2005) attacked 
ballet dance and belly dance, stating that a country like Egypt, whose constitution is based on 
Islamic law, should not host these kinds of arts. The MB continued its pressure on the 
Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Culture in the 2005 Parliament to censor TV and 
cinema material (al-Markaz al-I’lami li al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin 2010).   
 
The MB’s advocacy against certain intellectual and artistic products was backed and 
legitimised by al-Azhar Scholars’ Front, an NGO established by a group of scholars from al-
Azhar in 1946 and officially registered in Egypt in 1967. This organisation has been 
dominated by scholars from the MB, and its political activities and campaigns have served its 
  
 148 
political agenda. One of its key priorities has been to oversee the political and legal roles 
played by the leadership of al-Azhar, and it was very critical of certain positions taken by al-
Azhar leaders appointed by Mubarak in the 1990s. Consequently, the government dissolved 
the NGO in 1998 (Mustafa 2000:16), although it illegally continued its activities.166 On many 
occasions, the Front pressured al-Azhar and the government, in attempts to ban books and 
movies, or prosecute intellectuals and artists. For instance, its scholars engaged in public 
campaigns against Faraj Foda and Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, accusing them of heresy. It also 
pressured the government in 1997 to ban the Egyptian movie the Immigrant (al-muhajir), 
produced by the Egyptian film director Youssef Shahine, accusing the movie of depicting the 
life of the Prophet Joseph (Mustafa 2000:14; Abu Dif 2013).  
 
3.2 Selected Cases of Censorship 
This section discusses the interaction of the MB with some key cases of state censorship of 
freedom of expression and argues that the political activism of the MB since the 1980s has 
contributed to increasing restrictions on freedom of expression. The MB was the main 
instigator of some cases of censorship, and in other cases was supportive of the interference 
of al-Azhar and the state to restrict freedom of expression. Al-Azhar has been a key player in 
defining the scope of freedom of expression in Egypt. Since the beginning of the 20th 
Century, al-Azhar’s scholars have been making recommendations to the state to censor 
certain publications considered offensive to Islam. This role has been consolidated over the 
last three decades with the rise of political Islam and state attempts to gain the support of al-
Azhar in its competition with Islamists (Moustafa 2000; Barraclough 1998).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166Many prominent MB scholars have been members of the Front such as Mohammad al-Ghazzali, ‘Abd al-Sattar Fathalla 
Sa‘id, Abd al-Hay al-Faramawi, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Barr, Tawfik al-Wa‘i, Kahiri Rakwa, al-Sayd Nuh and al-Sayd ‘Askar.      
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According to Article 30 of Decree No. 250/1975 of Executive Regulation of Law No. 
103/1961, al-Azhar provides permission for the publication of the Qur‘an and gives opinions 
on the publication of Islamic books.167 In 1994, the State Council adopted an opinion (fatwa) 
that held that al-Azhar has a mandate to review the Islamic content of any intellectual or 
artistic work and its decisions in this area are obligatory for the state authorities. The well-
known Islamist judge, Tarek al-Bishri, who was heading the Department of Fatwa at the 
State Council at that time, prepared this opinion upon the request of al-Azhar.168 During the 
1990s and 2000s, Egypt witnessed dozens of cases of censorship and forfeiture of intellectual 
and artistic production (Abu Si‘da 2007:187-216). In most of these cases, the MB and al-
Azhar agreed on a restrictive version of freedom of expression. At the same time, ‘the 
Egyptian government increasingly saw its political interest in leading rather than following 
on issues that it perceived could give it Islamic legitimacy’ (Chase 2012:139).  
 
The case of the Egyptian judge and scholar Muhammad Sa‘id al-‘Ashmawi shows this 
harmony between the MB and al-Azhar on freedom of expression. In January 1992, al-Azhar 
ordered the removal of five books written by al-‘Ashmawi from a presentation at the Cairo 
International Book Fair.169 Responding to international and local outrage over this decision, 
then-President Mubarak intervened and cancelled the ban within the week (al-‘Ashmawi 
2004:13-22). However, in 1994, another official religious institution, the Supreme Council of 
Islamic Affairs, announced the ban of al-‘Ashmawi’s books, accusing his work of insulting 
Islam and offending the Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphs (O’Sullivan 1997:105). In 
1979, after the publication of his first book (usul al-shari‘a), the MB’s magazine al-da‘wa 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Article 30, Decree No. 250/1975 of Executive Regulation of law No. 103/ 196, Official Gazette no.13bis of 27 March 
1975.  
168 State Council, Statement on the Law No.121, 10 February 1994. According to Article 58 of Law 47/1972 on the State 
Council, executive bodies can ask for any legal opinions from the Department of fatwa.         
169 The titles of these books are ’Usul al-Shari‘a, al-Islam al-Siyasi, al-Riba wa al-Fa’ida fi al-Islam, Ma‘alim al-Islam, and 
al-khilafa al-Islamiyya (al-‘Ashmawi 2004).     
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launched a smear campaign against al-‘Ashmawi (Abu Isma‘il 1979; ‘Ashmawi 1979:12-14; 
1980:14-15: al-Mat‘ani 1979:37-39). In his writings, al-‘Ashmawi (1998) has argued for new 
interpretive methods of the Qur’an and Sunna and posed intense critique of political Islam 
and the application of Islamic law in the modern nation sate. In response to him, Salah Abu 
Isma‘il (1979:61), a prominent MB leader wrote: 
 
If al-‘Ashmawi thinks that the application of shari‘a is not the rulings of 
transactions mentioned in the Qur’an and Sunna, we tell him we disbelieve 
in you and believe in God, the Prophet. He [al-‘Ashmawi] should not be 
permitted to speak to the Muslim society because he hurts the feelings of 
Muslims and deviates from Islamic sanctities.         
 
Salih ‘Ashmawi (1980:15), another leader of the MB, accused al-‘Ashmawi of conspiring 
against Islam and Islamic law and urged him to publicly repent from his views to avoid being  
charged with apostasy. At that time, Egypt’s Parliament was discussing the enactment of 
Islamic criminal code along other Islamic codes,170 and ‘Ashmawi blamed former President 
Sadat for delaying the adoption of these codes. This delay, according to him, ‘encouraged al-
‘Ashmawi and other writers to attack Islam’. He was also critical of the media and the 
Ministry of Culture for publishing views offensive to Islam. This led to very serious cases of 
intimidation for al-‘Ashmawi, who repeatedly received death threats from violent Islamists 
during the 1980s (Fluehr-Lobban1998:2), and remained under continuous security protection 
until 2011.171       
            
The harassment of Egyptian secular intellectuals turned bloody in the 1990s. While it was the 
militant Islamists who were directly involved in violence, the campaigns orchestrated by the 
MB fuelled the ill sentiment of these militants against liberals and secular Muslims. Militant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 In 1977, al-Azhar proposed a draft law of apostasy which stated that a Muslim can be declared an apostate if he/she 
‘denies what is necessarily known of religion’ (quoted in ‘Abd al-Fattah 1984:159). Apostasy was also considered a crime in 
the Islamic criminal law proposed by the People’s Assembly (1982:112-120).   
171In a meeting with al-‘Ashmawi in Cairo in January 2013, he informed me that his security protection was cancelled after 
Islamists took over power in 2012.   
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Islamists killed the secular Egyptian intellectual and politician Faraj Foda in 1992 in response 
to his call for a separation between state and religion, and his critique of the application of 
Islamic law. In his writings and talks, Foda had refuted the ideological underpinnings of 
Islamists and called for drastic Islamic legal reform (Najjar 1996:4), which many Islamists 
viewed as deviating from the fundamentals of Islam and heretical, rather than another 
possible interpretation of Islam. For instance, Muhammad Salim al-‘Awa, a famous Islamist 
thinker claimed in a public debate with Foda that secularism is a form of atheism (‘Umara 
2011b:36).172 It was clear from the context of the debate that this statement was made on 
purpose to delegitimise the idea of the secular state. Foda strongly objected to this statement 
and considered it an attack on his personal religious faith (‘Umara 2011b:48-49).     
 
Islamists participated in public debates with Foda not to engage in thoughtful discussion with 
his critical views, but to convert him back to Islam. Mohammad al-Ghazzali stated in an 
interview in al-Ahram newspaper that he was keen to attend a public debate with Foda to 
encourage him to repent from his views and ‘return him back to faith’ but he failed, because 
Foda, according to al-Ghazzali, was ‘hostile to Islam and its system’ (quoted in al-Qaradawi 
2000:290). It comes with no surprise that in his testimony in 1993 before the High Court of 
State Security – which tried the killers of Foda – al-Ghazzali provided a juristic justification 
of the assassination of Foda and the persecution of religious dissidents in Egypt. He blamed 
Foda for his thought, instead of condemning his murderers. Al-Ghazzali publicly stated at the 
court that ‘a Muslim who insults and denies the application of shari‘a is an apostate and 
should be subjected to death sentence if he/she insists on spreading his/her corrupted views in 
the society’ (quoted in al-Qaradawi 2000: 283-284). According to al-Ghazzali, ‘it is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Few months before his assassination, Foda participated in two famous public debates with prominent Islamists on Egypt 
between the Islamic state and the civil state. Amongst the Islamists who debated, Foda were the MB ideologue Mohammad 
al-Ghazzali and the mouthpiece of the MB Ma’mun al-Hudaiby. The transcripts of these debates are collected by ‘Umara 
(2011a:2011b). 
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violation of the ruler’s powers if ordinary persons volunteered to implement the punishment’, 
but he informed the judges that there ‘is no punishment in Islamic law for that’ (quoted in al-
Qaradawi 2000:285). In a press interview after the trial, al-Ghazzali said that ‘the government 
can apply discretionary punishment against persons who disregard the ruler and apply Islamic 
penalties by themselves’ (quoted in al-Qaradawi 2000:291). In July 2012, President Morsi 
pardoned Abu al-A’la ‘Abd Rabbu, one of the killers of Foda, along with other violent 
Islamists who had been subjected to exceptional trials under Mubarak. In a TV show, ‘Abd 
Rabbu justified his crime by accusing Foda of being an apostate (‘Abd Rabbu 2012; Al-
Mesryoon 2012).  
 
Two years after the killing of Foda, the Egyptian novelist and Nobel laureate Naguib 
Mahfouz survived an attempt on his life by an Islamist militant. This attempt was preceded 
by a campaign led by the MB and militant Islamists against Mahfouz and his novels. In a 
religious opinion (fatwa), ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman, the leader of the jihad militant Islamist 
group, had accused Mahfouz of apostasy, and Islamists and prominent scholars at al-Azhar 
had harshly criticised his novels. Among these, in particular, was The Children of Gaballawi 
(awlad haritna), which has sparked controversy in Egypt since its publication in 1959, and 
had been banned for some time by presidential decree due to a report prepared by a 
committee of scholars from al-Azhar, of which Mohammad al-Ghazzali was a co-author 
(O’Sullivan1997:108).   
 
After Mahfouz won the prize, the MB’s magazine al-I‘tisam wrote that his novels ‘destroy 
the authentic values and indult God, the Prophet and the messengers’, adding that ‘the West 
appreciates Arab novels which are based on atheism and unrestricted by Islamic values’ (al-
Jindi 1988:21-25). In 1989, the global storm caused by The Satanic Verses of Salman 
Rushdie empowered Egypt’s Islamists to take tough positions on secular writers and 
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novelists. Al-I‘tisam published that Rushdie and Mahfouz are both part of the Western 
secular conspiracy against Islam. The magazine stated that The Children of Gaballawi closely 
resembles the Satanic Verses, affirming that the two novels insult God and Islam and the 
Prophet (al-’i‘tisam1989b:5-7). Al-I‘tisam announced that Mahfouz’s novel contains clear 
disbelief and demanded the trial of Mahfouz (al-Jindi 1989b:18-20). In 1994, al-Ghazzali 
‘condemn[ed] those who advocate the publication of Awlad Hartina calling them a 'band of 
brokers of kufr ... heretics ... who hate God and Islam’ (quoted in Najar 1998:155).  
 
The MB has not changed its hostile position to the work of Mahfouz, and even distanced 
itself from a more lenient view developed by one of its prominent leaders, Abdel Moneim 
Abu al-Futuh. The leader stated that controversial novels should not be published by the 
state, but that the private sector should be free to publish any book, even if one of these books 
calls for atheism. Abu al-Futuh had also visited Mahfouz in 2004 and encouraged him to 
publish awlad haritna (Saad 2012:88). The mouthpiece of the MB, Mahmoud Ghuzlan 
(2012) criticised Abu al-Futuh’s opinion on freedom of expression and considered his view a 
deviation from the thought of the MB.   
 
The first time a court declared an Egyptian citizen to be an apostate was in the famous case of 
the Egyptian academic, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd. In this case the defendant did not 
intentionally convert from Islam, but the Court of Cassation held that Abu Zayd’s published 
views on the development of the Qur’an and jurisprudence proved his apostasy. It 
consequently ordered the dissolution of his marriage to his Muslim wife (Moustafa 2010:20-
21; Najjar 2000).173 Ma’mun al-Hudaiby (1996), the former General Guide of the MB and the 
Deputy General Guide at that time, applauded the judgment and expressed his astonishment 
at those people who opposed the judgment, stating that ‘challenging the beliefs of the Muslim 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Court of Cassation, Cases Nos. 475,481 and 478/65, 5 August 1996.  
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umma, the Qur’an and Islamic shari‘a is not freedom of expression or a practice of ijtihad’.  
The legal action against Abu Zayd had been filed by a group of Islamist lawyers. Until 1996, 
any citizen could file a hisba case at family courts, challenging the violation of family law or 
the doctrines of Islamic law). According to Article 6 of Law No.462/1955 Abolishing the 
Shari‘a and Milli Courts, judges apply the most famous opinion of the Hanafi School of law 
to such cases, if they do not find a resolution for any legal matter in the Personal Status Law. 
Accordingly, the conversion of one of the spouses from Islam could make the marriage void 
(Najjar 2000:190-191; Balz 1997). In an attempt to calm the international and domestic 
outrage caused by this case, the government then moved to restrict the use of hisba in 
Egyptian courts, and according to Law No.3/1996, the General Prosecutor became the only 
entity that can file hisba cases in family matters.174 Al-Bahnasawi (2003:28) was critical of 
this legal amendment, because it limits the ability of individuals to observe the rulings of 
Islamic law. 
 
In 2000, Islamists and al-Azhar considered the novel A Banquet of Seaweed (walima li 
a‘shab al-bahr), written by the Syrian novelist Haider Haider, to be blasphemous and 
offensive to Islam. The novel was published by the Ministry of Culture in 1999. Islamists 
played a major role in triggering this case. The Islamist newspaper al-Sha’ab, the mouthpiece 
of the Labour (al-‘amal) Party and a close ally of the MB since 1987, led a media campaign 
against the novel and its writer, calling for popular demonstrations. This episode started with 
a provocative article by the Islamist writer, Mohammad ‘Abas (2000), in which he attacked 
the publication of the novel, accusing it of disseminating unbelief. He also declared its writer 
and publishers to be unbelievers, and quoted sentences said by some characters of the novel 
in which the Qur‘an and God are mocked and insulted. He prompted al-Azhar and its 
students to protest, and urged the state to ban the novel and prosecute its publishers. As a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Law No.3/1996 on the Regulation of hisba Cases in Family Matters, Official Gazette no.4bis of 29 January 1996.  
  
 155 
reaction to this campaign, massive protests erupted among students at Al-Azhar University. 
In response, the author of the novel stated that those who attacked the novel extracted some 
parts of the novel from its literary context to provoke public opinion (Haider 2000). In 
defense of the novel, other Egyptian intellectuals asserted that literature has special rules of 
critique, and that the overall message of the novel should be evaluated (al-Namnam 
2000:237-244). However the Islamic Research Academy (2000) accused the author of 
deviating from the rulings of Islamic shari‘a and public morals through the novel, adding that 
it features obscene words and calls for sex outside of marriage.    
 
Although the main instigator of this crisis was the Labour Party and its newspaper, the MB 
was supportive of the campaign against the novel. The state’s crackdown on the MB was 
intense during the 1990s but the Labour Party and its newspaper provided the MB with a 
political and media platform. As observed by the journalist Andrew Hammond (2000), who 
covered this crisis from Cairo, ‘if the banned group had card-carrying members, al-Sha‘ab 
editor-in-chief Magdy Hussein would probably fit the description’. In a public statement 
released on 30 April 2000, the MB (2000) expressed its deep concerns at the publication of 
the novel and asked the General Prosecutor to initiate a case against the state officials who 
ordered the publication of the novel by the Ministry of Culture. The statement concluded that 
‘the novel flagrantly insults Islam and God’. At the end of the statement, the MB warned 
Egyptians against ‘a conspiracy against the nation’s identity and values undertaken by a 
minority of people who occupy senior government positions’. This statement indicated the 
anger of the MB at the policies of the Ministry of Culture (and we see later on that once the 
group took power in Egypt, it attempted to marginalise secular intellectuals and public 
servants from the public cultural sectors). The MB also mobilised its members and supporters 
at al-Azhar University to organise public protests against the novel, and its leaders attended a 
public conference held in Cairo against the novel under the name of the ‘Anger for God’ (al-
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Namnam 2000:76). The statements made by its leaders and scholars were also supportive of 
banning the novel (Qimiha 2000; Heshmat 2001; al-Qaradawi2007a).  
 
Some commentators have argued that the intense involvement of Islamists in this incident 
was driven by their plans at that time to run for the parliamentary elections to be held in 
November 2000 (Hamond 2000). During this crisis, the Minister of Culture Farouk Hosny, 
was critical of Islamists’ campaign against freedom of expression and defended the 
publication of the novel. However, this position changed during the 2000s when Hosni 
started to compromise with Islamists. This change coincided with the political rise of the MB 
in Egypt’s Parliament from 2000.    
 
In January 2001, Mohammad Jamal Hishmat, a MB parliamentarian presented a question to 
Farouk Hosny about the publication of three novels by a public cultural institution, claiming 
that the novels contained obscene and sexual phrases and content. The three novels are 
Before and After (qabil wa ba‘d) by Tawfiq ‘Abd al-Rahman, The Sons of the Romantic Sin 
(abna’ al-khata’ al-rummansi) by Yasser Sha‘ban, Prohibited Dreams (ahlam muharama) by 
Mahmoud Hamid (Al-Markaz al-Dawli li al-’I‘lam 2005). Hishmat held that the novels 
threatened the societal morals and public order. Commenting on his action, Hishmat (2001) 
stated that:  
 
 
Absolute freedom of artistic creativity does not suit the Arab and Muslim 
peoples. Egypt’s Constitution says that the Islamic shari‘a is the main 
source of legislation and that Islam is the official religion of the state so the 
Ministry of Culture violated the Constitution and the public morals by 
publishing these novels.     
 
As a reaction to this campaign, Farouk Hosny banned the publication of the three novels and 
dismissed five senior officials who were responsible for publishing them. The action of the 
MB and the reaction of the Ministry of Culture provoked secular and liberal intellectuals and 
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artists, who feared that the state was conceding to the conservative demands of Islamists (al-
Jazeera Net 2001). These fears were indeed valid, as the government then continued its 
compromises with Islamists at the expense of freedom of expression. In 2003, the Ministry of 
Culture banned another poetic work titled Recommendations in the Love of Women (wasaya 
fi ‘ishq al-nisa’) authored by the Egyptian poet Ahmed al-Shawi and printed by the Ministry 
of Culture. The MB’s parliamentarians protested against the sexual phrases in the book and 
the use of some verses of the Qur’an and Prophetic sayings in the poems (al-Markaz al-Dawli 
li al-’I‘lam 2005).         
 
The Egyptian poet Helmi Salim (1951-2012) was another intellectual whose freedom of 
creativity was exposed to censorship and intimidation. Salim published a poem titled The 
Balcony of Laila Murad  in one of Egypt’s state-owned magazines called Creativity (Ibda’) 
in April 2007. Salim used controversial metaphors in his poem, by for instance, equating God 
with a villager force-feeding a duck. Salim won the annual state prize in literature in June 
2007 in an appreciation for his contribution to literary life in Egypt, yet MB parliamentarians 
launched a campaign at the parliament to withdraw the prize, claiming that the poem was 
more offensive to Islam than the satirical Danish Cartoons of the Prophet (Hamad 2007). The 
Islamic Research Academy at al-Azhar strongly criticised the poem and accused Salim of 
propagating atheism in society. Based on a lawsuit filed by an Islamist lawyer in April 2009, 
the Court of Administrative Justice cancelled the decision of the Ministry of Culture to grant 
Salim the prize, and in April 2009, the Court of Administrative Justice revoked the license of 
the magazine, Ibda’. The court stated that ‘press freedom should respect the fundamental 
religious and moral values of the society’.175         
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Court of Administrative Justice, Case No.1751/61, 7 April 2009.  
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3.3 Advocacy for Anti-Blasphemy Laws 
Egypt’s anti-blasphemy laws were repeatedly implemented under the rule of former President 
Mubarak to prosecute writers, novelists and bloggers accused of offending Islamic doctrines. 
For instance, in 1991 ‘Ala’ Hamid, an Egyptian novelist was sentenced to eight years in 
prison for the publication of his novel Distance in a Man’s Mind (O’Sullivan 2003:109-112). 
In 2001, the Egyptian writer Salah al-Din Muhsin was sentenced to three years in prison for 
writing critical books about Islam and divinity that the court considered blasphemous 
(O’Sullivan 2003:99-102). In 2007, the Egyptian blogger, Karim Amer was sentenced to 
three years in prison for publishing articles on his blog that an Egyptian court considered 
blasphemous against Islam and al-Azhar.176 
 
The criminalisation of blasphemy was integrated in the first codified criminal law 
promulgated in Egypt in 1883. Article 161 of this law criminalised any contempt of religions 
practiced publicly in Egypt.177 The notorious prosecution of the Egyptian intellectual and 
writer Taha Hussein (1889-1973) in 1926-1927 was based on this article. After pressure from 
al-Azhar, Hussein was charged with blasphemy for the publication of his book ‘On Pre-
Islamic Poetry’178 but the prosecutor closed the case, stating that Hussein was conducting an 
empirical research and that he did not intend to commit blasphemy against Islam.179 The 
Penal Code No.58/1937 criminalises certain offences against religions and public morals. The 
most famous one is Article 98bis of Law No.29/1982 which says that:  
 
 
The imprisonment for a period of not less than six months and not 
exceeding five years, or a fine of not less than five hundred pounds and not 
exceeding one thousand pounds shall be the penalty inflicted on whoever 
makes use of religion in propagating, either by words, in writing, or in any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 See General Prosecutor v. Karim Amer, Eastern Alexandria Misdemeanor Court of Appeals, Case No.8240/2007, 12 
March 2007.  
177 Article 139 of National Penal Code, 13 November 1883. It became Article 139 under the Penal Code of 1904 
178 In this book, Hussein challenged the authenticity of pre-Islamic Arabic poetry and questioned the occurrence of some 
incidents mentioned in the Qur’an (Silawi2006).     
179 The full text of the decision of the General Prosecutor in (Silawi 2006:267:282).  
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other means, extreme ideas for the purpose of inciting strife, ridiculing or 
insulting a heavenly religion or a sect following it, or damaging national 
unity’.180  
 
 
Moreover, Article 160 of the Penal Code provides up to three years imprisonment for ‘the 
destruction, vandalism, or desecration of religious buildings, sites, symbols, cemeteries, and 
graves, as well as the hindering of religious ceremonies’.181 The same penalty is prescribed in 
Article 161 for ‘the printing and dissemination of deliberately distorted religious texts for 
recognised religions, and also criminalises, the mocking or ridicule of religious ceremonies in 
public’.182 Article 178 provides up to two years of imprisonment and or a fine of 5000-10000 
LE for ‘possession, distribution, or manufacturing of documents in violation of public 
morals’.183  
 
The publication of the satirical cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper 
JYllands Posten in September 2005 intensively renewed the domestic and international 
debate on religion and freedom of expression. The Egyptian government was amongst the 
Muslim states that contributed to the transformation of this incident into an international 
upheaval (Klausen 2009:39). However, this act appears to have been politically motivated, as 
some have argued that Mubarak wanted to further his domestic popular legitimacy and co-opt 
his influential Islamist political competitors by appearing as the guardian of Islam (Mayer 
2012:198-199; Klausen 2009:167-179; Chase 2012:133-134). Al-Qaradawi (2006c) was 
outspoken about the crisis. In a Friday sermon in February 2006, he called Muslims all over 
the world to protest the cartoons in a day he named ‘a Day of Rage’. He took this occasion to 
harshly criticise Arab and Muslim states for what he considered weak political responses to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Law No.29/1982 Amending Penal Code No.58/1937, Official Gazette no.16 of 22 April 1982, translated in Farahat, C. 
(2008).   
181 Article 160 of Penal Code No.58/1937 amended by Law No.113/2008, translated in Freedom House (2010:24).  
182 Article 161 of Penal Code No.58/1937, translated in Freedom House (2010:24).  
183 Article 178 of Penal Code No.58/1937, translated in Freedom House (2010:24).   
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attacks on Islam, accusing them of acting as subordinates to the US. He also urged Muslims 
to boycott Danish and European products because of their silence on the cartoons, and urged 
the international community to ban blasphemy, saying in his sermon:  
 
 
The governments must be pressured to demand that the U.N. adopt a clear 
resolution or law that categorically prohibits affronts to prophets - to the 
prophets of the Lord and His messengers, to His holy books, and to the 
religious holy places. This is so that nobody can cause them harm. They 
enacted such laws in order to protect the Jews and Judaism (al-Qaradawi 
2006e). 
 
As the most powerful opposition group at that time, the MB escalated its responses to the 
cartoons. It led the street protests in Egypt and urged Mubarak to take tough diplomatic 
measures against the Danish government. It called upon Arabs and Muslims to boycott 
Danish products. 184  In their campaign against blasphemy, MB leaders cited the 
criminalization of anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial in many Western states, accusing the 
West of double standards because of their silence on the contempt of Islam (Sa‘id 2006; al-
Qaradawi 2006e). The MB’s parliamentarians proposed an amendment to the Penal Law in 
order to allow Egypt’s General Prosecutor to prosecute the perpetrators of blasphemy even if 
the alleged acts of blasphemy were committed by non-Egyptians in foreign states (‘Adel 
2006).185 This amendment was dismissed by the parliament but in this tense political 
atmosphere, the criminalisation of blasphemy in Egypt was strongly legitimated.  
 
Nevertheless, Egyptian human rights NGOs have opposed anti-blasphemy laws and warned 
against their misuse to restrict freedom of expression. Some key NGOs joined the 
international human rights movement in campaigning against diplomatic efforts orchestrated 
by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to justify blasphemy laws (CIHRS et al 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Official Records of the People’s Assembly, Report No.15 of 23 February 2006, p.13.     
185 Egypt’s criminal law is applied to foreign nationals who commit a crime on the Egyptian territories and other crimes 
related to state security but blasphemy is not amongst them. The MB proposed that Egypt’s courts have universal 
jurisdiction on the crime of blasphemy. See Article 2 of Penal Code No.58/1937.     
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2008). In December 2008, dozens of prominent Egyptian and Arab intellectuals and human 
rights defenders called upon the Arab and Muslim governments in a public petition to refrain 
from using religion as a pretext to infringe on academic freedom, freedom of artistic 
creativity and religious freedom. They maintained that state censorship of religious ideas 
undermines the development of religious thought. This initiative was an outcome of a 
conference organised in Paris in November 2008 by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights 
Studies (CIHRS 2008) on religion and freedom of expression in the Arab world.   
 
In conclusion, the MB have firmly blamed Mubarak’s regime for its encroachment on 
freedom of expression. However, its political experience under Mubarak shows that its 
advocacy for freedom of expression actually meant the protection of political expression, 
which was necessary for its activities in opposition. In its platforms and in Parliament, the 
MB was outspoken against restrictions on media and freedom of assembly (Brown and 
Hamzawy 2010:9-35). However, its political activism obstructed rather than supported the 
practice of many other aspects of freedom of expression in Egypt. The MB’s interventions in 
the previous cases have exerted pressure on Muslim reformers and secular intellectuals who 
found themselves pursued by accusations of heresy and apostasy. Moreover, given its 
organisational and social strengths, the MB’s campaigns embarrassed the state and pushed it 
in many cases to concede to the Islamist version of freedom of expression. This was 
manifested in the increasing role given to al-Azhar to monitor intellectual and artistic 
production. We see in the following sections that many intellectuals and artists in Egypt did 
not trust the political rise of the MB after 2011 because of its record under Mubarak and the 
continuation of its restrictive approach to freedom of expression in the post-Mubarak era.       
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4. The Muslim Brotherhood in Power 
4.1 The 2012 Constitution 
The 2012 Constitution, written by the Islamist-dominated Constituent Assembly, protected 
freedom of expression but subjected it to broad limitations. Article 45 of the 2012 
Constitution said that ‘freedom of thought and opinion are guaranteed. Every person has the 
right to express his opinion in speaking, writing, image, or otherwise’. It also included 
articles on ‘the freedom of journalism, the press, the publishing industry and other media’, 
‘the freedom of scientific research’ and ‘the right to creative expression in its various forms’.    
However, other articles entrusted the state with broad powers to restrict freedom of 
expression. Article 10 said that: 
 
 
The family is the foundation of society. The family’s foundations are 
religion, morality, and patriotism. Both state and society seek to preserve 
the inherent character of the Egyptian family, its cohesion, stability, and 
moral character, and to protect the family.  
 
 
Article 11 stated that, ‘the state promotes morality, decency, and public order, as well as 
religious and patriotic values’. The ambiguous moral and religious tasks given to the state in 
these two articles created fears among liberals and human rights defenders during the 
constitution-making process. Although similar articles existed in the 1971 Constitution,186 the 
changing political context after Mubarak, in which Islamist parties became the strongest 
actors, increased the fears that these articles legitimate the state’s encroachment on personal 
liberties and freedom of expression. Under the 1971 Constitution, these articles were used by 
judges to justify certain restrictions on artistic works.187 What was also at stake is that Article 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 See Articles 9 and 12 of the 1971 Constitution.   
187  See Court of Administrative Justice, Case No.31328/61,1 April 2008. Article 12 was invoked by the Court in the case of 
Helmi Salim. See also Court of Administrative Justice. Case No.10355/63, 12 May 2009. In this case, the court cited 
Articles 9 and 12 of the 1971 Constitution to order the shutdown of pornographic web sites on the Internet.    
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10 speaks about the responsibility of the state and society in preserving morality and religious 
values. Critics of this article argued that it would lay the legal ground for establishing 
religious and moral police, similar to the practices in Iran and Saudi Arabia (Tadros 2013b). 
Article 81 said that ‘all rights and freedoms are practised provided they do not conflict with 
the essential elements of state and society’. Islamic shari‘a comes top of these elements. Thus 
freedom of expression would be limited in practice by the reference to Islamic law. For the 
first time in Egypt, the Constitution also explicitly prohibited blasphemous expression. 
Article 44, which was proposed by Salafists and al-Azhar and backed by the MB (Almasry 
2012), said that ‘insult or abuse of all religious Messengers and Prophets shall be 
prohibited’.188 This constitutional provision protected the blasphemy law from any challenge 
before the SCC. It would also allow the legislator to toughen the punishment for blasphemy.  
 
 
4.2 A Strained Relationship with Intellectuals and Artists 
A lot of intellectuals and artists were worried about the political rise of Islamists in the post-
Mubarak era. Their work had been under attack for decades from the MB. But there were 
also other worrying signals that increased their fears. Amongst these indicators was the 
marginalisation of liberal voices in the constitution-making process, as well as the 
controversial articles in the new constitution on freedom of expression. However, what 
furthered their fears was the rise of legal actions initiated by Islamist lawyers against 
prominent movie stars, writers and journalists, accusing them of blasphemy or corrupting 
public morals. Generally, citizens submit complaints to the General Prosecutor who then 
opens investigation and refers persons accused of blasphemy to criminal courts. Additionally, 
Egypt’s Law of Criminal Procedure allows citizens to file lawsuits against the perpetrators of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Article 44 of the 2012 Constitution.  
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misdemeanours,189 so that lawyers can file blasphemy cases against other citizens without 
submitting a complaint to the General Prosecutor.  
 
For instance, in January 2012, the popular film star and UN Good Will Ambassador Adel 
Imam was sentenced to three months in prison on charges of blasphemy. The court held that 
in his films, Imam mocked Islamic symbols and dress such as the beard and the garment.190 
The Misdemeanor Court of Appeal overturned this judgment on in September 2012, arguing 
that Imam was critical of certain social and political behaviour and not Islam per 
se.191Another case was initiated against Adel Imam and five prominent film directors and 
scriptwriters in another court in April 2012, but the Court did not find them guilty.192 This 
latest judgment uniquely introduced a new interpretation of the crime of blasphemy and has 
widened the scope of freedom of expression (see section 3.2.3 below).           
 
Under Morsi, the General Prosecutor received dozens of complaints, accusing journalists and 
writers of blasphemy and followed up on some of these complaints such as the cases of the 
prominent journalist and TV presenter Ibrahim Eissa and the renowned satirist Bassem 
Youssef. These two persons were also known for their critical comments of Salafists, the MB 
and President Morsi. The General Prosecutor summoned the two persons and interrogated 
them, but the cases were kept pending without trial (CPJ 2012). However, even though they 
did not reach the courts, these kinds of cases aimed to intimidate the targeted persons, their 
media organisations and other critical voices in general.  
 
There is no evidence that members of the MB submitted blasphemy complaints to the 
General Prosecutor against artists, writers and journalists, but neither President Morsi nor the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 See Article 232 of Law of Criminal Procedure No.150/1950, Al-Waqa’i‘ al-Massriyya no.90 of 15 November 1951. 
190 ‘Asran Mansur v. Adel Imam, Misdemeanour Court of al-Haram, Case No.24215/2012, 17 January 2012. 
191 ‘Asran Mansur v. Adel Imam, Al-Haram Court of Appeal, Case No.24215/2012, 12 September 2012.  
192 ‘Asran Mansur v. Adel Imam and others, Misdemeanour Court of al-‘Ajuza, Case No.529/2012, 26 April 2012. 
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Islamist-majority in Parliament took any legal measures to protect intellectuals and artists. On 
the contrary, the performance of the MB in the constitution-making process and the positions 
of its platforms on freedom of expression do not suggest that the group wanted to open up the 
space for freedom of artistic creativity. In January 2012, al-Azhar intervened to set the 
boundaries between Islamic law and freedom of expression, by publishing a document on this 
issue. This asserted that Islam tolerates freedom of artistic creativity and academic freedom, 
but at the same time subjected freedom of expression to ambiguous Islamic qualifications that 
open the door for arbitrary restrictions (al-Azhar 2012).  
 
Commenting on this document, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Barr (2012a) endorsed previous actions 
taken by al-Azhar against academic freedom, freedom of expression and artistic creativity, 
stating that freedom of expression should respect religious sensibilities and societal moral 
values. The MB’s endorsement of blasphemy cases against journalists and intellectuals was 
also obvious in a statement released by the FJP in support of the investigation against the 
satirist Bassem Youssif. The FJP (2013) rebuffed US pressure to drop the accusation against 
Youssif, arguing that he was accused of blasphemy, ‘a crime that touches the religious 
feelings of Egyptians’. The statement added that Egyptian people would understand that 
Western countries, like the US, ‘condone the crime of blasphemy committed by some 
Egyptian journalists’.        
 
The tension escalated between President Morsi and intellectuals in May-June 2013 because 
of what was considered by many intellectuals and artists to be an attempt by the MB to 
control the public cultural sector and marginalise liberal and secular intellectuals and artists. 
In a limited reshuffle in May 2013, President Morsi appointed Alaa Abdel Aziz, a professor 
of cinema who was not widely known among Egyptian intellectuals and artists, as the new 
Minister of Culture, which, in Egypt, controls significant cultural and artistic sectors funded 
  
 166 
by public money. Given the long reputation of the MB in supporting state censorship of 
intellectual and artistic activities, many liberal and secular intellectuals and artists were 
concerned about the future of freedom of expression under the rule of the MB. The decisions 
and statements made by the new Minister increased their concerns. Abdel Aziz announced 
his plan to purge the Ministry of Culture of corrupt officials. He did not submit cases to the 
General Prosecutor or conduct an impartial investigation, but used his powers to dismiss a 
group of senior officials in various cultural sectors, including the President of the Egyptian 
Association of Books and the President of the Opera House (Loveluck 2013). 
 
This action coincided with demands made by Islamist members of the Shura Council to ban 
ballet dance, accusing it of being obscene and immoral. The Shura Council also decided to 
cut the arts budget (Loveluck 2013). A few months before the controversy over ballet, the 
Court of Administrative Justice had ordered the closure of a famous TV channel specialised 
in broadcasting belly dance shows. The Court held that ‘the content broadcasted in the 
channel violates public morals and fundamental religious beliefs’. The Court built its 
reasoning on different constitutional provisions like Article 10 and 11 that give the state and 
society the responsibility to protect public morals and religious values.193 A senior member of 
the MB welcomed the judgment, saying that it aims to ‘protect the community’s values’. He 
added ‘like rotten food, there are rotten ideas being fed to our society’ (quoted in Mekky 
2013).      
 
The official website of the MB introduced Abdel Aziz as ‘a person who wholeheartedly 
believes that the identity of the Egyptian people is Islamic’ (al-Qa‘ud 2013). In an interview 
with Ikhwan Online, Abdel Aziz stated that ‘culture in Egypt is monopolised by leftists and 
deviant intellectuals’, adding that ‘the Egyptian people are religious and the Islamisation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Court of Administrative Justice, Case No.41852/66, 16 February 2013.   
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culture is a normal thing in a country dominated by Muslims’. Abdel Aziz was firm that ‘any 
intellectual or artistic creativity that is offensive to religions or sanctities cannot be tolerated 
at all’ (al-Qa‘ud 2013). The MB’s official media supported the new Minister of Culture and 
explained his decisions to the public. For instance, Helmi al-Qa‘ud (2013a) a prominent 
intellectual affiliated with the MB wrote on Ikhwan Online that: 
 
 
 
Those intellectuals who protest the new minister are the ones who 
supported Mubarak in his war against Islam and Muslims. They spread 
corruption, obscenity, apostasy and heresy among Muslims. They defended 
the communist Syrian novelist Haider Haider who insulted God in his novel 
A Banquet for the Seaweed. They also excluded any voice defending the 
religion, culture and values of the Muslim umma.   
 
 
In another article, the same writer encouraged President Morsi to further the 
Islamisation of state institutions, saying that: 
 
 
 
Islamists should not leave the cultural sector to liberals, Marxists or 
Nasserists who want to displace Islam. Islamists should know that they 
committed a grave mistake when they allowed the enemies of Islam to brain 
wash the minds of Muslims through the ministries of culture, education and 
media (al-Qa‘ud 2013b).   
 
 
The accusation that Egypt’s culture was monopolised by secularists before the MB came to 
power is ill-founded, since Islamic activities and publications were always sponsored by the 
state. But for the MB, Islamic culture should guide all intellectual and artistic activities in the 
state. These statements indicated that the MB government was inclined to censor artistic and 
intellectual activities as it was advocating for in opposition. The attitudes of the Minister of 
Culture towards freedom of expression and censorship do matter in Egypt since key artistic 
institutions and public publishing houses work under his supervision. The Egyptian 
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Censorship Bureau, which provides licenses to screen audio-visual materials, is also 
subordinated to the Ministry of Culture.194 
 
Hundreds of intellectuals and artists refused to concede to Abdel Aziz and announced their 
engagement in an open sit-in in front of the Ministry of Culture to pressure Morsi to remove 
him. They announced that the new minister would undermine the cultural and artistic sector 
in Egypt. Many other prominent political and human rights activists expressed solidarity with 
this movement and joined the sit-in (Loveluck 2013). Young activists who opposed the MB’s 
version of artistic creativity used media such as ballet in their protests to express their anger 
and to show their appreciation of the arts (Mourad 2013). Morsi made no efforts to bridge the 
gap with his opponents. But the steps taken by Egypt’s intellectuals and artists escalated the 
pressure on the MB at a time when they were facing increasing societal opposition and 
dissatisfaction. 
 
I explained in the beginning of this chapter that MB scholars agree that government under 
Islamic law is responsible for observing the respect for Islamic morality and values in society 
and in different state institutions. The implementation of this theory in practical terms means 
that one ideological trend is likely to control public institutions and that the state becomes 
less tolerant of non-Islamist worldviews and ideologies. Under this vision, Islamists risk 
considering their electoral victory to be a blanket popular mandate to reengineer state 
institutions and society along their Islamist ideological lines, without limitations. Human 
rights and constitutionalism becomes very relevant in this regard to provide for certain 
safeguards in order for the state to avoid becoming ‘the immediate agent of the ruling party . . 
. so that those excluded by the political process of the day can still resort to state organs and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 See Law No.430/1955 on the Censorship of Audio-Visual Materials, 3 September 1955.   
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institutions for protection against excessive use or abuse of power by state officials’ (An-
Na‘im 2008:5-6).        
 
4.3 The Rise of Blasphemy Cases 
In the post-Mubarak era, blasphemy cases reached a peak. EIPR (2013:12-13) documented 
36 blasphemy cases from March 2011 to December 2012. The defendants in 19 cases were 
members of religious minorities such Christians, Shi‘as and Ahmadis, and the remaining 
cases involved Sunni Muslims. The high number of cases continued under President Morsi 
(Chick 2013). According to EIPR (2013:16-17), blasphemy cases in the post-Mubarak era 
coincided with certain political occasions of high political and religious polarisation in 
society such as the presidential elections in June 2012, the parliamentary elections in early 
2012 and the referendum on the constitutional amendments in March 2011. A new trend in 
the post-Mubarak era has been for laypersons to be increasingly charged with blasphemy for 
making statements or actions in their normal daily lives deemed offensive to Islam.  
 
One can argue that the political influence of Islamists in the post-Mubarak era endorsed the 
use of the blasphemy law. The MB has defended the criminalisation of blasphemy since the 
crisis of the Danish Cartoons. Salafists and the MB were keen to prohibit blasphemy in the 
2012 Constitution for the first time in Egypt’s constitutional history. In some blasphemy 
cases members of the MB and Salafists incited the public against the accused persons 
(Hubbard and El Sheikh 2013). According to EIPR (2013:15) the highest number of 
blasphemy cases occurred in Upper Egypt, a region where Islamists have enjoyed significant 
presence.195 EIPR (2013:127) has observed the interference of Islamists in some of these 
cases. For instance, in October 2011 in Minya Governorate in Upper Egypt, members of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195According to a research on voting patterns in the post-Mubarak era published by Rand Corporation, Islamists run 
strongest in the governorates of Upper Egypt (Martini and Worman 2013:1).   
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MB and Salafists pressured the government to forcibly evict a Christian family from its 
housing area in reaction to an allegation of blasphemy against a member of the family. Other 
similar cases have been also documented in Asyut in late 2011 and early 2012.     
 
In September 2012, the issue of blasphemy came to the fore after the crisis of the Innocence 
of Muslims (2012) film. This crisis began after a group of Egyptian American Christians 
released on the Internet a low-budget film which accused the Prophet Mohammad of 
fabricating the Qur’an and portraying him and some of his companions as power-hungry, 
bloody and sex-crazed. This film sparked fierce popular anger in Egypt and other Arab and 
Muslim states. A massive demonstration of Islamists was organised in front of the US 
embassy. The state tolerated the demonstrations in the first day of the crisis, letting some 
Islamists climb the walls of the embassy and replace the American flag with a black flag with 
the Islamic declaration of faith (shihada). The US protested the lack of the protection of its 
embassy and the police started to disperse protesters the following day (Sydow 2012).  
 
In power, the MB was most likely keen to build confidence with the West, and particularly 
the US, which may explain why its international reaction to this film was much softer than its 
reaction to the Danish Cartoon when it was in opposition. After the release of the film, the 
MB (2012) urged the international community to adopt legal measures against the defamation 
of religion. It supported the trial of the movie’s producers but it tried to avoid any political 
turbulence with the US. The Salafists led the popular mobilisation against the movie. Being 
under political pressure from Salafists, Morsi was reluctant to disperse protesters who 
attacked the American embassy but he had to intervene later when Egypt’s relations with the 
US was endangered (Afify 2012). A criminal court convicted the producers of the movie in 
absentia. Seven Egyptian American Christians were sentenced to death for blasphemy and 
treason, and an American priest was sentenced to five years in prison for blasphemy. The 
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charge of treason was based on other statements made by the Egyptian producers of the film 
where they called for a separate state for Egyptian Christians and invited the international 
community to intervene to protect Christians from persecution. The judges who examined the 
case urged the lawmakers to legislate death penalty for the perpetrators of blasphemy.196   
 
This crisis was an opportunity for Islamists to reinforce their restricted version of freedom of 
expression. In a public statement, the FJP (2012) stated that blasphemous speeches are not 
protected by IHRL, since freedom of expression is limited by public order and morals. The 
statement accused Christian Egyptians living in foreign countries of conspiring against Egypt 
by producing this movie. This general accusation came at the time when Egyptian Christians 
had been strongly critical of President Morsi and Islamists. The MB (2012) openly blamed 
Western states for tolerating the contempt of Islam and Muslims but prohibiting the denial of 
the Holocaust. In September 2013, Morsi stated in a TV interview, ‘Islamic sanctities and the 
Prophet Mohammad are red lines for Muslims. We reject any type of contempt to our Prophet 
for whom we sacrifice our lives’ (quoted in EIPR 2013:67).  
 
This crisis fostered the efforts made by Islamists and al-Azhar to prohibit blasphemy in the 
constitution (Al-Masry 2012). Commenting on the crisis at the Constituent Assembly, 
Hussein Ibrahim, the Secretary General of the FJP stated that ‘freedom of expression does not 
mean the contempt of the Prophet, Messengers of Allah, the Mothers of the Believers and 
Companions’. He asserted that since we call the international community to ban blasphemy 
in international law, Egypt’s new constitution should also be clear about that.197 Liberal 
members of the Constituent Assembly agreed on the inclusion of this constitutional provision 
since it was difficult during this tense climate to oppose it (al-Majid 2013:90-91).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196General Prosecutor v. Morris Sadiq, Murqus ‘Aziz, Nabil Adib and others, South Cairo Felonies Court, Case No.636/2012, 
29 January 2013.  
197 Official Records of the Constituent Assembly, Report No.13, 18 September 2012.  
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It should be noted that Islamists are not the only actors who support the criminalisation of 
blasphemy in Egypt. Mubarak’s government was vocal internationally against blasphemy, 
and some non-Islamist politicians have also supported the criminalisation of blasphemy. 
However, we should also consider that the political, social and religious activism of the MB 
and Islamists in general since the 1970s have influenced positions taken by other political and 
social actors in Egypt. On many occasions, Sadat and Mubarak encouraged Islamist policies 
to appease Islamists and counter-balance their political influence. The increasing number of 
blasphemy cases under president Morsi led some liberal figures to express their dismay at the 
law. Mohamed ElBaradei, the leader of the Constitution Party (al-dustur) said that 
‘blasphemy accusations exist only in authoritarian states’ (Ramadan 2013), while other 
politicians considered the blasphemy law a political weapon to repress dissidents (al-Wirdani 
2013). Key human rights NGOs have been also outspoken about the negative implications of 
blasphemy laws for freedom of expression (CIHRS et al 2013d).         
 
Morsi (2012) took this issue to the international community in his speech at the UN General 
Assembly on 26 September 2012. He condemned blasphemy against Islam and called for an 
international mechanism to protect religions from defamation. In his speech, Morsi (2012) 
said:  
 
Egypt respects freedom of expression. One that is not used to incite hatred 
against anyone. One that is not directed towards one specific religion or 
culture. A freedom of expression that tackles extremism and violence. Not 
the freedom of expression that deepens ignorance and disregards others.   
 
Morsi obfuscated the difference between state responsibility to combat incitement to violence 
or discrimination against members of religious communities, and the prohibition of 
blasphemy. The former protects individuals and the latter protects religious beliefs and 
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doctrines. I explained in the first section of this chapter that it has become increasingly 
acceptable under IHRL that critical and offensive expressions about religions or ideologies be 
protected under freedom of expression. 
 
The crisis of The Innocence of Muslims was followed by a high number of blasphemy 
charges and trials. The facts of these cases have indicated an increasing climate of intolerance 
to religious pluralism among a wide sector of Egyptians, particularly in rural areas and poor 
urban areas where the possibility of sectarian tensions is high (EIPR 2010; Tadros 2013:46-
47). In many cases, Muslims involved in the cases complained that those persons accused of 
blasphemy had a grudge against Egypt’s Islamic identity. Such feeling led many Muslims to 
misinterpret any critical statement made by non-Muslims about Islamic figures or history and 
consider that to be blasphemy. For example, in some cases, Christian teachers were convicted 
for blasphemy because of their comments about Islam or Islamic history in class.198 In other 
cases, everyday discussions between groups of people ended with blasphemy trials.199 
Selectivity is an inherent problem in blasphemy laws in many states where they often protect 
states’ dominant religions (Leo et al 2011).200 All blasphemy cases in Egypt from 2011 to 
June 2013 targeted those persons who commented on Islam; however Islamists who 
systematically attacked Christianity and other religions were left without punishment. 
Exceptionally, a Muslim preacher was convicted of committing blasphemy against 
Christianity after he tore up the Bible in a public demonstration against The Innocence of 
Muslims film which was considered by many Muslims to be offensive to Islam and the 
Prophet (El-Dabh 2012). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198General Prosecutor v. Dimyana Obeid al-Nour, Luxor Primary Court of Misdemeanor, Case No.1647/2013, 11 June 2013; 
EIPR (2013) documented other blasphemy cases which involve teachers and professors.  
199 General Prosecutor v. Romani Murad, Asyut Primary Court of Misdemeanor, Case No.2939/2013, 1 June 2013.   
200 See UNCHR ‘Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief Asma Jahangir’ (2007), p.70.  
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The prohibition of blasphemy limits the freedom of atheists to question religion. The case of 
Alber Saber, a young Egyptian atheist of Christian origin convicted for blasphemy is a 
striking example. The case started with a petition submitted to the police by Saber’s 
neighbours, accusing him of disseminating ‘the Innocence of Muslims’ movie on Facebook 
and Twitter, and posting other materials considered by the complainant to be blasphemous to 
religion. In the interrogation, Saber denied any intention of insulting religion and affirmed 
that all of his postings on the Internet were related to his study of comparative religions and 
Islamic philosophy and that he had started to post these materials on Facebook and YouTube 
in 2010. In his trial, Al-Marj Primary Court of Misdemeanour considered this statement a 
confession by Saber of committing blasphemy and sentenced him to three years in prison.201  
 
Unrecognised religious minorities can also be prosecuted under the blasphemy law. In Egypt, 
the state recognises only Abrahamic religions (Islam, Christianity and Judaism). Members of 
these religions can publicly practise their rituals and build their places of worship according 
to certain limitations and they also apply their religious family laws. The 1923 and 1971 
Constitutions did not explicitly limit the practice of religious freedom to Abrahamic religions, 
but this principle has been well-established in Egyptian courts. 202  This principle was 
entrenched in the 2012 Constitution which said that ‘the state shall guarantee the freedom of 
religious rites to established places of worship for the divine religions’.203 Certain Islamic and 
Christian sects such as the Shi‘a and Jehovah’s Witnesses have not been treated as recognised 
religious communities (EIPR 2004; Pink 2005). Article 98bis of the Penal Code protects only 
Abrahamic religions from defamation.204 This is evidence that the use of the blasphemy law 
is selective and discriminatory.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 ibid.  
202 See Court of Administrative Justice, Case No.19/4,26 May 1952, Supreme Court, Case No. 7/2, 1 March 1975 and Court 
of Administrative Justice, Case No.183/58. 29 January 2008.   
203 Article 43 of the 2012 Constitution. 
204Law No.29/1982 Amending Penal Code No.58/1937. 
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The religious doctrines of the Shi‘a, the Baha’iyya, and the Ahmadiyya are often considered 
blasphemous to Islam by Egypt’s courts. Blasphemy cases against Egyptian Shi‘a have 
persisted in the post-Mubarak era.205  The political actions and statements made by the MB 
and Salafists in 2012 and 2013 fuelled intolerance of the Shi‘a. Sunni Islamists claim that the 
Shi’a do not respect the historical figures of Sunni Islam, and that many of their religious 
doctrines deviate from the Sunni orthodoxy. Although President Morsi was tentatively 
interested in restoring the political ties with Iran, he was keen in his first visit to Tehran to 
show that his new foreign policy did not mean that Sunni Muslims can forget the doctrinal 
differences with the Shi‘a. In his speech at the OIC conference in Tehran in August 2012, 
Morsi paid tribute to the family of the Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphs, Abu Bakr, 
‘Umar, ‘Uthman and ‘Ali. As noted by Ezzat (2012)  
 
The reference to Ali, the most holy member of the Prophet Mohamed's 
family in the eyes of Shi‘as, could have been perceived by Morsi's Shi‘a 
audience . . .as flattering had it not come after references to Abu Bakr, 
Omar and Othman, who are abhorred by Shi‘as and whose role in early 
Muslim history is not even mentioned in the history books of Iranian 
schools.   
 
In most blasphemy cases, Egyptian courts opted for a broad and ambiguous definition of 
blasphemy that severely restricts freedom of expression and religious freedom. The courts 
hold in the cases under review that blasphemy law protects the fundamental doctrines of 
Abrahamic religions and safeguards society from temptation and turbulence. The courts do 
not censor certain provocative views with a view to protecting public order and social 
harmony, but rather protect specific understandings of religion and dismiss others even if 
there are no grounds that the expression of these views would disturb public order. The 
problem here is how the courts identify certain views as blasphemous or not. The case law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 See for example, General Prosecutor v. Mohammad Fahmi ‘Asfou, Kafr al-Zayat Primary Court of Misdemeanour, Case 
No.13044/2011, 24 April 2012 and Misdemeanour Court of Appeals of Kafr al-Zayat, Case No. 1095/2012, 26 July 2012 
and  Disciplinary Court of Qina, State Council, Case No.115/20, 24 December 2012.  
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shows that new interpretations of the Qur‘an or Sunna can be considered blasphemous, and 
that those expressing opinions against the idea of divinity and religions are liable to 
prosecution as well. Accordingly, the criminalisation of blasphemy intimidates atheists and 
converts when publicly declaring their religious affiliation and views. The HRC stated that 
‘blasphemy laws should not be used to prevent or punish criticism of religious leaders or 
commentary on religious doctrine and tenets of faith’.206   
 
 
In the case of Adel Imam, an Egyptian court has followed a different reasoning on blasphemy 
with the objective of widening the scope of freedom of expression. The Court has held that 
Egypt’s law on blasphemy does not protect religions or religious feelings and that the crime 
of blasphemy had to be accompanied by a special intent to harm national unity, public order 
and societal peace. The Court has maintained that if the legal provision on blasphemy is 
meant to protect religions, it becomes incompatible with Article 18 of the ICCPR. It held that 
its understanding of blasphemy is in line with the legitimate limitations on freedom of 
expression in Article 18(3) of the ICCPR. Moreover, the Court has argued that the protection 
of religious doctrines blocks critical thinking and undermines the development of religious 
thought. It has also added that the mere invocation of the protection of religious feelings or 
sensibilities of others does not stand as a justification to restrict freedom of expression unless 
there is an imminent threat to public order caused by the expression of opinions.207 The Court 
was right to emphasise this point, as the argument of the protection of religious feelings of 
individuals often has attention to the feelings of the majority of the population but does not 
give equal attention to the feelings of non-believers or the beliefs of few members of the 
society.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 General Comment 34, para.50.  
207 ‘Asran Mansur v. Adel Imam and others, 26 April 2012. 
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The reasoning of the Court in this case is exceptional in the case law and indicates that some 
Egyptian judges consider developments in IHRL in their judgements. However, the criteria 
set by the Court in this case still present a justification to censor the public manifestation of 
provocative or shocking views. Egypt’s case law on religious freedom and freedom of 
expression indicates that concepts such as public order, public morals and national security 
are often used to violate the essence of rights. According to the HRC, limitations of rights 
must meet a strict test of justification, necessity and proportionality.208 The proponents of the 
prohibition of blasphemy argue that states find themselves under pressure to censor and 
repress blasphemous expressions to maintain public order, since in many situations 
blasphemy has led to massive protests and violent reactions. Arguably, this rationale poses a 
threat not just to freedom of expression but also to any other human rights norms disapproved 
by a group of persons in any society. They will be easily ready to use coercion and 
intimidation to silence other views in society. As noted by Langer (2014:107) this approach 
risks ‘provid[ing] an incentive to rampage and cause havoc in order to vindicate future 
suppression of offensive speeches’. Even though, the ban of certain provocative blasphemous 
or provocative speeches might be justified in certain circumstances for the purpose of public 
order, morals and national security, the general criminalisation of blasphemy is not a 
proportionate response. Therefore, the HRC holds that prohibition of ‘displays of lack of 
respect for a religion or other belief systems, including blasphemy laws, are incompatible 
with the [ICCPR]’ as long as the expression of views do not amount to incitement to 
discrimination and violence as stipulated in Article 20 of the ICCPR.209  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 HRC, GC34, para.28-29.   
209 ibid., para. 47.  
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5. Conclusion 
Certain ideas and concepts in the thought of the MB inevitably lead to tensions with freedom 
of expression. Posing critique of religious doctrines or publishing ideas that do not agree with 
the dominant orthodoxy are not tolerated by the Islamic state, according to the MB. The 
accusation of apostasy is not applicable only to those who convert from Islam, but can also be 
used to target Muslims who challenge certain doctrines such as the sovereignty of shari‘a as 
the state law or the eternity of certain rulings of Islamic law. The idea that the state guards 
Islamic morals in society threatens the right to artistic creativity. The MB’s approach to the 
arts puts artists under the guardianship of ambiguous criteria that is arbitrarily and selectively 
enforced by the state in the name of Islamic morals. This conception blurs the boundaries 
between what is observed by individuals in their private lives according to their religious 
beliefs, and what is enforced by the state. This distinction is crucial for international human 
rights to be realised in the modern nation state. The practice of the MB in Egypt confirms that 
the group aims to reengineer society in accordance with its understanding of Islamic morals. 
The state’s interference in order to protect public morals is recognised under IHRL, but 
without damaging the substance of rights.    
 
This chapter has also shown that the political activism of the MB in opposition obstructed the 
expansion of the scope of freedom of expression in Egypt, and has done so by utilising its 
growing political and social strength since the 1970s. Its actions in the cultural and artistic 
field generated intense pressure on secular intellectuals and artists, and fostered a climate of 
intolerance for intellectual pluralism. In many cases, the MB’s political campaigns against 
freedom of expression triggered political competition between the state and Islamists to 
sponsor conservative attitudes towards freedom of expression. In opposition and in power, 
the MB was a driving force in supporting anti-blasphemy laws, which were used repeatedly 
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under President Morsi to repress ideas critical of religion. This law was also manipulated to 
target political opponents. 
 
The group defends the legitimacy of the anti-blasphemy law, but in its political discourses it 
has confused the difference between the protection of religion from critique and the 
prohibition of incitement to discrimination or violence. The MB’s leaders treat the two 
concepts as if they have the same meaning but they do not. UN human rights treaty bodies 
and experts have acknowledged that IHRL does not shield religious doctrines from criticism 
but it protects members of any religious community if they are targeted by incitement to 
violence or discrimination. Meanwhile, in power, the MB aimed to gradually enforce its 
Islamic version of freedom of expression, and the 2012 Constitution provided the basis for 
the state’s censorship of ideas and the criminalisation of blasphemy. The group’s plan to 
control the public cultural sector and its institutions cannot be read in isolation from its 
approach to freedom of expression and its policy objective to ensure that cultural production 
meets its Islamic scheme of artistic creativity. However, the resistance of intellectuals, artists 
and civil society to this plan provides clear evidence that what is considered an Islamic 
authenticity by the state or Islamists is not necessarily approved by other Muslims.      
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Chapter Six: The Rights of Religious Minorities 
 
This chapter explores the rights of religious minorities in the thought and practice of the MB. 
It addresses the concepts of equality and non-discrimination in the MB’s model of an Islamic 
state. It discusses some key issues in the ongoing debate on the rights of religious minorities 
in Egypt such as the right to construct and maintain places of worship, the rights of 
unrecognised religious communities, the right of non-Muslims to hold public office, inter-
faith marriage and the applicability of Islamic law to non-Muslims.        
 
Religious minorities in Egypt have long been concerned about their future rights under the 
rule of Islamists. Instead of being encouraged by the fall of Mubarak, religious minorities 
found their fears exacerbated by the rise of Islamist parties (Halawa 2011; Egypt Independent 
2011). The numerical size of religious communities in Egypt is a contentious issue. There are 
no comprehensive and updated official figures for all religious communities in Egypt. 
According to an official census conducted in 1986, Christians represented 5.6% of the 
population (Tadros 2013a:30), and this official figure reached 7% in 1998 (Brownlee 
2013:5). Islamists have accepted this figure and have accused the Christian community – 
which report a greater population – of exaggerating their number, while the Christian 
community has at times claimed that the state does not report the correct numbers of 
Christians in order to devalue their weight in the society. Other sources also reject this figure 
and maintain that Christians represent 11% of the population (Tadros 2013a:30-31). What 
gives particular significance to this question in the Egyptian context is that some rights 
claimed by non-Muslims in Egypt are connected with their numbers, such as their 
representation in political and public institutions, as well as the outcome of an ongoing debate 
on the right of religious minorities to construct places of worship.   
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According to the International Religious Freedom Report for 2012 published annually by the 
US Department of State (2012), 90% of Egyptians are Sunni Muslims; the Shi‘a represent 
less than 1% of the population and there are also a small number of Qur’anist and Ahmadi 
Muslims. 10% of the populations are Christian, the majority affiliated with the Coptic 
Orthodox Church, but also Catholics, Protestants, Maronites and Anglicans. There are 1000 
to 1500 Jehovah’s witnesses and 1500 to 2000 Baha’is. 
 
Regardless of their size, there are certain rights for religious minorities under IHRL that 
should be guaranteed by the state. Article 27 of the ICCPR protects the rights of religious, 
ethnic and religious minorities.210 In its interpretation of this article, the HRC has held that 
religious minorities should not be subjected to any form of discrimination. Their members 
have the right to ‘profess and practise their own religion’ and they have the right to preserve 
their identity. Under certain circumstances, the enjoyment of these rights may require certain 
positive legal measures for protection against state and non-state actors, to preserve their 
identities and to ‘ensure the effective participation of members of minorities communities in 
decisions which affect them’.211 Many other articles in the ICCPR are also relevant to the 
protection of the rights of religious minorities, and they come through the discussions in this 
chapter on protections such as ‘freedom of thought, conscience and religion’ (Article 18), the 
prohibition of ‘any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement 
to discrimination, hostility or violence’ (Article 20.2), equality before the law and the 
prohibition of any form of discrimination (Articles 26 and 2.1) and the right to participate in 
the conduct of public affairs, to vote and to be elected and to have access to public services 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210Article 27 of the ICCPR.    
211 HRC GC No.23’ (1994), paras. 6-7.   
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(Article 25). According to the HRC, ‘affirmative measures may be taken in appropriate cases 
to ensure that there is equal access to public service for all citizens’.212  
        
1. Religious Minorities, Equality and Non-discrimination  
In its literature, the MB has maintained that its conception of the Islamic state does not pose 
any threat to the rights of religious minorities. Nevertheless, when we analyse the scope of 
the rights and duties of Muslims and non-Muslims in this state, one comes to the conclusion 
that the tendency of the MB to use terms such as equal citizenship, non-discrimination and 
equality does not indicate that the group has completely abandoned the discriminatory rulings 
of Islamic law on ahl al-dhimma. Pre-modern Muslim jurists developed this branch of 
Islamic jurisprudence as part of the governance enterprise in entirely different social and 
political settings (Emon 2012b:224-226). As noted by Emon (2012b:225) ‘the historical 
shifts in law and the enterprise of governance present a new context in which old answers 
lose their relevance’. Despite its claims of renewal, we see in this chapter that these old 
answers are still present in the thought of the MB. The introduction of the underlying 
principles of the rulings of ahl al-dhimma in the modern nation state cannot be reconciled 
with equality and non-discrimination as key principles of international human rights treaties, 
which constitute what can be called ‘a human rights based view of citizenship’ (An-Na‘im 
2008:131).213  
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1.1 Citizenship and the Rule of Shari‘a 
MB scholars have argued that the expression ‘ahl al-dhimma’ does not signify that non-
Muslims are inferior to Muslims in the Islamic state. According to this view ‘the contract of 
dhimma provides non-Muslims with the same rights of modern equal citizenship with few 
exceptions. This contract has an authority over Muslims because of its divine source’ (al-
Sirjani 2011:68-69). But judged by the standard of IHRL, these ‘few exceptions’, as shown in 
this chapter, are significant. Since the 1990s and in response to intense critique of their 
project by members of the Egyptian intellectual and political elite, the MB and its scholars 
have maintained that if the term ahl al-dhimma is not acceptable to non-Muslims today, the 
term citizenship should be used instead (al-Qaradawi 1999:30-31; 2012a; al-Wa’i 2001:48). 
The former Deputy General Guide Mohamad Habib explained that ‘identity cards are 
provided by the state to its citizens so the term ahl al-dhimma is not relevant any more to 
describe non-Muslims living in the Islamic state’ (quoted in al-Shamakh 2008: 106).  
 
According to the scholars under review, certain principles guide Muslims in their behaviour 
towards non-Muslims in the Islamic state. The Qur’an (60:8) orders Muslims to be righteous 
toward non-Muslims and to behave justly with them (al-Banna 2006:169-170; al-Sirjani 
2011:77; al-Bahnasawi 2004:2). The MB holds that non-Muslims (Christians and Jews) in the 
Islamic state are to be treated in accordance with the maxim that ‘they [non-Muslims] have 
the rights that we [Muslims] have and the duties that we have’ (lahum ma lana wa ‘alayhum 
ma ‘alyana) (Sabiq 1973b:665; al-Wa’i 2001:74; al-Bahnasawi 2004:3). The MB’s scholars 
claim that this is a principle in Islamic jurisprudence. Tadros (2012a:99-104) traced the 
history of this principle in Islamic law and concluded that this principle ‘has no basis in fiqh 
references’. According to her analysis, this principle was articulated by the Prophet when he 
was speaking about non-Muslims who converted to Islam. It has, however, been taken out of 
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its original context and introduced by the MB since the time of Hassan al-Banna to convince 
non-Muslims that equality between Muslim and non-Muslims has existed since the beginning 
of Islam, and that non-Muslims should not fear the Islamist project. Regardless of its 
historical origin, the reference to this principle in the literature of the MB is misleading. 
While it entails certain rights for non-Muslims, it does not provide for full legal equality with 
Muslims, and does not change the fact that non-Muslims have a legal duty in the Islamic state 
to submit to the rule of Islamic law. I show in this chapter that the practice of the MB in 
power has also demonstrated that non-Muslims can lose the state’s protection in certain 
circumstances if they openly challenge or protest the model of the Islamic state. 
 
The MB’s practice also confirms that it can acknowledge the reference to citizenship only if 
it is presented within the framework of the shari‘a state. In this context, the MB rejected a 
constitutional amendment in 2007 that aimed to declare citizenship to be a constitutive 
element of the Egyptian state.214 The MB was the only political block to oppose this 
provision. One of its leaders explained in the media that ‘the concept of citizenship is 
Western and it means secularism and [that] Islam accepts only a civil state with an Islamic 
background’ (Mohammad 2007). The 2012 Constitution used the term citizenship in Article 
6,215 but other provisions in the Constitution such as Articles 2, 4 and 219 consolidated the 
Islamic framework so there were no concerns that citizenship could limit the Islamic nature 
of the state (see chapter three). Article 6 referred to citizenship, democracy and human rights 
alongside the term shura (consultation). The term shura in the literature of the MB has been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 After the constitutional amendments, Article 1 of the 1971 Constitution said, ‘Egypt is a democratic state based on 
citizenship’. See Amendments to the Constitution of Egypt, 31 March 2007.   
215 Article 6 of the 2012 Constitution said, ‘the political system is based on the principles of democracy and shura 
(consultation), citizenship (under which all citizens are equal in rights and duties), multi-party pluralism, peaceful transfer of 
power, separation of powers and the balance between them, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and freedoms; all 
as elaborated in the Constitution.   
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used to refer to the Islamic version of democracy, where the sovereignty of the people is 
subject to the rulings of Islamic law (al-Shawi 1987; 1992).   
 
Defending the applicability of Islamic law in a multi-religious society, the MB scholars argue 
that Muslims obey Islamic law as a matter of belief, but non-Muslims living in the Islamic 
state can treat it like any other secular laws (al-Hudaiby 1977a:84-85). They have added that 
Islam represents a civilisational identity for Muslims and non-Muslims (al-Qaradawi 
1999b:62). The most common argument made by MB leaders and scholars to defend the 
application of Islamic law despite the presence of non-Muslim communities in the state is 
that Muslims as the majority of population in Egypt have the right to be governed by their 
religious traditions provided that they respect the rights of minorities (al-Banna 1938; al-
Qaradawi 1999:10-11, al-Sirjani 2011:65; al-Shamakh 2008:92-93). However, analysing the 
substance of Islamic law, as presented by the MB, confirms that non-Muslims will not be 
equal to Muslims in the Islamic state and that the majority rule proposed by the MB becomes 
a ‘tyranny of the majority’ (El Fegiery 2012).216 In international law, human rights violations 
cannot be justified by the consent of the majority. For instance, in 2009 the HRC declared 
that a referendum sponsored by the Swiss government to ban the construction of minarets all 
over Switzerland was discriminatory.217  
 
One even doubts that the majority of Muslims in Egypt would agree on the meaning of 
Islamic law. In reality, the application of Islamic law in the modern nation state reflects the 
attitudes of those actors who dominate the state’s institutions (An-Na‘im 2008:1-2). The 
HRC upheld that where a religion becomes the official state religion, it should not lead to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 The expression ‘tyranny of the majority’ was used in the 19th century by some liberal philosophers such as John Stuart 
Mill (2005) to describe a situation when the dominant majority in a society appeals to its majoritarian power to infringe on 
individual liberties. 
217 See UNCHR ‘Comment on Switzerland’s Third Periodic Report on Implementation of the ICCPR’ (2009), para.8.   
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discrimination against individuals in the enjoyment of human rights.218 As noted by An-
Na‘im (1990:1), Muslims’ right of self-determination in the modern nation state does not 
justify the encroachment on the rights of non-Muslims living with them in the same state. Yet 
as I discuss in the following sections, the dominant views among MB scholars and leaders are 
that non-Muslims cannot hold certain public positions, Muslims are privileged in building 
places of worship, Muslim males can marry Christians or Jews but non-Muslim males cannot 
marry Muslim women, and non-Abrahamic religions and non-Sunni Islamic sects are not 
recognised in the Islamic state.         
 
Nevertheless, the MB has argued that there is common ground between their Islamist project, 
and that of Christians in Egypt. It has assumed that both share the goal of protecting public 
morals and confronting obscenity, heresy and atheism, and therefore Christians should not 
treat the MB with suspicion (al-Shamakh 2008:6; al-Qaradawi 1999:11-13). But this 
argument is ill-founded, because Christians, like Muslims, adhere to different interpretations 
of religion and morality, and the political practice of most of their leaders and intellectual 
figures since the 1970s and even before, demonstrates their opposition to the Islamist model 
of the MB (Carter 1986:272-279; Zaidan and Cumbria 2007). Some writers of the MB argue 
that Christian figures have praised the application of Islamic law (al-Shamakh 2008:94-99; 
al-Qaradawi 1999:69-75). But this should not be taken as evidence to suggest that Egyptian 
Christians would accept an Islamist state that marginalises non-Muslims. For example, the 
representatives of Egypt’s churches withdrew from the Constituent Assembly in November 
2012, protesting against many provisions in the constitution, including those articles that 
consolidated the reference to Islamic law. They complained that the constitution ‘did not 
reflect the pluralistic identity of Egypt’ (Egypt Independent 2012c).     	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 See UNCHR ‘HRC GC 22’ (1994), para.9. 
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The MB’s leaders and scholars have reiterated that non-Muslims in the Islamic state are not 
to be forcibly converted to Islam according to the Qur’anic (2:256) principle that ‘there is no 
compulsion in religion’ (Auda 1960a:31-32; al-Hudaiby 1977a:81; al-Qaradawi 1999:13). 
However, the actual realisation of this principle is questionable in the proposed Islamic state, 
in which non-Muslims face certain forms of direct and indirect pressure that constrain their 
religious freedom. In this state, the government is not neutral towards all religious 
communities but openly sponsors Islam and observes its laws. For instance, al-Sirjani 
(2011:84) holds that ‘the Islamic state has a duty to raise the awareness of Muslims about the 
corrupted doctrines of Christianity and non-Islamic beliefs’.  
 
In the Islamic state, the Islamic identity and moral worldview is superior by the constitution 
and law over any other identities in the state. This sense of superiority is also conveyed to 
non-Muslims when prominent leaders of the MB hold that Muslims are not allowed to greet 
non-Muslims on their religious feasts if these occasions are incompatible with the Islamic 
beliefs, an example being Christmas (al-Sirjani 2011:166-167; al-Barr 2013b). Moreover, 
Muslims are not allowed to convert to Christianity, but non-Muslims are encouraged to join 
Islam by granting Muslims permission to preach Islam while prohibiting non-Muslims from 
proselytizing, and allowing Muslim men to marry non-Muslim women (al-Sirjani 2011:173-
174). 219 These patterns of discrimination create physical and psychological pressure over 
non-Muslims and non-believers who would be isolated in this Islamic state.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 Chapter seven addresses the issue of conversion from Islam.  
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1.2 Non-Muslims and Legal Autonomy 
When Islamic law becomes the supreme source of legislation in the Islamic state, what is the 
relationship of non-Muslims with this law? The MB’s scholars agree that non-Muslims enjoy 
legal autonomy in their religious and family regulations, but that other laws are applicable to 
all citizens (al-Hudaiby 1977a:82-83; al-Qaradawi 1999:15). According to al-Ghazzali 
(2005b:217) the legal autonomy of non-Muslims in the Islamic state is based on the Qur’an 
(5:42; 43; 47). Al-Bahnasawi (2003:92-93; 2004:31-32) and al-Qaradawi (2012a) referred to 
the precedent of the Constitution of Medina, in which the Prophet acknowledged the 
autonomy of non-Muslim communities who lived alongside Muslims. The platform of the 
FJP (2011a) and the presidential programme of Mohammad Morsi (2012b:8; 20) affirmed 
that certain non-Muslims (Christians and Jews only) apply their own religious family 
regulations. The 2012 Constitution recognised the rights of non-Muslims to apply their own 
religious regulations within their family and religious affairs. Article 3 of the 2012 
Constitution stated that ‘the canon principles of Egyptian Christians and Jews are the main 
source of legislation for their personal status laws, religious affairs, and the selection of their 
spiritual leaders’.220  
 
Many observers considered this Article to be a step forward for the rights of non-Muslims, 
since it was the first time that a constitution recognised the existence of other religious 
communities in Egypt and guaranteed their legal autonomy in their religious and family 
matters (al-Majid 2013:85). This autonomy has long been portrayed by the MB and its 
scholars as a human right and a sign of tolerance of religious minorities, which they consider 
to be lacking in the West (al-Hudaiby 1977a:83-84). Article 3 entrusted leaders of non-
Muslim religious communities with enacting certain laws ruling them. I show in this section 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Article 3 of the 2012 Constitution. 
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that Egypt’s law has indeed already allowed Christians and Jews to apply their regulations in 
marriage and divorce, yet while Article 3 provided constitutional protection for non-
Muslims’ legal autonomy, it has arguably undermined the equal constitutional rights 
protection for Egyptian citizens regardless of their religious affiliation.      
 
A key challenge that arises under legal pluralism is how the state can strike a balance 
between claims made by certain communities to preserve their traditions and the protection of 
individual rights under IHRL particularly the right to equality before the law and non-
discrimination. There is no explicit prohibition of systems of legal pluralism or parallel legal 
jurisdictions under IHRL (Quane 2013). 221  However, UN human rights bodies have 
expressed certain concerns over the operation of these systems (Temperman 2010:194-195). 
In its General Comment No.32, the UNHRC urged States to ‘protect the rights under [the 
ICCPR] of any persons affected by the operation of customary and religious courts’.222 The 
UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women called upon Egypt in 
2010 to ‘consider issuing a unified family law on personal status covering both Muslims and 
Christians’.223 Liberal theorists argue that a minority group cannot evoke its autonomy as a 
group to violate the individual rights of its members (Rawls 2005:466-474; Kymlicka 
2002:342), and according to this view: ‘Individuals should be able to leave the communal 
track and transfer their disputes to civil courts at their own will, especially when there is a 
direct and imminent threat by communal norms and institutions to the constitutionally 
protected rights and freedoms of individuals’ (Sezgin 2011:15). However, research shows 
that members of religious communities in some societies are subjected to intense social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 A different approach was taken by the ECtHR which held that the very system of legal pluralism is incompatible with the 
European Convention of Human Rights, see Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, para.119.     
222 See UNCHR ‘HRC GC No.32’ (2007), para.24.  
223 UNCHR ‘Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Conclusions and 
Recommendations, Egypt’ (2010), Para.28. Similar recommendation was made to Lebanon in 2008 and 2005. See U.N. 
DOCs. CEDAW/C/LBN/CO/3, para18 and CEDAW/C/LBN/CO/2, para. 24 
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pressure to not follow laws other than their communal laws (Sezgin 2013:214-215). This 
challenge would limit the actual impact of having a secular family law applied to all citizens, 
beside parallel communal family laws in the same legal jurisdiction. In the long term, legal 
reforms need to be supported by large constituencies in these communities to survive.     
 
In Egypt, the application of legal pluralism in personal status laws restricts certain rights for 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The application of multi-religious family laws is a 
contemporary version of the milli system applied in the Ottoman Empire since the 15th 
century (Scott 2010:28:31). According to this system ‘the organised, recognised, religio-
political communities enjoyed certain rights of autonomy under their own chiefs’ (Scott 
2010:28). It was common historically that non-Muslims voluntarily took their legal disputes 
to Muslim courts to take advantage of certain Islamic rules (Shaham 2010:410). Egypt’s laws 
in the first half of the 20th century provided non-Muslims with this option (Sezgin 2013: 122-
123).224 However, in the course of the institutional modernisation and normative unification 
process, the freedoms enjoyed by non-Muslims to choose under which legal jurisdiction they 
could settle their personal status disputes were limited. Article 3 of the 2012 Constitution 
limited these freedoms as well by explicitly referring non-Muslims to their canon laws. Thus 
Article 3 did not typically re-introduce the milli system in Egypt before the modernisation of 
its legal system.     
 
The non-Muslim milli courts and shari‘a courts were abolished in 1955, and since then all 
Muslim and non-Muslim family cases are examined by national courts. Egyptian Christians 
apply their own regulations on marriage and divorce. Codified Islamic law on issues such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Ottoman Decree of 14 May 1883 entrusted the milli courts with adjudicating matters of marriage, divorce and 
maintenance for members of the Coptic Orthodox Church in case parties did not request the intervention of shari‘a Courts.  
Article 1 of Law 25/1944 required the consent of all interested parties in order for milli Courts to adjudicate cases of 
succession. Otherwise, Islamic inheritance laws became applicable. 
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inheritance, intestate succession, bequest, capacity and guardianship is applied to all 
Egyptians (Berger 2001:94).225 One can argue that Article 3 opened the door for Christians 
and Jews to claim the application of their own laws on these matters since they are also part 
of personal status laws, but the debate during the constitution-making process focused on 
regulations related to marriage and divorce only. The system of religious family laws applied 
in Egypt and entrenched in the 2012 Constitution does not give any kind of choice for 
Egyptian citizens to avoid religious family laws and be adjudicated under a secular law 
applied equally to all citizens. It also adheres to a discriminatory position against non-
Abrahamic religions and empowers the leaders of religious communities to decide their 
regulations. The family law applied to the followers of the Coptic Orthodox Church is an 
illustrative example to highlight the human rights limitations of this system. This example 
shows the inadequacy of the MB’s Islamic concept of legal autonomy from a human rights 
perspective.  
 
Many Egyptian Coptic Christians suffer from strict regulations on divorce applied by the 
Coptic Orthodox Church. Some Christians have converted to Islam or changed their sect in 
order to apply Muslim family law (Sadiq 2011a; Berger 2001).226 The leadership of the 
Coptic Orthodox Church praised the constitutional provision on the legal autonomy of non-
Muslims, viewing it as an important safeguard against the interference of the state in its 
regulations regarding marriage and divorce (Shukri 2012). This provision would shield these 
regulations from judicial oversight. Previously, some Coptic Orthodox Christians had 
challenged the Church over its strict regulations on marriage and divorce before the judiciary. 
In a notorious case in 2010, the Supreme Administrative Court ignored the instructions of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 According to Article 875 and 915 of the Civil Code No.131/1948, Islamic inheritance laws are applied to Muslims and 
non-Muslims.   
226 According to Law No.462 of 1955, if a spouse converts from one non-Muslim sect to another or converts to Islam, 
Muslim family law is applied to family disputes.      
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Church and overrode its refusal to permit a divorced Coptic Orthodox Christian to remarry.227 
The Church was dismayed by this judgement, arguing that it violated its teachings, which do 
not permit a second marriage for divorced Christians who ended the contracts of their first 
marriage on grounds other than the commission of adultery by one of the spouses, or 
conversion (Saad 2010:5). Despite its reservations to the Islamisation of the constitution and 
law, in this dispute, the Church appealed to Article 2 of the 1971 Constitution, arguing that 
Islamic shari‘a protects the autonomy of non-Muslims in the Islamic state (Saad 2010:6).   
 
This controversy has a long legal background. The 1938 Code of Personal Status for Copts 
provides several grounds for divorce. This Code was adopted by the Coptic Orthodox 
Communal Council (al-Majlis al-Milli), a lay leadership established by the Egyptian 
authorities in 1874 and more powerful than the clerical authority of the Coptic Church. 
However, in the 1950s and 1960s, ‘absolute control was returned to the Church’ (Shaham 
2010:412-413). This began with the abolition of the milli courts which were controlled by the 
Communal Council, and then the dissolution of the Council by former President Nasser in 
1962 upon the request of the Church. The 1938 Code has been however rejected by the 
leadership of the Orthodox Church since 1945, which accused it of being in violation of 
religious teachings of Copts. But all attempts to repel this Code failed until the Patriarch 
Shenouda III, the former head of the Coptic Orthodox Church, who adopted a confrontational 
approach towards the state and issued a decree in 1971 preventing ‘Copts who had obtained 
dissolution of marriage judgements from national courts on grounds other than adultery from 
re-marrying’ (Shaham 2010:413).  
 
Studying the legal history of Egyptian Coptic Christians, Shaham (2010:409) argues that ‘the 
1938 Code was not innovative, as claimed by Shenouda, and that it relied on medieval Coptic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Supreme Administrative Court, Case No.12244/55, 29 May 2010.  
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Orthodox legal treaties’. The 2010 judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court 
challenged Shenouda’s decree and considered that the complainer was divorced according to 
the 1938 Code and was entitled to get permission from the Church to remarry. The Church, 
however, rejected this judgement. Shaham (2010:409) explains that the strict position of the 
Church’s leadership on divorce and marriage ‘was motivated by [its] desire to strengthen 
communal identity and cohesion in the face of religious and political developments in Egypt’. 
Patriarch Shenouda III challenged the 2010 judgment before the Supreme Constitutional 
Court, drawing on its power to settle disputes resulting from two conflicting final judgements 
delivered by different judicial organs.228 The Church argued that the Court of Cassation had 
acknowledged the autonomy of the Church in regulating marriage and divorce in a 1979 
ruling.229 On 7 July 2010, the SCC suspended the implementation of the 2010 judgement 
from the Supreme Administrative Court until its examination of the case (Suliman 2010). The 
Church was comfortable with this decision, although complaints by Christians about the strict 
regulations of the Church continue in Egypt without solution (Mahmood 2012b).  
 
In post-Mubarak Egypt, the Church found itself in agreement with the MB that the legal 
powers of the Church over Christian citizens on marriage and divorce should be endorsed. 
This was realised in the 2012 Constitution. But over the last five years, increasing numbers of 
Christian activists and writers have criticised the position of the Coptic Orthodox Church on 
family matters, and advocate with like-minded Muslims for the need for a secular family law 
that is applied equally to all Egyptians (Mahmood 2012b; Kamal 2010).   
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 See Article 25 of Law No.48 /1979 on the Establishment of the SCC.    
229 Court of Cassation, Case No.16/48, 17 January 1979.  
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1.3 Paying the Poll Tax (jizya) 
The payment of the poll tax (jizya) by non-Muslims living in the Muslim community was a 
key element of the contract of dhimma elaborated by pre-modern Muslim jurists. Many 
traditional Muslim jurists argued that this tax was a sign of the submission of non-Muslims to 
the authority of Muslims in the Muslim territories. According to this view, non-Muslims pay 
the jizya to Muslim rulers in exchange for their protection by Muslims, but also as a kind of 
punishment for their disbelieving in Islam and to encourage non-Muslims to convert to Islam 
(Zidan 1982:143-144). In Egypt under the Ottoman Empire, the system of jizya was amended 
in 1855 whereby non-Muslims had the option to either serve in the military or pay a tax. The 
jizya was fully abolished in 1909 (Scott 2010:37-38).  
 
Most scholars of the MB argue that historically, the system of jizya did not aim to humiliate 
or subjugate non-Muslims but was part of the contractual relationship between Muslims and 
non-Muslims according to which Muslim rulers were responsible for protecting non-Muslims 
living in the Muslim territories (Sabiq 1973c:49; Zidan 1982: 146-147). According to al-
Bahnasawi (2004:40), there were historical precedents, in which Muslim leaders exempted 
non-Muslims from paying the poll tax after they joined the Muslim army. The prevalent view 
of the MB and its scholars is that the purpose of jizya has ceased to exist, as non-Muslims 
perform military service and defend the nation, and they pay tax now like Muslims (al-
Shamakh 2008:103-105; al-Qaradawi 2012a). This opinion was expressed by Hassan al-
Banna (1948) when he stated that when non-Muslims serve in the army of the Islamic state, 
they are not requested to pay jizya.  
 
Sayd Qutb (1993:175) was explicit that jizya was not just an administrative arrangement 
between Muslims and non-Muslims but ‘it is also a guarantee that non-Muslims stop resisting 
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Muslims and Islam and refrain from creating any barriers before its dissemination and 
sovereignty’. Most MB scholars do not explicitly address the function of jizya as a sign of 
subjugation, but they agree with Qutb that non-Muslims should submit to the ruling of Islam 
in the Islamic state even though they are exempted nowadays from paying jizya. Their 
position is, however, problematic by the claim that Muslims and Islam are the highest in the 
hierarchy of religions in the state. As noted by the Egyptian academic Sherif Younis (2011), 
‘the rule should therefore be the required payment of jizya, but a certain historical context, 
rather than a basic right to equality, provides an exception to the rule’. Since the supremacy 
in this state is given to Muslims and Islamic law, in theory the door is open for Muslim rulers 
to decide in certain circumstances that non-Muslims should not be part of the army of the 
Islamic state and pay jizya if their loyalty to this army and its Islamic cause is questionable.  
 
Moreover, there have been some signs that the institution of jizya has not been fully removed 
from the thinking of the MB’s members. Some top leaders in the group still believe that 
under certain circumstances, non-Muslims can pay jizya in exchange for not fighting. This 
was the opinion of the former General Guide of the MB Mustafa Mashhur in an interview 
with al-Ahram weekly on 3 April 1997. Mashhur explained that: 
 
 
When we have an Islamic state, the army will be the cornerstone of its stand 
against anyone trying to attack this Islamic state. If we have non-Muslims 
in the army and a Christian country attacks us then Christian members of 
the armed forces could change their allegiance and become agents for the 
enemy (quoted in All Africa Press 1997).  
 
This statement triggered fierce reactions from the Coptic Orthodox Church, former president 
Mubarak and the liberal and leftist opposition (All Africa Press 1997). Consequently, 
Mashhur was prompted to revisit his position, saying that ‘the payment of jizya relates to 
those who fought Islam and Muslims. This would not apply to Coptic citizens… since they 
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have fought the enemies of this nation’ (quoted in Tadros 2012a:90). Another volume on 
Islamic teachings which is widely read among MB members still maintains that non-Muslims 
in the Islamic state have two options – either to convert to Islam or to pay the poll tax (jizya) 
(Mahmoud 2011:424).  
 
In conclusion, the declared view of the MB today is that non-Muslims are not required to pay 
jizya because they serve in the army of the Islamic state alongside Muslim citizens. However, 
this opinion has not been rooted in a belief that Muslim and non-Muslims enjoy equal 
citizenship in the state. Therefore, it can be revisited. The decision to exempt non-Muslims 
from paying jizya is subject to the discretion of the Islamic state. Jizya can be possibly 
reinstated under different political circumstances, as long as the Islamic state defines its 
domestic and external policies along religious lines. The debate on paying jizya emphasises 
the limitations of the reform methods utilised by the MB. One cannot focus only on the 
development of new opinions, rather the coherence of the methods and the reasoning 
employed to reach the opinion are equally important for Islamic reform to be sustained. As 
argued by An-Na‘im (1990:46) as long as ‘the underlying shari‘a principles remain intact, 
[partial reforms] are subject to loss when there is a forceful reassertion of shari‘a’.  
 
1.4 Building Places of Worship 
IHRL protects the right of religious minorities to build and maintain their places of 
worship.230  However, as noted by Villaroman (2012:4), ‘the right to establish and maintain 
places of worship may be said to be only in its nascent stage of normative development 
because its own substantive content has not been elaborated’. When they intervene to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 In its GC No.22, the HRC has held that the construction of places of worship is one of the key elements of the freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or belief. See also Article 6 of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981). 
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regulate the practice of this right, states face the difficult task of reconciling demands made 
by all religious communities living on their territories. In many states all over the world 
including Western democracies, one finds religious communities complaining of different 
types of restrictions on their right to build their places of worship. 231  Nevertheless, 
Villaroman (2012:295-322) has deduced some principles that explain the normative content 
of this right, from the work of the HRC and the Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights 
Council. Foremost, is the right to be protected from discrimination in applications to build 
places of worship; state regulations should be applied equally to all religious communities 
without giving privilege to certain religion. Any regulations should be clear and their 
application should be transparent and accessible to all religious communities. States should 
also refrain from depriving any religious community of this right.   
 
These principles are not respected in Egypt where the law does not guarantee equal and 
transparent criteria for the construction and maintenance of places of worship (Rowe 2007). 
Sunni Muslims, Christians and Jews are the only religious minorities that can build their 
places of worship, but even those communities are not treated equally. Egyptian law gives 
wide discretionary powers to the authorities in providing Christians with permission to build 
or maintain churches, with approval by the President. Giving this power to the top authority 
of the state has been inherited from the Ottoman era. According to the 1856 Hamayouni 
edict, all requests for building churches were examined by the Sultan, withdrawing ‘the 
licencing process from the local authorities, which Christians had accused of obstructing 
construction work’ (Fastenrath and Kazanjia 2008:2). As an attempt to simplify the 
procedures, Mubarak issued Decree No.13/1998 by which the governorates were delegated to 
permit renovation work in existing churches.232 Then, this task was moved to municipal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 See UNCHR ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Elimination of all Forms of Religious Intolerance’ (1997) UN 
DOC A/52/477, paras.34-61 and Amnesty International (2009).  
232 Presidential Decree No.13/1998, Official Gazette no.2bis of 11 January 1998.  
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administration under Decree No.453/1999, 233  and was later cancelled by Decree 
No.291/2005, which delegated the governorates to grant permission to expand or rebuild 
existing churches.234 However, these legal amendments have not satisfied the demands of 
Christians to find a sustainable solution that ends the state’s arbitrary powers in approving or 
rejecting their applications (Fastenrath and Kazanjia 2008:2).        
 
According to the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, the number of 
mosques in Egypt amounts to 108,395, and the number of churches is 2,869 (US Department 
of the State 2012). However, one should note that this figure does not include all mosques in 
the country because it is easy for Muslims to unofficially establish small public prayer halls 
in private and public properties. Many of these halls use loudspeakers to call for prayers, and 
the state often tolerates their presence. In 2001, the Ministry of Islamic endowments adopted 
certain conditions for building mosques, but in reality these conditions have not been not 
strictly observed by the state (‘Abdalla 2002). Furthermore, religious communities that are 
not recognised by the state are prohibited from building places of worship. The Baha’is had 
their own organised communities until 1961 when Nasser dissolved them, and outlawed the 
activities of the minority.235 The Supreme Court in 1975 approved this action and ruled that 
Egypt recognises only the three Abrahamic religions.236 
 
The absence of fair treatment of religious communities in Egypt with respect to places of 
worship has repeatedly led to sectarian clashes. When non-Muslims tried in some cases to 
defy the law, they were met by strict measures from the state and from Muslim citizens who 
oppose the establishment of churches in their neighbourhood. The starkest example of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Presidential Decree No.453/1999, Official Gazette no.52bis, 30 December 1999.  
234 Presidential Decree No.291/2005, 8 December 2005.   
235 Law No.263/1960 Dissolving the Baha’i Communities, Official Gazette no.161of 19 July 1960. 
236 Supreme Court, Case No.7/2, 1 March 1975.  
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sectarian episode occurred in 1972 in al-Khanka district in Cairo. The official fact-finding 
committee, established by the People’s Assembly upon the request of former President Sadat 
and headed by the former parliamentarian Jamal al-Utayfi (1972), found that sectarian 
violence in this incident was ‘associated with the establishment of unlicensed churches’. To 
avoid the repetition of this incident, the committee urged the government to adopt a simple 
and clear legal procedure for Christians to build their churches, but successive Egyptian 
governments have ignored this recommendation.      
 
In its literature and its practice in opposition and in power, the MB has not proposed a 
solution for this situation, but rather has sustained a discriminatory position. A general 
recognition of the right of non-Muslims to build places of worship is stated in the literature 
(‘Auda 1960:32-33; al-Hudaiby 1977a:82). However, the exercise of this right is enormously 
qualified as I explain in the following. The most hardline view was expressed by Abdulla Al-
Khatib (1981a:41) in his fatwa published in al-Da‘wa magazine where he stated that:  
 
 
Churches should not exist on the territories conquered by force or newly 
established by Muslims. But Muslims can keep churches built on the territories 
acquired through agreements with their inhabitants. In this last case, the 
renovation of these churches can be permitted only if there is an agreement about 
that between Muslim rulers and Christians.  
 
It was common for classical Muslim jurists to decide on the ability of non-Muslims to build 
religious sites in accordance with a specific categorisation of Muslim territories (Emon 
2012b:119-122). Al-Khatib (2006b) later revised his opinion, stating that Christians can build 
their churches as long as there is a need for that. Al-Shamakh (2008:114-115) has also 
pointed out that the 1981 fatwa does not represent the official view of the MB. The dominant 
view today among the MB leaders and scholars is that the establishment of churches in the 
Islamic state is permitted but it should be decided based on the number of Christians and it 
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should not in any way threaten the Islamic identity of the state or negatively provoke the 
feelings of Muslims (al-Qaradawi 1985:10, al-Ghazzali: 1991:67; al-Sirjani: 2011:81-82; al-
Barr 2011c; Tadros 2012a:110).  
 
In a public event, Al-Barr (2011d) held that ‘the construction of Churches should not be 
prompted by a desire to show Christian symbols and to compete with Muslims’. These pre-
conditions mean that Muslims should be privileged in any regulation of the construction of 
places of worship. Certain restrictions can be also imposed on Christians to respect the 
feelings of Muslims. For instance, they should ‘not expose their ceremonies or crosses in the 
Islamic dominions, nor should they erect a church in a city where there had not previously 
been one’ (al-Qaradawi 1985:10). When Muslim jurists in the pre-modern era were 
restricting the ability of non-Muslims to establish new places of worship or maintain old 
ones, they were also motivated to ensure ‘the Islamic character of lands falling under the 
imperium of the Islamic enterprise of governance’ (Emon 2012b:122). 
 
The right of Christians to build churches was mentioned in the electoral platform of the FJP 
(2011b), which stated that ‘Christians should not be deprived of their right to build their 
places of worship and [that] there should be a just solution to the unlicensed Churches’. In 
this document, the FJP acknowledged only the rights of Christians to build places of worship; 
there was no reference to Jews, the Shi‘a or non-Abrahamic religions. Although the party 
acknowledged the right of Christians to build their places of worship, it did not promise to 
change the relevant laws governing the building of places of worship, or that certain 
regulations would be applied equally to Muslim and non-Muslims.   
 
Some official attempts have been made since 2005 to pass a unified law on the construction 
of places of worship that creates equal regulations for the construction of churches and 
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mosques. But these draft laws were not supported by the ruling political elite and they failed 
to gain the support of the main political actors for different reasons.237 The repeated sectarian 
tensions over the construction of churches and the increasing political activism of Christians 
have renewed the debate on this issue in post-Mubarak Egypt. Another draft law was 
presented in June 2011 by the transitional Prime Minister Essam Sharaf, but it was rejected 
by most key actors. The law proposed a series of difficult conditions for the building of 
churches and mosques alike (Shaker 2011).238 Official churches opposed the draft law, 
considering it restrictive and below their expectations (Sadiq 2011b), and the same reasons 
pushed human rights NGOs to oppose the draft. They also condemned the law for its 
provision that limited the right to build places of worship to followers of Abrahamic religions 
(CIHRS 2011). The MB and the Salafist al-Nour Party maintained that any regulations must 
be proportional to the number of Christians and their actual needs, but that this criteria should 
not be applied to Muslims. Therefore, the law according to most Islamists should treat the 
construction of churches and mosques separately (Al-Wafd Newspaper 2012a). Al-Azhar has 
also rejected the idea of a unified law for the same factors expressed by Islamists (al-Ahram 
2012).  
 
The right of religious communities to construct places of worship was not adequately 
protected by the 2012 Constitution. Article 43 states that ‘the state guarantees the practice of 
religious ceremonies and the establishment of places of worship for Abrahamic religions as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237In 2005, a leading parliamentarian affiliated with the former ruling National Democratic Party presented a draft for a 
unified law but it was not considered by the Parliament. The same draft was resubmitted in February 2007 without success 
as well (Fastenrath and Kazanjia 2008:37). In 2007, the National Council for Human Rights proposed a draft law but the 
government disregarded it (Saleh 2007).    
238 For instance, the proposed law prohibited the presence of places of worship attached to residential buildings. Places of 
worship should be built on a 1000 metres land. The draft law did not recognise the needs of different Christian sects. It 
proposed that the space between any two places of worship should be 1000 metres, a condition that would create practical 
difficulties for Christians and Muslims to meet the needs of their followers in many regions in Egypt (Shaker 2011 and 
CIHRS 2011).        
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regulated by the law’.239 This article deprived followers of non-Abrahamic religions of the 
right to publicly manifest their religion. The right of Christians and Jews to build and 
maintain their places of worship was also uncertain according to Article 43 of the 2012 
Constitution. This article did not clearly state that the right to build places of worship is 
practiced by religious communities equally without discrimination, and it vaguely subjected 
the right to the regulation of the law, opening the door for arbitrary restrictions on the right 
itself. President Morsi was not clear in his electoral campaigns on whether he was ready to 
sponsor a new law for places of worship. He did not address it in his presidential platform 
(Morsi 2012b). When he was asked about the rights of Christians to build churches, he stated 
that this issue should be subjected to the law. However, he did not explain whether he meant 
that the existing law is sufficient or a new law should be adopted (Morsi 2012c). In his year 
in power, President Morsi did not propose a new legal framework to regulate the construction 
of places of worship, although sectarian incidents that were associated with this matter 
continued under his rule. He did however approve the establishment of a new church whose 
application had been under consideration for 17 years.240 Christians praised this step but it 
was not enough for them to trust and support the MB (Ali 2013).  
 
1.5 The Right to Hold Public Office 
This area of the debate on the rights of non-Muslims demonstrates the contradictions in the 
MB’s conception of Islamic citizenship. There is an agreement among MB scholars that since 
non-Muslims are citizens in the Islamic state, they have the right to participate in its political 
institutions, but subjected to certain qualifications. Al-Qaradawi (1997:194) has maintained 
that the participation of non-Muslims in the parliaments of Islamic states is permitted as long 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 Article 43 of the 2012 Constitution. 
240 Presidential Decree No.345/2013 Permitting the Building of a New Church for the Coptic Orthodox Sect, Official Gazette 
no.23 of 6 June 2013, p.7.   
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as Muslims always dominate these parliaments. In a Muslim majority state, one would expect 
that the representation of Muslims would routinely outnumber the representation of non-
Muslims but making such a statement reveals a belief that the Islamic political system should 
ensure the domination of Muslims over other non-Muslim citizens. Al-Qaradawi (1997:194-
195) has argued that the Qur’an orders Muslims to behave justly with non-Muslims, so they 
should be allowed to run for parliamentary elections to represent their communities and not 
be isolated from Muslim citizens. Al-Qaradawi (1997:196-197) has opposed the prohibition 
of non-Muslims from political participation in the Islamic state based on the Qur’anic (4:144) 
principle that Muslims must not take disbelievers as allies instead of believers. He has argued 
that non-Muslims in this verse are the ones who fight Muslims and not non-Muslims in 
general. On the other hand, he has conceded to the view expressed by most traditional 
Muslim jurists that the appointment of non-Muslims in executive posts should be under the 
authority of Muslims. To clarify his idea, al-Qaradawi (1997:194-195) has referred to non-
Muslim women who marry Muslim men; in this marriage according to him, non-Muslim 
women enjoy authority over their children and household, but under the overall authority of 
Muslim men.  
 
Al-Qaradawi (2008a;2012a) has held that non-Muslims cannot hold certain public positions 
of a religious nature. At the top of these positions is the leader or the president of the Islamic 
state who is supposed to undertake certain religious tasks. Therefore, non-Muslims are not 
allowed to run for this position. Most pre-modern Muslim jurists held this view (Zidan 
1982:78). However, al-Qaradawi (2010b) expressed a different opinion in an interview with 
the BBC Arabic in February 2010 when he argued that the position of the president in 
modern Muslim states differs from the historical position of the Caliph who is supposed to 
rule Muslim territories. But according to him, individual Muslims states are provinces 
(imarat) of the Islamic Caliphate. The leader of this grand Islamic state should be a Muslim 
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because he is the supreme leader of all Muslims and of Islamic affairs, while non-Muslims 
can preside over the provinces. The underlying concern in this reasoning is not the principle 
of equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, but the presence of certain guarantees that 
ensure that non-Muslims will always submit to the authority of Islam in the state. As long as 
the Islamic framework of the state is protected, non-Muslims can hold top positions. 
However, given the fact that the grand Islamic state does not exist, one can speculate that 
until this goal is achieved, Muslim states should be ruled by Muslims. In other writings and 
media appearances, al-Qaradawi still declares that non-Muslims cannot hold the position of 
the presidency of Muslim states (Al-Qaradawi 2008; 2012a).    
 
The official position of the MB on this issue is that non–Muslims can occupy any position in 
the Islamic state except the position of the president, since it is classified under the position 
of ‘the general leadership’ (wilaya ‘amma), which is only occupied by Muslims. The position 
of the prime minister can come under this category as well if this office enjoys certain powers 
like the president. This position was mentioned by the MB in the 2007 Draft Party Platform 
but it was absent in the 2011 programme of the FJP. However, the MB literature and the 
statements of its leaders continue to repeat the opinion that non-Muslims cannot occupy 
certain other positions in the Islamic state (Ghuzlan 2006:24; al-Sirjani 2011a:103). 
However, due to intense political pressure on the MB post-Mubarak, the group stated that any 
political party can nominate non-Muslims to the presidential elections, but the MB abide by 
their jurisprudential opinion that only Muslims can represent them in the presidential 
elections (al-Waziri 2011).       
 
Some commentators might not consider that the issue of the right of non-Muslims to run for 
the presidency is a priority in a country like Egypt, where the majority of population is 
Muslim. In this situation, it would be normal that the president be Muslim. But if non-
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Muslims are not allowed to occupy certain positions considered wilaya ‘amma, it becomes 
possible that other official positions may also be put under this category as well, such as the 
leader of the army, or governors.241 Moreover, the explicit statement that certain citizens are 
prohibited from reaching particular public positions is discriminatory under IHRL, and it 
sends a very negative message to non-Muslims living in Egypt, as we can see in the writings 
of Egyptian Christian intellectuals (Fawzi 2009:133).  
 
The following two examples clearly show that the conception of wilaya ‘amma can be 
evoked to exclude non-Muslims from occupying other public positions in the state apart from 
the presidency. For ten days in April 2011, massive sits-in and demonstrations were 
organised in Qina, a city in Upper Egypt, against the appointment of General Emad Mikhail, 
a Christian citizen, as the governor of Qina. The demand was to replace him with a Muslim 
governor. According to field research conducted by the EIPR (2012:30-31), the MB was one 
of the political entities which sponsored the protests along with Salafist associations and 
politicians affiliated with the dissolved former ruling party, the National Democratic Party. 
Consequently, the government suspended its decision and assigned a Muslim official to 
provisionally act as a governor. The previous governor in Qina, appointed by Mubarak, had 
also been Christian. According to Safwat Hegazi (2011), an Islamist scholar close to the MB, 
protesters refused the appointment of a second Christian governor in Qina, fearing that this 
position would become reserved for Christians.   
 
In his electoral campaigns, Morsi promised his liberal political allies that he would appoint a 
Christian as vice president once he became president of Egypt, as a gesture of his 
commitment to equal citizenship (Hussein 2012). Salafists rejected this promise, arguing that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241Most scholars under review in this chapter focus on the position of the president but others explicitly state that non-
Muslims cannot hold other positions such as leading the army (al-Sirjani 2011a:103).   
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under Islamic law neither Christians nor women can occupy the position of the vice president 
because the role replaces the president in certain circumstances, and consequently is 
considered wilaya ‘amma.  Morsi bowed to pressure and appointed two persons, a Christian 
man and a Muslim woman as his assistants – advisory positions without any constitutional 
powers (El Fegiery 2012:18; BBC 2012a). These two examples increased the lack of 
confidence between the MB and Christians.              
 
Christians have long complained of poor representation in the parliament (Fawzi and Morcos 
2012:5-6). Figures show that Christians won a higher number of parliamentary seats in the 
first half of the 20th century than at any time since.242 In the 2000 Parliament, only three 
Copts out of 444 members were elected and only one Copt was elected in 2005 and 2010. In 
the 2012 parliamentary elections, six Christians were elected out of 498 members (Fawzi and 
Morcos 2012:5-6). ‘Since 1952, successive regimes have used appointments to compensate 
for the meagre Coptic presence on the political scene’ (Fawzi and Morcos 2012:6). The 
SCAF followed the same tradition and appointed five Christian members in the 2012 
parliament. In December 2012 President Morsi appointed 90 members in the Shura 
(consultative) Council, among them twelve Christians.243 This number reflected the interests 
of President Morsi at that time to satisfy the opposition and encourage its leaders to engage in 
the political process under the 2012 Constitution given the intense political polarisation 
between the MB and liberals in November and December 2012 over the constitution-making 
process. However, the problem of the appointment mechanism is that those Christian 
members chosen by the executive usually reflect the political choice of the ruling elite and 
not the people or the Christian community. But explaining their failure to be adequately 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 For example, the number of elected Christians in the 1924 Parliament was 16 out of 214 members. In 1926, 23 Christians 
were elected out of 235 members and in 1936, 20 Christians were elected out of 232 members. In 1924, 27 Christians were 
elected out of 264 members. The average of the parliamentary representation of Christians from 1924 to 1950 is 6.13%.  
This average dropped to 2.54% in the period of 1957-1969 and 1.65 from 1971 to 2005 (Fawzi and Morcos 2012:5-6).   
243 Presidential Decree No.432/2012, Official Gazette no.51bis of 20 December 2012.  
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represented in the parliament, Christians complain of two specific barriers. The first is the 
failure of the electoral system to enable vulnerable groups to be adequately represented in the 
parliament. The second barrier is the heavy use of inflammatory and divisive religious 
slogans in electoral campaigns (Fawzi and Morcos 2012:6-7).         
 
I begin with the debate on the electoral system. There is no specific mechanism under IHRL 
by which states are obliged to ensure the effective participation of minorities in public 
affairs. The discretion is left to states. The Special Rapporteur on the rights of minorities has 
proposed different measures to realise this objective. Among these measures are reserved 
seats as a provisional affirmative action. ‘Some types of electoral systems can be [also] more 
conducive than others to the election of minorities’ representatives’.244 The HRC has held 
that affirmative action measures are compatible with the ICCPR. It has explained that:  
 
 
The principle of equality sometimes requires States parties to take 
affirmative action in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause 
or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the Covenant . . . Such 
action may involve granting for a time to the part of the population 
concerned certain preferential treatment in specific matters as compared 
with the rest of the population. However, as long as such action is needed to 
correct discrimination in fact, it is a case of legitimate differentiation under 
the Covenant.245 
 
Constitutional and legal measures were taken by Mubarak in 2007 to increase the 
parliamentary participation of women, but not of religious minorities. The position taken at 
that time by the MB and other political forces revealed that affirmative action was not 
popular in Egypt.246 The MB and other liberal and leftist opposition parties rejected reserved 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 See UNCHR ‘Report of the Independent Expert on Minorities Issues, Gay McDougall’ (2010).  p.18.   
245 UNCHR ‘HRC GC 18’ (1994), para.10. O’Hare (2000) has suggested that ‘the equality principle in human rights law, not 
only permits, but arguably may, in certain circumstances, require states to adopt affirmative action in fulfilment of their 
obligation to respect the equality principle’.  
246 The constitutional amendments of 2007 stated that the electoral system may include ‘a minimum limit for the women’s 
participation’. See Amendments to the Constitution of Egypt, 31 March 2007.  The electoral law was accordingly amended 
in 2009, reserving 64 parliamentary seats for women for two parliamentary terms. See Law 149/2009 Amending Law 
38/1972 on the People’s Assembly, Official Gazette no.24bis of 17 June 2009.      
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seats as a mechanism to enhance the participation of women, considering it a discriminatory 
practice but not in the sense of affirmative action (Uthman 2011:177-178).  After 2011 
Revolution, the MB as well as non-Islamist forces247 did not change their opposition to this 
mechanism. The new electoral system developed in 2011 abolished reserved seats for women 
but due to pressure from civil society, the new system stipulated that one female candidate at 
least was to be nominated by political parties in any electoral lists.248 In reality most parties 
nominated women at the end of the lists, so this mechanism was not effective enough to raise 
the participation of women in the parliament (Badran 2012).249 Under Morsi, there were some 
demands to design an electoral system that raised the participation of women and Christians, 
but it was rejected by the Islamist-dominated Consultative Council. Similar to the 2011 
electoral system, the proposed electoral system required political parties to nominate one 
woman at least for any place in all electoral lists. The declared reason, however to exclude 
Christians from this system was that the 2012 Constitution allowed for affirmative action 
only for women (CNN Arabic 2013). It was not on the agenda of the constitutional drafters in 
2012 to provide special protection for minorities.    
 
For their part, Christians have been divided on whether affirmative action is a good way to 
increase their representation in the parliament. The Coptic Orthodox Church has refused it, 
fearing that reserving some seats for Christians would isolate them and further sectarianism 
in the society, while other Christians believe that it is a temporary measure to empower 
Christians in political life (Danyal 2013; Hamid 2013). This mechanism aside, the state still 
has variable means, provided that it has the political will, to empower minorities and women 
to participate in public affairs in general, but this has not been a priority for the MB. This was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 In 2013, new liberal and leftist parties formed after the 2011 Revolution have become open for empowering women and 
minorities through affirmative action measures (al-Shami 2013). The 2014 Constitution drafted after the removal of Morsi 
allowed for affirmative action for women, Christians and youth.  
248 Article 1 of Law 108/2011 Amending Law 38/1972 on the People’s Assembly, Official Gazette no.28bis of 19 July 2011.  
249 The political participation of women is discussed in chapter eight.  
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clear in the 2012 constitution-making process, which marginalised non-Muslims and women 
with respect to their representation in the Constituent Assembly, and the consideration of 
their demands in the constitution.             
 
The electoral climate can be much more accessible for religious minorities if the state 
effectively confronts discriminatory slogans during elections. Under IHRL, the use of 
religious slogans in elections can be banned if they amount to an incitement to discrimination 
or violence. The legal debate around the use of religious slogans in elections came to the fore 
in 2000 when the MB decided to re-engage in electoral politics. In Egypt, the use of religious 
slogans in electoral campaigning has received its legitimacy from the constitutional fact that 
‘Islam is the official religion of the state and the principles of Islamic law are the main source 
of legislation’250 so candidates can propagate their Islamic religious platforms. This is the 
argument invoked by the MB to defend itself against its critics (al-Shamakh 2008:108-109; 
Abu Baraka 2010).  
 
The position of Egypt’s courts on this issue dismayed the government under Mubarak. 
During the electoral campaigns of the 2000 parliamentary elections, the Ministry of Interior 
prevented candidates affiliated with the MB from publicising the famous slogan of the MB 
‘Islam is the Solution’. It argued that this slogan breached the 2000 regulations of electoral 
campaigns which prohibited candidates from posing any threats to ‘the national unity and 
social harmony’ during electoral campaigns. The ministry of interior did not explain the 
actual implications of this slogan and how it jeopardises national unity. It seemed that this 
action was politically motivated to repress MB candidates. The Court of Administrative 
Justice challenged the Ministry of Interior and held in 2000 that candidates were allowed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 Article 2 of the 1971 and 2012 Constitutions.  
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under Article 2 of the 1971 Constitution to advocate the application of Islamic law, arguing 
that this did not threaten national unity or security. 251  
 
Nevertheless, on many occasions, candidates have not only advocated the application of 
Islamic law but also mobilised voters along sectarian lines. In the 2005 parliamentary 
elections, the MB in some electoral districts appealed to Muslim voters not to vote for 
Christians or secularists, questioning their loyalty to Islam. These kinds of campaigning 
could be considered incitement to religious discrimination. Ironically in other electoral 
districts the MB was keen to convince Christian voters that it was bound by the Islamic 
teachings to protect ahl al-dhimma (Tadros 2012a:88-89).  
 
To be sure, it is not only Islamists who utilise religious slogans in electoral campaigns. Under 
Mubarak, there were many incidents of candidates affiliated with the former ruling party who 
used religion in their campaigns (Tadros 2012a:88-89). This pattern has expanded after 
Mubarak. According to Tadros (2013a:219): 
 
 
Elections [following the 2011 Revolution] represented a manifestation of 
the extent of communalisation and were a contributing factor to its 
exacerbation and intensification by framing messages around religion rather 
than party agendas; by circulating rumours around candidates’ religious 
affiliations and whether they were in God’s camp or not; and by using 
religious symbols, spaces, and discourses to mobilise support. 
 
The SCAF amended the 1956 Law Regulating the Practice of Political Rights, adding Article 
50bis which prohibited and criminalised the use of religious slogans in electoral campaigns or 
the use of any other slogans that incited to discrimination based on sex or origin.252 But this 
article has not been implemented. For example, in the campaigns ahead of the referendum on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 Court of Administrative Justice, Case No.38/55, 17 October 2000.   
252Any persons violates Article 50bis can be sentenced to up to three months in prison and fined between 5000 to 10000 LE, 
see Law 124/2011 Amending Law 73/1956 Regulating the Practice of Political Rights, Official Gazette no.40bis of 8 
October 2011.  
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the 2011 constitutional amendments, Salafists and the MB ‘[instrumentalised religion] to the 
maximum to show that good Muslims should vote yes and that only infidels and unbelievers 
would vote no’ (Tadros 2013a:207). At that time, power struggle was intense between 
Islamists and non-Islamists on the future of Egypt’s transition. Religious slogans allowed 
Islamists to discredit their competitors. Similar incidents of mobilising voters along sectarian 
and religious lines were witnessed during the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections (Tadros 
2013:220-222; CIHRS 2012a:87).     
 
Under Morsi, the proposed new electoral law did not prohibit the use of religious slogans in 
elections but prohibited any electoral campaigns that discriminate between citizens based on 
religion, sex or origin. The early draft of the law prohibited the use of religious slogans in 
electoral campaigns but was amended upon the request of Islamist parliamentarians.   
Surprisingly, the SCC disappointed Islamists and held in May 2013 that the use of religious 
slogans in electoral campaigns is not constitutional.253 The SCC argued that the preamble of 
the 2012 Constitution and certain of its articles highlighted the values of equal citizenship, 
national unity and respect for human rights. It explained that the use of religious slogans in 
electoral campaigns by itself and regardless of its substance discriminates against citizens 
based on their religious affiliation. It said that ‘these slogans prompt each religious 
community to show that its religion is superior over other religions’. This according to the 
Court ‘jeopardies the doctrine of equal citizenship and furthers divisiveness in the society’. It 
also added that ‘the use of religious slogans in electoral campaigns would obstruct the ability 
of voters to assess candidates based on their electoral platforms and violate the principle of 
equal opportunities between candidates’.254  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 Supreme Constitutional Court, Case 2/35,25 May 2013, Official Gazette no.21bis of 26 May 2013, pp.10-11.   
254 ibid.   
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The prohibition of incitement to discrimination or violence as stipulated in Article 21 of the 
ICCPR is an efficient framework to make sure that religion is not instrumentalised during 
elections. The absolute prohibition of religious slogans in electoral campaigns without 
providing a clear definition of these slogans can possibly lead to unjustifiable restrictions on 
freedom of expression (Temperman 2010:322). For instance, if electoral campaigns call for 
the establishment of the application of discriminatory religious laws or defend the position 
that certain religious law should be superior in the state, one can argue that these slogans are 
not consistent with Article 21 of the ICCPR and the doctrine of equality and non-
discrimination. But this would not be the case if these slogans inspire neutral religious values 
and ethics without having negative implications for human rights. The task of the SCC in the 
Egyptian constitutional and political context was very difficult in this case. The SCC was not 
able to declare the reference to the application of Islamic law discriminatory as an argument 
like this would not be possible under Article 2 of the constitution. Therefore, the SCC evaded 
any discussion of Islamic law and limited its arguments to the use of religious slogans. This 
approach allowed the SCC to effectuate the constitutional provisions on equality, citizenship 
and non-discrimination but without making a statement on whether the call for the 
application of Islamic law is discriminatory or not.  
 
President Morsi, the MB and their Islamist allies were unhappy with this reasoning. The SCC 
deprived them of one of their strongest weapon in elections. However, they had no option but 
to concede to this judgment to pass the electoral law. The Shura (consultative) Council 
amended the draft law and prohibited the use of religious slogans in electoral campaigns 
(Sami and Lashin 2013). However, it is yet to be seen how this legal prohibition can be 
observed in practice in future elections in Egypt and how lower courts would interact with 
this judgment which is binding on Egyptian courts.    
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1.6 Inter-faith Marriage 
Marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men is prohibited under Egyptian law. 
There is no codified rule but this rule which has been supported by most pre-modern Muslim 
jurists is enacted in Egypt through Article 280 of the Decree on the Organisation of the 
Shari‘a Courts. This article states that judges apply the prevalent opinion of the Hanafi school 
of Islamic law.255 Article 6 of Law 462/1955 on the Abolition of the Shari‘a and Milli Courts 
states that Article 280 is applicable to personal status cases.256 On many occasions, the Court 
of Cassation has confirmed that marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men is 
null and void.257 Human rights defenders or politicians who call for a legal change in this area 
come under fierce attacks from Islamists and al-Azhar. For instance, Amr Hamzawy, a 
prominent liberal figure and former parliamentarian, declared in 2011 that civil marriage 
could be a solution to provide Egyptians with the freedom to choose their spouses regardless 
of their religious affiliation. A smear campaign targeted Hamzawy after this statement, 
accusing him of being a Jew and of pursuing a foreign agenda. To save his political career, 
Hamzawy had to apologise for his statement (Madkur 2011).             
 
There is agreement among MB scholars that inter-faith marriage between Muslim women 
and non-Muslim men is prohibited under Islamic law while Muslim men are permitted to 
marry Christian or Jewish women (al-Khatib 1980a; al-Qaradawi 1994:184; al-Sirjani 
2011:176). This opinion is based on certain verses of the Qur’an (2:221; 60:10) and the 
consensus of pre-modern Muslim jurists. Explaining this opinion, they argue that Muslims 
acknowledge Christianity and Judaism so that they will respect the religious freedom of their 
female partners, while on the contrary, a non-Muslim male will not respect the religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 Decree No.78/1931 on the Organisation of Shari‘a Courts, al-Waqa’i‘ al-Masriyya no.53 of 20 May 1931. 
256 Law No.462/1955 Abolishing Shari‘a and Milli Courts, Official Gazette no.73bis of 24 September 1955  
257 See Court of Cassation, Cases No. 28/33, 9 January 1966; No. 16/35, 8 March 1967; No. 9/44, 24 December 1975; No. 
61/56, 29 March 1988; Nos. 475, 478, 481, Year 65, 5 August 1996. 
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beliefs of his Muslim female partner. On this point, al-Qaradawi (1994:185) has wondered 
‘how can Islam take chances on the future of its daughters by giving them into the hands of 
people who neither honour their religion nor are concerned to protect their rights?’  
 
However, the assumption that non-Muslims will necessarily disrespect the religious beliefs of 
their Muslim partners is weak because the contrary can happen as well. The Qur’an (5:72) 
condemns certain beliefs of Christians and even declares those who embrace these beliefs to 
be unbelievers, so it is also possible that Muslim males influenced by the Qur’an pressure 
their non-Muslim partners to convert to Islam. Al-Sirjani (2011:177) says that the Qur’an 
(6:108) prohibits Muslims from insulting the religious convictions of non-Muslims but in 
practice, the state cannot ensure that Muslim husbands do not disrespect the religious beliefs 
of their non-Muslim wives in their daily life or pressure them to convert to Islam, particularly 
in a country like Egypt where family law is discriminatory against women.258 The weak 
position of women’s marital status under Islamic law is illustrated by MB scholars when they 
argue that women are under the guardianship (qiwama) of men so that their partners can 
influence their religious convictions (al-Sirjani 2011:177; al-Qaradawi 1994:185). The 
problem in this argument is that it takes the assumption of inequality between men and 
women in Islam for granted without making juristic efforts to change it. This view assumes 
that Muslim women are weak and not able by definition to defend their religious beliefs.  
 
Most scholars under review in this chapter permit the marriage of Muslim men to women of 
the People of the Book (ahl al-Kitab) based on the Qur’anic teachings. Abd al-Mit‘al al-Jabri 
(1983) opposed this view, arguing that the People of the Book of our age are unbelievers 
since their beliefs about the nature of the Prophet Isa (Jesus in the New Testament) are 
corrupted. This theory could lead to far-reaching discrimination against Christians and Jews 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 The rights of women are discussed in Chapter eight.  
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in the Islamic state. Al-Jabri also repeated the view of al-Mawdudi and Sayd Qutb (al-Jabri 
1983:15-22) that the marriage between Muslim men and non-Muslim women brings harmful 
consequences to Islam and Muslim families. Al-Jabri (1983:17-18) believes that this 
marriage is also not allowed for Muslim living in non-Muslim societies, citing the opinion of 
al-Qaradawi that Muslim men in non-Muslim societies should marry Muslim women for the 
benefit of Muslim communities in these societies.  
 
In cases of inter-faith marriage, Muslim personal status law is applicable and this brings 
certain difficulties for non-Muslim women. They do not receive a reserved portion of 
inheritance from their dead husbands because interfaith inheritance is forbidden under 
Egypt’s law.259 Their children are automatically registered as Muslims like their fathers 
(Scott 2010:87) and they can lose the custody of their children if they are divorced from their 
Muslim partners.260 In 2008, Zainab Radwan, a famous scholar in Islamic law and a 
parliamentarian, presented a draft law to permit non-Muslims women to inherit from their 
Muslim husbands, arguing that there is no consensus among Muslim jurists that Christian or 
Jewish women do not inherit from their Muslim husbands. But the MB lobbied against the 
proposal, and it was dismissed by the parliament (Abu Zayd 2008). Some leading figures at 
al-Azhar supported the proposal, but among others, the Islamic Research Academy did not 
accept it (Tadros 2012a:113).    
 
Cases of inter-faith marriage and news about the conversion of non-Muslim women in order 
to marry Muslim men have been a source of sectarian tensions. Because of the discriminatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Article 9 of Law No. 71/1946 allows Muslims to bequeath their properties to non-Muslims.  
260See the case of Kamilia Lotfy whose custody to her sons Andrew and Mario were handed to her ex-Muslim husband. In 
this case her husband was Christian when he married her but then he converted to Islam. Consequently, the two children 
Andrew and Mario were registered as Muslims despite having spent their childhood as Christians. Kamilia bravely struggled 
for five years at Egyptian courts to retain custody of her sons and finally the Court of Cassation on 15 June 2009 accepted 
that she maintain the custody of her sons but on the condition that she brings them up as Muslims (EIPR 2009).        
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nature of Egyptian law in this area, non-Muslims feel in these cases that they are inferior to 
Muslim citizens. This might explain why sectarian tensions easily emerge when these cases 
come to the surface. In 2004, Wafa Qustuntin, the wife of a Christian priest, left her martial 
home and disappeared. Thousands of Christians protested, alleging that Wafa had been 
abducted by a Muslim man and forcefully converted to Islam. Because of the profile of her 
husband and to avoid sectarian violence, State Security Services ordered the arrest of Wafa 
and allowed the Coptic Orthodox Church to communicate with her. Then she expressed her 
willingness to remain Christian (Mahmood 2012b:55). In July 2010, the wife of another 
Coptic priest, Kamilia Shehata, ran away from her family and allegedly converted to Islam. 
The police found Kamilia and handed her back to the Coptic Orthodox Church. She then 
appeared in the media and declared that she is Christian, but Islamists accused the church of 
pressuring Kamilia to convert back to Christianity (Tadros 2013a:104).  
 
The performance of the church, the state and Islamists in these cases has furthered sectarian 
tension. The church was not transparent on the destiny of Wafa and Kamilia and whether 
they converted to Islam or not. The behaviour of the church seems to be prompted by the 
general feeling of Christians that their rights are not secured in Egypt and that they are 
exposed to discrimination. The state was keen to maintain public order and to maintain its 
friendly relationship with the Coptic Orthodox Church. Islamists adhere to discriminatory 
policies against non-Muslims and in these cases they also expressed their dismay at the 
political power of the Church (Hassan 2011). This feeling has influenced Islamists’ attitudes 
towards Christians and pushed them to believe that Christians have advantaged status in the 
state and that they attack the identity of the majority population.   
 
Similar incidents have occurred in post-Mubarak Egypt. In May 2011 in Imbaba 
neighbourhood in Giza, a group of Salafists accused Mar Mina Church of kidnapping Abir 
  
 217 
Tal’at, a Christian woman who had married a Muslim man and converted to Islam. Salafists 
insisted on inspecting the Church to search for the woman. Bloody clashes erupted between 
Muslims and Christians in Imbaba for two days that led to the death of 15 persons, the injury 
of around 232 others and the burning of two Coptic churches. Security forces failed to protect 
citizens and the churches (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights 2011). Abir appeared in the 
media after the clashes and stated that she had voluntarily converted to Islam and that she had 
been detained at the Mar Mina Church (Ahram on Line 2011). Hamdi Hassan (2011), a 
leader of the MB stated in a TV interview after the incident that ‘Churches are only places for 
worship and not for detention’. He also reminded his audience of previous similar cases of 
Wafa and Kamilia Shehata.    
 
In this case, the Church violated the law by detaining a Christian citizen to pressure her to 
return to Christianity, and Muslims on the other hand gave themselves the right to attack the 
Church, and insisted on its inspection. Both infringed the rule of law, but the lack of equality 
and religious freedom escalated the tension between non-Muslims and Muslims in this 
incident. To contain the social tensions resulting from conversion and interfaith marriage, the 
political advisor of the Prime Minister suggested after the incident of Imbaba the 
establishment of an institution composed of Muslim and Christian members to regulate and 
register cases of conversion (al-Fatah 2011). Previously, non-Muslims could not convert to 
Islam before attending guidance sessions (jalasat nusuh wa irshad) at churches but the 
Minister of Interior had suspended this mechanism since 2004 (Tadros 2013a:95).261  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261This mechanism is not mentioned in the law but this was the common tradition under Mubarak to appease the Coptic 
Orthodox Church and to avoid sectarian tensions caused by the conversion of any Christian to Islam. A prominent Christian 
lawyer filed a case in March 2008 before the Court of Administrative Justice to challenge the decision of the Minister of 
Interior but the Court held the case inadmissible because the lawyer failed to prove that the minister of interior stopped the 
advice sessions. See Court of Administrative Justice, Case No.3814/60, 4 March 2008.       
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The proposal to establish an institution to regulate conversion cases as well as the 
organisation of guidance sessions is problematic under international human rights because 
religious freedom is a personal choice, and individuals should not be compelled to 
communicate with their religious institutions or any other institutions before they convert 
from their religions and the state has an obligation to protect this choice. However, 
conversion is not the only problem in tensions such as the Imbaba case because the law 
allows Muslim men to marry Christian women but prohibits Christian men from marrying 
Muslim women. Any solution for these tensions from a human rights perspective should 
ensure that all citizens are equal before the law and that the engagement in a marital 
relationship is an individual choice that should not be restricted based on the religious 
affiliation of citizens. The Christian writer Sameh Fawzi (2010:2) has held that these 
incidents are nothing but the outward manifestation of latent sectarian tensions. A political 
discourse that is based on denying the root causes of these tensions does not help in treating 
this intractable problem. 
   
2. Unrecognised Religious Minorities 
As noted, Christians and Jews are not the only religious minorities that claim their rights in 
Egypt. There are other small religious communities who are not recognised by Egyptian law 
and consequently face multiple hardships in their private and public lives, particularly if they 
seek to be recognised as an independent religion like the Baha’is. Other communities such as 
the Shi’a and the Ahmadis define themselves as Muslims but are treated as having deviated 
from the dominant Sunni Islam. Over the last decade and with the support of human rights 
NGOs, through advocacy and litigation, the rights claims of unrecognised religious 
communities have been brought to the surface (Hassan 2009:24). 
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In pre-modern Islamic law and throughout the historical traditions of Muslims, one finds 
precedents that non-Muslims other than Christians and Jews who were living on Muslim 
lands were treated as part of ahl al-dhimma and consequently preserved certain rights 
(Baderin 2003:166-167; Friedmann 2003:84). However, this has not been the situation in 
contemporary Egypt with regards to religious communities who have recently appeared in 
society, or whose beliefs are considered heretical in Islam. For example, the Baha’i religion, 
also known as Babism, originated in Iran in the 19th century and ‘teaches veneration for the 
founder of all the major world religions’; its founders came from an Islamic background and 
when it originated many Muslims converted to Babism (Mayer 2012:144). Therefore, in the 
mind of many Muslims, this religion is a heretical Islamic sect which aims to undermine 
‘authentic’ Islamic teachings. The Baha’is however do not consider themselves Muslims and 
define their religion as an independent one.  By contrast, the Ahmadis consider themselves 
Muslims but their opponents treat them as a heretical sect. Mirza Ghulam Ahmed founded 
Ahmadiyya in Qadian, India by the end of the 19th century. His followers consider him the 
promised Messiah who supplements the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (Khan 
2003:218). The Baha’is have long been portrayed in Egypt as agents of Western imperialism 
and Zionism.262 One reason for that is that the centre of the world community of Baha’i is 
located in Haifa, Israel. This political concern explains the tough approach taken by former 
President Nasser when he dissolved the Baha’i communities in 1960 with a law that 
prohibited their activities in Egypt and stipulated a punishment of up to six months in prison 
for violating its provisions.263 
 
Since its establishment and until today, the MB has declared the Baha’i and Ahmadiyya to be 
destructive beliefs (‘aqa’id hadama). Under the leadership of Hassan al-Banna, it advocated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 See Supreme Court, Case No.7/2, 1 March 1975 and Court of Administrative Justice, Case No.18354/58, 29 January 
2008.    
263 Law No.263/1960 Dissolving the Baha’i Communities. 
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against the activities of the Baha’is and Ahmadis in the Muslim world (Amin 2003:101-104; 
2006:298-305). Al-Khatib (1979a:62) published a fatwa in al-Da‘wa magazine, saying that 
the Baha’i is a corrupted sect supported financially and politically by the enemies of Islam. 
He urged Muslim governments to confront its spread in the Muslim world. In opposition and 
in power, the MB has taken hardline positions towards unrecognised religions. The group’s 
Reform Initiative of 2004 stated that ‘religious freedom is guaranteed for the recognised 
monotheistic religions’ (MB 2004:324). A similar restriction can be found in the FJP’s 
(2011a:154) platform which talks about the state’s duty to protect only the monotheistic 
religions. The MB leaders maintain that non-Muslim citizens who are not People of the Book 
have the right to live in Egypt, but are not allowed to publicly express their religious beliefs 
or to build their own places of worship (Scott 2010:159; Tadros 2012a:111). 
 
Many of the Egyptian Baha’is are of Muslim origin and this underpins the view that 
considers them converts from Islam. For instance, the Court of Administrative Justice in 1952 
held that the marriage of Baha’is is null and void on the grounds that conversion from Islam 
invalidates marriage.264 In 1975, the Supreme Court confirmed that the law which prohibits 
the Baha’i communities is compatible with the 1971 Constitution, arguing that religious 
freedom is not absolute and it can be subjected to certain limitations for the preservation of 
public order. It also stated that Egypt recognises only the three Abrahamic religions. Egyptian 
courts cite this judgment until now. 265  In 1977, the State Council declared that the 
government cannot register the marriage contracts of the Baha’is because this religious 
community is not recognised in Egypt.266  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 Court of Administrative Justice, Case No.195/4,26 May 1952 
265 Court of Administrative Justice, Case No.18354/58, 29 January 2008.    
266 State Council, A Statement on the Law No.544, 13 July 1977.  
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In an exceptional precedent, the Court of Administrative Justice held in 1983 that Egyptian 
Baha’is have the right to record their religious affiliation in their identity cards. The Court 
argued that even though the state does not recognise the Baha’i religion, its members should 
be able to record their true religious affiliation. It also held that under Islamic shari‘a, non-
Muslims apart from the People of the Book can live in the Islamic state even if they are not 
entitled to the same rights like Christians or Jews.267 This judgment was however overruled 
by other courts and the government continued its discrimination against the Baha’is (Pink 
2005:149-150). In 1985, a group of Egyptian Baha’is were arrested and referred to criminal 
trial under the 1960 Law on charges of being affiliated to the Baha’i religion. The MB’s 
magazine al-I‘tisam (1985:3; 1986:22-25; 1987b:29; 1987a:30-32) supported the trial of the 
arrested persons and started a campaign against the Baha’is and their religious activities in 
Egypt.  
 
The Egyptian Baha’is’ struggle to record their religious affiliation in their identity cards was 
renewed in 2000 when Egypt adopted a new digital identity card so that all Egyptian were 
required to replace their paper identity cards with the new computerised ones. The Ministry 
of Interior refused to register the religious affiliation of the Baha’is (HRW and EIPR 2007). 
A group of Egyptian Baha’is in cooperation with human rights NGOs filed petitions before 
Egyptian courts. In April 2006, the Court of Administrative Justice followed the 1983 
precedent and ordered the ministry of interior to record the Baha’i religion in the official 
identity cards of the Egyptian Baha’is.268 This judgment met strong opposition from the 
government and the MB. In May 2006, the People’s Assembly discussed this judgement and 
the Egyptian Baha’is found themselves under fierce attack from parliamentarians. Members 
of the National Democratic Party and the MB led the discussion in this session. Leading 
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member of the MB, Sobhi Saleh, urged the government to challenge this judgement before 
the Supreme Administrative Court and to strictly criminalise the Baha’i religion in Egypt. 
Akram Al-Sha‘ir, another leader of the MB, stated in Parliament that ‘the Baha’is are non-
believers and they should not be recognised in Egypt which is ruled by Islamic shari‘a’; he 
added that ‘Zionists support the Baha’is’ (Shalabi 2006a). Maher ‘Aql, a parliamentarian 
affiliated with the MB, declared the Baha’is apostates and called for punishing them by death 
(Shalabi 2006a).269 In a public statement, the Arab Network for Human Rights Information 
(2006) condemned this parliamentary session and blamed the government and the MB for 
committing incitement to discrimination and violence against the Egyptian Baha’is.               
 
On 16 December 2006, the Supreme Administrative Court overruled the 2006 judgement.270 
Consequently, the Baha’is followed a new legal strategy by limiting their demand to the 
issuing identity cards without recording any religion and they succeeded in getting a new 
judicial precedent that partially addressed their rights. In January 2008, the Court of 
Administrative Justice ordered the Ministry of Interior to put a dash in the space of the 
religious affiliation in the identity cards of the Egyptian Baha’is. 271  The Supreme 
Administrative Court confirmed this judgement on 16 March 2009.272 However, this new 
precedent does not end other forms of discrimination against the Baha’is and it has not 
recognised their presence in Egypt. The rise of human rights activism over the last decade 
and the emergence of new private media have empowered the Baha’is and encouraged them 
to go public with their demands. This development however has annoyed others forces in 
Egypt including the MB. Writing for the official web site of the MB, Sayd Nizili (2008), a 
leader of the group, condemned human rights defenders who support the Baha’is, stating that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Official Records of the People’s Assembly Session Held on 3 May 2006, Report No.69, 14 June 2006. 
270 Supreme Administrative Court, Case No.16834/52, 16 December 2006.  
271 Court of Administrative Justice, Case No.18354/58, 29 January 2008. 
272 Supreme Administrative Court, Case No.10831/54, 16 March 2009.  
  
 223 
the Baha’is embrace heretical views that undermine Islam and shari‘a. Moreover, in a 
parliamentary meeting held in April 2009 by the Committee of the Defence and National 
Security and the Committee of Religious Affairs, some members of the ruling National 
Democratic Party and the MB urged the government to pass a law criminalising affiliation 
with the Baha’i religion and called for the trial of TV presenters hosting leaders of the Baha’i 
community in Egypt on their programmes. They also accused the Baha’is of being 
subordinated to Israel, Jews and Zionism, and distorting Islamic beliefs (Salih 2009).   
 
In the post-Mubarak era, the discrimination against the Baha’is persisted. According to the 
2012 Constitution, the exercise of religious freedom was only guaranteed for monotheistic 
religions. Article 43 said that ‘freedom of belief is an inviolable right. The State shall 
guarantee the freedom to practice religious rites and to establish places of worship for the 
divine religions, as regulated by law’.273 Teaching religion is compulsory for Muslims and 
Christians students in Egyptian primary and secondary schools, and in January 2013, the 
Minister of Education stated that Baha’i students should attend either Islamic or Christian 
religious courses (Allam 2013).   
 
In an attempt to confront the dissemination of the Shi‘a doctrine in Egypt, the 2012 
Constitution stated that Egypt recognises only the sources of Sunni Islam.274 The MB and its 
scholars refuse certain beliefs adopted by the Shi‘a and consider them innovation (bid‘a), and 
they also rejected the criticism posed by the Shi‘a of the companions and the prophet’s wives. 
They resist the spread of the Shi‘a doctrine in Egypt, which for them should be a Sunni state 
(Ghuzlan 2009; Amin 2010; Mahmoud 2013). However, certain political factors have 
influenced the MB’s policies towards the Shi‘a. Since the Iranian Islamic revolution and until 
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the conflict in Syria in 2012, the MB found that the alignment with Iran and the Lebanese 
Shi`ite group Hizb Allah is necessary to confront Israel and Western powers in the MENA. 
Therefore, the MB was keen to avoid the engagement in a doctrinal debate with the Shi‘a 
(MB 2006; Altman 2009). This position has changed since post-Arab uprisings because of 
the support of the Iranian government for the Allawite275 regime in Syria in its fight against 
the Sunni militant opposition. This conflict has escalated the rift between Sunni and Shi‘a 
Muslims in the Arab region (Abdo 2013).  
 
Egyptian Islamists have given the conflict in Syria a strongly sectarian flavour, portraying it 
as a holy war between Sunni Muslims and the heretic Shi‘a (Neriah 2012). Consequently, the 
incitement against the Shi‘a has been routinely found in Egypt over the past four years. 
Under the MB, the state was lenient on incitement to violence and discrimination against the 
Shi‘a. For instance, Safwat Hegazi (2010) a famous religious preacher and a close ally to the 
MB, incited the killing of Yassir al-Habib, a Shi‘a clerk who lives in the UK, accusing him of 
insulting the family of the Prophet, yet he was appointed by the Islamist-dominated 
parliament as a member of the National Council for Human Rights.276  
 
In a public conference held on 16 June 2013 in support of the Syrian revolution and attended 
by President Morsi, Salafist leaders made inflammatory statements against the Shi‘a, calling 
them ‘unclean and heretics’. They urged Morsi to fight the dissemination of the Shi‘a 
doctrine in Egypt. Morsi did not condemn these statements. On 23 June 2013, a few days 
after the conference, an angry mob killed four Shi‘a men in the village of Abu Muslim, south 
of Cairo. Amongst those killed was Sheikh Hassan Shehata, a famous Egyptian Shi‘a 
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preacher. The killers identified their victims as apostates and enemies of Sunni Islam 
(Amnesty International 2013; EIPR 2013b; HRW 2013a).277 The MB condemned the killing 
and denied its involvement in the incitement campaign against the Shi‘a; however, public 
statements made by its leaders on the killing implicitly condemned the beliefs of the victims. 
For instance, the mouthpiece of the MB said that ‘the victims were holding ideas that are 
alien to our society’ (Surur 2013a). Another leader of the FJP stated that the victims might 
have deserved to be punished but, according to him, the state is responsible for holding them 
to account, not non-state actors (Surur 2013b). This case clearly shows that systematic 
discrimination against certain religious minorities and the state’s official sponsorship of 
specific religious doctrines could easily aggravate intolerance and sectarian polarisation in 
society.  
3. Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the rights of religious minorities in the thought and practice of the 
MB, and has shown that the MB has failed to expand its understanding of the rights of 
religious minorities. Locating this in the larger context in Egypt, I have shown that many 
forms of discrimination against religious minorities have long been rooted in its law. 
However, the MB’s contribution to the debate on the rights of religious minorities in Egypt 
has furthered this discrimination and legitimised it in Islamic terms. The fundamental 
principle that governs the rights and duties of non-Muslims in the Islamic state is their 
submission to the rule of Islam and shari‘a, and this principle legitimises all forms of 
discrimination against non-Muslims. This meaning of citizenship has been difficult to 
reconcile with the principles of equality, non-discrimination and religious freedom. Non-
Muslims in the proposed Islamic state are exposed to certain forms of discrimination that 
obstruct their full engagement in this state as equal citizens. Those religious minorities who 	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are entitled to certain rights are the followers of the Abrahamic religions, but other 
unrecognised religious communities are subjected to flagrant forms of discrimination. Yet as 
I have demonstrated, recognised religious communities are not fully equal to Muslim 
citizens. 
 
The legal autonomy of non-Muslims in family law has meanwhile been portrayed as a sign of 
tolerance with non-Muslims, where in practice, the application of sectarian religious family 
laws in Egypt has deprived the followers of religious communities of the right to equality and 
non-discrimination. Finally, the prevalent view in the MB is that paying jizya is not relevant 
now, but the reasoning used to reach this opinion leaves the possibility of its reinstitution if 
political circumstances change in the Islamic state. And if non-Muslims challenge the Islamic 
background of the state, they risk losing the state’s protection completely.   
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Chapter Seven: Apostasy and its Legal Implications   
 
 
In traditional Islamic law, a Muslim can be declared an apostate after the commission of 
certain deeds or the utterance of words of unbelief. For instance, the perpetration of 
blasphemy and heresy can amount to apostasy (Saeed and Saeed 2004:36-40). Under this 
category, apostasy can be established even though the accused person denies his/her 
conversion from Islam. As noted by Johansen (2003:688) ‘apostasy thus becomes a 
depersonalised objective fact without any relation to the intentions of the individuals 
concerned’. I have addressed this type of apostasy in my discussion of blasphemy and heresy 
in chapter five and I have argued that these concepts influence the MB’s thought and practice 
in the area of freedom of expression. Another ground for the establishment of apostasy is that 
a Muslim intentionally converts from Islam to any other religion or to non-religious beliefs. 
The question here is ‘the speaker’s explicit self-perception of his[/her] religious identity’ 
(Johansen 2003:691). This subjective type of apostasy is the focus of this chapter.    
 
The right to change one’s religion has long been a contested issue in Egypt and many other 
Muslim majority states (Stahnke and Blitt 2005). There have been dozens of cases of 
conversion from Islam examined at Egyptian courts over the last decade where converts 
challenge the state’s refusal to officially recognise their conversion (El Fegiery 2013). In 
Egypt, citizens’ religious affiliations are recorded in the official documents of identification. 
In addition to the wish to be identified according to their true beliefs, the legal effort made by 
converts to gain official recognition from the state is necessary for their normal social life as 
citizens. Religious affiliation determines certain rights and duties for citizens in many areas 
of social life such as marriage and education. Litigation by human rights lawyers over the 
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past five years has achieved little success in expanding the scope of the right to religious 
freedom. Many legal barriers to conversion from Islam remain in place in Egypt and there 
seems little prospect that they will be overcome in the near future. This chapter examines the 
intellectual and political roles of the MB and its scholars in this debate.        
 
1. The Debate on the Right to Change One’s Religion  
Most traditional Muslim jurists have held that unrepentant apostates are to be executed 
(Friedman 2003:130). In earlier eras Shafi‘i and Zahiri jurists treated the punishment for 
apostasy as a fixed punishment (hadd) but other jurists in the Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali 
schools considered it a discretionary (ta‘zir) punishment (Friedman 2003:130-135). Among 
the early jurists, Ibrahim al-Nakha‘i and Sufyan al-Thawri were of the view that apostates 
should not be executed but invited back to Islam (Baderin 2003:123). Since the beginning of 
the 20th century, Muslim scholars have drawn on these differences among traditional jurists to 
revisit Islamic law on apostasy. The prevalent trend among those scholars is to define 
apostasy in association with the commission of other crimes against the state. However, as I 
explain in this chapter, many of them, including the MB scholars, do not define these crimes 
in a clear and precise manner, leaving the door open for restricting the ability of Muslims to 
convert from Islam or imposing penalties other than the death penalty for conversion. What 
has been ignored in this new jurisprudence on apostasy is that apostates can also be exposed 
to serious civil consequences. An apostate is not permitted to marry a Muslim, and if married, 
his or her marriage will be deemed void. Apostates are not allowed to claim custody of their 
children, nor retain their right to inherit, neither are they allowed to maintain the ownership 
of their properties (Hashemi 2008:38).  
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For many Muslim states, the substance of freedom of religion and belief has been a 
contentious issue since the beginning of the codification of international human rights 
instruments. As noted by Baderin (2008:625) ‘while the principle of religious freedom is 
theoretically recognised by Muslim states, the scope of its practical application is narrower 
than that of IHRL’. During the drafting of the UDHR, Saudi Arabia and Egypt opposed the 
reference in Article 18 to the right of individuals to change their religion as a component of 
freedom of religion and belief (Waltz 2004:815-816) but eventually the right of an individual 
to change his/her religion or belief was included in Article 18 of the UDHR. The debate on 
this issue was renewed during the drafting of the ICCPR with the result that Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, Pakistan and Morocco succeeded in having the explicit reference to the right to 
change one’s religion omitted from Article 18 of the ICCPR (Waltz 2004:818). However, 
international and regional human rights organs and the majority of UN member states agree 
that the right of individuals to change their religion is a fundamental element of freedom of 
religion and belief.278 In its General Comment No.22, the HRC has maintained that: 
 
 
The freedom to ‘have or to adopt’ a religion or belief necessarily entails the 
freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one's 
current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as 
the right to retain one's religion or belief.279  
 
The active presence of Christian missionaries in Egypt in the colonial era left negative 
perceptions of proselytism and conversion among Islamist and nationalist forces. These 
missionaries have become considered a sign of political exploitation and cultural imperialism 
(Sharkey 2010; Mahmood 2012a:433). ‘Though Christian missionaries in countries like 
Egypt converted relatively few Muslims to Christianity over the course of more than a 	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century, memories of their efforts loom large for many Muslims today’ (Sharkey 2010:57). 
Historically, one of the original functions of the MB was to confront the activities of 
Christian missionaries in Egypt and the Muslim world and resist conversion from Islam 
(Amin 2006: 273-294). In its first meeting in May 1933, the Consultative Council of the MB 
urged the King of Egypt to protect Egyptians from Christian missionaries and strictly monitor 
the activities of Christian schools and associations operating in Egypt (al-Shamakh 
2011b:74). In 1940, the MB led a campaign to criminalise proselytism, arguing that 
conversion from Islam was not consistent with the fact that Islam was the official religion of 
the state under the 1923 Constitution (Amin 2006:294).      
 
Apostasy is not a crime in Egypt’s law but it involves civil implications for apostates. The 
civil consequences of apostasy often arise in civil courts as a result of disputes between 
citizens over marriage, inheritance or children’s custody. Having studied the jurisprudence of 
Egyptian courts in this area, Berger (2002:584) concludes that apostasy from Islam has 
serious consequences for matters related to the application of the Personal Status Law, 
observing that ‘it renders the marriage of the apostate null and void, prevents him from 
entering into a new marriage even with a non-Muslim and excludes him from inheritance’. In 
1975, the Court of Cassation held that the traditional Islamic rules on the consequences and 
the prohibition of apostasy are core elements of Egypt’s public order. In 1996, the Court held 
that the legal consequences of apostasy were derived from Article 2 of the Constitution of 
1971.280 Berger (2003:723) has argued that Egypt’s case law in this area is consistent. He 
surveyed the case law of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, and 
concluded that ‘apostasy is perceived as a legal impediment to almost all personal status 
rights by virtue of the apostate having incurred civil death’. Hamad (1999) reached the same 
conclusion after analysing a set of cases examined before the State Council in which certain 	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legal principles on the legal consequences of apostasy were confirmed. These principles 
include the loss of an apostate’s right to marry and inherit. 
 
Amid the intense debate on the codification of shari‘a in the 1970s, there were efforts made 
by Islamists and al-Azhar to prescribe a punishment for apostasy in Egypt’s law (Skovgaard-
Petersen 1997:231-232). At that time, al-Azhar was supportive of the Islamisation of Egypt’s 
constitution and law. Article 71 of the Islamic Draft Constitution, proposed by the Islamic 
Research Academy of al-Azhar in 1978, stated that Islamic hudud, including the punishment 
of apostasy, should be applied. A committee from al-Azhar prepared a draft law on apostasy. 
Article 1 of this draft said that ‘any adult Muslims who intentionally leave Islam either by 
explicit utterance or deed or deny what is necessarily known of religion is offered 30 days to 
repent and then punished by death if he/she insists on apostasy’ (al-Fattah 1984:159). The 
MB sponsored this draft law and Islamist parliamentarians advocated this law in Parliament. 
Christians, however, felt threatened by this draft law. The Coptic Pope called on Egyptian 
Christians to fast, protesting the draft law (Hassan 2003:107). The draft law was eventually 
blocked in Parliament but the discussion of the codification of Islamic law continued.  
 
Writing for al-I‘tisam, the MB’s prominent scholar Jirisha (1979) blamed the government for 
not passing the law, saying that ‘conversion from Islam cannot be considered a liberty in an 
Islamic state like Egypt’. He maintained that this law is needed to confront Christian 
missionaries and to prevent people from manipulating religion for personal interests. He 
referred to Christians who become Muslims to dissolve their marriage then convert back to 
Christianity. Early MB literature restated the prevalent position of traditional Muslim jurists 
on apostasy, according to which apostasy is punishable by death (al-Hudaiby 1977b; Jirisha 
1979:198). Writing about the purpose of executing the apostates, Sabiq (1973c:457) and Qutb 
(2003b:158) held that the unity of the Muslim community and its spiritual integrity are 
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gravely threatened if apostates are left without punishment. In his fatwa published by al-
Da‘wa magazine, Al-Khatib (1980c) stated that ‘Islam does not compel any persons to 
become a Muslim but once a person joins Islam, he/she is not allowed to manipulate the 
religion. Apostasy is a crime of treason against God so apostates are either to repent or to be 
executed’. As a response to the political rise of Islamists and al-Azhar, former President 
Sadat sponsored the efforts to put Egypt’s law in line with Islamic law. The Parliament 
formed a committee to codify shari‘a. The committee published its report in 1980 and the 
death penalty for apostasy was included in the draft penal law (People’s Assembly 1982:112-
120). But during the 1980s, President Mubarak halted this codification project. Nevertheless, 
although efforts to introduce a strict punishment for apostasy have failed, apostasy and its 
consequences continue to be a contested issue in Egypt’s courts and in the public debate on 
human rights.  
 
In Egypt, Muslims are not allowed to convert to any other religion, or to give up religion 
completely. Neither the law nor the successive Egyptian constitutions explicitly prohibit 
conversion, but this is a rule developed by Egypt’s courts. Moreover, the right to change 
one’s religion is still not widely accepted among Egyptians. A recent study of the Pew 
Research Center (2013) on a sample of 2000 Egyptians shows that although more 75% of the 
sample supported religious freedom, 64% of the respondents held the view that apostasy from 
Islam should be punished. Nevertheless, Egyptian converts have been searching for legal 
recognition since 1980. The number of conversion cases at Egyptian courts has significantly 
increased over the last decade, and the issue has become also on the agenda of many 
Egyptian human rights NGOs. Through litigation and domestic and international advocacy, 
the right of Egyptians to freely choose their religion and beliefs come to the fore (HRW and 
EIPR 2007). The intense litigation on conversion has partially led to the recognition of some 
rights for converts, as I explain in the following sections. In 2006, a group of lawyers and 
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activists established Egyptians against Religious Discrimination, a social coalition supportive 
of freedom of religion and the rights of religious minorities. A handful of politicians and 
media figures defend the expansion of the scope of freedom of religion in Egypt and use 
arguments from Islamic law to support their positions (Youssef 2013; al-Shubaki 2007).  
 
The significant rise of the culture of protest and of claiming rights after the 2011 Revolution 
has encouraged many Egyptian atheists and converts to be outspoken in the media and 
Internet about their rights and their views on religion. They wanted to make their voices 
heard by the drafters of the post-revolutionary constitution. The rise of Islamists and their 
intense discourse on the Islamisation of Egypt has also led to the increasing emergence of 
young secularists and atheists who vocally advocate the removal of Islam and Islamic law 
from the constitution as the most viable way to preserve religious and political pluralism and 
international human rights (Diab 2013; Fouad 2012; al-Din 2013). The flow of ideas through 
the Internet has allowed many Egyptian atheists to network with their counterparts in other 
regions in the world (Whitaker 2014).    
 
Books by atheist thinkers like Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens and Stephan Hawking 
have become easily accessible in Arabic to young people in Egypt. For the first time in the 
history of Egyptian cinema, an Egyptian film entitled ‘The Atheist’ openly discusses the 
issue of atheism among young people (Gawad 2012), and also for the first time, a debate was 
convened in February 2013 (during the rule of the MB) at an Egyptian mosque in the heart of 
old Cairo between atheists of Muslim origin and Muslims (Deasy 2013). The fact that a 
debate like that was held in Egypt at that time does not mean that the MB was tolerating 
religious expression; rather, it is an indicator of the courage of those young people who took 
the risk of engaging in this debate. We have seen in the previous chapters that during this 
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period, blasphemy cases remarkably increased and the Islamist-led government undertook 
repressive measures against religious minorities and secularist opposition.       
 
Egypt’s politicians do not deny that there are atheists in Egypt. For instance, al-Wafd 
newspaper, the mouthpiece of the al-Wafd Party, published an investigative report in April 
2013 on ‘the Secret World of Atheists in Egypt’ which reported that the number of atheists 
had significantly increased in Egypt since 2011 (Salama 2013). Some Islamist and non-
Islamist parliamentarians urged the government to study the reason behind the spread of 
atheism in Egypt (Allah 2013). The superstar satirist and columnist Bassem Youssef (2013) 
has held that ‘the spread of [atheism] may carry unperceived benefits, such as modernizing 
and altering religious rhetoric in order to confront new challenges, instead of burying our 
heads in the sand’. We have seen before that Youssef himself was a victim of blasphemy law 
because of his critique of the ideology of the MB. These indicators suggest that the demand 
for religious freedom is developing from within Egyptian society. But tensions continue 
because Egyptian law has failed so far to satisfy the needs of this sector in the society. At the 
same time, the most powerful political forces and institutions like the MB, al-Azhar and the 
judiciary have been reluctant to hold that Islam does not block individuals to freely choose 
their religious conviction.      
 
A new trend in the literature on Islamic law on apostasy has emerged across the Muslim 
world, and among Muslim scholars who argue that apostasy simpliciter is not punishable in 
Islamic law, but the state can impose discretionary punishment for apostasy if it becomes 
rebellion against the state (An-Na‘im 1986; Baderin 2003:123-124; Kamali 1992; Nielsen 
2003:331). Most traditional jurists were ambivalent as to whether apostasy was punishable 
only for the change of religion, or for posing a threat to the integrity of the Muslim 
community and its belief systems. Al-Sarkhasi was of the opinion that the death penalty for 
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apostasy was a precautionary measure against potential hostilities waged by apostates against 
Muslims (Said and Said 2004:68). In modern times, this discussion has become central for 
many Muslim scholars who have maintained that apostasy is punishable only if it is 
associated with other actions committed against the state. But as noted by An-Na‘im 
(1986:215) these views have failed to ‘establish a positive right to change one’s religion or 
faith. They admit that adverse consequences may follow upon apostasy. This is inconsistent 
with freedom of religion’. Therefore, this new trend has not found a legal solution for the 
civil consequences of apostasy.          
 
Nevertheless, this new scholarship has had a limited impact on the position of the MB on 
apostasy. The new position developed by MB scholars over the last 20 years is that there is 
no punishment for apostasy if the act is kept as a private matter, but once apostasy is publicly 
manifested, the state can impose discretionary punishment to protect public order and the 
beliefs of Muslim society. This punishment can amount to the death penalty, if the public 
actions of apostates pose a high threat to society (al-Ghazzali 2005a:205-207; 2005b: 97-82; 
Al-Bahnasawi 2003:26; Al-Qaradawi 2005b; 2006c 64-65; 2007c:196; Al-Khatib 2010;).281 
President Morsi (2012c) expressed the same view in one of his electoral conferences when he 
stated that ‘the punishment for apostasy is limited to converts who threaten Muslim society 
by their public manifestation of their apostasy’.   
 
The problem with this view is that the potential actions by which converts can be declared a 
threat to a Muslim society is not clear and can be easily used arbitrarily to restrict the scope 
of religious freedom. The revision made to the idea that the punishment of apostasy is a fixed 
punishment in Islamic law, is the only progress achieved by this reasoning. The authors of 
this view held that their interpretation of the punishment of apostasy is similar to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 See also al-Mat‘ani (1993:91), Al-Shamakh (2008:113-114; 2011:117-118), Abu ‘Ajur (2012:276).  
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punishment of serious crimes committed against any state today, such as armed rebellion 
against the state or the commission of treason. But these are not the only grounds that allow 
the state to punish apostates according to the key ideologues of the MB, who believe that the 
public manifestation of apostasy in and of itself endangers Muslim society. Peaceful activities 
by converts can therefore expose them to punishment.  
 
Muslim jurists developed the law of apostasy in a time when religion had a central place in 
defining the community, in the pre-modern governance project. But the punishment for 
apostasy as a means by which to protect the Islamic political order in the modern nation state 
is problematic and irrelevant to the concept of equal citizenship in this state. The line 
between the religious and political functions of the punishment for apostasy is often blurred 
in the thought of the MB. As long as the overall goal of the Islamic state is the protection of 
its Islamic belief and identity, public manifestation of apostasy and the practice of 
proselytism is seen by MB scholars – and the judiciary – as dangerous to the fabric of this 
state, and public order. In this meaning, the law of apostasy protects the ideological and 
political project of the Islamic state. This understanding is not supported under IHRL where 
the public manifestation of religions and beliefs is a constitutive element of freedom of 
religion and belief, including the right of individuals to publicly encourage other people to 
adopt their religious beliefs. The new opinion of the MB has not presented a solution for this 
discordance; on the contrary, positions and actions taken by the group in opposition and 
power legitimated and exacerbated the legal suffering of converts.  
 
A handful of top figures at al-Azhar such as the former Grand Imams of al-Azhar, Sheikh 
Mahmoud Shaltut (2001:281), Sheikh Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi (Said and Said 2004:96) 
and Sheikh Ali Juma‘a (2007b), the former Grand Mufti, have challenged the death penalty 
for apostasy, but their intellectual efforts have not changed the fact that conversion is 
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prohibited in Egypt and that apostasy cannot be publicly manifested. In May 2006, the House 
of Islamic Legal Opinions (dar al-ifta’) said that any person who joins Islam by his/her own 
free will cannot deviate from the public order of society by publicly announcing his/her 
apostasy and requesting the change of his/her religious affiliation. This prohibition, according 
to this fatwa, is necessary to protect the rights of other citizens, and to avoid any temptation 
and confusion for the majority.282 Egyptian courts have repeatedly cited this fatwa to justify 
their rejection of petitions filed by Egyptian converts who request the state to record their 
new religious affiliation in their official documents.283  
 
In January, Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb, the Grand Imam of al-Azhar, released a document on 
the basic freedoms sponsored by Islamist and non-Islamist political parties. The position of 
this document on religious freedom is ambivalent. The document is only concerned with the 
protection of members of the Abrahamic religions, but not the right of individuals to choose 
or change their religious convictions. Moreover, the document recognises the right of 
individuals to ‘embrace any ideas ... without encroaching upon the right of society to the 
maintenance of divine religions … and without breaching the public order’ (al-Azhar 2012).  
 
The expansion of the substance of religious freedom to include the right to change one’s 
religion is much clearer in the writings of liberal Muslim reformers than in those of the MB 
or the scholars of al-Azhar. For example, al-‘Ashmawi (2004:162-165) held that ‘religious 
freedom is enshrined in international human rights treaties and considered an inalienable 
right to all human beings’. For him the right of individuals to freely choose their religious 
conviction is strongly manifested in the Qur’an. The prescription of a penalty for apostasy, 
according to al-‘Ashmawi, was influenced by the nature of the pre-modern Muslim 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 House of Islamic Legal Opinions, Opinion No.704/2006, 14 May 2006.  
283 See Court of Administrative Justice, Cases Nos. 35647/61, 29 January 2008 and 4475/58, 30 June 2009.  
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community where religion was a determinant factor in defining the membership in this 
community. Islamic reformation, according to intellectuals like al-‘Ashmawi, Jamal al-Banna 
and Abu Zayd, applies a contextual and historical understanding of Islamic sources, a project 
that subjects the rulings in the Qur’an and Sunna, including those rulings derived from 
authentic and certain texts, to reason and reflection.   
 
One would assume that Islamists whose grand ideal is to establish the Islamic state would be 
unlikely to accept their project being threatened by apostasy and proselytism. This explains 
why the main objective of the MB in the debate on apostasy has been to defend the system of 
beliefs of the Islamic state. But other Islamists like Rachid al-Ghannuchi (2012:72-77), the 
leader of the MB offshoot in Tunisia, have been able to take a different route to fellow 
Islamists in Egypt. Despite his struggle for the realisation of the Islamic state, he clearly 
admitted that no one including Muslims may be compelled to religion. In his view on 
apostasy, he states that acts of treason or armed rebellion are the only acts that can be 
punished, opening the door for any other peaceful manifestations of religious views by 
apostates. However, one should note that because al-Ghannuchi, like other Islamists, 
maintains a traditional methodological understanding of Islamic law, he has not been able to 
revisit the potential civil consequences faced by apostates on marriage and inheritance. What 
also limits the approach taken by al-Ghannuchi is what I have previously made in this thesis 
that the practice of freedom of religion and the rights of religious minorities is structurally 
constrained in the Shari‘a state propagated by Islamists. 
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2. The Debate on Proselytism 
The MB’s resistance to proselytism does not in reality aim to confront possible exploitation 
by foreign missionaries but is rather a position against conversion per se and any kind of 
proselytism among Muslims. In its literature, no distinction has been made between what can 
be considered legitimate or illegitimate forms of proselytism. This position was clear in the 
MB’s reaction to a document published in April 2005 on religious freedom by Sheikh Fawzi 
al-Zifzaf, the head of the Permanent Committee of al-Azhar for the Dialogue among the 
Monotheistic Religions and a delegation of American Christian priests, some of them of 
Egyptian origin. The document recognised the right of individuals to choose and practice 
their religious beliefs. It also stated that ‘the followers of different religions have the right to 
peacefully propagate their religious doctrines to other individuals’ (al-Khatib 2006a). The 
MB and other scholars at al-Azhar understood this document as a green light for Christians to 
dispatch missionaries and attempt to convert Muslims. The publication of this document 
turned into a scandal for al-Azhar (al-Din 2006). On 17 April 2006, the parliamentary bloc of 
the MB strongly condemned the document. The Committee on Religious Affairs at the 
People’s Assembly urged al-Azhar to withhold its support for the document. The Grand 
Imam of al-Azhar, Sheikh Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, denied any knowledge about this 
document but al-Zifzaf stated in the Egyptian media that he had signed the document at the 
request of Tantawi. Al-Zifzaf defended the document, arguing that ‘religious freedom and 
peaceful and non-coercive proselytism do not violate Islamic law and its tolerant message’ 
(al-Khatib 2006a; Shalabi 2006b; US Copts 2006).  
 
The MB and its scholars sponsor preaching activities in the non-Muslim world, including in 
Western societies, and hold it to be an act of aggression against Islam and Muslims if a 
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government in the non-Muslim world refuses to host Islamic preaching activities. In his 
seminal treatise ‘In the Shade of the Qur’an’, Qutb (2003a:416-417) held that:  
 
 
Islam advocates jihad to guarantee the right and freedom of expression and 
propagation of the faith . . . in order for individuals to make the choice of 
whether they believe in Islam or not. Nothing should stand between them 
and God’s message.   
 
In his volume on the jurisprudence of jihad in Islam, al-Qaradawi (2010c:64) has maintained 
that there is no need today to use jihad in the meaning of the use of force to preach Islam in 
non-Muslim territories, since freedom of religion and the protection of religious minorities 
are key norms in the international community, and allow Muslims to preach Islam peacefully. 
But despite this emphasis on religious freedom, the MB and its scholars, including al-
Qaradawi (2001a), deprive other religious communities of the same right to propagate their 
religious doctrine on Muslim territories including, as we have seen in the previous chapter, 
for non-Sunni Muslims.  
 
In an article published on Ikhwan Online, Muhammad ‘Umara (2008), a prominent Islamist 
thinker, has held that Muslims have reasons to refuse the reception of Christian missionaries 
in their societies but at the same time preach Islam in non-Muslim societies. ‘Umara (2008) 
argued that Islam regulates the state and therefore, the Islamic state cannot stand neutral 
against any attempts to undermine its belief system. He compares this with the experience of 
communist states, which protected their dominant ideology with all legal means. This 
argument, however, gives more consideration to the role of Islam in the state and politics 
rather than its spiritual message to individuals. The argument certainly hardens the task of 
human rights activists in convincing Islamists to tolerate conversion and proselytism as long 
as Islamists consider the prohibition of apostasy a means to protect the ideological and 
political project of the state.  
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Another argument made by ‘Umara (2008) is that Muslims are politically weak and easy 
targets for Western powers, media and missionaries. Therefore, Muslim states should protect 
themselves from proselytism conducted by foreign actors to maintain their identity and 
culture. In this argument, the interests of the community trump the rights of individuals. It 
has become increasingly acknowledged in international human rights discourse that under 
certain conditions, states can protect their citizens from certain unethical ways of proselytism 
(Stahnke 2001). However, while religious communities are entitled to be protected from 
coercive measures aimed at changing or displacing their identities, they in turn cannot impose 
their religious identity and beliefs over their members. ‘Umara ignored the fact that today 
many Muslim states generously sponsor the preaching of Islam all over the world in Western 
and non-western societies. Peterson (2012;774) notes that since the 1970s ‘some Muslim 
NGOs competed with Christian NGOs, replicating their missionary techniques in attempts to 
bolster the faith of Muslims and convert non-Muslims’.  
 
In his article, ‘Umara reminded his audience of the correlation between colonialism and 
Christian missionaries throughout history, giving a recent example of the activities of 
Christian missionaries after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the Western coalition led by the 
US. On many occasions, developments in global and regional politics have overshadowed the 
pertinence of human rights norms.  Mayer (2012:133) has rightly maintained that ‘critical 
assessment of discriminatory treatment of non-Muslims tend to be linked in people’s mind 
with the pursuit of Western imperialist and neo-imperialist agendas’. This is largely attributed 
to the way that Western colonial powers have used the excuse of protecting religious 
minorities to justify colonialism; the activities of Christian missionaries under colonialism 
and the alleged advantaged treatment of religious minorities by colonial powers have been 
part of the arguments used today to discredit legal rights claimed by minorities (Mahmood 
2012a). Yet while the history of colonialism and Western practices are relevant issues in the 
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discussion of human rights, in many cases they have been used in political maneuvers by 
both states and non-state actors to hamper respect for and discourse about human rights.                
 
In its explanation of religious freedom, the HRC held in 2011 that ‘the right to manifest one’s 
religion includes carrying out actions to persuade others to believe in a certain religion’. This 
right is also protected by Article 19 of the ICCPR on freedom of expression, which protects 
‘the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds. . . [including] 
religious discourse’.284 By way of comparison, the ECtHR has maintained that freedom to 
manifest one’s religion encompasses ‘the right to try to convince one's neighbour’.285 Article 
12(1) of the American Convention of Human Rights says that freedom of conscience and 
religion includes freedom to ‘disseminate one’s religion or beliefs’.286 Article 18(2) of the 
ICCPR says that: ‘No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice’.287 As noted by the Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Religion or Belief ‘the term ‘coercion’ . . . is to be broadly interpreted and 
includes pressure applied by a state or policies aiming at facilitating religious conversions’ or 
the prohibition of conversions.288 Proselytism by non-state actors is allowed as part of public 
manifestation of religion but it should not be conducted through coercive or improper means. 
This was the view of the ECtHR in its two famous judgements in Larissis and Others v. 
Greece289 and Kokkinakis v. Greece.290 Proselytism is a public manifestation of religious 
beliefs and its practice is not absolute. However, any restrictions proposed by the state on the 
activities of proselytism should be strictly in line with the criteria set out in Article 18(3) of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 UNCHR ‘HRC, General Comment No. 34’ (2011) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP.2, para.11.   
285 Kokkinakis v. Greece, ECtHR, 25 May 1995, para.31.  
286 Article 12(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights (1969). 
287 UNCHR ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asma Jahangir’ (2005) UN Doc A/60/399, 
p.16. See also UNCHR ‘HRC General Comment 22’ in ‘Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies (1994) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994), para.5.  
288 ibid., p.16.  
289 See Larissis and Others v. Greece, ECtHR, 24 February 1998. 
290 See Kokkinakis v. Greece, ECtHR, 25 May 1995. 
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the ICCPR.291 However, one still cannot easily differentiate between proper and improper 
proselytism. The analysis of state practice and the jurisprudence of international and regional 
human rights organs by the UN experts and legal scholars (Stahnke 2001:328-341) give us 
importance guidance on this issue. The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and 
Belief has stated that: 
 
 
Missionary activity cannot be considered a violation of the freedom of 
religion and belief of others if all involved parties are adults able to reason 
on their own and if there is no relation of dependency of hierarchy between 
the missionaries and the objects of the missionaries’ activities.292  
 
Stahnke (2001:330) has held that: 
 
 
The more that proselytism interferes with [the ability of an individual] to 
make a considered and unrestrained choice in matters of religious belief and 
affiliation… the more the regulatory power of the state may be attracted… 
coercion exists in a variety of forms. Sources may exert different forms of 
coercive authority and control over others. Targets may be more or less 
susceptible to certain types of action or certain sources. The location of the 
action can contribute to coercion where the freedom of the target to freely 
move in and out of that place is restricted. Finally, the nature of the 
proselytism in particular the nature of any proposed exchange between 
source and target, may be more or less coercive.  
   
 
The aforementioned sources suggest that state regulation of proselytism should aim only to 
guarantee that individuals make free choice and not to protect the dominance of certain 
religion or beliefs in the state. A general ban on proselytism is not consistent with IHRL. For 
instance, when voting on the UDHR, Saudi Arabia invoked the argument that the inclusion of 
the right of individuals to change their religion would encourage unethical activities by 
missionaries (Waltz 2004:815). This is not, however, a sufficient argument to justify a full 
ban on conversion and proselytism in many Muslim states. As made clear by An-Na‘im 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 Article 18(3) of the ICCPR says: ‘Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others’. 
292 UNCHR ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asma Jahangir’ (2005), p.19.  
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(1999b:8), the mediation of the competing claims to religious freedom and communal self-
determination require states to ‘acknowledge the positive aspects of proselytisation while 
trying to guard against its risks and or/excesses’.  
 
 3. Conversion in Egyptian Courts   
Egyptian converts have filed dozens of cases before the State Council to challenge the refusal 
of the Ministry of Interior to record their new religious status in their identity documents. 
According to Article 47 of Law No.143/1994 on Civil Affairs, ‘the change or correction of 
official data on the nationality, professional or religious affiliation of citizens should be based 
on official documents or decisions made by the concerned organs’.293 This article explicitly 
allows individuals to change their religious affiliation in their official documents of 
identification without any exceptions, but in practice Egypt’s Ministry of Interior and most 
judges have restricted the scope of this article by prohibiting Muslims from changing their 
religious affiliation.     
 
The case law in this area can be classified into three categories. The first category involves 
cases filed by citizens who were Christians but converted to Islam, then converted back to 
Christianity. They are known in the Egyptian media as returners to Christianity. A 
considerable number of these petitioners converted from Christianity to Islam in order to 
apply the Muslim Personal Status Law on divorce, since the Orthodox and Catholic Churches 
in Egypt take a strict position on divorce (chapter six, section 2.2).   
 
The second category includes cases filed by citizens who were born and brought up as 
Christians, but whose fathers converted to Islam before they reached 16-years-old and could 	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hold their own identity cards. In this situation, the religious status of those citizens has been 
changed in their birth certificates, sometimes without their knowledge.  Many of these people 
later filed cases in an attempt to register their original affiliation to Christianity in their 
identity cards. Around 89 cases were documented under this category from 2005-2007. But 
the Court of Cassation held that according to the dominant opinion of the Hanafi school of 
law ‘a child follows the best religion of his/her parents’.294  
 
Most pre-modern Muslim jurists agreed that a child of Muslim parents is a Muslim and when 
a Muslim man marries a Christian or Jewish woman, children follow the religion of their 
father. If a Christian father or mother converted to Islam, his/her children become Muslim. 
This view is based on a saying of the Prophet which states that ‘every newborn is born in the 
natural condition [(fitra)]; his parents transform him into a Jew, a Christian or Zoroastrian’ 
(quoted in Friedman 2003:109). Muslim jurists have commonly understood the term fitra in 
this hadith as a reference to Islam. According to the Hanafi jurist Ibn ‘Abdin (2003:370-371) 
‘this innate nature is kept when a child is born to Muslim spouses but when parents adopt 
different religions, a child should follow what it is in line with this fitra so he/she becomes a 
Muslim if one of his parents is Muslim’. The same view was restated by MB scholar al-
Khatib (1980c), adding that if a pregnant mother converts from Islam, her child continues to 
be a Muslim, following the religion of his Muslim father.      
 
To avoid any possible sectarian tensions triggered by this principle between Muslims and 
Christians in Egypt, the former General Prosecutor, Abd al-Majid Mahmoud, attempted to 
challenge this principle before the Court of Cassation in March 2009 in the case of Andrew 
and Mario (see the section of interfaith marriage in chapter six). He proposed that when one 
of the parents changes religion, a child should freely choose his/her religious belief at the age 	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of seven. In June 2009, the Court of Cassation dismissed this view and adhered to its 
previous precedents that children follow the religion of their Muslim parents.295 The Court of 
Administrative Justice invoked the same principle two weeks later.296  
 
Based on Article 18(4) of the ICCPR and Article 14 of the CRC, the right of parents to 
provide religious guidance for their children should be guaranteed by the state. When the 
intellectual capacity of children evolves, they have the right to freely express their own 
religious choice without coercion.297 The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and 
Belief Heiner Bielefeldt has noted that: ‘It is important for the state to ensure that conflicts 
possibly arising from parents having different convictions are settled in an unbiased and non-
discriminatory manner’.298 The proposal presented by the General Prosecutor could have 
been a possible solution for such a legal dispute. There are a number of arguments adduced in 
support of the proposal of the Prosecutor. The verse of the Quran (1:256) that says ‘no 
compulsion in religion’ can support this view. This verse was revealed when a Christian man 
converted to Islam and asked the Prophet to forcibly convert his two sons but the Prophet 
refused (Hawa 1991:600). However, this verse might not be sufficient evidence for some 
Muslim scholars to allow children to choose their religion freely because in this verse the two 
sons were adults and in Islamic law non-Muslim adults do not necessarily follow their father 
if he converted to Islam. Nevertheless, Muslim jurists today can develop their jurisprudence 
based on the views of some Maliki jurists in the eleventh century and Shiite jurists who hold 
that every Muslim from the age of maturity can choose his/her own religious beliefs 
(Friedman 2003:114-115; Hashemi 2007:215).  
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Another rule also in support of this view was established by Abu Hanifa, al-Shafi‘i and many 
other jurists who held that ‘the forcible conversions . . . are not valid and a person so 
converted who reverts to his former faith is not deemed as apostate’ (Friedman 2003:144). 
This rule could be applied to children since they do not have the required intellectual capacity 
to decide their religious beliefs, and should, therefore, be given the opportunity to state their 
religious preferences at the age of maturity.  However, Egyptian judges are bound by the law 
to implement the dominant opinion of the Hanafi school of law on legal issues that are not 
treated in the personal status law and they cannot select from other schools of law unless this 
view is codified in the law. Nevertheless, no government in Egypt has been willing to use its 
legislative powers to amend the law on this matter.      
 
The third category of cases involves cases filed by Muslims who converted to Christianity 
but who were not able to have their new religious status registered in their identity cards. A 
prominent Egyptian human rights defender has pointed out that there is no accurate figure for 
the number of Muslims who have converted to Christianity, since the majority of them are 
afraid of societal revenge if they announce their conversion publicly (Bahgat 2007).  
 
The jurisprudence of the State Council has exhibited three trends in its handling of the issue 
of conversion from Islam; the hardline, the liberal, and the pragmatic approaches (El Fegiery 
2013). Judges using the hardline approach have rejected the complaints of Muslim citizens 
who want to register their new religious status in their identity cards, basing it on the 
traditional prohibition of apostasy in Islamic law and the protection of public order in a 
Muslim-majority country.299 This pproach has long represented the mainstream. However, it 
was modified in cases in 2008 and 2011 by a pragmatic reasoning, which maintained the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 See Court of Administrative Justice, Cases Nos. 20/29, 8 April 1980; 4475/58, 30 June 2009; 35647/61, 29 January 2008.  
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same traditional understanding of apostasy, but acted in favour of registering the new 
religious status of converts who were Christians, converted to Islam and then reverted to 
Christianity. This reasoning was based on the protection of public order and the requirements 
of the modern nation state but without invoking support for the principle of freedom of 
religion.300  
 
This reasoning has not, however, been applied to converts who were born and brought up as 
Muslims and decided to convert from Islam, or converts from Islam for whom one non-
Muslim parents converted to Islam during their childhood. Moreover, some judges in the 
State Council opposed this reasoning, arguing that it was inconsistent with the constitutional 
provision on the principles of Islamic law as the main source of legislation. Therefore, these 
judges have challenged the judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court and referred 
many conversion cases to the SCC to examine the constitutionality of Article 47 of Law 
N.143/1994 on the Civil Affairs, arguing that this article is not compatible with the 
constitutional provision on Islamic law by not explicitly prohibiting Muslims from converting 
from Islam.301 The SCC has not delivered a judgement yet on this constitutional review case 
but the referral has prompted some judges in the Court of Administrative Justice to suspend 
the examination of some conversion cases until the SCC accomplish its review (Masrawy 
2010).  
 
There have been a few cases where judges followed a liberal approach towards religious 
freedom and Islamic law but they were limited to petitions filed by converts of Christian 
origin.  For instance, in the case of Mohammad Mahdi Abdullah, the claimant was a 
Christian who was born to Christian parents. Then he converted to Islam but he reverted after 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 See Supreme Administrative Court, Cases Nos. 13496/53, 9 February 2008; 19082/60, 12 February 2011; 33472/60, 3 
July 2011.    
301 See Court of Administrative Justice, Cases Nos.444/61, 4 March 2008 and 38719/63, 29 December 2009.    
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that to Christianity. Consequently, he requested from the Ministry of Interior to change his 
religion affiliation in his identity card to Christianity but his request was rejected. In this case 
the Court accepted the claim and ordered the Ministry of Interior to register the new religious 
affiliation of the claimant.302 This case is among other 22 cases decided positively by the 
Court from April 2004 until September 2006. At the time, the Court of Administrative Justice 
was headed by judge Faruq Abd al-Qadir who adopted a liberal reasoning.  
 
In these cases, the Court considered the refusal of the Ministry of Interior to register the new 
religious affiliation of the claimant to be an unjustifiable interference in his personal choice. 
The Court also argued that the official registration of the new religious affiliation of the 
claimant is just an administrative procedure which reflects reality. This registration is 
necessary to establish rights and duties based on the correct religious status. In its response to 
the argument that a Muslim who changes his religion violates public order, the Court 
affirmed that Article 40 of the Egyptian constitution provides for equality between citizens in 
all rights and duties without discrimination, based on religion, language, origin and sex. The 
Court also referred to Article 46, which protects the rights of individuals not only to freely 
believe in a religion but to manifest religious faith. The Court cited the UDHR and the Arab 
Charter of Human Rights. It has also argued that many centuries ago, Islam recognised 
freedom of religion, and in doing so, it cited several Qur’anic verses that highlight the 
principle of freedom and non-compulsion in religious conviction.303   
 
However, the Court’s understanding of freedom of religion in Islam seems to be not 
applicable to citizens who are born and brought up as Muslims and decide to convert to 
another religion. In explaining this position, the Court ambiguously maintained that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 Court of Administrative Justice, Case No. 26103/85, 26 April 2005.  
303 ibid.   
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according to Islamic jurisprudence, a Muslim cannot be considered apostate unless he/she 
feels comfortable with his/her apostasy.304 This argument infers that the Court would only 
guarantee the right of persons who became Muslims for a while then decided to apostatise 
from Islam. By this reasoning, the Court avoided engaging in a thorough discussion of the 
issue of religious freedom and apostasy in Islam. In fact, the cases, which were only 
examined before this Court, were filed by converts of Christian origins but the Court was not 
tested in other cases which are filed by converts of Muslim origin.              
 
In conversion cases, judges have faced a subject matter that is not treated in the traditional 
Islamic law on apostasy. This law was concerned about the punishment of apostates and the 
legal consequences of apostasy for marriage, divorce, child custody, property rights and 
inheritance; the registration of religious affiliation in official documents of identification is a 
new legal matter that has emerged in the modern nation state. The protection of public order 
has become the focus of legal reasoning, with many judges holding that if they tolerate 
conversion, the public order of the Muslim state whose official religion is Islam and whose 
main source of legislation is Islamic law, would be undermined. In their rulings, judges have 
also been influenced by the view that apostasy is not allowed under Islamic law. For converts 
of Christian origin, judges are aware that most of them became Muslims for temporary 
reasons, and therefore, the Supreme Administrative Court has exempted them from the main 
rule that apostasy is not allowed in Islam since they did not join Islam out of deep conviction. 
Moreover, the rise of cases involving converts of Christian origin has been also a source of 
tensions in the relationship between Muslims and Christians in Egypt. This may explain why 
the Supreme Administrative Court has opted for a more flexible approach in treating their 
cases.  
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However, as I have shown, not all judges are comfortable with this solution because they 
blame those converts for playing with religion for personal interests, and hold that a decision 
to convert to Islam should be done in good faith. This was also the view of prominent MB 
scholar Mohammad al-Ghazzali (2005b:80-81) who pointed out that ‘it is an insult to Islam 
and its beliefs when a Christian or Jew becomes a Muslim for any temporal purposes such as 
marriage, then converts from Islam after that’. Al-Ghazzali holds that this practice should not 
be tolerated in a Muslim society. If the Coptic Orthodox Church were to soften its strict 
position on divorce, many of these conversion cases would disappear; but as explained in the 
previous chapter, there is little or no prospect of this in the immediate term.  
 
As a reaction to this intense dispute on apostasy in the Egyptian courts, certain members of 
the MB in parliament urged the government in 2009 to pass a law criminalising apostasy. 
However, the leadership of the MB opposed this proposal, arguing that Egyptian society is 
not prepared yet for such a law (Ali and Jadd 2009; Hidya 2009). Amid this debate, Sheikh 
‘Abdallah al-Khatib (2010) clarified the position of the MB on the issue of apostasy in an 
article posted on Ikhwan Online. The article confirms that even though the MB has become 
less assertive on the death penalty for apostates, its scholars still support legal restrictions on 
conversion from Islam. Al-Khatib states that Islam does not compel people to join it, but that 
once a person becomes a Muslim, he/she should not manipulate religion and hurt the 
community of believers by leaving Islam without any kind of accountability. He proposes 
that judges and Muslim scholars be given the chance to convince apostates to repent, but that 
if they fail, a discretionary punishment such as a prison sentence should be enacted for 
apostates who insist on manifesting their apostasy in public, as a protective measure for 
Muslim society and its identity.            
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The 2012 Constitution did not protect religious freedom in a manner that conforms with 
Egypt’s international obligations, nor yet, I assert, in a manner that responds to the needs of 
Egyptian citizens. The public manifestation of religion under Article 43 was only allowed for 
Abrahamic religions and Article 44 prohibited any insult to the Prophet and messengers; both 
articles gave a legal justification for repressing non-believers. Article 81 limited the practice 
of constitutional rights by a vague reference to respect for the fundamental values of the state 
and society. Moreover, the consolidation of Islamic law in the Constitution (Article 219) 
would most likely obstruct the practice of religious freedom.   
        
When a state refuses to register a citizen’s new religious affiliation, and if apostasy entails 
civil consequences for apostates such as the dissolution of marriage and exclusion from 
inheritance, this can amount to a violation of the absolute nature of the freedom of conscience 
and religion under international human rights law. The practice of the daily private and public 
life of converts is hindered if they are not able to change their religious affiliation in their 
documents of identification, and if they are deprived of certain civil rights. The HRC has 
stated that article 18 of the ICCPR ‘does not permit any limitations whatsoever on the 
freedom of thought and conscience or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of 
one’s choice’. The Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir, held 
in 2012 that: ‘The right to change religion is absolute and is not subject to any limitation 
whatsoever. Any legislation that would prohibit or limit the right to change one’s religion 
would be contrary to international human rights standards’.305    
 
One can argue that the identification of religious affiliation in the official documents of 
citizens is a potential source of religious discrimination and an interference with individual 
freedoms and should be abolished, not only from the identity cards but also from any other 	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official documents. People can then freely decide which religious rules they abide by with 
regard to marriage. However there are those who argue that such an abolition, despite being 
important in principle, it is not a practical solution in a country where religious status 
establishes certain rights and duties in family matters. The only practical solution in the short 
term is to enable citizens to freely record their true religious affiliation in their documents 
(Bahgat 2007; EIPR 2006). In the longer term, however, to avoid any potential legal 
consequences for conversion, there should be a drastic revision of Islamic law on apostasy, a 
revision that not only challenges the death penalty for apostasy but also establishes the right to 
change one’s religion without being exposed to any kind of punishment or barrier. It appears 
unlikely that this option can be foreseen in the near future in Egypt.  
   
4. Conclusion   
While MB scholars have become less assertive on the punishment of apostasy with death, 
they have hesitated to establish that religious freedom involves the right of Muslims to 
convert from Islam without being repressed or intimidated. An opinion like this from a 
powerful political and religious organisation like the MB would help to change the restrictive 
landscape of religious freedom in Egypt. However instead, the activities of MB in opposition 
and in power sustained the restrictions on religious freedom in Egypt and blocked any 
development in this area. Although the MB asserts that apostates should only be punished if 
the public manifestation of their apostasy poses a threat to the Islamic state and its beliefs, 
this is still a restrictive application of freedom of religion in Egypt. A major part of this 
breach, for Egyptian converts, is that they are not able to publicly declare their true religious 
affiliation or give effect to their decision to leave Islam in their daily lives.   
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The MB has assertively opposed proselytism, but this aims to preserve the superiority of 
Islam in society, rather than protect people from coercion. Other state institutions have not 
been also keen to expand the scope of religious freedom and permit conversion from Islam, 
and this can explain why the MB has not found itself under pressure to change its view on 
this matter. The judiciary has recently provided some limited rights for converts of Christian 
origin but its jurisprudence is similarly still dominated by the view that conversion is not 
allowed under Islamic law and poses a threat to the public order of the state. Nevertheless, 
the demand for religious freedom is evolving in Egypt, and despite increasing risks, converts 
and atheists have become vocal about their rights.                   
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Chapter Eight: Women’s Rights in Islam 
 
    
The 2011 Revolution brought mixed signals for the future of women’s rights and gender 
equality in Egypt. Since 25th January 2011, large numbers of Egyptian women from all social 
and generational backgrounds took part in political protests alongside men, and their roles in 
the struggle for political and social change were significant. Nevertheless, women’s rights did 
not progress. On the contrary, the political rise of Islamist forces with their hardline stances 
on women’s rights threatened the reversal of previous reforms gained by Egyptian women 
(Langohr 2011). The prominent women’s rights activist, Hoda Badran (2012), stated one year 
after the fall of Mubarak that ‘women [were] the losers of the revolution’.    
 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, Egyptian feminists have been struggling to overcome 
immense political, cultural and religious barriers in order to expand the scope of their 
political and civil rights (Younis 2006; Badran 1995). Today, the status of Egyptian women 
has improved in comparison with their status at the beginning of the feminist movement in 
the first half of the 20th century. But Egyptian women are still far from realising gender 
equality as stipulated in international human rights treaties, particularly CEDAW. The 
dominant religious discourse in society, with its main assumption that the relationship 
between men and women is based on the complementarity of roles, not equality, has been a 
major challenge. Certain forms of discrimination against women in public and private are 
hidden behind this assumption.  
 
The contestation over the meaning of shari‘a has been intense in this debate among various 
actors. The price of this controversy has been high for women, as many important reforms 
  
 256 
especially in the area of personal status law have been blocked for decades due to a lack of 
support from the dominant Islamic discourse. Success was only possible when the official 
Islamic establishment sponsored such reforms, and when the balance of power between 
Islamists and the ruling political elite allowed for that.  
 
Two other factors have reinvigorated the struggle for women’s rights in Egypt over the past 
three decades: the significant development of the international women’s rights movement and 
the emergence of the Egyptian women’s rights movement with its reference to international 
human rights treaties (Zulficar 2008; Sharafeldin 2013). However, certain institutional and 
political constraints have slowed the implementation of CEDAW in Egypt, and the MB’s 
thinking on women and gender roles is very relevant to understand these constraints. Since 
al-Banna, the literature written about women’s rights in Islam by MB scholars and leaders 
has been vast, and it has challenged the core philosophical underpinnings of international 
women’s rights law and the demands of Egyptian feminists and women’s rights groups. This 
chapter analyses the reactions of the MB towards reforms proposed in Egypt over the past 
three decades to expand women’s rights, with a special focus on the status of women in the 
family, a particularly thorny area in the relationship between Islamic law and international 
human rights.        
 
1. The Articulation of Gender Equality  
1.1 Intellectual Foundations 
Pre-modern treatises of Islamic jurisprudence maintained patriarchal attitudes towards 
women’s roles in society. Drawing on certain verses in the Qur’an and hadiths, they 
developed rulings that discriminate against women in marriage, divorce, inheritance and the 
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occupation of public posts (Mir-Hosseini 2009: 28:32; An-Na‘im 1988:493:497). 
Nevertheless, within the large body of diverse juristic views were some which were friendly 
to women. For instance, the Malikis gave women more options for judicial divorce than other 
schools of law, and many jurists recognised in various degrees the right of women to insert 
specific stipulations in the marriage contract to protect their interests (Ali 2008:21-23). This 
diversity of juristic views was employed by successive Egyptian governments and feminists 
over the 20th century to expand women’s rights in the personal status laws. However, as 
noted by Mir-Hosseini (2009:28): 
 
 
The various fiqh schools all share the same inner logic and patriarchal 
conception. If they differ it is in the manner and extent to which they have 
translated this conception into legal rules.    
 
It should be noted that some women and intellectuals in the early history of Islam contested 
the patriarchal gender roles presented today as the only authentic conception of gender roles 
in Islam (Ahmed 1986; 1992:239-240). Moreover, archival research on the practice of pre-
modern Shari‘a courts in Egypt demonstrates that Muslim women utilised the plural juristic 
views to their advantage. Sonbol (2003) argues that these courts granted women some kind of 
protection that can be seen as more advantaged than the protection of women under the 
modern shari‘a-based codes. According to Sonbol (2003:231): 
 
 
Those calling for the establishment of an Islamic state demand the 
establishment of rules that they consider to be Islamic, based on the 
writings of medieval theologians of their choice with little reference to 
actual legal practice in Islamic courts.  
 
Feminist consciousness originated in Egypt in the 19th century and took an organisational 
form in the first half of the 20th century (Badran 2009). Muslim reformers like Rifa‘a al-
Tahtawi (1801-1873), Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905) and Qasim Amin (1863-1908) 
advocated for the improvement of the status of women in public and private (Hourani 1983). 
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‘Abduh developed some progressive juristic views that are cited by many women’s rights 
advocated until today. But despite the old roots of this movement, the idea of full gender 
equality especially in the family was not so obvious in the work of most well known 
Egyptian feminists (Younis 2007:472). This is unlike the experience in Tunisia, where the 
Tunisian scholar al-Taher al-Haddad (2007) (1899-1956) in 1930 applied a contextual and 
historical reading of the Qur'an and concluded that men and women should be equal in 
marriage, divorce and inheritance. He also called for the prohibition of polygyny. In the 
words of the Egyptian reformer Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (2006:90) ‘it would be no 
exaggeration to claim that it was al-Taher al-Haddad who first paved the way for the feminist 
Qur’anic hermeneutics movements that arose in the 1990s’.306 
 
Gender equality has been a key demand of Egyptian human rights and women's rights groups 
over the past three decades. Some of these NGOs have also advocated for gender equality 
from an Islamic frame of reference. However, in practice many of the initiatives announced 
by these NGOs have aimed only to ameliorate the status of women in the family but without 
radically challenging the unequal status of men and women. The Egyptian feminist and legal 
scholar Marwa Sharafeldin, who works closely with women’s rights groups in Egypt, 
suggests reasons for what she considers ‘unavoidable messiness’ in the advocacy agenda of 
Egyptian feminists and women’s rights advocates. According to Sharafeldin (2013:72-73), 
this can possibly be attributed to: 
 
Personal religious faith that prohibits some activists from making certain 
demands for equality they feel are in contradiction with that faith; the 
perceived socio-political willingness, or unwillingness, of society to accept 
certain demands for women; concerns that some demands, although calling 
for equality, could be potentially harmful to women and would deprive 
them of some current advantages; NGOs’ structural weakness and lack of 
ability to mobilise supporters and leverage to effect significant changes in 
the situation of women; and the fact that the discourse is still gradually 	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taking shape, therefore, ‘inconsistencies’ are to be expected during the 
process of building and developing it through practice. 
        
Women's rights advocates have been aware that throughout the 20th century, the MB was 
resisting most legal reforms adopted to improve the situation of women in society. After the 
revolution, it was clear for them that the group was planning to reverse these reforms and 
obstruct further development in women's rights (Badran 2012; Langohr 2011; Gomez-Rivas 
2011). This reality was depressing for many women who had significantly participated in 
political protests and strikes as of 25th January 2011.  
 
Under the slogan of the ‘implementation of shari‘a’, Egyptian Islamists have long struggled 
to preserve what they consider divinely ordained family regulations, and have blocked any 
attempts to improve the status of women in family. Drawing on traditional Islamic 
jurisprudence, the MB and its scholars have advanced the argument that complementarity of 
roles between men and women is an immutable model of gender relations in Islam. This 
theory paradigmatically challenges the idea of gender equality enshrined in international 
human rights treaties. 
 
The female section of the MB was established in 1932 as a separate body, not fully integrated 
into the MB’s leading bodies. The general supervisor of this section has been always a man, 
since women are not eligible to join the top bodies of the organisation (Farag 2012:8-9). This 
is consistent with the MB’s philosophy that women should be excluded from grand 
leadership positions. Male leaders of the MB have authored most educational books read by 
the Muslim Sisters. The historical leader of the Muslim Sisters, Zainab al-Ghazzali (1995) 
wrote regularly in Al-Da‘wa and Liwa’ al-Islam magazines but her writings reflected the 
same patriarchal philosophy of the MB towards women (Lewis 2007).  
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One possible reason for the poor contribution of the Muslim Sisters in developing the thought 
of the organisation on women’s rights is the organisational hierarchy and rigidity, and the 
marginalisation of women in decision-making processes (Abdel-Latif 2008; Tadros 
2012a:134-135). Another possible reason is the ideological hegemony inside the organisation 
and the strong belief among the Muslim Sisters that their unequal status with men is 
prescribed by Islam and they should be committed to this vision to be pious Muslims. As 
noted by Ottaway and Abdel-Latif (2007:8) in their analysis of the place of women in 
Islamist movements, most female Islamists including the Muslim Sisters ‘do not perceive 
themselves as lagging behind Western women because they measure their progress and 
achievements against a different standard’. Based on her research on the historical 
development of the Muslim Sisters, Tadros (2012a:134) has suggested that: 
 
 
Because the Muslim Sisters are expected to be completely subservient to 
the MB leadership, one which has been very conservative throughout most 
of its eighty-years history, the women who emerge as leaders tend to 
espouse the same ideology.  
 
Over decades, the Muslim Sisters have played a key role in supporting the political vision of 
the MB (Farag 2012; Tadros 2012a:134).  In times of repression under Nasser in the 1950s 
and 1960s, some Muslim Sisters, most notably Zainab Al-Ghazzali, were active in 
maintaining communication between prisoners and the movement, and provided assistance 
for prisoners’ families. Over the last decade, Muslim Sisters have become increasingly 
visible within the political struggle of the organisation. They were nominated as 
parliamentary candidates since 2000 and regularly took part in political protests organised by 
the group (El Ghobashi 2005:382-383). Despite flagrant manipulation by the state of voting 
in the parliamentary elections in 2000, 2005 and 2010, these Islamist women insisted on 
supporting MB candidates and challenged all barriers set by the security forces and 
supporters of the former National Democratic Party to reach ballot boxes. For those women, 
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as noted by a former member of the Muslim Sisters, it was a task of jihad to endorse the 
political struggle of the group (Abd al-Mun‘im 2011:158).  
 
Based on interviews with some members of the Muslim Sisters, Farag (2012:10-11) observes 
increasing demands among them to integrate the female section into other leading bodies of 
the MB. However, as I show in this chapter, this activism has not led to an improvement in 
the official positions taken by the MB on women’s rights. To the contrary, the Muslim Sisters 
have been used by the organisation as a defence shield against other critical discourses of 
secular and Islamic feminists. In its first ever general conference held on 2 July 2011, the 
Muslim Sisters declared its commitment to challenge any attempts to undermine Islamic 
shari‘a and to confront the conspiracy against Muslim women and families (al-‘Ajuz 2011; 
Sibi‘ 2011).  
 
The exclusion of women from taking leading positions in the organisational hierarchy of the 
MB has not been the practice at the FJP. Some members of the Muslim Sisters have been 
able to occupy leading positions at the FJP and they have become very well known in public, 
but their positions on gender issues have been conservative and lagged behind the Islamic 
discourses of the leadership of al-Azhar on many issues as I explain below. However, the FJP 
does not work independently from the MB, so one might expect female leaders of the FJP to 
be shaped by the same mentality of the wider organisation.                     
 
Some critical female voices have appeared among female Islamists with previous affiliation 
with the Muslim Sisters. Heba Ra’uf Ezzat, a professor of political science at Cairo 
University is one example. She grew up at the Muslim Sisters and her mentor was Zainab al-
Ghazzali but her critical approach to the status of women in Islam drove her to leave the 
organisation and to develop her own intellectual project. She has not broken with the model 
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of complementarity roles between men and women but her views are much more progressive 
than the official MB positions (Karam 1998:221-225).  
 
Another example is Intissar Abd al-Mun‘im (2011) whose book A Biography of A Former 
Muslim Sister: My Story with the Brothers presents an insightful critique of the treatment of 
women inside the MB and the hardline views taken by the group’s leaders and ideologues on 
the place of women in private and public. Her book confirms the political use of the Muslim 
Sisters by the MB to advance its political agenda but without any efforts to empower women 
in society. According to Abd al-Mun‘im (2011:112-113), the educational programmes 
provided for girls and women reinforce the marginalisation of women in society. Female 
members are taught to obey their husbands and recognise their leadership in the family. They 
are also instructed that their most precious task is child-bearing and that their commitment to 
the Islamist project is jihad for the cause of God. This testimony is consistent with the 
sources authored by male leaders of the group (al-Juhari and Khayal 2000; al-Khuli 1980; al-
Jabri 1994; al-Wa‘i 2005) to indoctrinate women inside the organisation.          
 
In the following, I address how the question of women has been articulated in the literature of 
the MB. From Hassan al-Banna to Mohammad Badie, the prevalent view among MB leaders 
and scholars is that women and men are equal in human value and equal before God, but 
certain natural and functional differences between the two sexes justify and entail that each 
sex has different rights and duties in society. This argument is well established in the 
intellectual sources and official documents of the MB until today. In his notorious 
publication, The Message of the Muslim Women, al-Banna (2006:402) maintained that ‘the 
differentiation between men and women in rights is justified by their inescapable natural 
differences and the different tasks performed by both of them’. This differentiation according 
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to him is to the benefit of women because due to their natural physical and psychological 
attributes, women cannot perform the same roles as men.  
 
Al-Bahiy al-Khuli (1980:317) followed the same line in his book Islam and the 
Contemporary Issues of Women, holding that full equality between men and women goes 
against ‘the innate nature of human beings (al-fitra al-insaniyya) and the biological 
specificities of women’. In their important source, The Muslim Sisters and the Formation of 
the Qur’anic Family, the leaders of the female section of the MB, Mahmoud al-Juhari and 
Mohammad Khayal (2000:18-19), maintained that the rulings of marriage, divorce and 
inheritance in the Qur’an are immutable. They condemned ‘Muslim states who follow the 
corrupted Western philosophies of gender equality that would destroy the family, the last 
bastion of Muslim societies’, adding that ‘Muslim family laws should consider the 
psychological and physical differences between men and women’. Salim al-Bahnasawi 
(1986:38) wrote in The Status of Women between Islam and Universal Laws that ‘men and 
women are equal in what they similarly share but because of their natural differences, they 
are unequal in certain social roles.’ Al-Qaradawi (2005a) and al-Ghazzali (2005b) have also 
defended the complementarity thesis.307 However, certain positions taken by these two 
scholars on the status of women in Muslim society can be considered more liberal than the 
prevalent views at the MB. For instance, both al-Ghazzali (2011:44-57) and al-Qaradawi 
(2010d) have held that women under certain conditions can hold public positions including 
leadership of the state or the judiciary (al-Jawad 2009). However, they agree with other 
scholars that women’s duties in the family take precedence over their public roles.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307 See also the views of the Former Guide of the MB Umar al-Tilimisani (1985:31) who maintained that ‘equality between 
men and women is inconsistent with the nature of the divine creation’.   
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In 1994, the MB published a document on its position on women. Similar to the intellectual 
sources, the document begins by stating that the Qur’an establishes equality between men and 
women in human value and religious duties, but that this equality is not the norm that should 
govern the relationship between men and women at all times, because there are exceptions. 
The underlying philosophy behind these exceptions establishes a system of discrimination 
against women in private and public. According to the document, these exceptions are 
immutable because they are ‘from God, the all-knowing and well aware because it is he who 
knows His creation best and the exceptions are in those specific characteristics that 
distinguish the female from male’. The distinction between men and women is aimed at 
achieving complementarity of roles between men and women that is necessary for the family 
and marital life. The primary function of women ordained by God is motherhood, procreation 
and caring for their husbands.  
 
The document asserts that ‘these duties must be given precedence over other responsibilities 
and they are necessary for the stability of the family which is the basic cell of society’. In its 
discussion of the doctrine of qiwama, the document reiterates that it is confined to the family 
and not practiced by men over women in general. ‘It is a leadership and direction over the 
family practised by men if they fulfil their duties and obligations’. In the marriage, the 
husband pays the dower and is obliged to maintain his wife and children, and women have no 
obligations at all to contribute to these expenses, even if they have wealth. According to the 
document, any group should have a leader and in most cases, the husband is older and it is 
the husband who is usually the breadwinner of the family and mixes more with a wider range 
of people’. This qiwama requires the wife to obey her husband, so she cannot leave home or 
go out to work without the permission of the husband.  
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In this document, the MB displays its willingness to limit the presence of women in public 
and prevent them from associating with men based on vague criteria of modesty and decency. 
According to the document, modesty is a condition for women’s rights and freedoms. It says: 
‘The nature of women requires them to maintain their chastity since it is crucial for the 
integrity of offspring and honour’. The Qur’an, according to the document, requires women 
to cover their bodies, except their faces and hands, and refrain from mixing with men. The 
document condemns the status of women in the West, holding that it is based on ‘an obscene 
philosophy that goes against the moral principles and values of shari‘a’. The platform of the 
FJP (2011:113) endorses the same hierarchal relationship between men and women. It says 
that ‘the Party promotes the culture of equality between men and women without prejudice to 
the complementarity of roles’. It then states that ‘the wife has the right to work in all political, 
social, cultural and economic fields’ but ‘within the limitations of Islamic shari‘a’.   
 
The argument that the Qur’an (4:34) provides for men’s guardianship (qiwama) over women 
establishes the basis of discrimination against women in traditional treatises of Islamic law 
and modern family laws in many Muslim states. This verse is usually cited to rationalise 
discriminatory interpretations of other verses in the Qur’an and Prophetic sayings, which 
provide men with superior status over women in the martial relationship, divorce, inheritance, 
polygyny, testimony before judges and the occupation of certain public posts. The patriarchal 
interpretation of the doctrine of qiwama is also supplemented by another verse in the Qur’an 
(2:228) that states that ‘men have a degree over women’. The interpreters and translators of 
the Qur’an have disagreed in defining this degree and whether it is a degree of right, 
responsibility or advantage. The same disagreement is found in the interpretation and 
translation of the word qiwama; for some, it means guardianship or leadership and for others 
maintenance or responsibility (al-Hibri 1997:28). The doctrine of qiwama is commonly 
understood in Egypt in a discriminatory manner against women.  
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Despite his progressive views on polygyny and divorce, Mohammad ‘Abduh did not break 
with the conception of men’s guardianship or in his words, leadership (ri’asa), over women 
in the family, considering it part of ‘the distribution of tasks between men and women’. 
According to him, this is attributed to the natural features of men and their ability to 
financially support their wives (‘Umara 1997:69-73). One should consider the social context 
in Egypt where ‘Abduh developed this view but it is an indicator of the inconsistency of 
many positions taken by early Egyptian reformers who have attempted to present progressive 
interpretation of Islamic sources without challenging the epistemological and methodological 
assumptions of traditional Islamic law.  
 
In June 2013, the Association of Senior Scholars at al-Azhar published a document on 
women’s rights in Islam (al-Masri al-Yawm 2013). It was seen by many Egyptian 
commentators as an endeavour to counter the hardline discourses of the MB and other 
Islamists, because over the previous three decades, al-Azhar had supported many reforms in 
personal status laws and condemned the conservative approach taken by the MB on these 
reforms. However, this document reveals the common ground between al-Azhar and 
Islamists. According to the document, the doctrine of qiwama provides for the responsibility 
of men towards their families. It says: ‘Men are obliged to maintain their families since 
women perform their natural tasks of procreation and bringing up children’ (al-Masri al-
Yawm 2013).  
 
The document begins with the argument that women’s right to work should be qualified by 
the conditions of families and respect for the ‘Islamic morals and values’. According to the 
document, ‘this right is urgent to protect poor families from collapse more than being 
motivated by the purpose of equality between men and women’ (al-Masri al-Yawm 2013). In 
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this document, women’s labour is deemed necessary to save their families, not to fulfill their 
ambitions and their life plans. This instrumental approach to the integration of women into 
the labour market can be read within the failure of Egyptian state since the beginning of 
economic liberalisation in the middle of the 1970s to provide basic social and economic 
rights for citizens and families. The document does not explain why women who work to 
assist their husbands due to economic factors are still exposed to certain types of 
discrimination, and why they should obey their husbands. The concept of gender equality, as 
presented in CEDAW and defended by many Muslim feminists, and the idea of Islamic 
reformation go beyond the supposed ‘moderate’ or ‘centrist’ (wasati) role of al-Azhar. One 
should remember that as much as al-Azhar has supported some reforms, it has also blocked 
many other reforms and, as explained in chapter five, legitimated the persecution of Egyptian 
reformers since the beginning of the 20th century.  
 
The presentation of the doctrine of qiwama as ‘role differentiation within the family’ 
(Baderin 2003:135) or complementary roles between men and women in reality reinforces 
discrimination against women and qualifies women’s right to political participation, since it 
supports the assumption that it is the top priority of women in Islam to care for their husbands 
and children, rather than participate in the public life on an equal footing with men. This 
theory of ‘role differentiation within the family’ contradicts the evolving social reality of 
Muslim families today. In Egypt for instance and as noted by Sharafeldin (2013:75): ‘Due to 
the high poverty levels, most Egyptian households nowadays find it very difficult to get by 
without the income of both partners, Additionally, in 2000, 22% of households were solely 
dependent on the woman’s income’. Based on her field work and her analysis of case law on 
family disputes in Egypt, Al-Sharmani (2013:51) has raised the same point, stating that: ‘The 
disjuncture between the lived experience of many married couples and the legal model of 
marital roles leads . . . to conflicts between the spouses’. This conclusion weakens the 
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argument that the ‘role differentiation within the family’ protects the family from 
disintegration.   
 
To challenge the model of gender equality, some scholars also argue that Islam is concerned 
with ‘substantive justice’ rather than ‘formal equality’. The practical implications of formal 
and substantive equality models on women is a topic hotly debated among feminists and 
human rights defenders across the world (Kapur 2012:269-272), and it has been observed that 
‘while CEDAW has primarily adopted a substantive model of equality, there are elements of 
a formal model evident in the text’ (Kapur 2012:271). But the contribution of Islamists to this 
debate has entirely different logic and purposes. While al-Banna and his heirs have argued 
that the system of complementarity of roles is ordained for the benefit of women, the effect in 
this context is the perpetuation of existing inequalities.   
 
Other female and male Muslim scholars have treated the model of gender complementary 
roles as historically contingent, not as an eternal rule of Islam. Muslim feminists like Amna 
Wadud, Azizah Al-Hibri and Asma Barlas present new interpretations of the Qur’an, arguing 
that verses in the Qur’an should be read within the Qur’an’s overall messages of justice, 
equality and God’s oneness. In her book, Qur’an and Text, Amna Wadud (1999:69-70) 
argues that the qiwama of men over women in the family is conditioned on a system of 
‘reciprocity between privileges and responsibilities’ and is not unconditional or absolute. 
Wadud argues that the Qur’an (4:34) does not privilege men over women in absolute terms 
and ‘all men do not excel over some women in some matters. Some men excel over some 
women in some manners. Likewise, some women excel over some men in some manners’. 
This verse according to Wadud is open to many possibilities. She maintains that:  
 
 
The ideal scenario establishes an equitable and mutually dependent 
relationship. However, it does not allow for many of today’s 
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realities…therefore the Qur’an must be eternally reviewed with regard to 
human exchange and mutual responsibility between men and females 
(Wadud 1999:73).  
 
The model of complementarity for Wadud is an ideal option but its realisation in our times is 
not possible. The possibility that this model had been followed for specific historical 
circumstances is absent from her analysis. This is not consistent with her contextual and 
historical reading of the Qur’an on other issues likes obedience and the beating of wives by 
their husbands. On these two issues, Wadud argues that the Qur’an was attempting to restrict 
existing practices. Commenting on her work, Raja Rhouni (2010:256) has stated that: 
 
 
Contextualisation emerges . . . as a mere strategy invoked to rescue an 
insufficient and unconvincing interpretative method . . . rather than as a 
systematic and pondered approach that recognises and asserts the Qur’an 
historicity.  
 
In her second book Inside the Feminist Jihad, Wadud (2006:203) revisits her previous 
interpretive approach, admitting that she utilised ‘the linguistic space of manipulating 
meaning’ to promote an interpretation that the Qur’an perhaps did not intend. Drawing on a 
linguistic analysis of the verse (4:34), Azizah Al-Hibri (1997:28) argues that this verse bears 
different meanings, adding that ‘where a society was authoritarian, it made sense that 
interpreters coloured these meanings with their own authoritarian perspectives. As the world 
changed, modern interpreters tried to regain for the word its original meaning’. Al-Hibri 
(1997:30) has concluded that qiwama is an advisory role that can be practised by either men 
or women based on their qualities and is not an absolute privilege provided by God for men. 
For many Muslim feminists, economic factors play an important role in defining the limits of 
qiwama. Accordingly, qiwama is not absolutely enjoined by the husband but can also be 
practiced by the wife in our modern times since women now support their families (Saeed 
2014:120:122). But the changing distribution of financial capabilities between the husband 
and the wife does not adequately challenge the unequal gender status in the family under 
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Islamic law, as for many Muslim scholars the financial factor is not decisive in stipulating 
gender roles; discrimination against women is usually justified by essentialising the nature of 
men and women.  
 
Therefore, the choice of women to go out to work has been treated as a secondary matter by 
them, and does not change the subordination of women to men. We have even seen this 
explicitly argued: according to al-Azhar, if women choose to work to save their families from 
collapse, their subordination to their husbands continues. For most traditional Muslim jurists, 
the concept of obedience has entailed that a woman to satisfy her husband sexually, not to 
leave the house without his permission, and ensure procreation and the rearing of children 
(Mir-Hosseini 2013:30-32). Drawing on the evolving financial capacity of women is 
therefore not enough to challenge this patriarchal theory. Alternatively, Abu Zayd (2013:163-
164) maintained that the regulation of marriage, divorce and inheritance and other legal 
stipulations is part of the social level of the Qur’anic discourses which addressed the seventh-
century milieu and the nascent Muslim community. He added that ‘when the Qur’an sustains 
absolute equality in both the cosmological and the ethical spiritual domain, this is the 
direction in which the Qur’an would like Muslims to upgrade the societal domain of 
inequality’ (Abu Zayd 2013:164).  
 
In conclusion, the historical and contextual readings of the Qur’an are firmly rejected by the 
MB, whose conception of complementary roles means in reality that not all the rights enjoyed 
by men are provided to women. I show in the following sections that this understanding has 
influenced the discriminatory positions held by the MB towards women.  
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1.2 Women’s Rights in the 2012 Constitution 
The protection of women’s rights in the 2012 Constitution was one of the thorny issues in the 
constitution-making process under the rule of the MB (Khattab 2013). This constitution 
dismayed women’s rights advocates, who attempted through public protests and media 
campaigns to pressure the Islamist-dominated Constituent Assembly to expand the protection 
of women’s rights in early drafts of the constitution (Nazra for Feminists Studies 2012; 
Kortam 2012). The participation of women in the Constituent Assembly was very modest. 
The People’s Assembly elected seven female members out of 100 members; three of them 
were affiliated with the MB. Manal al-Tibi, a well-known human rights defender and one of 
the female members, withdrew from the Constituent Assembly on 24 September 2012 and 
spoke out in the media against Islamists’ hostile attitudes on international human rights 
norms, particularly on gender equality (al-Majid 2013:83).  
 
On the contrary, in her testimony about the making of the 2012 Constitution , Amani Faraj 
(2013:172-196), an Islamist female member of the Assembly, complained that human rights 
defenders and international NGOs like HRW were trying to introduce certain concepts alien 
to Islam and the Muslim family. According to her, gender equality is not acceptable as far as 
it means equality in marriage, divorce, inheritance, the prohibition of polygyny, sexual 
freedoms, homosexual rights and the permission of abortion. To show that women’s rights 
advocates are driven by an alien foreign agenda, she named them in her book the 
‘globalisation current’ (tayar al-‘awlama). The testimony of Faraj in her book reveals the 
wide gap between Islamists and international human rights.               
 
Women were explicitly mentioned in the 2012 Constitution three times. Two of these 
references reduced women to the roles of sisters, mothers and partners, rather than primary 
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citizens and rights holders. The preamble stated that: ‘No dignity is there for a nation if 
women are not appreciated. Women are men’s sisters and partners in gains and national 
responsibility’. But what ‘dignity’ entails for women is ambiguous. Islamists present their 
model of complementarity of roles as a means to protect the woman and preserve their 
dignity, yet while using terms like ‘sisters’ or ‘partners’, which overshadows the aspiration of 
gender equality. The narrow perspective of the status of women in society is obvious in 
Article 10, which required the state to ‘reconcile between the duties of a woman toward her 
family and her work’. This provision was mentioned under the constitutional section on the 
moral foundations of the society, not the human rights section. The same article stated that: 
‘The family is the basis of the society and is founded on religion, morality and patriotism’. 
The reference to religion here is ambiguous and irrelevant and could provide a religious basis 
for discrimination against women. One can argue that Article 10 provides for affirmative 
action measures to assist women to practice their right to work. For instance, Article 25(2) of 
the UDHR states that ‘motherhoods and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance’ 
but it is made clear in the UDHR and other international human rights documents like 
CEDAW (Article 16) that motherhood cannot be used as a basis for discrimination against 
women. Article 16 of the UDHR says that men and women in the family ‘are entitled to equal 
rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution’.   
 
The analysis of this point cannot be separated from the economic conditions in Egypt and 
many other states in the world. Hassan al-Banna (2006:404-414) for instance was insistent 
that women should focus on their families and their public roles should be very limited. 
However, as mentioned, difficult economic conditions in Egypt have pressured Islamists over 
the last two decades to increasingly accept that women become integrated in the labour 
market. I referred in the previous section to the statement made by al-Azhar that women’s 
financial contribution to save the family from collapse is encouraged. In theory the state as 
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elaborated in Article 10 of the 2012 Constitution is ready to provide women with facilities to 
work but in return their subordinated status to men in the family does not change. This 
creates immense hardships for women because in practice the state has provided poor 
affirmative action measures for pregnant or mother female workers. While this is a situation 
that is found also in many Western societies (McLarney 2012), its consequences on Muslim 
women in Egypt is much higher because those women are also requested to fulfill their duties 
in the family and obey their husbands.         
 
A reference to equality between men and women was made only in the preamble, stating that: 
‘Equality and equal opportunities are established for all citizens, men and women, without 
discrimination or nepotism or preferential treatment, in both rights and duties’. But this was 
very marginal, and accompanied by provisions which restricted the place of women in 
society. Article 33 stated that: ‘All citizens are equal before the law. They have equal public 
rights and duties without discrimination’. Originally this article prohibited discrimination 
based on sex and religion, but at the end these grounds were omitted in an indicator that the 
drafters worried that such a reference might not be in line with shari‘a (al-Majid 2013:82).  
 
Islamists insisted on reintroducing Article 10 of the 1971 Constitution that explicitly 
restricted gender equality and the practice of women’s rights by the rulings of Islamic 
shari‘a.308 But this proposal was opposed and condemned by many non-Islamist forces and 
women’s rights groups. The reference to Islamic law as the main source of legislation was a 
foundational principle of the state in the 2012 Constitution (Article 2, 4 and 219) and this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308  Article 11 of the 1971 Constitution stated that: 
 
The State shall guarantee harmonization between the duties of woman towards the family and her work in 
the society, ensuring her equality status with man in fields of political, social, cultural and economic life 
without violation of the rules of Islamic jurisprudence. 
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allowed for limiting the scope of women’s rights and all human rights in the constitution. 
Women’s rights advocates were not ready to demand the omission of Article 2 in the 
constitution but they were very concerned about any specific reference to the rulings of 
shari‘a in the constitutional provision on women. However, I argue that key women’s rights 
advocates have been fighting the wrong battle during the constitution-making process. The 
critique of draft Article 36 by these actors was not enough without either calling for the 
removal of Article 2 or limiting its scope.  
 
The proposed provision referred to the rulings (ahkam) of shari‘a unlike Article 2, which 
stated that the principles of Islamic shari‘a are the main source of legislation. Women’s rights 
advocates309 argued that the word ahkam is confusing and would enable legislators to draw 
on hardline opinions from traditional Islamic jurisprudence. For them this was an obvious 
indicator of the intentions of the drafters to block any doors that could be used to challenge 
the unequal status of women and men. The contradiction is that the statement of the coalition 
of women’s rights advocates attacked this proposal but overlooked the impact of Article 2 
under which women’s rights have been restricted. The interpretation of Article 2 by the SCC 
is broad enough to be abused by any political force once it controlled the judiciary. Finally, 
Islamists decided to omit any reference to gender equality in the constitution, as for them 
such a reference cannot be made without limiting its scope by a general reference to shari‘a 
(al-Majid 2013:106-107; Faraj 2013:194-195).   
 
To be sure, many Egyptian liberals and non-Islamist political parties have demonstrated an 
ambivalent and confusing agenda towards women and Islamic law. During the constitution-
making process they argued against the reference to Islamic law in the provision on women’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 On this point, I draw on a statement published on 22 September 2012 by a coalition of 14 feminist and human rights 
groups, 5 political parties, 11 public figures and the Coalition of Feminist NGOs, a coalition of16 feminist groups (Coalition 
of Feminist NGOs et all. 2013).  
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rights, but that Article 2 of the constitution on Islamic law was enough to ensure that family 
matters would be regulated by shari‘a. It seems that those liberals supported an improvement 
of the status of women in the family but not the pursuit of full gender equality in the private 
sphere. Their commentaries show that they were more concerned about gender equality in 
public.310 The experience of the 2012 Constitution shows that Islamists were able to endorse 
their vision of the status of women in society, while liberal and leftist political forces opposed 
this agenda, but without being ready to fully and openly challenge the Islamists’ 
constructions on the relationship between men and women.            
 
1.3 Reactions to the International Women’s Rights Movement 
Given its theological assumptions on gender roles in Islam, it is predictable that the MB 
would reject the conception of gender equality as articulated in international human rights 
treaties, particularly CEDAW. These treaties drastically challenge traditional and unequal 
gender roles in Muslim societies. In modern times, ‘women and family law became symbols 
of cultural authenticity and carriers of religious tradition’ (Mir-Hosseini 2009:37). The 
displacement of Islamic law in many areas of law has prompted many Muslims to consider 
Islamic family laws ‘the last bastion of Islam’ (Mir-Hosseini 2009:40) or ‘the hard 
irreducible core of what it means to be a Muslim today’ (An-Na‘im 2002:9). In the words of 
Abu-Odeh (2004:1046) ‘attachment to medieval patriarchy came to mean attachment to 
[Islam]’. Any efforts to undermine this traditional framework of gender roles have been 
perceived by the MB as a threat to the Muslim family and ‘Islamic values’.     
 
As noted by Mir-Hosseini (2009:37-38) the struggle for women’s rights under colonialism 
and post-colonialism has been heavily intertwined with the relationship between Muslims and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310See for instance the op-eds written by Amr Hamzawi (2012), the President of Egypt Freedom Party and Mohammad Abu 
al-Ghar (2012), the President of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party.    
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the West. The literature of the MB is full of harsh critique of feminist voices and movements 
that emerged in Egypt in the 19th century by treating these movement and its male and female 
figures as part of a ‘colonial, crusade and Zionist conspiracy’ to eradicate Muslims values 
and traditions. Under colonialism, cultural and political resistance to feminist discourses was 
shaped by a feeling among many Egyptian intellectuals that these discourses serve the 
colonial political agenda and advance its sense of cultural superiority over the colonised 
culture and traditions (Ahmed 1992:150-151). ‘It was . . . in the combining of the languages 
of colonialism and feminism that the fusion between women and culture was created’ 
(Ahmed 1992:151). This association between feminists, colonialism and Westernisation has 
put Egypt’s feminist movements under attack in the literature of the MB.  
 
Their struggle has largely been condemned in the writings of Islamists (Yussuf 1998; 
Mahmoud 2011; 170-188) despite the limited and gradual agenda of early feminists and their 
interest in building their arguments from Islamic jurisprudence. Islamists have, over the past 
three decades, taken on many of these views such as women’s right to education, work and 
political participation, but they have nevertheless rejected the feminist movement overall, 
because its members do not share the Islamist political worldview as a whole. This tone, 
which increased significantly after the 1970s and has been revived over the last decade with 
US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, has overshadowed any possible 
critical attempts by Muslim feminists to engage with Islamic traditions or to encourage and 
implement drastic cultural and religious reforms.  
 
Since 1994, the MB, its scholars and associations have been active in campaigning against 
UN conferences on women’s rights. For instance, as a reaction to the Fourth World 
Conference on Women held in Beijing 1995, a statement was published by six prominent 
Islamist scholars on 4 November 1995 under the title A Message for Women All Over the 
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World. Three of the authors of this statement are affiliated with the MB (al-Ghazzali, al-
Qaradawi, abu-Shuqa) and the other three figures are close to the group and well-respected 
by its members (Mohammad ‘Umara, Fahmi Huwaidi, Mohammd Salim al-Awa). The most 
notable thing in this statement is that it explicitly discredited the struggle of women all over 
the world for freedom and equality by using the vocabularies of Qutb and calling this 
movement ‘a new state of ignorance’ (jahiliyya jadida) (al-Ghazzali et al.1995). The same 
term was used by the General Guide of the MB Mohammad Badie in October 2012 in his 
weekly message Human Rights in Islam, where he urged his followers to embrace the Qur’an 
and sunna to ‘protect women from the temptation of the new jahiliyya, which under the 
slogans of freedom and liberation want to transfer women into a commodity for pleasure and 
lust’. The application of shari‘a is the only means by which to emancipate Muslim women 
according to Badie (2012a).    
 
The same discourse appeared in 2005 in a message released by the General Guide of the MB 
Mahdi Akif (2005) titled Women’s Issues from an Islamic perspective, on the occasion of the 
49th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women. Commenting on CEDAW, Akif 
attacked what he considered to be ‘Western efforts to impose alien concepts to the culture of 
Islam’. Since his statement came two years after US-led invasion of Iraq, his statement made 
a connection between Western military and political domination on the Muslim world and its 
attempts to ‘reformulate the structure of Muslim family along Western lines’. Akif and most 
of his Islamist companions have insisted on presenting CEDAW as a western plot but they 
have ignored the fact that  ‘the West is itself divided on the question of women’s rights and 
particularly the merits of CEDAW, as evidenced by disagreement within the United States 
that have prevented US ratification of the treaty’ (O’Connor 2012:347). The defensive mode 
taken by Islamists places the relationship between Islam with individual rights and gender 
equality in opposition. It also monopolises the understanding of Islam and discredits other 
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voices that give different meanings to Islam and its founding texts. Moreover, when these 
statements were being written and distributed, other Muslim women in the Muslim world 
asserted that these international conferences are an opportunity to empower their struggle 
against discrimination and patriarchal practices (Maktabi 2013:287). 
 
The increasing role of civil society and the international human rights movement has pushed 
the MB to globally advocate for an Islamist alternative to the philosophy of gender equality. 
The Islamic Charter on Family is the culmination of this effort. This document was adopted 
in 2007 by the IICWC. The drafting committee of this Charter included the former Mufti of 
Egypt Ali Jum‘a and other scholars affiliated with the MB such as al-Qaradawi and Makarim 
al-Diri, a female candidate under the MB in the 2005 parliamentary election. It also included 
‘Umara and other scholars from Morocco, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Sudan and Syria 
contributed to the drafting, many of them affiliated with MB sections in these states. The 
participation of the Grand Mufti of Egypt in drafting this document demonstrates that the MB 
and official Islamic establishments in Egypt share a similar philosophy on women’s rights in 
Islam.  
 
The ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis is felt in the introduction of the Charter, in which ‘Umara 
(2007) wrote that ‘Western cultural invasion of the Muslim world has posed a serious threat 
to Islam and its system of values. Therefore, it has become necessary to clearly distinguish 
Islamic concepts from other secular and irreligious frame of references’. For him, the 
international women rights movement and its concepts stand as ‘a declaration of war against 
the family and its morals and values in Islam’. The Charter defends the different gender roles 
resulting from what it considers ‘physical and mental differences between men and women’. 
He assert that the denial of this fact according to Article 9 of the Charter ‘is not permissible 
under shari‘a or logic. It also humiliates human nature’.    
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Twenty years after the ICPD, the MB’s hostile attitudes towards feminists and the women’s 
rights movement have not changed. This was evident in its fierce reaction towards the 57th 
session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women held in New York in March 2013. 
This was used an opportunity for Egyptian Islamists to reiterate their positions on 
international human rights treaties and the idea of gender equality. Female leaders of the 
Muslim Sisters were outspoken against the conference (Helmi 2013a; 2013b). The 
conference was held at a time when the MB was attempting to strengthen its grip on power in 
Egypt amidst intense confrontation between President Morsi and the non-Islamist opposition 
and human rights movement, and the increasing concerns of women and religious minorities 
about their future under the rule of Islamists. One can suggest that the occasion of the UN 
conference was seized on by the MB as a political opportunity to mobilise the public on a 
culturally sensitive issue like women’s rights, and appear as the protector of ‘Islamic 
authenticity’.  
 
This reaction also was consistent with the MB’s plans to lay the ground for reversing some of 
the reforms achieved in the areas of personal status law and child law under Mubarak. To 
discredit these reforms, Islamists dubbed the expression ‘Suzanne’s laws’ or qawanin al-
hanim (al-Hafiz and Ibrahim 2011; al-Zayat 2011) in a reference to the role of Suzanne 
Mubarak, the former first lady, in pushing for these laws (Badran 2012). In 1979, when 
President Sadat adopted unprecedented reforms for the status of women in the family, 
Islamists called it ‘Jihan’s law’, portraying it as top-down and undemocratic reforms. But this 
description overlooks the struggle launched by Egyptian feminist movement since the 
beginning of the 20th century and the role of civil society over the past three decades in 
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pushing these reforms onto the public platform.311 Moreover, the MB’s male and female 
leaders were not satisfied with the performance of the National Council for Women 
(NCW) 312  and the National Council for Motherhood and Childhood 313 , linking both 
institutions and their members with the legal reforms adopted in the Personal Status Law and 
Child Law. The MB as I explain in detail in the following sections rejected these reforms. It 
was also one of its declared goals to dissolve these institutions and replace them with what 
they called ‘the National Council for Family’ (Abu al-Nasr 2012; Helmi 2012; Egypt 
Independent 2013a).           
 
In their reactions to the 2013 UN conference, the MB (2013) and the International Union of 
Muslim Scholars (2013) headed by al-Qaradawi reiterated the common Islamist position that 
women’s rights in Islam are based on complementarity of roles between men and women as 
the way to achieve peace and harmony in the family. They blamed the UN for propagating an 
agenda that according to them is harmful to the integrity of families, declaring these 
conferences a ‘continuation of the civilizational and cultural invasion of the Muslim world’. 
They attacked CEDAW, considering its provisions incompatible with the religious beliefs 
and laws of Muslim peoples, refusing any calls to withdraw the reservations made by Muslim 
states to CEDAW.  
 
Moreover, these statements have urged Muslim states to be united in their defence of Islam 
and shari‘a. As in the statement made by Islamist scholars in 1995, the MB (2013) questioned 
the religious piety of Muslim feminists and human rights defenders by calling on them to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311 For detailed overview of the story of these reforms and the role of Egyptian feminists and civil society see Fawzy (2000); 
Zulfakar (2008); Sharafeldin (2013).   
312 NCW is composed of 30 members appointed by the President. Presidential Decree No.90/2000 Establishing the National 
Council for Women, Official Gazette no.5bis of 8 February 2000.     
313 Presidential Decree No.54/1988 Establishing the National Council for Motherhood and Childhood, Official Gazette no.5 
of 4 February 1988.     
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‘commit to their religion and morals of their communities and the foundations of good social 
life and not be deceived with misleading calls to decadent modernization and paths of 
subversive immorality’. This position was condemned by the NCW (2013a; 2013b; 2013c) 
which advocated for possible liberal interpretations of Islamic sources from within traditional 
Islamic law to show the possibility of expanding women’s rights in Egypt. However, in its 
statements, the NCW did not go further to challenge discrimination against women on certain 
issues like inheritance, divorce and the marital responsibilities between men and women. 
Despite the important roles played by this institution to improve the status of women in the 
Egyptian society, its alignment with scholars from al-Azhar and the state put certain political 
limitations on its advocacy.  
 
To conclude, the approach of the MB to the international women’s’ rights movement as a 
threat to Islamic values and Muslim identity has overshadowed any constructive engagement 
between the group and its scholars, with women’s rights defenders or international treaties. 
The group, instead, has been occupied by proposing alternative frameworks for women rights 
in Islam that legitimise discrimination against women in the private and public spheres.       
 
2.  The Reform of Personal Status Law    
In this section, I address selected issues on the status of women in the family. I primarily 
focus on personal status laws since the unequal status between men and women in the family 
provides grounds for many other forms of discrimination in society at large. If women are not 
seen as equal to men in the family, it is most likely that they are marginalised in public, even 
if the law establishes for gender equality in public life. As stated by Maktabi (2013:282) 
‘family law plays a crucial role in limiting the legal authority of female citizens as full 
members of the polity’. Throughout the 20th century and thanks to the long struggle of 
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Egyptian feminists, the rights of women to education, work and political participation have 
been recognised in Egyptian law. But there are still certain political and legal challenges to 
adequately effectuate these rights. Over the last decade, some women have been appointed in 
Egypt’s judiciary but although the law does not prohibit women from being appointed as 
judges, some judicial organs firmly insist on excluding women from the judiciary (HRW 
2010).  
 
On the political rights of women, the MB (1994:223) has maintained that shari‘a allows 
women to run for parliamentary elections and to occupy public posts. It was only in 1994 that 
this position was officially declared and according to the former member of the Guidance 
Bureau, ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Abu al-Futuh (2010:131-132), it was not easy to reach consensus on 
this issue among the leaders of the group. This position began to be articulated among the 
MB’s scholars as of the 1980s, by revisiting the teachings of the founder of the MB, Hassan 
al-Banna (2006:414). These maintained that the public roles of women can be accepted in 
very exceptional situations, but that women are not allowed to vote in public elections or to 
be appointed in any public positions. Their work, al-Banna maintained, should be limited to 
certain jobs that are suitable for women. But this still does not establish a path to full gender 
equality in public life; the roles of women in the family take precedence over their 
engagement in public activities, the approval of their husbands is a pre-condition, and women 
are excluded from running for the presidency of the state. Moreover, the MB’s position on 
the right of women to occupy judicial posts is ambivalent. Its document on the status of 
women in Islam stated that this issue is open for ijtihad, but it has not decided its juristic 
preference on this matter (the MB 1994).        
 
The Egyptian state and Islamists agree that women’s responsibilities towards their families 
can qualify their public roles. The MB (1994:220) believes, as above, that the women’s right 
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to work is conditioned on the approval of their husbands. This was the condition under 
Egypt’s law but it was softened in 1985 by a provision requiring the husband who refuses to 
allow his wife to work to argue before the court that ‘her use of this right is corrupted by 
abuse of the right, or that it is contrary to the interests of the family’.314  Similarly, according 
to Article 3 of the Minister of Interior Decision No.3937/1996, women were obliged to get 
permission from their husbands to have passports issued. In January 2000, the government 
wanted to allow women to apply for passports without this condition but this proposal was 
rejected by Parliament, and the MB opposed it as well.315 In November 2000, the SCC struck 
down Articles 8 and 11 of Law No.97/1959, which provided the Minister of the Interior with 
wide discretion to set conditions for issuing passports for all citizens.316 Consequently, the 
condition set by the Minister of the Interior was declared void and women became able to 
have passports issued, although their husbands still can challenge that before courts. This 
background shows that the restriction of the participation of women in public life is 
connected with discriminatory family regulations. 
 
From the promulgation of Law No.25/1929 until the 1970s, there were several attempts to 
reform personal status laws but all ended without success. These initiatives met by resistance 
from the state, al-Azhar and Islamists (Najjar 1988:318-322). Certain developments occurred 
over the last three decades that have since renewed the debate on legal reform, including the 
emergence of the international women’s rights movement. International dynamics such as the 
UN Decade for Women (1975-1985), the ratification of CEDAW by Egypt on 18 September 
1981 and the regular organisation of international conferences on women have pushed the 
language of women’s rights and gender equality to the front. This has coincided with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Article 1 of Law No. 25/1920 Amended by Law No.100/1985.  
315 Official Records of the People Assembly, Report no.23 of 27 January 2000, pp.15-18.   
316 Supreme Constitutional Court Case No.243/21, 4 November 2000.  
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development of Egypt’s human rights movement and the establishment of women’s rights 
NGOs (Zulficar 2008).  
 
Additionally, starting from the second half of the 1970s, Egypt began to increase its political 
and economic ties with the West and international financial institutions. This political shift 
prompted the state to sponsor certain reforms in the area of women’s rights to improve its 
international image and to also accommodate domestic economic and social transformation in 
the country (Hatem 1994; Al-Ali 2000:80-81; Maktabi 2013:287-289). Another factor that 
should be considered is the roles played by Egypt’s first ladies Jihan al-Sadat and Suzann 
Mubarak, who sponsored some of the reforms undertaken since 1979. But to legitimise these 
reforms, the state under former presidents Sadat and Mubarak had to mobilise supporters 
from al-Azhar (Najjar 1988). The reach of these reforms, however, was constrained by the 
configuration of political alliances in the country (Zubaida 2005:171-173).   
 
The MB and other Islamists became influential in the political scene in the 1970s and they 
adhered to a very conservative agenda towards women. The state’s alignment with al-Azhar 
was politically necessary to counter Islamists but it also set limits to the reform processes. 
The state could not always guarantee the support of al-Azhar. For instance, al-Azhar joined 
Islamists in 1994 in their opposition to the gender agenda of the ICPD (Moustafa 2000:13).  
The SCC has meanwhile backed the reforms initiated by the government over the past three 
decades, finding a middle ground between the liberal agenda of women’s rights movement 
and the hardline agenda of Islamists.  But it has not challenged the hierarchal relations 
between husbands and wives in the family (Abu Odeh 2004:1193-1145). In their judgements 
in the 1990s and 2000s, the SCC held that the unilateral pronouncement of divorce is an 
absolute right of the husband, but supported all legal reforms aimed at empowering women to 
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obtain judicial divorce.317 It also held that polygyny cannot be prohibited or restricted but 
supported the legal provision that allowed women to seek divorce for harm in case of 
polygyny.318 This reasoning, while supportive for previous reforms, does not help expand 
women’s rights. The previous analysis shows that there have been increasing opportunities 
for advocating women’s rights in Egypt over the last three decades and this has led to certain 
tangible reforms, but there have been also immense institutional, intellectual and political 
challenges that constrain the scope for more reforms to realise gender equality. In the 
following sections, I explore some specific issues as case studies.       
  
2.1 The Debate on Polygyny 
The Qur’an (4:3) allows men to marry up to four wives. But the interpretation of this verse 
and the possible forms of its implementation in Muslim family laws has been a contentious 
issue among Muslim scholars. The Qur’an (4:3;129) requires men to be just with their wives 
and yet in another verse, (4:129) states that men will never be able to be just. Verse (4:3) was 
originally concerned with the treatment of female orphans. It proposed that their male 
guardians who were responsible for managing their wealth could marry up to four of them so 
they would maintain them and care about their wealth (Wadud 1999:76-77). However, 
Muslim scholars have disagreed on whether polygyny is permitted in Islam under all 
circumstances or only to meet exceptional situations. There have been also different views on 
how men can deal justly with their wives (Ali 1997:141-143), and whether this just a moral 
duty or entails remedy for its breach (Coulson 1964:19).      
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 Supreme Administrative Court, Case No.5257/43, 28 December 1997.  
318 Supreme Constitutional Court, Case No.35/9, 14 August 1994.  
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In the end of the 19th century and early 20th century, Mohammad ‘Abduh and Qasim Amin 
were outspoken against polygyny and openly called for its restriction. While he was serving 
as the grand mufti of Egypt, ‘Abduh was of the opinion that it is within the powers of the 
ruler to restrict polygyny by allowing husbands to obtain a judicial permission to marry 
another wife, only if his first wife is infertile. ‘Abduh developed an original juristic view 
without being limited by the consensus of traditional Muslim jurists. He argued that the 
Qur’an tends to gradually restrict polygyny, and admits that justice between wives can rarely 
happen, concluding that the Qur’an leaves the door open to restrict polygyny in accordance to 
changing social conditions. According to ‘Abduh if polygyny was deemed useful at the time 
of early Muslims, it has negative implications in our modern times for Muslim families and 
the whole society. He added that religion is revealed for the interests of human beings and it 
is one of its primary goals to avert harm. Therefore, ‘Abduh concluded, one cannot accept 
polygyny without strict conditions in our times (‘Umara 1997:113-120). In his writings, 
Qasim Amin (2012) followed the same line of arguments, but Egypt’s legislators in the 20th 
century did not follow this progressive opinion.  
 
In contrast, The Tunisian Personal Status Law of 1956 prohibits polygyny based on a 
progressive interpretation of the Qur’anic verses on polygyny (Welchman 2007:78; Jansen 
2007:205). According to the 2004 Moroccan Family Code, polygyny can be permitted by 
judges on exceptional grounds and provided that courts are comfortable that men can treat 
their wives justly. Women can obtain judicial divorce if they do not agree that their husbands 
marry another wife (Jansen 2007:203). Many Islamic feminists and Muslim reformers have 
maintained that the institution of polygyny was part of the social-cultural life of Arabs at the 
time of the revelation and it is not acceptable in our modern times (Abu-Zayd 2004:226-228; 
Wadud 1999:76-82).  
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In this section I argue that the MB and its scholars have opted for the most conservative view 
on polygyny and obstructed all possibilities to reform polygyny law in Egypt. Hassan al-
Banna (1944) wrote that the government can intervene to ensure that men treat their wives 
justly. He did not explain how this would be implemented in reality but it is most likely that 
he meant that women could complain about their husbands before judges if they are not 
treated justly. His subsequent opposition to any reforms aiming to restrict polygyny provides 
evidence for this conclusion.  
 
In the 1940s, al-Banna condemned a draft law presented by Mohammad Aluba Pasha, the 
Minister of Social Affairs, by which husbands would first have to obtain permission from a 
judge who should assess their financial capacity and their ability to maintain more than one 
wife. This proposed law would have allowed the first wife to obtain divorce if she rejected a 
second marriage by her husband. In its official magazine, the MB rejected this draft, stating 
that it flagrantly clashed with the Qur’an, and that if it was applied, it would increase illicit 
sexual relations. It urged the government to encourage marriage to honour women rather than 
restrict what has been ordained by God (Amin 2006: 155-156). The MB and its scholars 
followed this thinking against another attempt to reform polygyny law in 1979, as I explain 
further below.  
 
MB scholars (al-Bahnasawi 1986:193-194; al-Qaradawi 2005a:118; al-Khuli 1980:109-126; 
al-Juhari and Khayal 2000:117-119) have maintained that men can marry up to four wives 
provided that they treat them justly. The definition of justice by this group of scholars is 
limited to material justice, meaning that men must provide their wives with equal 
maintenance, housing needs and sexual treatment. According to this view, the 
acknowledgment in the Qur’an (4:129) that men will not be able to treat their wives justly 
does not cover the psychological aspects of the marital relationships and this is beyond the 
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ability of human beings, so men will certainly have some emotional preferences for one wife 
over another. According to them, there are specific cases where polygyny becomes a mercy 
for men and women, such as the infertility of the wife, the inability of the wife to sexually 
satisfy her husband, and in cases where the number of women exceeds the number of men in 
society.   
 
Two contradictions can be highlighted in this reasoning. Firstly, the reasons suggested to 
justify polygyny can be applied equally to men and women so the emphasis that polygyny is 
a mercy and moral and humanist option, pertains only to the needs of men and ignores 
women. Secondly, those scholars have claimed that they believe that polygyny is not the 
norm in Islam but it is ordained by God to treat exceptional circumstances. However, they 
contradict themselves when they refuse to even restrict the practice of polygyny by limiting 
its grounds or requesting men to get the approval of judges before having a second wife, 
preferring to leave this condition as a moral guidance, without being regulated by the state. 
Abu Shuqa (2011:311) was the only scholar who stated that judges can check the ability of 
men to achieve justice before they engage in polygynous marriage, but he was concerned 
only about the fair treatment of wives but not the restriction of polygyny itself.  
 
The MB and its scholars have opposed considering polygyny ipso facto harm that allows 
women to be divorced without being obliged to prove that polygyny has caused them harm 
(al-Bahnasawi 1984:144). This approach was followed in Egypt for a short period under Law 
No.44/1979 which was ‘consider[ing] the mere occurrence of a second marriage without the 
wife’s consent as constituting injury’. Women were able therefore to obtain judicial divorce 
within one year of their knowledge of the second marriage (Najjar 1988:329). The 
explanatory memorandum of this Law argued that this provision was based on the idea of 
judicial divorce for harm articulated in Maliki and Hanbali jurisprudence. According to this 
  
 289 
view, the definition of harm is left to societal changes and customs. It also pointed out that 
the emphasis in verse 2:229 obliges men to ‘retain women in honour or leave them in 
kindness’ and that all actions should avert harm in accordance with the Prophetic 
teachings.319  
 
The MB dismissed this reasoning, arguing that if men are committed to treating their wives 
justly, judicial divorce for harm is not relevant. The commentaries published about this 
provision in the MB’s magazines considered that allowing women to obtain judicial divorce 
if their husbands have engaged in a second marriage is a restriction on the licence provided to 
men by God. According to them, this provision was a punishment for men and a green light 
for them to commit adultery (al-Muti‘i 1979; Shalabi 1979; al-Fiqi 1979; al-Jamal 1986a). 
Al-Bahnasawi (2003:115) held that the provision on polygyny in Law No. 44/1977 is void as 
it treats something permitted by the texts of the Qur’an as if it were causing harm.  
 
The approach chosen in Law 44/1979 to restrict polygyny did not survive, and Law 
No.100/1985 adopted another model by allowing women to obtain judicial divorce within a 
year of their knowledge of the polygynous marriage, provided that they prove that this 
marriage has caused them harm.320 The determination of what constitutes harm is left to the 
discretion of judges. In 1994, the SCC held that polygyny is permitted in the Qur’an and that 
the legislator cannot prohibit or restrict it but the state can ensure that polygynous husbands 
do not deprive their wives of their marital rights under Islamic law.321 According to the SCC, 
the harm that can be invoked by first wives should be ‘actual and demonstrable not imagined 
or assumed and connected with the second marriage’.322 This definition resembles the view 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 Explanatory Memorandum of Law 44/1979 on Personal Status Laws, Official Gazette no.25 of 21 June 1979.   
320 Article 11bis of Law No. 25/1929 Amended by Law No.100 of 1985.  
321 Supreme Constitutional Court, Case No.35/9, 1994.  
322 ibid.  
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of the MB and its scholars that the lack of justice between wives stand as a reason for women 
to initiate judicial divorce for harm.    
 
Law No. 100/1985 presented a limited solution for the problem of polygyny. In August 2000, 
it became possible for women to stipulate in their marriage contracts that that their husbands 
cannot marry another wife without written permission from them. 323  The SCC had 
foregrounded this by ruling in 1994 that the principle of freedom of contract in Islam allows 
women to place conditions in the marriage contract.324 Some scholars have proposed this 
route as a solution to many possible tensions between Muslim family law and IHRL (Baderin 
2003:143). Salim al-Bahnasawi (1984:144) suggested this option as an alternative to the 
approach followed in Law 44/1979. But this proposal overlooks possible pressure on women 
not to stipulate conditions in their marriage contracts even if the law allows for that (Sezgin 
2013:151).  Female leaders of the Muslim Sisters argue that allowing women to give a lot of 
conditions in their marriage contracts discourages men to marry (Mahmoud 2011). This was 
also the argument made by Sheikh al-Azhar Jad al-Haq in 1994 when women’s rights groups 
were struggling to implement the new marriage contract form (Zulfakar 2008:240).     
 
For some Muslim activists and intellectuals, the prohibition of polygyny is the ideal solution, 
following the model of Tunisia. According to Abu Zayd (2004:228), arguments developed to 
justify the practice of polygyny ‘simplify men and women in their biological formation and 
sexual functions and draw on these arguments to legitimise an inferior status of women and 
ignore their status as human beings with equal dignity’. If the total prohibition of polygyny is 
not acceptable now in society, he asserts that it can be allowed in very exceptional cases 
defined in the law and after the approval of judges, as suggested by Mohammad ‘Abduh.  	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324 Supreme Constitutional Court, Case No.35/9, 1994.  
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However, the SCC’s theory on polygyny does not achieve either of the two options. The SCC 
was clear that the state cannot intervene to ban or restrict polygyny but can only avert its 
potential harmful implications for first wives. This supports my argument that as long as laws 
must be legitimated under Islamic law, the debate on the scope of human rights is constrained 
and views are presented in a mutually exclusive manner since different actors present their 
understanding of certain rights as the only possible and legitimate one under Islam. Even if 
reformers become able to convince the state to endorse their liberal proposals, other 
conservatives will continue their struggle using absolute religious arguments to reverse 
reforms. This contestation will continue in Egypt and other Muslim states unless these states 
become open to the conception of a secular state, whose constitution and laws are devised 
based on inclusive and rational debate open for all people regardless of their religious 
convictions.  
  
2.2 The Debate on Khul‘ 
Under Laws Nos. 25/1920 and 25/1929 as amended by Law No. 100/1985, the wife can 
obtain judicial divorce on certain grounds based on the discretion of judges (Qassem 
2002:25). To adopt these reforms, Egypt’s legislators selected opinions from different 
schools of law to avoid the rigid positions of the Hanafis on divorce (Welchman 2004:3-5). 
Article 11 of Law No.25/1929 amended by law No.100/1985 allows judges to grant a wife a 
divorce even if she fails to prove harm after exhausting attempts of reconciliation and after ‘it 
becomes obvious to the court that the spouses cannot live together’. These reforms have 
however failed to achieve a balance in the marital relationship. While men are able to divorce 
their wives unilaterally by the pronunciation of talaq, women have to engage a long and 
potentially expensive process of litigation with uncertain results (Chemais 1996:52-74). 
Egyptian feminists and women’s rights groups continued their struggle to improve the status 
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of women in divorce. This was the purpose of Law No.1/2000 whose Article 20 allows 
women to obtain judicial divorce known in Islamic legal traditions as khul‘,  even though 
their husbands do not agree, provided that women return the dower and waive all of their 
remaining financial rights.325    
 
The People’s Assembly witnessed a heated debate on this article. It was not only Islamists 
who opposed it but other non-Islamist forces as well (Fawzy 2004:63-67). The debate on this 
Article shows how immensely difficult it is in Egypt to modify the unequal status between 
men and women in the family. Both the opponents and proponents of the law invoked 
shari‘a-based arguments. While the draft law was being discussed in the Parliament, al-
Sha‘ab newspaper, the mouthpiece of the Labour Party (Fawzy 2004:67) and the MB 
newspaper Afaq Arabiyya (2000) launched a vehement campaign against the law, stating that 
it was part of a foreign plot to destroy the Muslim family.                
 
The MB established its rejection of Article 20 on the assumption that women in Islamic law 
cannot end the marriage contract by their unilateral will. One can track some different views 
in MB sources on whether the mutual consent of the spouses is a precondition of khul‘, or 
judges have discretionary powers to enforce it upon husbands if they are satisfied with the 
claims made by wives. But they all agree that women can only terminate their marriage 
contracts after decisions made by judges. MB sources invoke certain stereotypes about 
women to argue that divorce should lie in the hands of men. For instance, Amer al-Shamakh 
(2010:56) has claimed that: ‘Women are emotional and can easily take furious decisions with 
harmful implications for the family and its cohesion’. This view is expressed in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 Law No.1/2000 Concerning Rules and Procedures of Litigation in Matters of Personal Status, Official Gazette no.4bis of 
29 January 2000.  
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foundational sources on women in Islam written by MB scholars (al-Juhari and Khayal 
2000:126; al-Bahnasawi 1986:212; al-Qaradawi 2005a:112; Abu-Shuqa 2011:100-101). 
 
The dominant view of MB political leaders was that the consent of the husband is a pre-
condition for khul‘ in Islam. This was the position taken by the MB's representative in 
Parliament, Ali Fath al-Bab in January 2000.   In his statement before the People’s Assembly, 
he argued that Article 20 violates the Qur’anic doctrine of Qiwama, stating that ‘God ordains 
the privileges of men over women on certain matters for the benefit of the Muslim family and 
the society at large’.326 He held that on a sensitive issue like divorce, the state should follow 
the prevalent view in Islamic jurisprudence which says that khul‘ should be based on the 
mutual consent of the spouses, citing the views of the Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafi‘ and Zahiri 
schools.327 Al-Bab’s suggestion to choose the prevalent view among traditional Muslim 
jurists (ra’iy jumhur al-fuqaha’) would block many possible reforms of personal status laws. 
This proposal breaks with the methodology of eclectic choices from different schools of law 
followed by Egypt’s legislators since the early 20th century.  In its explanation of Article 2 of 
the 1971 Constitution, the SCC held that the state can opt for any juristic choice or practice 
ijtihad in any legal matter that is not regulated by a clear text from the Qur’an and Sunna or 
the consensus of Muslim jurists (Lombardi 2006:199-200).  
 
Accordingly, the SCC held in 2002 that Article 20 of Law No.1/2000 is compatible with 
Article 2 of the 1971 Constitution, arguing that while the practice of khul‘ is based on a clear 
text from the Qur’an 2:229, there was no consensus on its detailed procedures among 
traditional Muslim jurists. According to the Court, the first opinion in Islamic jurisprudence 
held that khul‘ should be concluded by the mutual consent of the spouses and the second 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 Official Records of the People Assembly, Report no.23 of 27 January 2000, pp.15.    
327ibid., pp.16-18.  
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opinion taken by the Maliki jurists was that judges can order the dissolution of marriage if 
women insisted. The Court held that since there was no consensus on this matter, the 
legislator could choose the opinion that preserves the interests of the spouses and averts 
harm. According to the SCC, marriage is based on mercy, and a wife cannot live with her 
husband against her will if she explicitly declares that, returns her dower and waives her 
financial rights from divorce. These goals will not be realised if the approval of the husband 
is made as a pre-condition for divorce by khul‘.328 One should note that the provision of khul‘ 
in Egypt’s law represents a new ijtihad, which did not typically conform to the Maliki view 
under which judges have discretionary powers to order divorce or not, whereas under Article 
20 judges have no options but to order divorce if a wife insists on it.329    
 
The views of leading female activists in the MB and FJP were consistent with the position 
taken by the MB in 2000. In a position paper on Egypt’s personal status laws, Hoda Abd al-
Mun‘im (2006) a leading member of the Muslim Sisters and one of the leaders of IICWC, 
rejected Article 20 of Law No.1/2000, arguing that Muslim jurists agreed that a husbands’ 
approval is a pre-condition for khul‘ and that this provision jeopardised the Qur’anic doctrine 
of the qiwama of husbands over their wives. According to her, the judicial divorce for harm 
is adequate to protect women. This statement ignored the difficulties met by women who 
chose to initiate judicial divorce for harm. Nevertheless, most leading MB scholars (Sabiq 
1973b:299, Abu-Shuqa 2011a:284, al-Khuli 1980:140-141, al-Bahnasawi 1986:213; al-
Qaradawi 2007c:199) maintained that khul‘ can be decided by judges if there is no mutual 
agreement on divorce and based on the request of wives, but provided that judges make an 
assessment for the circumstances of each case. So according to this view, judges are not 
obliged to enact khul‘ as stipulated in Article 20.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328Supreme Constitutional Court, Case No.243/21, 4 November 2000.  
329For a detailed discussion on the conditions of khul‘ in traditional Islamic jurisprudence, see Muhammad (2011) and al-
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The rise of Islamists after Mubarak has renewed the debate on the application of judicial 
khul‘ in Egypt. The official platforms of the FJP (2011a:112) and President Morsi (2012) 
promised to amend personal status laws to bring them in line with Islamic law without 
specifying which areas of law needed to be amended. However, statements from male and 
female leaders of the MB and FJP clearly demonstrate that the amendment of the khul‘ 
provision was on the agenda. In a paper presented to a conference held by the International 
Union of Muslim Scholars in Cairo on 27-28 July 2011, Saida Mahmoud (2011), the research 
director of IICWC and a well-known member of the Muslim Sisters, repeated the argument 
that Article 2 of Law No.1/2000 violates shari‘a because it bypasses the approval of husbands 
on divorce, a condition that has been upheld by most Muslim jurists, according to her. She 
was also critical of the fact that judges have no powers to ensure that women do not abuse the 
khul‘ provision. Mahmoud also claimed that ‘judicial khul‘  ‘had harmed Muslim families in 
Egypt’, arguing that it had increased the rate of divorce. Kamiliya Helmi, member of the 
Executive Bureau of FJP, stated that: ‘The time has come to review all personal status laws 
which have been intentionally corrupted to replace Islamic law with international treaties’. 
Amongst the legal provisions that needed to be amended according to Helmi was the 
provision on khul‘ and the prohibition of the registration of marriage for males and females 
under 18 years old (Jalhum 2011).  
 
In March 2012, Mohammad al-'Umda, an independent member of the 2012 Parliament with 
close ties to the MB, presented a draft law to remove Article 20 of Law No.1/2000. The 
explanatory memorandum of the draft law claimed that khul‘ divorce as stipulated in Article 
20 ‘was granted to satisfy the NCW, which was chaired by former first lady Suzanne 
Mubarak, allegedly to save women from persecution in eastern countries. Islamic shari‘a has 
been under siege since then’ (Egypt Independent 2012a). Commenting on the draft law, Abd 
al-Khaliq Sharif, the head of al-Da’wa Department of the MB stated that women’s resort to 
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khul‘ should be subjected to some checks (Sayd 2012). This draft law alerted the NCW and 
women’s rights groups that something they had gained after long struggle was at risk. Al-
Azhar and dar al-ifta’ joined the discussion in Parliament and strongly rejected al-Umda’s 
draft law, asserting that Article 20 is in line with Islamic law (al-Din 2012). In the end, the 
Islamist majority in the People’s Assembly ignored this draft law and stopped the discussion 
on this matter. This was most likely for tactical reasons as there were other urgent priorities at 
that time, first and foremost the drafting of the constitution. But Islamists’ opposition to 
Egypt’s personal status laws and the women’s rights movement has continued.  
 
One can argue that Islamists have not come up with persuasive arguments in their campaigns 
against khul‘ divorce. The point that Article 20 spoiled the family is ill founded. According to 
the NCW (2013d) in 2010, 85% of divorce were initiated by men based on their unchecked 
powers to divorce their wives unilaterally, 13% resulted from judicial divorce for harm, and 
khul‘ divorce amounted only to 2% of the total cases of divorce. The NCW (2013d) has 
shown that disputes over the payment of maintenance to women after divorce constituted 
81% of family cases. This number indicates the challenge met by many women after divorce 
to secure their financial rights. It should be also noted that unilateral divorce by men through 
the pronouncement of talaq is open to serious abuse. Women can find themselves unable to 
prove this talaq and in some cases their husbands conceal its occurrence. Women also face 
hardships when trying to obtain judicial divorce for harm, because judges treat similar cases 
of harm differently in accordance with the social and educational backgrounds of women 
(Sezgin 2013:149;HRW 2004:21).  
 
In its interaction with Egypt's personal status law, the MB has claimed that its main goal is to 
safeguard the stability of the family. Arguably, putting the whole system of divorce under 
judicial oversight would help achieve this stability more than what is currently applied in 
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Egypt. Being concerned with the abuse of the right of unilateral divorce by men, this proposal 
was made by early Muslim reformers. Mohmmad ‘Abduh (‘Umara 1997a:91-98) established 
his proposal on the clear moral message in the Qur’an and Sunna that divorce is not desirable 
and should be always the last resort, highlighting the Qur’anic emphasis on arbitration 
between the spouses before divorce (‘Umara 1997a:35). Following the same line of argument 
in his seminal book The Liberation of Women, Qasim Amin (2012:90-91) proposed that 
divorce is to be ordered only by judges after a set of procedures. According to his proposal, a 
husband who wants to divorce his wife should first inform a judge about the dispute between 
him and his wife. Then, the judge should attempt reconciliation between the spouses. If these 
attempts fail, the judge permits the husband to divorce his wife, but no divorce can be 
recognised unless it is pronounced before a judge with the presence of two witnesses. The 
draft law presented by Mohammad Aluba Pasha, the Minister of Social Affairs in 1944, 
stipulated that ‘a notary cannot register divorce before having a judicial decision of divorce 
by a judge’. The draft law did not invalidate divorce if it was pronounced by a husband 
without judicial permission, but punished this husband with a prison sentence of up to three 
months and a fine. The MB condemned this proposal (Amin 2006: 155-156).   
 
The need for these reforms has been debated in Egypt over the last five years. A clear 
example is the proposal developed by the Network of Women Rights Organisations to reform 
the Personal Status Law (NWRO) (2010).330 According to this proposal: ‘It is necessary to 
define divorce as the dissolution of the marital covenant that could be practised by both 
husband and wife, each according to their own conditions, under the supervision of the 
judiciary’. The proposal however offers many other legal options to reform the current 
system of divorce without directly calling for the legal invalidation of the unilateral 
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pronouncement of divorce by husbands and the equal treatment of the spouses. Perhaps this is 
for advocacy tactics to accommodate the conservative attitudes of state institutions and 
political forces, or the coalition is constrained by shari‘a reasoning. The Guide tries to 
develop different progressive legal options from within traditional Islamic law without 
challenging its methodological assumptions, as done by many other Muslim feminists.331   
 
One should note that these NGOs have been working in a very challenging and tumultuous 
political context. After the 2011 Revolution and under the MB, the task was no longer to 
improve the current legal framework to protect the family but to shield its limited 
achievements from regression. The likelihood of feminists and human rights defenders 
transforming the system of divorce in Egypt and putting it under judicial oversight is very 
low in the absence of wide social and political supporters. Pursuant to the analysis provided 
in this chapter, Islamists would absolutely oppose this proposal, which goes beyond their 
imagination regarding the relationship between men and women in the family. But one can 
also recall the short-lived experience of Law No.44/1979 whose Article 1 stipulated a 
procedural restriction over men’s power to divorce their wives unilaterally by the 
pronunciation of talaq by stating that: 
 
 
The consequences of divorce would become effective as far as the wife was 
concerned only upon her being officially notified of the divorce. The Wife 
would be considered officially notified either by being present at the time 
of certification, or by receiving a copy of the divorce certificate from the 
court official (muhdir) (Najjar: 1988:327).  
 
Najjar (1988:328) reported that ‘conservative Muslim scholars rejected the argument 
that a divorce must be certified in order to become valid. They argued that the 
unequivocal pronouncement of repudiation by the husband is sufficient’. Law 
100/1985 amended this strict procedure by ‘constraining this suspension of the 	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financial effects of divorce . . . to circumstances in which the husband deliberately 
conceals it from his wife’  (Welchman 2007:123) The SCC may not also support the 
judicial oversight of a husband’s divorce since it is not in line with its jurisprudence. 
The SCC held that unilateral divorce by men is an eternal ruling of shari‘a but it 
confirmed that Islamic law does not reject the right of women to obtain judicial 
divorce. Explaining why the Qur’an entrusts men with this power, the SCC 
maintained that men are more competent and wiser than women to consider the 
serious consequences of divorce.332  
 
However, the Court could possibly review this position under different political 
settings. The claim that men are necessarily more capable than women to decide on 
divorce would have allowed the SCC to join the MB’s concerns and strike down 
Article 20 of Law No.1/2000, as under this article judges order the termination of 
marriage if wives insist without being obliged to prove harm. Women are obliged by 
the law to engage in reconciliation attempts, but the decision is for her to make in 
the end. Yet the SCC found Article 20 to be compatible with Islamic law. The 
flexible positions of the SCC may allow for revisions in the future, provided that the 
state sponsors these reforms.        
 
2.3 Child Marriage 
International human rights treaties do not provide for a specific minimum age for marriage. 
Article 16(2) of CEDAW states that: ‘The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no 
legal effect, and all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a 
minimum age for marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an official registry 	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compulsory’. According to Article 1 of the CRC ‘a child means every human being below the 
age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child majority is attained earlier’. 
But the CRC is silent on the issue of child marriage. The language of the two articles 
provides a space for states to allow marriage under the age of eighteen. In the 
Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of 
Marriages, the UN General Assembly sets the age of fifteen as the minimum age of marriage 
(Hashemi 2008:224). As concluded by Askari (1998) there is no adequate protection against 
early marriage for girls in the two conventions. Yet child marriage for girls is seen to have 
‘devastating even life-threatening consequences’ (UNFPA 2012:11). It has been widely 
considered a harmful practice with negative implications for children’s physical and 
psychological formation and their enjoyment of human rights in general (UNFPA 2012).  
 
Egypt’s law has raised the age of marriage through a ‘procedural route’ (Welchman 2007:62) 
whereby marriages below the minimum age may be valid but their contracts are not officially 
registered, leaving the spouses without means to have judicial recourse for protection. Article 
367 of Law No.78/1931 set the minimum age for concluding a marriage contract or 
registering the contract at sixteen for females and eighteen for males. Article 99(5) of the 
same law disallowed courts from examining claims arising from a marriage contract of males 
under the age of eighteen and female under the age of sixteen at the time of the hearing. 
According to the same article, the existence of an official marriage document was a pre-
condition for courts to hear marriage disputes if one of the spouses denied the marriage. 
Article 17 of Law No.1/2000 added that any written evidence of marriages is sufficient for 
claims of judicial divorce in the absence of an official marriage contract. This addition was 
important for females who have married under the legal age without registering the marriage 
contract but who for whatever reason wanted to obtain judicial divorce. In 2001, the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed its concerns at the spread of early marriage 
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in Egypt, requesting the state to prescribe an equal minimum age of marriage for boys and 
girls.333 This observation was considered in Law No.126/2008 which does not allow for the 
registration of a marriage of males and females under the age of eighteen.334  
 
Nevertheless, Egypt has failed to eradicate the practice of child marriage in Egypt and the 
state has not been yet able to strictly confront its legal loopholes. According to a survey 
published in 2012 by the NCW, 22% of Egyptian girls were married before the age of 
eighteen, particularly in rural areas (El Masry 2012). Families are able to circumvent the 
legal barriers through concluding informal or customary marriage contracts (zawaj ‘urfi).335 
Poverty is widely blamed for the spread of child marriage. It has pushed many poor families 
to offer their girl children to rich old men in return for a payment to girls’ families in what is 
called in the media the ‘business marriage’ (zawaj al-safqa), or the ‘tourist marriage’ (al-
zawaj al-siyahi), because it mostly involve non-Egyptian bridegrooms. Some Egyptian 
commentators consider these types of marriages ‘child prostitution in the guise of a marriage’ 
(El-Masry 2012). These marriages are usually consumed for a short period of time.336    
 
Consensual sexual intercourse between adults and children is an offence under Article 369 of 
the Penal Code No.58/1937 but this provision is not applied to valid marriages between 
adults and children. The spread of child marriage in certain areas of Egypt is also backed by 
long cultural traditions and customs. The reference to Islamic law is also clear in this debate 
and it is one of the reasons that the state is unable to go further in fighting child marriages. In 
traditional Islamic law, as soon as males and females reach the age of sexual maturity 
(bulugh), they are eligible for marriage (Shaham 1997:51). In an official fatwa, the former 	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334 Article 5 of Law 126/2008.   
335 Zawaj ’urfi is ‘unregistered marriages concluded outside official procedures’ (Welchman 2007:231). 
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mufti of Egypt Jad al-Haq (1980), held that in Islamic law there is no minimum age of 
marriage, adding that it is within the legitimate powers of the ruler to set a minimum age for 
the official registration of marriage, but this is not a condition for the validity of marriage in 
Islam. 
  
In its reaction to the 57th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women, the MB 
(2013) condemned international efforts to raise the age of marriage. This is the position that 
has been consistently taken by the MB over the last decade. It was clearly expressed in the 
parliamentary discussions of early drafts of Law No.126/2008 Amending the Child Law 
No.12/1996. One of the amendments raised the registration of marriages for females from 
sixteen to eighteen years old. The first argument invoked by the MB’s parliamentarians 
against this amendment was based on the dominant view among traditional Muslim jurists 
that the age of sexual maturity is sufficient for marriage for males and females. They argued 
that early marriage is a safeguard against moral corruption and the spread of illicit sex in the 
society. This prompted the government to reiterate in Parliament that early marriage was not 
prohibited but only the registration of marriage contracts (Al-Markaz al-I‘lami li al-Ikhwan 
al-Muslimin 2010). This statement reveals the contradictory approach followed by successive 
Egyptian governments since early 20th century on child marriage. This approach has aimed to 
challenge the legal consequences of this marriage but not to abolish it.   
 
In a position paper on its positions on the Draft Child Law, the IICWC (2008) rejected this 
amendment. Drawing on the views of a group of Azhari scholars, the paper asserted that 
males and females should be allowed to marry if they reach the age of sexual maturity and 
have financial capacity to start a family. The document added that ‘teenagers are exposed to 
different kinds of sexual attractions and marriage stands as a legitimate solution for that in 
Islam’. According to the document, the state should not obstruct early marriages. Otherwise, 
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it forbids what God permits. The Islamic Charter on the Family does not make a statement on 
the marriage age but it asserts in Article 23 that ‘Islamic shari‘a encourages youth to get 
married early to prevent moral and sexual deviance’ (IICWC 2007). In its commentary on the 
provisions of CEDAW, IICWC (2009) expressed shock that states under the CEDAW should 
tolerate extra marital sexual relationships and provide health services for women who engage 
in these relationships, but consider it correct to set a minimum age of marriage.  
 
For IICWC, Islam has a different moral philosophy because it ‘encourages Muslims to marry 
early to protect them from sinful behaviours’. Another argument invoked by the MB 
Parliamentarians in 2008, and President Morsi (2012) in his electoral campaigns, is that the 
prohibition of the registration of early marriage contracts under Egypt’s law deprives females 
who engage in early marriage of their legal rights, and increases cases of customary 
marriages (zawaj ‘urfi). According to this view, the solution is to register these contracts. 
This proposal may seem concerned with the protection of females married under the legal 
age. However, it would reinforce child marriage and undermine previous efforts to eliminate 
it.  
 
This strict position taken by the MB and its female leaders at IICWC against setting an age 
for marriage has lagged behind views among other Egyptian scholars who have supported the 
legal steps taken by the state to raise the official registration of marriage of males and 
females to eighteen years old, including the former mufti of Egypt from 2003 to 2013, Sheik 
’Ali Jum‘a (Soliman 2010). Moreover, in his programme at al-Jazeera TV, Sheikh Yusuf al-
Qaradawi (2010e) stated that the age of marriage is determined by societies according to their 
social and cultural conditions, and that early marriage is permitted in the Qur’an and sunna, 
but the ruler can restrict it to avert expected harm. According to him, ‘child marriage is not 
appropriate in our present times as it may not suit the physical conditions of girls and early 
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marriage disrupts their opportunity of attending education’. He then agreed that the age of 
marriage be set at eighteen years old in Egypt. But it seems that al-Qaradawi reversed this 
position in 2013, or was under pressure from his allies to revisit this position. This is evident 
in the declaration he released in his capacity as the leader of the International Union for 
Muslim Scholars (2013) on 27 February 2013 protesting the 57 session of the UN 
Commission on the Status of Women, where he attacked international efforts to prohibit 
marriage for males and females under 18 years old. In conclusion, despite the diversity of 
juristic views on the issue of early marriage, with increasing authority supporting its 
prohibition, the leadership of MB has been unwilling to review its position on this issue and 
has sought to undermine state efforts, in the name of Islam, to challenge this phenomenon in 
Egypt.  
3. Female Genital Mutilation   
According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), there are different types of FGM, 
known also as Female Genital Circumcision. It includes ‘the total or partial removal of the 
clitoris or the total or partial removal of the clitoris and the labiae minora’ (al-Hadi 1998:23). 
The third type of FGM, the most severe one, is found historically in a very limited number of 
regions, and involves the radical excision of the external genitalia, including the labia, and 
infibulation (Berkey 1996:27). In some classical sources of Islamic law, FGM is known as 
khifad, the act of reducing or shortening the clitoris. These sources distinguish between 
khifad as a moderate circumcision, which – according to the source – is either obligatory or 
recommended under Islamic law, and other forms of severe circumcision which is rejected 
under Islamic law. But this view is contested by many contemporary Muslim scholars who 
view FGM as a mere cultural custom that is neither recommended nor obligatory in Islam.  
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The practice of FGM has been widely spread in Egypt. The state started to take measures 
against it in the 1990s but, in the beginning these measures were met by resistance from the 
leadership of al-Azhar. The then-Mufti of Egypt, Sheikh al-Azhar, Jad al-Haq held that ‘if 
girls are not circumcised as the Prophet said, they will be subjected to situations that will lead 
them to immorality and corruption’ (cited in Moustafa 2000:13). However, successive leaders 
of al-Azhar and muftis supported the state effort to ban the practice of FGM in Egypt, and 
Egyptian civil society has been playing a key role in the local and international campaigning 
against FGM (al-Hadi 1998; Sa‘id 2004).      
  
In 1996, the Minister of Health, Isma‘il Salam, issued a decree banning the operation of FGM 
at public or private hospitals. This decree did not please some sectors in society, including 
Islamist lawyers, who challenged it before the administrative justice. But the Supreme 
Administrative Court held that the decree was the prerogative of the Minister of Health, that 
the practice of FGM is not supported by clear evidence from Islamic sources, and that the 
discretionary powers of the government enabled it to prohibit the practice, to preserve public 
interest (Balz 2000). While the practice of FGM has continued in Egypt, the rate reduced 
from 97% in 1995 to 71% in 2005 according to UNICEF (2008).  
          
Jonathan Berkey (1996:26) presents a deep socio-legal and historical analysis of the 
articulation of FGM in pre-modern Islamic sources, concluding that ‘the discourse within the 
juristic traditions . . . generally approved of female excision, and in some cases held it to be 
mandated by Islamic law’. For instance, FGM is recommended for the Hanbalis and 
obligatory for the Shafi‘s (Berkey 1996:24-25). The Andalusian Maliki jurists Abu al-Walid 
Muhammad Ibn Rushed held that ‘excision for women is a noble deed (makrama) although 
not an absolute requirement of the faith’ (Berkey 1996:26).  
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Berkey (1996:21) points out that ‘unlike the circumcision of boys, which is a nearly universal 
custom among Muslims, the practice of female excision is historically attested to in only 
parts of the [Muslim] world’. Some non-Muslim societies have practiced it for a long time, 
especially in Africa. In Egypt, FGM has been common among Muslim and non-Muslims 
alike and it was known in Ancient Egypt and Sudan. Consequently Berkey (1996:27) notes 
that ‘there is compelling evidence . . . that medieval Muslims, or at least those Muslims 
among whom female excision was practiced, perceived the custom as one that had religious 
sanction’. According to Berkey (1996:31) ‘a pre-Islamic practice such as female excision 
might survive the transition to the new religion by attaching itself to, and constructing a 
justification on, some ethical concern of the new faith’. This is evident in the arguments made 
by some Muslim jurists like Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, who viewed 
FGM as a means to control women’s sexuality and ensure their virtue, while circumcision of 
boys was a ritual of purification (Berkey 1996:31).  
 
Thus over the past decade, the MB has resisted the prohibition or criminalisation of FGM in 
Egypt and this hardline position has continued to the present time despite the increasing 
support provided by al-Azhar and dar al-ifta’ to the state in its efforts to eradicate this 
phenomenon. Al-Qaradawi has come up with a new thought on this matter by declaring that 
nothing in Islam opposes the prohibition of FGM if its harmful impact has become obvious. 
By this statement he joins similar positions taken by other influential scholars of Islamic law 
in Egypt like Mohammad Sayid Tantawi (2009), ‘Ali Jum‘a (2007a) and Mohammad Salim 
Al-Awa (2007). Al-Qaradawi declared this position in an international conference convened 
in Cairo in November 2006 by dar al-ifta’ and attended by a group of Egyptian and foreign 
Muslim scholars, doctors and physicians. The conference was held at the University of al-
Azhar under the auspices of the former mufti Ali Jum‘a.    
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The Qur’an is silent on FGM. The Shafi‘i jurists who argued that circumcision is obligatory 
for male and female Muslims concluded that Verse 16:123 indicates that circumcision should 
be followed by the followers of the Prophet Ibrahim. But al-Qaradawi (2007b:6-8) rejected 
this interpretation, arguing that the Qur’an in this verse is basically concerned about 
Ibrahim’s call for the oneness of God and not specific rulings like circumcision.  
 
Some traditions are cited by traditional and contemporary jurists who have maintained that 
FGM is obligatory, recommended or permitted under Islamic law. Three hadiths are most 
common in their literature, but their authenticity is questionable and they are classified as 
weak hadiths. The first hadith states that ‘ablution is obligatory when the two circumcisions 
(al-khitanan) meet’. For instance, Ibn Qudama concluded that ‘this hadith is an indicator that 
women were circumcised’ (Berkey 1996:22). Al-Qaradawi (2007b:10) does not agree with 
this understanding, noting that this hadith may indicate that circumcision was conducted for 
males and females among Arabs but the hadith cannot stand as evidence to consider FGM as 
obligatory or recommended. He also gave another possibility for interpreting this hadith, 
pointing to al-taghlib as an Arabic language rule whereby one expression indicates two 
different things at the same time, like the word al-Qamaran which refers to the moon and 
sun.    
 
The second hadith narrates that the Prophet told a woman who was conducting FGM ‘do not 
severely cut but shorten [the clitoris], for that is more favourable for the women and 
preferable for the husband’. Even though this hadith is considered authentic, the Prophet was 
advising the woman on a temporal matter for not causing other women harm while nothing 
indicates that the Prophet introduced FGM as obligatory or recommended act (al-Qaradawi 
2007b:11). The third tradition mentioned by Ibn Hanbal ‘described circumcision as Sunna for 
men and a noble deed (makrama) for women’ (Berkey 1996:25). Al-Qaradawi argues that 
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regardless of the authenticity of this hadith, it indicates that FGM was considered a noble 
deed under customs, but not shari‘a. Al-Qaradawi then concludes that FGM was not 
obligatory, prohibited or recommended but permitted or neutral (mubah). Since it is mubah, it 
is not appropriate to stigmatise the action or those who conduct it as long as they follow the 
advice of the Prophet to circumcise moderately. However, al-Qaradawi is clear that the 
decision to prohibit or permit FGM is left to doctors.   
 
The dispute over FGM was renewed in 2008 when the government criminalised FGM in the 
Penal Code.337 In 2007, an Egyptian girl had died as a result of FGM and there was strong 
pressure on the government to criminalise the practice and not just to forbid it. The MB 
parliamentarians vehemently opposed this proposal, arguing that the state is not mandated 
under Islamic law to prohibit and impose penalty on an action permitted in Islam, adding that 
there is no consensus among Muslim scholars that this proposal met the interest of the 
Muslim community; this ignored the positions taken by many scholars in Egypt, including 
the mufti and the leadership of al-Azhar. They repeated the assumption that what they 
consider ‘the Sunni’ FGM is not harmful to women and is necessary to preserve their 
chastity. In their opposition to the Child Law, Amir al-Shamakh (2010:77-78) and the IICCW 
(2008) quoted the statement of al-Qaradawi that FGM is permitted in Islam as long as it is 
conducted as guided by the Prophet, but ignored the rest of his reasoning: that FGM can be 
prohibited if it causes women harm.      
 
The debate on FGM escalated in post-Mubarak Egypt. Several statements from the MB and 
the Salafist al-Nour Party revealed their intention to decriminalise the practice of FGM as 
long as it was conducted under the supervision of specialised doctors (Gray 2012). In an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 See Article 242bis of the Penal Code No.58/1937 Amended by Law No.126/2008, Official Gazette no.24bis of 15 June 
2008.   
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interview with al-Majd Islamist Satellite Channel, the leader of the Da'wa  Department, Abd 
al-Khaliq Sharif (2011) strongly criticised the criminalisation of FGM and urged the new 
parliament to review this alongside other laws which according to him undermine the values 
of the Muslim family. International and Egyptian media reported that mobile health Clinics in 
Upper Egypt organised by FJP offered medical operations with nominal fees for male and 
female genital circumcision (Badran 2013). The MB and FJP denied this news but Tadros 
(2012b) investigated the incident and provided evidence for its occurrence, including a copy 
of the flyer of this campaign with the logo of FJP.  
 
As a reaction, a coalition of human rights groups, revolutionary youth coalitions, liberal and 
leftist parties and public figures including doctors condemned in May 2012 any 
parliamentary attempts to modify the Penal Code to decriminalise the practice of FGM, 
noting that the Child Law was backed by the official religious establishment before its 
promulgation in 2008, and reminding the public of the dangerous physical and psychological 
implications of FGM. For its part, dar al-ifta’ (2013) reiterated its support for the 
criminalisation of FGM. The constitutionality of Article 242 of the Penal Code that 
criminalises FGM had been challenged before the SCC in 2008 by Sheikh Yusuf al-Badri, an 
Islamist lawyer and former member of the MB. In February 2013, the Court found the case 
inadmissible for procedural reasons 338  but in its report to the Court, the SCC’s 
Commissioners Panel defended the compatibility between this article and Islamic law, 
repeating the arguments made previously by the Supreme Administrative Court and citing the 
opinions of senior jurists at al-Azhar and dar al-ifta’ (Egyptian Centre for Economic and 
Social Rights 2013).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 Supreme Constitutional Court, Case No.289/31, 3 February 2013, Official Gazette no.6bis of 12 February 2013, pp.32-39.    
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4. Conclusion    
A systematic analysis of the place of women in MB thought and practice explains why the 
political rise of the group in post-Mubarak Egypt dismayed women’s rights advocates. These 
concerns have proven to be particularly well-founded over the past three years. Perhaps, it is 
the MB’s position on the human rights of women that best shows the regressive agenda of the 
group towards human rights. Through its literature and political activism, the group has 
firmly challenged the idea of gender equality and obstructed the expansion of women’s rights 
in Egypt. The continuous association between women’s rights with foreign conspiracy and 
cultural invasion has undermined any constructive engagement with women rights’ advocates 
on solutions for the considerable problems faced by women in Egypt.  
 
This chapter has shown that the MB has tended to opt for the most conservative juristic views 
on the status of women in society, having not even drawn on its scholars to review its 
hardline positions on child marriage and FGM. What is striking is that the group has lagged 
behind the state and its institutions when it comes to women’s rights. The limited reforms 
taken by the state to ameliorate the status of women in the family has been dismissed by the 
MB, even though these reforms have been supported by the official Islamic establishment in 
Egypt and can be justified by traditional Islamic law. This trend has been reinforced in post-
Mubarak era, with intentions to reverse these reforms. The theoretical emphasis made by the 
group in its official documents on ijtihad and the flexibility of Islamic law, has not been 
translated into practical positions. One cannot track any progress in its official positions on 
women except the issue of women’s participation in public life, and even this has been 
subjected to certain qualifications. 
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The MB is certainly part of the problem of the realisation of gender equality in Egypt, but 
there are other institutional and political barriers that have complicated the tasks of women’s 
rights advocates. The discourses of the official religious establishment and the judiciary, 
despite being more advanced than the discourses of the MB, are not supportive of full 
equality between men and women, or even for further legal reforms similar to ones adopted 
in Tunisia or Morocco. The task is huge for feminists, women’s rights advocates and human 
rights defenders in general, who strive to construct coherent approaches to the relationship 
between Islamic law and women’s rights, and at the same time enlarge the social bases for 
their advocacy. Their advocacy agenda will, however, remain constrained and can be easily 
reversed, if they do not challenge the paradigm of Islamic law as the state law, and the 
methodological assumptions of traditional Islamic law.                  
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
 
1.  Explaining the Conservative Face of the MB 
This thesis has explored the development of the MB’s positions on Islamic law and 
international human rights. The MB is an old and major Islamist movement that has been 
active in Egypt and the Muslim and non-Muslim world. This thesis has gone beyond abstract 
enquiry about Islam and human rights, and focused on theories and practices of an Islamist 
movement in specific political contexts. Previous scholarship has compellingly argued that 
Islamic law and human rights discourses in Muslim societies are contingent upon an 
interactive web of changing socio-political conditions. Islamist movements are among the 
key players who contribute to the making of these discourses.    
 
During the 2000s, many scholars have argued that a moderate version of Islamism has been 
growing in the Muslim world. Moderate Islamists, according to them, could become a driving 
force to gradually legitimate democracy and human rights in Muslim and Arab societies, 
many of which have been ruled for decades under repressive authoritarian regimes. The 
reason for calling these Islamists moderate has been their commitment to engaging in 
peaceful political processes and their openness to plural democratic politics. Much academic 
attention was given to the MB in Egypt to explore whether the group could accommodate 
democracy. At that time, the debates on constitutional and political reforms were intense in 
Egypt, and many other Arab countries and Islamists actively engaged in these debates. The 
MB deployed the language of human rights, citizenship and democracy in its documents and 
political activism, and sent assurances to domestic and international actors that it could be a 
trusted partner in a democratic process, and that its activism aimed to free Egypt from 
authoritarianism.  
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Being influenced by this optimistic trend on moderate Islamism, my initial hypothesis in this 
thesis was that a major Islamist movement like the MB might contribute to the development 
of human rights-friendly interpretations of Islamic law. I systematically examined the MB’s 
literature and its practices to test this hypothesis. During my work on this thesis, I was able to 
witness the MB in two different political settings: as an influential opposition group under 
Mubarak, and following his decline, a political party in power (until the removal of President 
Morsi by the military in July 2013). My main conclusion in this thesis is that the MB has 
exacerbated rather than solved tensions between Islamic law and international human rights. 
In the preceding chapters, I have concluded that the organisation and its scholars have drawn 
on hardline juristic opinions and reinvented certain concepts from Islamic traditions in ways 
that limit the scope of international human rights, and advocate for Islamic alternatives. I 
have also concluded that a peaceful management of political and religious diversity in society 
will be hard to realise under the MB’s model of a shari‘a state.  
 
The MB’s human rights records, while in opposition and in power, have been mostly 
consistent with its literature. In opposition, it embraced human rights language in its struggle 
against an authoritarian regime but advocated for broad restrictions on freedom of expression, 
rights of religious minorities, religious freedom and women’s rights. The MB’s short-lived 
experience in power provides evidence for its inclination to reinforce restrictions on religious 
freedom, freedom of expression, association and rights of religious minorities and reverse 
previous reforms related to women’s rights. I have been also critical of the MB’s central 
theory that shari‘a should enjoys a superior status in the state. According to this model, which 
can be called the ‘Islamic state’, ‘shari‘a state’ or ‘civil state with Islamic background’, the 
constitution should contain a stipulation that Islamic law is the state law and that the state, 
through its executive, legislature and judiciary, are entrusted with the application of shari‘a in 
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society. As noted above, it will be difficult to peacefully manage diversity in society under 
this model, as the experience in Egypt after Mubarak well demonstrates.  
 
 
Throughout its history, the MB has mostly engaged the spectrum of the state, politics and law 
to try to achieve what it considers a revival of Islam. For the MB, the constitution, law and 
tools of governance are means to preserve Islamic identity and restore shari‘a. The MB and 
its scholars have been overwhelmed by what has been called by Abu-Odeh (2013:21) ‘the 
identity regulative project’, which has guided the MB’s performance in opposition and in 
power. In other words, the MB has failed to strike a balance between its legitimate right to 
defend what it considers to be Muslims’ communal identity, and the rights of others Muslims 
and non-Muslims to live according to their beliefs without coercion or persecution. The MB’s 
story in Egypt tells us that when Islamists fail to build the confidence of religious minorities 
and non-Islamist forces and exclude those who do not concede to its Islamist worldview, they 
motivate their opponents to exclude them in return. This may explain why many liberals, 
leftists and member of religious minorities protested against the MB and then supported the 
military’s removal of Morsi in July 2013.             
  
I have observed throughout this research that the evolution of the MB’s literature has been 
slow and limited. The MB and its scholars have tended to conform to views and theories 
developed by its early founders in most of the human rights issues addressed in this thesis, 
without critical engagement. The organisation has also disregarded the progressive views 
established by prominent scholars like al-Qaradawi on issues such as FGM, child marriage or 
the political rights of women and non-Muslims. Since its establishment, the thrust to build a 
strong organisation and large social base has pushed the MB and its leaders to focus their 
efforts on recruitment and mobilisation, drawing on general reactionary slogans such as the 
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protection of Islamic identity, the return of Islamic state and the application of shari‘a. In 
response to its continuous confrontation with the state since Nasser, the MB has been keen to 
maintain its organisational structure and social base rather than engage in intellectual 
reflection or self-criticism. According to many scholars, the hierarchal and closed 
organisational structure of the MB does not allow its members and leaders to engage in self-
criticism or revisit the general intellectual doctrines of the group (Trager 2012; Kandil 2015; 
Al-Anani 2013). Throughout the history of the MB, disciplinary actions have been taken 
against critical voices in the organisation. This prompted an Egyptian scholar with close ties 
with the MB to argue that organisational restructuring and institutional democracy inside the 
MB is an integral component of its reform, alongside changing its value system (Al-Anani 
2013).    
 
One can also argue that the socio-political environment in Egypt has maintained the MB’s 
conservatism rather than motivating the group to renew its thought. This environment has 
allowed the MB and Islamists in general to mobilise the public along religious lines. Religion, 
religious law and the religious establishment have influenced laws in Egypt in different forms 
and intensity since the beginning of its modern legal system. The separation between state 
and religion and religious reform has never been on the agenda of successive rulers and key 
political forces under and after colonialism. We have seen in the preceding chapters that the 
MB, successive Egyptian governments, the judiciary and the religious establishment have 
shared conservative views on many human rights issues such as freedom of expression, the 
rights of religious minorities, and religious freedom. The MB has lagged behind the state and 
its institutions on women’s rights, but they all share the general idea that gender relations are 
based on complementarity not equality.  
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The political vacuum caused by the decline of pan-Arab nationalism and socialism in the 
1970s, was filled by Islamists who became the most organised political force in the country 
until the removal of Mubarak. By the inclusion of Islamic law as ‘a source of legislation’ in 
the 1971 Constitution and then as ‘the main source of legislation’ in 1980, former President 
Sadat established what is called ‘liberal legalism with Islamist accommodation’ (Abu-Odeh 
2013:12), which continues to define Egypt’s legal system until today. After Mubarak, liberals 
and leftists were critical of Islamists’ domination over the constitution-making process and 
rejected the reinforcement of the role of religion and Islamic law in the new constitution. 
However, most of them had no option but to accept the reference to Islamic law in the new 
constitution, as was the case for the 1971 Constitution (Abu-Odeh 2013:6-7). Moreover, after 
Mubarak, the main political block that was ready to compete with the MB and win grounds in 
its Islamist constituency was not liberal or leftist forces but the ultra-conservative Salafists. 
The rise of Salafists in the post-Mubarak era drove the MB to reinforce its conservative 
outlook to counter their influence. This explains why the MB agreed to include in the 2012 
Constitution a conservative explanation of the principles of Islamic law (Article 219) and the 
consultative role of al-Azhar in the law-making process (Article 4) despite its previous 
support of the SCC as the authoritative interpretative body of Islamic law.   
 
2. Prospects for Transformation  
In chapters two and three, I argued that human rights provide states with a viable means of 
peaceful coexistence between individuals of different religious, sexual, ethnic, linguistic, 
social and political backgrounds. Using the expressions of Rawls (2005), human rights can be 
considered an outcome of an overlapping consensus to establish a well-ordered and stable 
society. Religious diversity is a salient feature in most societies today. People subscribe to 
different religious beliefs and philosophies. Diversity even exists within the same religious 
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community. The ability of a state that explicitly defines itself as the guardian of certain 
religious doctrines to inclusively and peacefully manage this diversity is questionable.  
 
The experience in Egypt shows that many Muslims and non-Muslims and particularly 
minorities have felt that their rights as equal citizens are not secure under a reference to 
Islamic law in the constitution. This reference has resulted in an open-ended contestation 
over the interpretation of rights and the state’s compliance with international human rights 
treaties. It has legitimised demands made by political actors in opposition or in power to limit 
the scope of certain rights, reverse previous reforms and reject international treaties on the 
assumption that they violate religious law. Even though Egypt’s Constitutions have contained 
sections on human rights, a constitutional provision on Islamic law in each has limited the 
scope of other provisions on constitutional rights. This contestation, which is based on 
religious arguments, undermines an objective assessment of the merits of the respect for these 
rights in society.  The final interpretation of the meaning of Islamic law is delegated to 
judicial or religious organs in the state, which claim that their opinions on contentious issues, 
are authentic manifestations of Islam.      
 
The shari‘a state presents a model of identification between state and religion, and not just a 
state’s symbolic establishment with religion. In the Islamic state, Islamic law and values 
define the scope of citizenship rights and the different areas of public policies. This model 
risks alienating religious minorities, secularists, atheists and dissident Muslims. I have 
discussed that according to the MB, political pluralism is only permitted in the state as long 
as all political parties and association admit to the rule of shari‘a. They can be declared 
hostile to the state, heretics or apostates if they call for separation between state and religion, 
or challenge the foundations of Islamic law as defined by the state. Moreover, I have 
explained in this thesis that Islamists' advocacy for the application of shari‘a has been a cause 
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of polarisation and divisions along religious lines, becoming a source of hate and violence 
between Islamists and non-Islamists and between Muslims and other religious minorities.339 
Learning from transitional experiences in Egypt and other Arab Spring countries, this thesis 
invites Islamists and non-Islamists to assess the implications of reducing their political 
debates to 'a religious-centric debate'. Yet there are risks. Sultany (2014:411) warns that this 
reductionism is most likely to 'overshadow and distract attention from a myriad of issues like 
social and economic issues as well as other questions of constitutional design concerned with 
political structures and institutions'.  
 
My theoretical preference in this thesis has been for the removal of shar‘ia from the 
constitution and the establishment of the impartiality of the state towards religion in a secular 
state that establishes a set of constitutional and institutional arrangements to manage religious 
diversity in society. This meaning of secularism is different from other forms of aggressive or 
exclusionary secularism that aggravate tension, divisiveness and alienate religious people 
(Bilgin 2011:57-59; An-Na‘im 2008:39-43). The secular state that I advocate for is the one 
that ‘is able to unite diverse communities of belief and practice into one political community 
precisely because the moral claims it makes are limited and thus unlikely to be the source of 
serious disagreement among citizens’ (An-Na‘im 2008:276). Under this framework, religious 
actors can still contribute to political life by proposing policies whose merits are evaluated in 
an open democratic process under constitutional safeguards for human rights and equal 
citizenship. Freedom of association allows religious communities to establish their 
independent forums to voluntary comply with their own religious regulations.  
 
This secular state helps ‘secure effective possibilities for preventing an exclusive and 
authoritarian religious group from threatening the essential interests of any segment of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 On this point, see also Sultany (2014:405-410).  
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population’ (An-Na‘im 2008:275). To establish this institutional arrangement, social and 
political forces including Islamists should revisit the application of Islamic law as state law 
and review certain conservative interpretation of Islamic sources. This transformation can 
build intersections between religious actors and the human rights movement. Religious actors 
will not be seen a threat to the expansion of human rights in society. At the same time, human 
rights defenders need to be open towards religion and religious actors, and acknowledge their 
potential contribution to the legitimation and evolution of human rights in their societies.   
 
 
However, the transformation of the state-religion relationship is not likely to occur in the near 
future in Egypt. Political developments over the past five years also suggest that this 
contentious and divisive issue cannot be settled in a way that excludes any of the political 
forces involved in the transition, whether Islamists or non-Islamists. Weiner (2011:10) warns 
against a situation in which ‘factions are essentially seeking to use the constitution making 
process to defeat, in an irrevocable fashion, those whose interests and visions for the future 
differ from theirs’. The risk in this zero-sum approach, according to Weiner (2011:12), is that 
it turns ‘the losing faction into a permanent opposition group and ultimately a source of 
political instability’. Islamists’ domination over the 2012 constitution-making process, and 
their exclusionary policies, turned non-Islamists, secularists and religious minorities into a 
permanent opposition for the MB and mobilised the public for its removal from power. The 
military intervened and ousted President Morsi in July 2013. Anti-MB forces drafted an 
amended version of the 2012 Constitution,340 while the MB and other opposition groups were 
being excluded and repressed. The MB and its political party were dissolved and thousands 
of its members have since been detained and prosecuted. However, the MB refused to admit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 See Amended Constitution of Egypt, 18 January 2014, Official Gazette no.3bis of 18 January 2014.  
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this new political and constitutional, order and has strongly continued its resistance of the 
new military-backed regime.        
 
I argue that the exclusion of Islamists is not a durable solution, for many reasons. Islamists 
still represent considerable sectors in society; even without the MB, political Islam is still 
rooted in Egypt  and there are other Islamist movements positioned to rise. Moreover, the 
exclusion and repression of Islamists may fuel violence and radicalisation among their 
supporters (Dunne and Williamson 2014).341 For example, there have been signs that some 
young members of the MB are less hesitant to consider the use of violence against the state in 
response to repression (El-Hudaiby 2013:3; Al-Anani 2015). Repressive authorities have also 
used Islamists’ threats as an excuse to repress other non-Islamist critics and disrupt 
democratic transitions, including in recent years (Filiu 2015). The post-Morsi military-backed 
regime has steadily expanded the scope of repression by imposing increasing restrictions on 
freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and freedom of association, not only to stifle the 
MB and Morsi’s supporters, but other liberal and leftists political forces and human rights 
defenders (Dunne 2015). Most importantly, as I have shown, Islamists are not the only actors 
who are ambivalent about human rights or defending a constitutional role for Islamic law. 
Even after the removal of Morsi and the exclusion of the MB, the reference to Islamic law as 
‘the main source of legislation’ was kept in the amended Constitution.342  
 
 
Therefore, in order to protect human rights and democracy in Egypt, the answer is not to 
exclude Islamists but help to gradually transform their ideas. Drawing on the incremental 
approach suggested by Weiner (2011:9), any future settlement for the current political crisis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 According to Dalacoura (2011), repression and exclusion may motivate some Islamists to join militant groups. However, 
they are not necessarily the primary cause for Islamist violence.   
342 Article 2, ibid.  
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in Egypt requires relations between Islamists and non-Islamists to be based on ‘a vision of a 
mutually bearable shared future [under which] each parties feel that they would enjoy a 
reasonably tolerable existence if the other side’s basic aspirations were realised’. Writing 
about Islamists parties and democracy two years before Arab uprisings, Masoud (2008:19) 
argued that ‘instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats, our goal should be to 
help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group – Islamist or 
otherwise – can subvert them’. This goal needs to be considered by those actors involved in 
transitions underway in the Arab world. In the following, I propose certain constitutional and 
institutional measures to facilitate an evolutionary interpretation of Islamic law, provide a 
baseline of human rights and gradually integrate international human rights into domestic law.  
 
1.2 A Baseline of Constitutional Rights 
A careful design of a constitutional bill of rights may help contain the negative influence of 
the shari‘a clause on human rights. The aim of this proposal is to ensure ‘a vision of a 
mutually bearable shared future’ between different communities in Egyptian society through 
a progressive realisation of human rights. The reference to Islamic law as a fundamental 
demand for Islamist could be kept in the constitution. However, Islamists need to 
acknowledge the legitimate concerns of religious minorities, women, secularists and non-
Islamists. The main task of this bill of rights is to establish a minimum agreement on basic 
rights that are necessary for stability in a diverse society. The negotiations on this are not 
expected to address all potential tensions between the constitutional provision on Islamic law 
and human rights however, and the scope of constitutional rights can gradually expand 
through judicial interpretation or emerging consensus among different political forces.  
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However, I suggest that this bill of rights clearly stipulate that the implementation or 
interpretation of the constitutional provision on Islamic law should aim to further the 
protection of constitutional rights and not to undermine any progress achieved in this area. 
This could open possibilities for expanding the scope of many constitutional rights such as 
women’s rights, freedom of expression and religious freedom. This provision is also 
proposed to challenge attempts made by conservative forces who wish to undermine progress 
in the implementation of constitutional rights. For example, proposals to reverse previous 
reforms aimed to improve the status of women in family, exclude non-Muslims or women 
from public posts or impose criminal penalty for apostasy are most likely to be dismissed by 
this suggested provision.       
 
2.2 Interpretation of Islamic Law Provisions 
Throughout its history, the SCC has drawn on its flexible Islamic legal theory to expand the 
scope of many human rights, particularly the rights of women. The SCC was able to counter 
many of the conservative positions taken by Islamists, and this legal theory may allow the 
Court in the future to expand human rights in Egypt. In order not to block the SCC’s 
prospects to further develop its Islamic legal theories in the future, it is better if the 
constitution does not oblige its judges to follow specific interpretative methods as was the 
case in Article 219 of the 2012 Constitution or as stipulated now by the 2014 amended 
Constitution, which requires the Court to be limited by its previous jurisprudence.343  
 
The liberal jurisprudence of the SCC can also be disrupted if conservative forces succeed in 
reformulating its membership. As noted by Sultany (2014:420): [Shari‘a] clause may . . . 
politicise the constitutional court by making it an object for power struggle between different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 See the Preamble of the Amended Constitution of Egypt, 18 January 2014.  
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political actors that are trying to tip the interpretive scales to their favour through backing the 
court with their preferred judges'. Therefore, a key aspect in the consolidation of the SCC is 
the development of constitutional and legal safeguards for its independence, and a transparent 
appointment mechanism for its judges that involves different institutions and forces in the 
state. The interpretive authority of the SCC may be also obstructed by the influence of al-
Azhar. Under the MB, the 2012 Constitution obliged the Parliament to consult al-Azhar on 
legalisation related to Islamic law, and while the 2014 amended Constitution removed this 
provision, it also upgraded the power of al-Azhar as ‘an authority in Islamic sciences and 
affairs’. 344  Even without these constitutional provisions, al-Azhar historically enjoys a 
symbolic and moral authority among Muslims in Egypt. The support of al-Azhar’s leadership 
for Islamic law reform and the expansion of human rights would further the legitimacy of the 
SCC. 
 
3.2 Integration of International Human Rights into Domestic Law 
Heyns and Viljoen (2001:522) have concluded that: ‘Treaties need a strong domestic 
constituency to have local impact’. Judges, lawyers and human rights defenders are among 
these domestic actors that can enhance the impact of international human rights treaties. I 
propose that the integration of international human rights with domestic law can be realised 
by upgrading the status of international human rights treaties in the legal system, and 
consolidating the engagement of NGOs and human rights defenders with international and 
regional human rights mechanisms. While the ratification of these treaties are not expected to 
bring about immediate human rights changes, they can help in the long term to integrate 
international human rights in domestic law and enhance NGOs’ domestic and international 
advocacy on human rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Ropp 1999; Risse et al 2013).  	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 It has become a well-established constitutional principle in Egypt that international treaties, 
which are signed and ratified by the Egyptian authorities, are considered domestic legislation 
after their publication in The Official Gazette.345 According to this system, ‘treaties are 
equivalent to statutes; they rank lower than the Constitution’ (Sloss 2011:8). Egyptian 
lawyers can invoke international human rights treaties before courts, and in some important 
precedents, judges integrated international human rights treaties in their reasoning (Zartner 
2014:145-148) (see chapters five and seven). To support these judicial precedents, 
comparative constitutional law provides for several scenarios to upgrade the status of 
international human rights treaties in the legal system (Bilkova et al 2014). For example, the 
constitution can encourage judges to consider human rights treaties and the jurisprudence of 
international and regional human rights judicial and semi-judicial organs in their 
interpretation of constitutional rights. One can refer in this regard to the Constitution of South 
Africa which requests judges to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights.346 Lifting shari‘a-based reservations to international human rights treaties ratified by 
Egypt, particularly those to the ICCPR and CEDAW, may also gradually harmonise domestic 
laws with the provisions of these treaties. However, this step does not guarantee their 
implementation on the domestic level, since the reference to shari‘a remains in the 
constitution.  
 
The externalisation of human rights demands has allowed Egyptian human rights defenders 
to energise domestic debates about them (Landolt 2013). I have discussed in this thesis that 
the development of the international women’s rights movement over the past three decades 
has empowered women’s rights defenders to advocate for personal status law reforms. Yet 
there are currently limited options for international human rights litigation. Egypt has not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 See Art 151 of Constitution of Egypt, 12 September 1971, Art 145 of Constitution of Egypt, 25 December 2012 and Art 
151 of the Amended Constitution of Egypt, 18 January 2014.  
346 See S. 39(1) of Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, National Gazette no.17678, 18 December 1996.    
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ratified the Optional Protocols to the ICCPR and CEDAW which provide the HRC and 
CEDAW Committee with the competence to examine individual complaints of alleged 
violations of both treaties.347 The African human rights system has been striving to positively 
add to the international human rights regime in spite of its lack of resources and the lack of 
political support from many African governments (Steiner et al. 2008:1063; Bentekas and 
Oette 2013:261-262). Egypt ratified the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on 
20 March 1984.348 Over the last decade, Egyptian human rights advocates have filed 
complaints before the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (African 
Commission) against the Egyptian government.349 Egypt can also sign and ratify the Protocol 
to the Establishment of the African Court on Human and People’s Rights. The African Court 
officially started its work in November 2006.350 It examines cases submitted individuals and 
NGOs petitions related to states’ violations of ‘the charter or any other relevant human rights 
instruments ratified by the states concerned.351    
 
However, the success of these constitutional and institutional safeguards is contingent upon 
the presence of a wide social base for human rights in society, which in itself represents a key 
safeguard against conservative political forces. Finally, this thesis concludes that the activism 
of the MB in Egypt is among the factors that have obstructed Islamic law reform and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347 See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December, entered into 
force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 302 and Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (adopted 6 October 1999, entered into force 22 December 2000) 2131UNTS 83.  
348 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 
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Rights, Communication No.244/2011. This case was filed on behalf of a group of human rights defenders who faced charges 
related to their human rights activism. EIPR and Interights v. Egypt, Communication No.334/2006.  In this case the 
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expansion of human rights. Future research on Islamists’ discourses and the evolution of 
Islamist movements in different political contexts may highlight other models in the 
interaction between Islamists and human rights.  
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